[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

Continue to recruit and retain individuals with relevant financial management and/or accounting skills, train, as well as cross-train existing resources on financial management standards, concepts, policies, and procedures.

Enhance controls for the Department and the components to identify, analyze, and respond to risks and/or significant changes to operations and financial reporting processes.

Enhance controls for the Department and the components to monitor and evaluate the design and effectiveness of existing controls and enhance communication between the Department and components.

Enhance monitoring capabilities related to existing deficiencies to address existing design deficiencies and improve operating effectiveness of the related controls in a timely manner. Specifically, management should consider a baseline (current year) assessment and compare against management's design (future state) of the internal control system to address the objectives and risks of the Department.

Complete the Analytical Framework for Emerging and Disruptive Technology (AFEDT) process to ascertain its AI needs and identify specific ways it can use AI to improve intelligence collection and analysis.

That the FBI assess the processes and procedures it uses to prepare for events that it determines present potential domestic security issues-but have not been designated as NSSE or SEAR events by DHS-to ensure that its processes and procedures set forth with clarity the division of responsibilities between and within the relevant FBI field office and FBI headquarters; clearly define a mechanism for making a formal determination whether and what kind of a nationwide intelligence and CHS canvass is necessary and appropriate under FBI policies; and provide sufficient guidance to ensure that relevant intelligence can be timely shared among the relevant FBI components and with non-FBI stakeholders.

In order for senior leadership to be able to consider and decide matters potentially raising constitutional separation of powers issues, we recommend that the Department evaluate when advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General, should be required before compulsory process is issued, and any corresponding NDOs are sought, for records of a Member of Congress or congressional staffers and establish, as necessary, implementing policies and guidance.

We recommend that the Department consider whether there are circumstances in which an exhaustion requirement should be a prerequisite for issuing compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress and congressional staffers.

Remedy $198,099 in unsupported subaward expenditures.

Remedy $24,464 in unallowable questioned costs related to excess administrative expenditures beyond the 5-percent allowance charged to the 2018 award.

Remedy $16,168 in unsupported questioned costs related to non-personnel administrative costs.

Remedy $196,776 in unallowable questioned costs related to excess drawdowns for the 2018 award.

Coordinate with West Virginia JCS to ensure FFRs are accurate and supported by accounting records going forward.

Ensure that the DEA enforces its policy requirement for Special Agents and Task Force Officers to timely complete the DEA-177 Consensual Encounter Form for each consensual encounter, and ensure that required data is being entered.

Ensure that the DEA fully implements appropriate transportation interdiction training that meets the purpose and intent of the OIG's prior recommendations, incorporates DOJ guidance, and addresses the concerns identified in the DEA Office of Training's report that led the DEA to suspend its Jetway training in April 2023.a. Once implemented, ensure that the DEA enforces its policy requirement for Special Agents and Task Force Officers participating in drug interdiction units at mass transportation facilities to complete transportation interdiction training.b. Assess whether the DEA should provide additional training to DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers who previously received Jetway training.

Assess whether the DEA's repeated payment of a percentage of cash forfeitures to transportation company employees, based on tips leading to seizures, over a period of years, is consistent with the Limited Use Confidential Source category and appropriate under Department of Justice policy.

Assess whether the DEA, in connection with its interdiction efforts at mass transportation facilities, should permit, outside the context of a predicated investigation, cash rewards to private company employees for regularly providing, over an extended period, potentially private consumer data without their employer's knowledge and without any legal process.

Consider whether to direct the Department of Justice law enforcement components to expand their body-worn camera policies to require the use of body-worn cameras during pre-planned consensual encounters with travelers at mass transportation facilities.

Prohibit participation in transportation interdiction activities at mass transportation facilities by DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers who have not received appropriate training.

Update the policy on "Consensual Encounters Conducted at Mass Transportation Facilities" in the DEA Agents Manual to provide additional consensual encounter guidance regarding transportation interdiction activities.

Provide additional training or guidance on the DEA-177 Consensual Encounter Form to ensure that DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers understand the importance of the form and how to complete it accurately. Update fields or instructions on the form, if needed.

Determine whether transportation interdiction activities and the use of confidential sources for this purpose are an effective use of law enforcement resources, and assess whether the benefits of these actions outweigh the potential legal risks.

Revise USMS Policy Directive 17.11 to reflect the accurate statutory language for the USMS's Title 18 law enforcement authority.

In consultation with the Department, update policies and procedures to reduce the risks of providing special deputation authority to ineligible or inappropriate applicants and ensure that USMS special deputations are only granted for allowable Title 18 purposes. These updates should clarify requirements and strengthen controls to better ensure reasonable and appropriate sponsorships, justifications, law enforcement authorities, eligibility, and timeframes for special deputations.

Implement formal training for the Special Deputation Program (SDP) to effectively oversee the special deputation process and appropriately grant Title 18 law enforcement authority.