Review the policies and procedures of its other law enforcement components to ensure that they are sufficient to address the concerns we have identified in the conduct of Operations Wide Receiver and Fast and Furious, particular regarding oversight of sensitive and major cases, the authorization and oversight of "otherwise illegal activity," and the use of information in situations where the law enforcement component also has a regulatory function.

Establish Procedures to Track Source of Facts Provided to the Public and Congress.

Require Identification of Federal Crime as Part of Documenting Predication.

Consider Revising Attorney General's Guidelines and DIOG to Reinstate Prohibition on Retention of Irrelevant First Amendment Material from Public Events.

Clarify When First Amendment Cases Should Be Classified as "Acts of Terrorism" Matters.

Assess its discovery obligations regarding Stellar Wind-derived information in international terrorism prosecutions.

Carefully consider whether it must re-examine past cases to see whether potentially discoverable but undisclosed Rule 16 or Brady material was collected by the NSA under the program, and take appropriate steps to ensure that it has complied with its discovery obligations in such cases.

As part of the [Redacted] project, the Justice Department's National Security Division (NSD), working with the FBI, should collect information about the quantity of telephone numbers and e-mail addresses disseminated to FBI field offices that are assigned as Action leads and that require offices to conduct threat assessments.

Consistent with NSD's current oversight activities and as part of its periodic reviews of national security investigations at FBI Headquarters and field offices, NSD should review a representative sampling [Redacted] leads to those offices.

In coordination with the NSA, implement a procedure to identify Stellar Wind-derived information that may be associated with international terrorism cases currently pending or likely to be brought in the future and evaluate whether such information should be disclosed in light of the government's discovery obligations under Rule 16 and Brady.

Continue its FBI Headquarters-managed asset validation review process and provide sufficient resources for the Analytical Unit to devote to these reviews.

Require that any analytical products relating to the asset, together with red flags, derogatory reporting, anomalies, and other counterintelligence concerns be documented in a subsection of the asset's file.

Require the field SSA, the ASAC, and the FBI Headquarters SSA responsible for each asset to signify that they have reviewed the entries in this subsection as part of the routine file review or of semi-annual or annual asset re-evaluations. If anomalies exist, the SSA should note what action has been taken with respect to them, or explain why no action is necessary, and the ASAC's agreement should be noted.

Require agents to record in the asset file any documents passed and all matters discussed with the asset, as well as each person who was present for the meeting.

Require alternate case agents to meet with the source on a regular basis, together with the case agent.

Limit the number of years any Special Agent can continue as an asset's handler. Exceptions should be allowed for good cause only.