The U.S. Department of Justice (the Department or DOJ) has many responsibilities in the national security arena, including prosecuting acts of international and domestic terrorism, countering foreign malign influence, preventing foreign espionage, protecting critical infrastructure from hostile actors, and safeguarding sensitive information and technology. In addition to the difficult challenges presented by these grave responsibilities, the Department must ensure that citizens’ civil rights and civil liberties are not improperly compromised in the name of protecting national security.
According to DOJ’s strategic plan, one of its key objectives is countering foreign and domestic terrorism, including exploiting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence with its partners and disrupting terrorist actors through prosecution efforts. U.S. persons, facilities, and interests at home and abroad face persistent and increasingly diverse threats from terrorism. The United States also faces increased threats from hostile nation-state actors such as China, Russia, and Iran. Protecting the integrity of U.S. elections from foreign malign influence efforts by or on behalf of these actors has become an important federal government national security priority in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the key Department contributor. In addition, threats to critical infrastructure is a significant strategic risk for the United States, threatening our national security, economic prosperity, and public health and safety. Nation-states are targeting critical infrastructure to collect information and gain access to industrial control systems in the energy, nuclear, water, aviation, and critical manufacturing sectors.
FBI New York Assistant Director in Charge checks in with one of the field office's Special Agent bomb technicians helping to keep New Year's Eve safe on December 31, 2023.
Source: FBI
DOJ has identified as a top objective the need to ensure the economic prosperity of the United States by protecting American companies, academic and research institutions, and workers against hostile actors seeking to steal critical and emerging technologies and intellectual property. To that end, the Department maintains countering foreign espionage as a vital interest.
International Terrorism
The October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attack in Israel and ensuing conflict in the Middle East have underscored the ongoing significant threat that foreign terrorist organizations pose to U.S. national security. As FBI Director Christopher Wray noted in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs in late October 2023, the attack may serve as an inspiration to those who seek to commit terrorist acts against the United States, and thus “the ongoing war in the Middle East has raised the threat of an attack against Americans in the United States to a whole other level.” Director Wray also noted after the October 7 attack that al-Qaida issued its most specific call to attack the United States in years, and ISIS urged its followers to target Jewish communities in the United States and Europe. In its 2024 Intelligence Assessment, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence further assessed that “[t]he risk of escalation into direct interstate conflict, intended or otherwise, remains high.”
In his April 2024 congressional budget testimony, Director Wray identified terrorism—both international and domestic—as the FBI’s continued number one priority. While the FBI remains concerned about the ability of foreign terrorist organizations, such as ISIS and al Qaida and their affiliates, to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United States, he stated that homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) are the greatest, most immediate international terrorism threat to the homeland. The FBI defines HVE as individuals living or operating primarily in the United States who prepare to engage in terrorist activities in furtherance of a political or social objective promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, even if they are acting independently of any direction by a foreign terrorist organization. Director Wray specifically identified lone actors or small cells of individuals who typically become radicalized online and primarily use easily accessible weapons to attack soft targets as the “greatest threat to our homeland.”
Hostage Rescue Team operators train for a close-quarters battle.
Source: FBI
An Office of the Inspector General (OIG) HVE audit report issued in March 2020 included a recommendation that the FBI examine and identify mechanisms field offices can use to revisit subjects of closed HVE assessments that may warrant further action by the FBI, while also ensuring any such mechanisms do not create any legal, policy, and civil liberties implications. In view of the significance of the HVE threat, we believe the FBI would benefit from its continued efforts to completely address this recommendation, which remains open.
Domestic Terrorism and Domestic Violent Extremism
Domestic terrorism and domestic violent extremism (DVE) continue to pose a significant national security challenge as evidenced by the July 13, 2024 attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The FBI is investigating the incident as a potential act of domestic terrorism as it seeks to learn the deceased shooter’s motives and determine the sequence of events leading up to the shooting.
In April 2024, Director Wray described two types of DVE actors, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists (RMVE) and antigovernment or antiauthority extremists, as the top domestic terrorism threat. The Director has further noted the significant increase in domestic terrorism investigations over the last several years. In its most recent threat assessment, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also described the continued risk that RMVEs pose in the United States, noting several fatal U.S. based attacks and that RMVEs have in some cases improved the quality of their online recruiting tools, potentially inspiring more attacks.
The OIG has conducted oversight work in an effort to assist the Department in addressing this threat. In June 2023, we released an audit identifying gaps in DOJ’s strategy to combat DVE actors. The report highlighted coordination challenges within the Department due to the large number of DOJ components involved in addressing this threat. The report included seven recommendations, one of which is closed and six of which are open as of October 1, 2024. One of these recommendations directed the Department to determine how to empower the Domestic Terrorism Unit of the National Security Division to coordinate and provide leadership across the Department on efforts to address DVE. Similarly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office issued reports in February 2023 and January 2024, both of which highlighted the need for improved coordination between the FBI and DHS and better information sharing with stakeholders in the domestic terrorism/DVE context.
Deputy U.S. Marshals conducting Operation Rolling Thunder at Oklahoma City in 2023.
