The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) have different investigative responsibilities. This page explains the law governing those responsibilities, and how it developed.
The OIG has broad, independent authority to investigate, audit, evaluate, or review DOJ programs and operations, including misconduct involving DOJ personnel. OPR investigates allegations about DOJ attorneys’ professional work—how they investigate cases, litigate, or provide legal advice—and related misconduct by investigators and law enforcement personnel.
Yes. DOJ attorneys are subject to OIG oversight, but whether the OIG or OPR handles an allegation depends on what the attorney is alleged to have done. Being an attorney does not place a DOJ employee outside the OIG’s jurisdiction. For example, the OIG has authority over allegations about an attorney’s travel or time‑and‑attendance claims, while OPR has authority over allegations about the attorney’s compliance with discovery obligations in a prosecution. The distinction concerns the function involved—professional legal work versus other types of misconduct—not simply the employee’s job title.
Additionally, OPR can refer to the OIG allegations of criminal misconduct by DOJ attorneys that fall within the OIG’s jurisdiction.
OPR is an essential part of the Department’s oversight framework. Inspector General Berthiaume is committed to supporting OPR to ensure its effectiveness while respecting the responsibilities Congress has assigned to each office. He is always prepared to work jointly with OPR on matters that implicate both offices’ jurisdictions. In Inspector General Berthiaume’s view, effective oversight depends on both the OIG and OPR fulfilling their responsibilities, communicating effectively, and working together when those responsibilities intersect.
The law requires the OIG to refer certain allegations about DOJ attorneys to OPR. Under 5 U.S.C. § 413(b)(3), the OIG must refer allegations to OPR when they relate to a DOJ attorney’s exercise of investigative, litigation, or legal-advice authority. Congress used the mandatory words “shall refer.” The provision also expressly excepts attorneys employed in OPR itself from this referral requirement. A referral also does not require OPR to find that misconduct occurred or to open a full investigation in every matter.
A referral identifies the appropriate office to assess an allegation; it is not a finding about whether misconduct occurred. It is the process by which the OIG places the allegations before the office responsible for assessing that category of conduct. OPR makes its own determination about whether further inquiry or investigation is warranted. Referral does not endorse the allegations, reject them, or guarantee a particular outcome. If information warrants coordination, a criminal referral, or consideration of an authorized OIG role, those questions can be addressed through the applicable Department processes.
No. Calling alleged prosecutorial misconduct a crime does not, by itself, give the OIG authority to investigate a prosecutor’s legal work. In other words, the statutory referral rule cannot be avoided simply by characterizing alleged prosecutorial misconduct as potentially criminal. A referral to OPR does not prevent potential crimes from being addressed: OPR can assess the allegations and make appropriate referrals, including to the OIG, and any further OIG role must be considered under the applicable authorities.
The OIG’s general authority to investigate criminal wrongdoing and administrative misconduct under 5 U.S.C. § 413(b)(2) is expressly limited by § 413(b)(3), which requires OIG to refer allegations about a DOJ attorney’s exercise of investigative, litigation, or legal‑advice authority to OPR.
No. The OIG’s operational independence and investigative capacity do not allow it to take over matters that the law assigns to OPR. Operational independence means that, within legal limits, the OIG decides what matters to review, how to conduct its work, what evidence to gather, and what findings and recommendations to issue; it does not expand the OIG’s jurisdiction or permit it to disregard responsibilities assigned to another office. Principle 2 of our Principles of Effective Oversight of the Department of Justice makes clear that independence operates within legal limitations and procedures, and Principle 4 requires consideration of jurisdiction, available resources, the appropriate forum, and the anticipated value of OIG participation when determining whether to initiate and how to prioritize its oversight work. The OIG’s investigative resources, congressional reporting responsibilities, and public reporting practices are important features of its oversight role, but they do not supersede the statutory referral requirement for matters within OPR’s jurisdiction. Independence and professional cooperation reinforce effective oversight: OPR is an essential oversight component, and respecting OPR’s responsibilities and coordinating through lawful processes are fully consistent with the OIG’s operational independence.
1975: Attorney General Edward Levi established OPR following revelations of misconduct during Watergate.
1988 and 1989: Congress enacted legislation establishing a DOJ Inspector General The OIG began operating in April 1989., while OPR remained a separate office.
1989: Attorney General Dick Thornburgh’s memorandum to all DOJ employees explicitly assigns OPR to “continue to exercise authority over investigations of allegations of misconduct involving attorneys and those in criminal investigative or law enforcement positions,” and the OIG to “exercise authority over allegations of misconduct involving other employees and for investigations and audits involving allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse.”
1994: Attorney General Janet Reno’s jurisdictional order assigned OPR allegations concerning attorneys’ investigative, litigation, and legal-advice duties. It expanded the OIG’s role in other misconduct matters, while retaining separate arrangements for FBI and DEA personnel.
2001: Attorney General John Ashcroft expanded the OIG’s authority over FBI and DEA employee misconduct. As Inspector General Glenn Fine later explained, that change did not transfer OPR’s responsibility for attorneys’ legal work to OIG.
2002: Section 308 of Public Law 107-273 enacted the present formulation of the attorney-related referral requirement and the exception to the OIG’s general misconduct-investigation authority.
2022: Congress reorganized the Inspector General Act into chapter 4 of title 5. The DOJ provisions previously cited as 5 U.S.C. App § 8E and often referred to as Section 8E are now found in 5 U.S.C. § 413.
