[Description omitted; CSOSA has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; CSOSA has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; CSOSA has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

Clarify officer safety-related training requirements for operational personnel, including Task Force Officers, and ensure that the requirements are clearly established in policy.

Ensure that the Training Division provides consistent and prompt assistance to those districts that do not have an assigned Tactical Training Officer.

Ensure that all Tactical Training Officers receive skills sustainment training.

Ensure that the new After-Action Review policy is implemented so that all critical incidents stemming from operations led by and/or involving U.S. Marshals Service personnel are reviewed for lessons learned and used to update and adjust officer safety-related training.

Consider including other Department of Justice law enforcement components in operational reviews of critical incidents, including but not limited to the new After-Action Review process, to allow for mutual awareness and improvements to officer safety-related training across components.

Evaluate whether modifications to training are needed to adequately cover open space encounters and to better support small teams, and, if so, develop and implement methods to ensure that training adequately addresses these.

Establish guidance and procedures for U.S. Marshals Service staff to follow in working with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement case workers to facilitate communication between family unit adults separated from associated family unit minors, especially parents in U.S. Marshals Service custody and their children in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody.

Work with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Department of Homeland Security to develop a formal interagency agreement (such as a memorandum of understanding) regarding the facilitation of communication between separated children in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody and their parents in U.S. Marshals Service custody.

Work with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Department of Homeland Security to develop a formal interagency agreement (such as a memorandum of understanding) regarding the facilitation of communication between separated children in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody and their parents in U.S. Marshals Service custody.

Ensure that its Correctional Services Manual includes policy on the required number of perimeter patrol vehicles at all types of institutions and implement a policy on the circumstances necessitating changes to the required number of perimeter patrol vehicles.

Establish a policy on the required assignment and use of Roving Alarm Notification System (RANS) hand-held radios.

Consider developing a national policy requiring institutional assessments of U.S. Penitentiaries (USP) on a prescribed, regular basis.

Improve the institutional assessment process by ensuring the Institutional Assessment Guidelines are comprehensive and include all necessary perimeter security aspects, ensuring the assessment reports are consistent in form and content, and requiring reviewed facilities to respond to any recommendations in the assessment reports.

Implement the preventative and detective internal controls over PGI (developing PGI spend plans, timely 90-day reviews, and quarterly headquarters examination of financial activity) as prescribed by the Department's Risk Mitigation Policy Memorandum, the AG FBI Undercover Guidelines, and the Agents Manual.

Formally determine whether the policies within the AG FBI Undercover Guidelines apply, in their entirety or in specific instances, to all DOJ law enforcement components; or if the Department must issue new guidance to govern undercover operations that are initiated by DOJ law enforcement components outside of the FBI.

Ensure that the DEA's policies reflect necessary measures and controls stipulated in applicable Department undercover guidance.

Establish controls that mitigate the risk of inmates communicating with unknown and un-vetted parties and take steps, including the utilization of available technological features as found in TRULINCS, to reduce the risk of mass emails being received by high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates.

Review cellblock conversation monitoring policy, procedures, and capabilities to determine whether and how improvements can be made to achieve security goals, including improvement of audio monitoring systems.

Revisit its social communication monitoring policy for high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all visits between terrorist inmates and their visitors are sufficiently monitored.

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

In conjunction with the efforts to address Recommendation Number 2, examine current field office initiatives that provide an ongoing mechanism to revisit subjects of closed assessments and investigations. This examination should identify any legal, policy, and civil liberties implications so that a decision can be made as to whether all FBI field offices should undertake similar initiatives.

Ensure that the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official cadre participates in National Level Exercises, when applicable, and ESF-13 Table Top Exercises.

Evaluate which types of Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity and raise policy considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.

Evaluate which types of Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity and raise policy considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.

Address the problems with the administration and assessment of CHSs identified in the report. (see items 4a. through 4f. on pages 415 and 416)

Ensure that appropriate training on DIOG 4 is provided to emphasize the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations and to ensure that agents account for these concerns, both in the tasking of CHSs and in the way they document interactions with and tasking of CHSs.