Source: U.S. Marshals Service
The OIG also recommended that the Department improve guidance to law enforcement components so that investigations with a DVE nexus are more consistently and properly identified.
The riot at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, serves as an indication that the charged political climate magnifies the domestic terrorism threat. The OIG’s review of the roles and activities of DOJ and its components in preparing for and responding to the Capitol Riot on January 6, 2021, is ongoing. Based on several factors, including ongoing criminal prosecutions and oversight conducted by other entities, the OIG review is focused on the FBI’s direction and handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) in the lead-up to and on January 6, and whether the FBI exploited its CHSs and other available information to determine the nature of threats in advance of the electoral vote certification on January 6. In the 40 months following January 6, 2021, the Department has charged more than 1,424 defendants and obtained 820 guilty pleas in connection with the ongoing investigation. Implementing the remaining recommendations from the OIG and the U.S. Government Accountability Office reports would ensure the Department is better coordinated and able to meet the DVE threat while at the same time safeguarding civil liberties.
Maintaining security in the U.S. electoral process is vital to our democratic system of government. It is essential that qualified voters can equally participate in public elections and have their votes counted without fear of discrimination, intimidation, or fraud. In addition to preventative measures against voter suppression, ensuring our elections are secure and free from foreign malign influence and interference is a priority for the Department.
Adversaries use distinctive tactics and techniques to accomplish their goal of disrupting election processes and undermining the public’s confidence in our democratic institutions and values. Foreign-generated deepfakes remain a crucial threat for the Department and other government organizations as they can be used to spread misinformation and propaganda. The FBI continues to commit resources to developing approaches to secure election infrastructure against foreign malign influence operations.
These adversarial threats include attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the security and integrity of the U.S. elections process, while also increasing negative sentiments toward the election system through influence campaigns. Consequently, the Department maintains its oversight by supervising and prosecuting cases relating to national security, including any cases involving foreign malign influence and interference in elections from global adversaries. In July 2024, the OIG released a report reviewing the Department’s efforts to coordinate information sharing about foreign malign threats to U.S. elections. In that evaluation, the OIG found effective communication within and among three DOJ components tasked with sharing case information regarding foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections, in addition to the DOJ components expressing positive views about their information-sharing relationships. However, the OIG found that neither DOJ nor the FBI had a specific policy or guidance applicable to information sharing with social media companies regarding foreign malign influence until February 2024.
The United States faces an expanding array of foreign intelligence threats by adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran that are using increasingly sophisticated methods to cause harm to U.S. interests. For example, the 2022 National Security Strategy sharply noted that the United States is in the midst of a strategic competition with China, the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective. According to a statement by FBI Director Wray, “The PRC is a singular threat because the Chinese Communist Party has essentially dedicated its whole government to seize economic development in the most critical areas for tomorrow’s economy.”
DHS Investigations and the FBI conduct a search during a Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet Enforcement team operation in 2021.
Source: FBI
Our nation remains a prime target of foreign intelligence gathering efforts in areas such as critical infrastructure, national security information, academia, technologies, and research laboratories. For example, in 2024, a resident of China, along with a Canadian national and Chinese national, conspired to steal trade secrets from their former employer, an American company which spent millions of dollars in the research and development of manufacturing electric vehicles, and sold products developed with the stolen trade secrets. Successful criminal prosecutions of foreign espionage operations, whether motivated by politics or economics, can deter and hold accountable those engaged in such activity. In addition, FBI intelligence investigations, in coordination when appropriate with U.S. intelligence community agencies, are essential to addressing this challenge.
As outlined above, the Department faces many significant national security challenges. It must, however, safeguard civil liberties in addressing the threat. For example, in recent years, the FBI has come under scrutiny for its use of its authorities under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Section 702 is critical to the Department’s national security efforts. It authorizes the targeted surveillance of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located abroad. First enacted in 2008, it was meant to fill gaps in the previously existing intelligence collection authorities included in FISA. Although it does not allow the surveillance and intelligence collection of persons located in the United States or U.S. persons located abroad, communications involving a U.S. person may be captured incidentally by the government. For this reason, there are several internal controls that are designed to “minimize” U.S. person information, including restrictions on when FBI personnel may query databases for information associated with U.S. persons.
However, despite these controls, there have been numerous repeated querying violations that the Department has reported to the FISA Court. These include searches of Section 702 holdings using the names of individuals arrested in connection with civil unrest in May and June 2020, and individuals suspected of involvement in the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol. It also included searches using the names of political donors to a congressional campaign. As a result, Congress and the President highlighted the need to implement reforms that meaningfully enhanced Section 702 safeguards while continuing to preserve its national security benefits.
The debate around these authorities culminated in the renewal of Section 702 with passage of the 2024 Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. The law reauthorizes Section 702 for 2 years with new restrictions on queries of U.S. persons. For example, the Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act requires FBI personnel to obtain prior approval from a supervisor or attorney before conducting a U.S. person query and prohibits involvement by political appointees in approving such queries. It also mandates audits of U.S. person queries and directs the DOJ OIG to issue a report on FBI querying practices within 545 days of enactment. The OIG has begun its work to meet this 545-day reporting requirement.