No. The provision allowing the OIG to investigate Department agency and component heads, § 413(b)(4), does not override the rule in § 413(b)(3) that allegations of misconduct relating to a DOJ attorney’s exercise of investigative, litigation, or legal‑advice authority must be referred to OPR. For example, a U.S. Attorney’s status as a component head does not remove such allegations from the referral requirement; the relevant distinction is the conduct alleged, not the official’s seniority or title. The OIG may investigate a U.S. Attorney’s alleged misconduct that is unrelated to the exercise of attorney authority, and the Deputy Attorney General may specifically assign an OPR matter to the OIG through the process established in Department regulations. But neither the official’s position nor an allegation of potential criminal wrongdoing, standing alone, eliminates the statutory attorney‑related referral requirement.
Yes. Two recent OIG investigations illustrate the distinction between OIG and OPR jurisdiction.
The OIG investigated alleged misconduct by then U.S. Attorney Rachael Rollins and issued a report in May 2023. In the Rollins matter, the initial complaint involved allegations that Rollins violated the Hatch Act by attending a political fundraiser. During the investigation, the OIG received additional allegations related to political activities, violations of the federal gift rules, and other alleged ethics and policy violations. None of the alleged misconduct related to her exercise of authority as U.S. Attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice.
The OIG’s investigation of allegations regarding the Government’s sentencing recommendations for Roger Stone illustrates the importance of examining the allegations and coordination underlying a particular review. The OIG’s July 2024 report expressly acknowledged the statutory requirement to refer allegations concerning attorneys’ investigative, litigation, and legal-advice duties to OPR. While the OIG was assessing its jurisdiction over allegations concerning the Stone sentencing recommendation, a separate allegation arose that a prosecutor had provided false testimony to Congress. OPR referred that allegation to the OIG. The OIG subsequently informed the Attorney General that its investigation would examine both the congressional testimony and the underlying sentencing events necessary to assess the competing accounts. The Attorney General raised no objection, and OPR concurred in the investigative scope.
That coordinated investigation should not be understood to mean that every allegation of improper political influence over a prosecution falls within the OIG’s independent jurisdiction. Its scope arose in the context of a separate alleged offense involving congressional testimony and express coordination with OPR and Department leadership. Each matter requires assessment under the applicable statutory and regulatory authorities.
Yes. The OIG is prepared to work jointly with OPR on matters that implicate both offices’ jurisdictions. The offices have worked together when a matter involved their respective responsibilities. For example, in 2008 both offices investigated allegations of politicized hiring practices in the DOJ Honors and Summer Law Intern programs. Also in 2008, the OIG and OPR conducted a joint investigation into the removal of 9 U.S. Attorneys and possible interference with prosecutions.
Those joint investigations did not abolish the division of authority. The U.S. Attorney removals report expressly stated that OPR had responsibility for allegations concerning U.S. Attorneys’ exercise of investigative, litigation, or legal-advice authority, while the OIG had responsibility for other allegations. Similarly, in the OIG’s 2006 review of the FBI’s handling of the Brandon Mayfield case, the FBI mistakenly linked Mayfield’s fingerprints to evidence from the Madrid train bombings. The OIG and OPR examined different parts of the government’s conduct. OPR investigated the attorneys’ conduct, and the OIG investigated the FBI agents’ conduct.
Yes. Under 28 C.F.R. § 0.29e(a)(6), the Deputy Attorney General may, at the Inspector General’s request, assign an OPR matter to the OIG. The regulation also governs notice and investigative activity while an assignment or jurisdictional issue is pending.
Operation Lost Trust illustrates an OIG review of an OPR matter that was specifically requested by the Deputy Attorney General. The OIG’s contemporaneous account states that the Deputy Attorney General requested an OIG review of the South Carolina investigations and prosecutions following a judicial dismissal. The OIG examined discovery failures and prosecutors’ representations, found no prosecutorial misconduct, and criticized aspects of the government’s handling of discovery.
Importantly, this case stands not as an example of the OIG exceeding its jurisdiction, but rather of its long history of scrupulously following the legal limits and frameworks that govern its oversight.
Yes. The OIG can review programs involving attorneys—such as case management, enforcement practices, or systemic management issues—without conducting investigations into individual attorneys’ professional misconduct. When the OIG reviewed the Operations of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division in 2013, it specifically distinguished its systemic enforcement and management review from OPR’s jurisdiction over the handling of the New Black Panther Party litigation, making clear that investigations of attorneys’ legal decisions remained within OPR’s authority. The OIG’s 2018 review of the FBI’s and DOJ’s actions in advance of the 2016 election examined allegations concerning prosecutive decisions by assessing whether the interpretation and application of the relevant criminal statute was consistent over multiple administrations, and investigative decisions by assessing whether the circumstances surrounding the decision suggested it was based on considerations other than the merits of the investigation. The OIG explicitly stated that the OIG would not substitute its judgment for the judgments “made by the FBI or the Department regarding the substantive merits of investigative or prosecutive decisions.”
Some reviews have examined substantive legal work under specific authorities granted by Congress, such as the mandated review of the President’s Surveillance Program, which required participating inspectors general to examine OLC legal opinions and the approval process for the program.
These examples underscore that when assessing historical reviews involving attorneys, it is important to consider the particular mandate and authority for each review, rather than assume that the current attorney‑related referral requirement does not apply.
The OIG is not an appellate body for OPR’s decisions on matters within OPR’s responsibility. However, an allegation of misconduct by an OPR attorney presents a different question: the statute expressly excepts OPR attorneys from the mandatory referral provision. Each submission must be evaluated under the authority applicable to the conduct alleged.