Ensure that the DEA enforces its policy requirement for Special Agents and Task Force Officers to timely complete the DEA-177 Consensual Encounter Form for each consensual encounter, and ensure that required data is being entered.

Ensure that the DEA fully implements appropriate transportation interdiction training that meets the purpose and intent of the OIG's prior recommendations, incorporates DOJ guidance, and addresses the concerns identified in the DEA Office of Training's report that led the DEA to suspend its Jetway training in April 2023.a. Once implemented, ensure that the DEA enforces its policy requirement for Special Agents and Task Force Officers participating in drug interdiction units at mass transportation facilities to complete transportation interdiction training.b. Assess whether the DEA should provide additional training to DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers who previously received Jetway training.

Assess whether the DEA's repeated payment of a percentage of cash forfeitures to transportation company employees, based on tips leading to seizures, over a period of years, is consistent with the Limited Use Confidential Source category and appropriate under Department of Justice policy.

Assess whether the DEA, in connection with its interdiction efforts at mass transportation facilities, should permit, outside the context of a predicated investigation, cash rewards to private company employees for regularly providing, over an extended period, potentially private consumer data without their employer's knowledge and without any legal process.

Consider whether to direct the Department of Justice law enforcement components to expand their body-worn camera policies to require the use of body-worn cameras during pre-planned consensual encounters with travelers at mass transportation facilities.

Prohibit participation in transportation interdiction activities at mass transportation facilities by DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers who have not received appropriate training.

Update the policy on "Consensual Encounters Conducted at Mass Transportation Facilities" in the DEA Agents Manual to provide additional consensual encounter guidance regarding transportation interdiction activities.

Provide additional training or guidance on the DEA-177 Consensual Encounter Form to ensure that DEA Special Agents and Task Force Officers understand the importance of the form and how to complete it accurately. Update fields or instructions on the form, if needed.

Determine whether transportation interdiction activities and the use of confidential sources for this purpose are an effective use of law enforcement resources, and assess whether the benefits of these actions outweigh the potential legal risks.

Revise USMS Policy Directive 17.11 to reflect the accurate statutory language for the USMS's Title 18 law enforcement authority.

In consultation with the Department, update policies and procedures to reduce the risks of providing special deputation authority to ineligible or inappropriate applicants and ensure that USMS special deputations are only granted for allowable Title 18 purposes. These updates should clarify requirements and strengthen controls to better ensure reasonable and appropriate sponsorships, justifications, law enforcement authorities, eligibility, and timeframes for special deputations.

Implement formal training for the Special Deputation Program (SDP) to effectively oversee the special deputation process and appropriately grant Title 18 law enforcement authority.

Improve program oversight and accountability by formalizing processes to routinely evaluate and ensure special deputations comply with policies, procedures, and guidance, as well as by implementing controls that ensure any exceptions are appropriate and documented consistently.

Develop and implement policy and procedures for documenting the reason for the lapse and the decision regarding TFO participation or restrictions on participation on USMS operational activities.

Improve current processes and implement controls within the USMS's case management system to consistently identify TFO investigative activity and ensure accountability and oversight of deputized TFOs.

Enhance its management of TFO misconduct allegations by: (a) reinforcing the policy requirement for reporting misconduct allegations to the USMS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and OIG; (b) developing and implementing a policy regarding the utilization of a TFO who has an active misconduct allegation; and (c) implementing a process to document and track the status and outcome of all TFO misconduct investigations, when appropriate, to support decisions regarding a TFO's retention of special deputation authority.

Develop policies, procedures, and controls to manage court security officer (CSO) special deputations. During the development of this framework, the USMS should ensure the Judicial Security Division (JSD) takes into consideration relevant USMS requirements and processes for all other special deputations, including any updates that are made as a result of this audit.

Update its policy for reporting CSO misconduct to establish stronger controls that better ensure both USMS OPR and the DOJ OIG receive relevant and appropriate information.

Evaluate and update its guidance to the USMS on special deputations to clarify requirements for Department review and approval of special deputation requests.

Work with the relevant components to better align metrics across the Department and to determine what metrics for the ransomware threat, including metrics tracking disruption efforts, are most impactful, and which demonstrate the effectiveness of its actions to combat the ransomware threat.

Assess the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) implementation of the deconfliction policy, for ransomware cases, to ensure that federal prosecutors have a consistent understanding of the policy and comply with its requirements.

Implement sufficient controls to ensure all incidents involving an imminent or ongoing threat of sexual and/or physical abuse or exploitation of a child or adult are handled within 24 hours as required.

Implement sufficient controls to ensure FBI employees responsible for notifying victims and providing victim services become aware of all eligible federal crime victims, notify and offer services to these victims, and document victim notifications and services offered to victims in the investigative case file.

Enhance its monitoring of leads to ensure that leads are covered timely and appropriately.

Develop an enterprise-wide strategy that addresses the rising number of crimes against children and human trafficking (CAC/HT) cases and ensures CAC/HT agents have appropriate support and resources to manage their assigned caseloads.

Revise its procedures to ensure all electronic storage media containing sensitive or classified information, including hard drives that are extracted from computers slated for destruction, are appropriately accounted for, tracked, timely sanitized, and destroyed.

Implement controls to ensure its electronic storage media are marked with the appropriate National Security Information (NSI) classification level markings, in accordance with applicable policies and guidelines.

Coordinate with MHMR to ensure that the matching requirement is met.

As DOJ policy does not address what information Department personnel may include in a statement that is determined to be necessary to reassure the public that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or to protect public safety, we recommend that the Department revise this policy to require that the information contained in a statement released pursuant to JM 1-7.400(C) be reasonably necessary either to reassure the public that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or to protect public safety.

We recommend that the Department make clear whether the Justice Manual's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy, Justice Manual 1-7.000, applies to the Attorney General.