Improve program oversight and accountability by formalizing processes to routinely evaluate and ensure special deputations comply with policies, procedures, and guidance, as well as by implementing controls that ensure any exceptions are appropriate and documented consistently.

Develop and implement policy and procedures for documenting the reason for the lapse and the decision regarding TFO participation or restrictions on participation on USMS operational activities.

Improve current processes and implement controls within the USMS's case management system to consistently identify TFO investigative activity and ensure accountability and oversight of deputized TFOs.

Enhance its management of TFO misconduct allegations by: (a) reinforcing the policy requirement for reporting misconduct allegations to the USMS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and OIG; (b) developing and implementing a policy regarding the utilization of a TFO who has an active misconduct allegation; and (c) implementing a process to document and track the status and outcome of all TFO misconduct investigations, when appropriate, to support decisions regarding a TFO's retention of special deputation authority.

Develop policies, procedures, and controls to manage court security officer (CSO) special deputations. During the development of this framework, the USMS should ensure the Judicial Security Division (JSD) takes into consideration relevant USMS requirements and processes for all other special deputations, including any updates that are made as a result of this audit.

Update its policy for reporting CSO misconduct to establish stronger controls that better ensure both USMS OPR and the DOJ OIG receive relevant and appropriate information.

Evaluate and update its guidance to the USMS on special deputations to clarify requirements for Department review and approval of special deputation requests.

Work with the relevant components to better align metrics across the Department and to determine what metrics for the ransomware threat, including metrics tracking disruption efforts, are most impactful, and which demonstrate the effectiveness of its actions to combat the ransomware threat.

Assess the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) implementation of the deconfliction policy, for ransomware cases, to ensure that federal prosecutors have a consistent understanding of the policy and comply with its requirements.

Implement sufficient controls to ensure all incidents involving an imminent or ongoing threat of sexual and/or physical abuse or exploitation of a child or adult are handled within 24 hours as required.

Implement sufficient controls to ensure FBI employees responsible for notifying victims and providing victim services become aware of all eligible federal crime victims, notify and offer services to these victims, and document victim notifications and services offered to victims in the investigative case file.

Enhance its monitoring of leads to ensure that leads are covered timely and appropriately.

Develop an enterprise-wide strategy that addresses the rising number of crimes against children and human trafficking (CAC/HT) cases and ensures CAC/HT agents have appropriate support and resources to manage their assigned caseloads.

Revise its procedures to ensure all electronic storage media containing sensitive or classified information, including hard drives that are extracted from computers slated for destruction, are appropriately accounted for, tracked, timely sanitized, and destroyed.

Implement controls to ensure its electronic storage media are marked with the appropriate National Security Information (NSI) classification level markings, in accordance with applicable policies and guidelines.

Coordinate with MHMR to ensure that the matching requirement is met.

As DOJ policy does not address what information Department personnel may include in a statement that is determined to be necessary to reassure the public that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or to protect public safety, we recommend that the Department revise this policy to require that the information contained in a statement released pursuant to JM 1-7.400(C) be reasonably necessary either to reassure the public that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or to protect public safety.

We recommend that the Department make clear whether the Justice Manual's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy, Justice Manual 1-7.000, applies to the Attorney General.

We recommend that the Department clarify its policies to address whether any of the provisions of 28 C.F.R. 50.2 remain Department policy in light of the existence of the Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy contained in the Justice Manual.

If 28 C.F.R. 50.2(b)(9) remains valid Department policy, we recommend that the Department require that requests to the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General for approval to release information otherwise prohibited from disclosure and any approval to release such information pursuant to 50.2(b)(9) be documented.

We recommend that the Department consider revising its White House communications policy to clarify what information can be disclosed to the White House in situations where the policy permits communication about a contemplated or pending civil or criminal investigation.

Require the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) to perform a formal evaluation of the personnel and financial resources required to meet anticipated future demand for Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) services and provide the results to FBI executive leadership. In response to this evaluation, FBI executive leadership should determine whether to allocate the personnel and financial resources, and/or potentially leverage other similar programs and activities within the FBI, necessary to meet ViCAP's anticipated needs.

Develop a comprehensive strategic plan for ViCAP that accounts for both the resources available to ViCAP and also the anticipated short-term and long-term changes in demand for ViCAP's services. This plan should specifically identify necessary improvements to ViCAP's information technology and quality control functions.

Using the strategic plan developed in response to Recommendation 2, establish and maintain comprehensive and meaningful performance metrics, including a mechanism for capturing and evaluating customer feedback, program reach, and active participation, to better assess the value and effectiveness of ViCAP.

Ensure that there is a process for employees to file a retaliation claim with the OIG when a security clearance review or suspension lasts longer than 1 year

Analyze whether and under what circumstances its policies permit identifying and removing sensitive items from a crime scene, whether the crime scene is managed by the FBI or another law enforcement agency, particularly following an agent- or officer-involved shooting;

Develop guidelines for identifying and removing sensitive items, including appropriate documentation requirements and standards for involvement by agents involved in or witnesses to a shooting

Conduct training of FBI HRT and SWAT units to ensure that these standards are consistently implemented and followed.

Ensure the Ohio AG revises its financial policies and procedures to help ensure adequate administration of federal award funds and that all relevant personnel are aware of these policies. In particular, the financial policies and procedures should cover, at a minimum: (1) completing appropriate Subgrant Award Report (SAR) submissions; (2) drawdown-related reconciliation procedures, which ensure that funds are spent or returned to DOJ within 10 days of being drawn down; and (3) matching cost reporting on Federal Financial Reports (FFR) to help ensure the information reported is reconciled to supporting data, reviewed by appropriate personnel, and that data supporting the amounts reported is maintained.

Ensure the Ohio AG develops a mechanism to complete subrecipient monitoring timely and in accordance with its policy.