Improve program oversight and accountability by formalizing processes to routinely evaluate and ensure special deputations comply with policies, procedures, and guidance, as well as by implementing controls that ensure any exceptions are appropriate and documented consistently.

Develop and implement policy and procedures for documenting the reason for the lapse and the decision regarding TFO participation or restrictions on participation on USMS operational activities.

Improve current processes and implement controls within the USMS's case management system to consistently identify TFO investigative activity and ensure accountability and oversight of deputized TFOs.

Enhance its management of TFO misconduct allegations by: (a) reinforcing the policy requirement for reporting misconduct allegations to the USMS Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) and OIG; (b) developing and implementing a policy regarding the utilization of a TFO who has an active misconduct allegation; and (c) implementing a process to document and track the status and outcome of all TFO misconduct investigations, when appropriate, to support decisions regarding a TFO's retention of special deputation authority.

Develop policies, procedures, and controls to manage court security officer (CSO) special deputations. During the development of this framework, the USMS should ensure the Judicial Security Division (JSD) takes into consideration relevant USMS requirements and processes for all other special deputations, including any updates that are made as a result of this audit.

Update its policy for reporting CSO misconduct to establish stronger controls that better ensure both USMS OPR and the DOJ OIG receive relevant and appropriate information.

Evaluate and update its guidance to the USMS on special deputations to clarify requirements for Department review and approval of special deputation requests.

Work with the relevant components to better align metrics across the Department and to determine what metrics for the ransomware threat, including metrics tracking disruption efforts, are most impactful, and which demonstrate the effectiveness of its actions to combat the ransomware threat.

Assess the U.S. Attorneys' Offices (USAO) implementation of the deconfliction policy, for ransomware cases, to ensure that federal prosecutors have a consistent understanding of the policy and comply with its requirements.

Determine how to appropriately remedy its management and use of an improper personal services contract.

Evaluate the lapses that occurred in the FBI's management and oversight of this contract. This evaluation should include determining the best course of action for resolving the $4,928 payment discrepancy, while taking into consideration Contractor-1 receiving less than the firm-fixed-price amount on the relevant task orders. In addition, the FBI should analyze prior OIG reported contract issues to determine if additional action is needed to enhance the FBI's contracting practices due to similar issues occurring in this contract.

Develop and implement a method to monitor FBI employees' compliance with mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse for an appropriate amount of time following the implementation of its updated policy and take appropriate remedial action in instances of non-compliance.

Implement sufficient controls to ensure all incidents involving an imminent or ongoing threat of sexual and/or physical abuse or exploitation of a child or adult are handled within 24 hours as required.

Implement sufficient controls to ensure FBI employees responsible for notifying victims and providing victim services become aware of all eligible federal crime victims, notify and offer services to these victims, and document victim notifications and services offered to victims in the investigative case file.

Enhance its monitoring of leads to ensure that leads are covered timely and appropriately.

Develop an enterprise-wide strategy that addresses the rising number of crimes against children and human trafficking (CAC/HT) cases and ensures CAC/HT agents have appropriate support and resources to manage their assigned caseloads.

Revise its procedures to ensure all electronic storage media containing sensitive or classified information, including hard drives that are extracted from computers slated for destruction, are appropriately accounted for, tracked, timely sanitized, and destroyed.

Implement controls to ensure its electronic storage media are marked with the appropriate National Security Information (NSI) classification level markings, in accordance with applicable policies and guidelines.

Remedy $8,361 in unsupported contractor costs under Grant Number 15PJDP-22-GG-03809 DGCT.

Remedy $10,077 in unsupported other direct costs, including $7,009 under Grant Number 2020-DC-BX-0110, $895 under Grant Number 2020-AR-BX-0082, $364 under Grant Number 15PBJA-21-GG-03978 MENT, and $1,809 under Grant Number 15PJDP-22-GG-03809 DGCT.

Remedy $74,840 in unsupported matching costs under Grant Number 2020-DC-BX-0110.

Coordinate with MHMR to ensure that the matching requirement is met.

As DOJ policy does not address what information Department personnel may include in a statement that is determined to be necessary to reassure the public that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or to protect public safety, we recommend that the Department revise this policy to require that the information contained in a statement released pursuant to JM 1-7.400(C) be reasonably necessary either to reassure the public that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or to protect public safety.

We recommend that the Department make clear whether the Justice Manual's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy, Justice Manual 1-7.000, applies to the Attorney General.

We recommend that the Department clarify its policies to address whether any of the provisions of 28 C.F.R. 50.2 remain Department policy in light of the existence of the Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy contained in the Justice Manual.

If 28 C.F.R. 50.2(b)(9) remains valid Department policy, we recommend that the Department require that requests to the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General for approval to release information otherwise prohibited from disclosure and any approval to release such information pursuant to 50.2(b)(9) be documented.

We recommend that the Department consider revising its White House communications policy to clarify what information can be disclosed to the White House in situations where the policy permits communication about a contemplated or pending civil or criminal investigation.

Require the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) to perform a formal evaluation of the personnel and financial resources required to meet anticipated future demand for Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP) services and provide the results to FBI executive leadership. In response to this evaluation, FBI executive leadership should determine whether to allocate the personnel and financial resources, and/or potentially leverage other similar programs and activities within the FBI, necessary to meet ViCAP's anticipated needs.

Develop a comprehensive strategic plan for ViCAP that accounts for both the resources available to ViCAP and also the anticipated short-term and long-term changes in demand for ViCAP's services. This plan should specifically identify necessary improvements to ViCAP's information technology and quality control functions.

Using the strategic plan developed in response to Recommendation 2, establish and maintain comprehensive and meaningful performance metrics, including a mechanism for capturing and evaluating customer feedback, program reach, and active participation, to better assess the value and effectiveness of ViCAP.