The United States Marshals Service's Workforce Planning and Management
(Redacted for Public Release)

Audit Report 07-38
July 2007
Office of the Inspector General

Chapter 2: USMS Workforce Planning

Effective planning, which includes defining the common vision of the agency and identifying the necessary steps to achieve that vision, is integral to the success of an organization. We found that during the time period covered by our review, the USMS operated under an inadequate strategic plan that lacked several key standard elements. Although the USMS issued a new strategic plan in January 2006, many district representatives with whom we spoke were unaware of the plan and the USMS’s performance goals and strategies contained within it.

In performing its planning activities, the USMS faces challenges because the bulk of its workload is not self-initiated and instead originates from other agencies and the federal judicial system. Since 1995, the USMS has taken steps to develop quantitative models to determine its resource needs in association with its workload. However, we found weaknesses in the data systems that feed the USMS’s workforce model and its budget development process.

Strategic Planning

In 1997, the USMS issued a 5-year strategic plan, but this plan lacked several key standard elements.24 The plan did not assess current and future workload levels or outline how the USMS intended to distribute its resources among competing priorities. Further, the plan did not provide a method by which the USMS could assess the achievement of its goals and objectives. During our audit, a senior headquarters official in the USMS’s Management and Budget Division stated that the plan was weak and that USMS employees reviewed it when it was first issued and then disregarded it. Moreover, another USMS headquarters official told us that until recently, the USMS’s strategic planning processes revolved around the preparation and submission of the annual budget.

In January 2006, the current USMS Director issued a more comprehensive strategic plan for FYs 2006 through 2010.25 The plan is organized around six broad goals, including the USMS’s five basic mission areas (Judicial and Courthouse Security, Fugitive Apprehension, Prisoner Security and Transportation, Protection of Witnesses, and Operations Support) and one overarching, cross-cutting area of Organizational Excellence that covers organizational accountability; operational excellence; information technology improvement; and human resources development, integrity, and professionalism.

To develop the new strategic plan, in October 2005 the USMS established a Strategic Planning Committee consisting of district office and headquarters personnel. The USMS Director instructed the committee to generate a plan that was realistic and could be implemented without expending additional resources. Each U.S. Marshal had the opportunity to provide feedback before the Director submitted the plan to DOJ and received approval to publish the document.

The plan was first released to USMS management at two national management conferences in early 2006. Additional copies of the plan were then mailed to each of the 94 districts, a version was posted on the USMS intranet, and an e-mail was sent to all USMS personnel. However, during our site visits to the district offices, we found that although most senior managers were aware of the strategic plan, many of the administrative employees and operational staff, including some supervisors with whom we spoke, were not familiar with it. We believe that USMS district management should better publicize the strategic plan to district employees.

When the FY 2006-2010 strategic plan was released, the USMS Director assigned each organizational unit’s senior management the task of developing a Unit Performance Plan detailing how each unit would implement the overall strategic plan and monitor the unit’s progress in implementing the plan.26 During our fieldwork, most senior managers were aware of the Unit Performance Plans and provided us with copies of the plans for their districts. Based on our review, it appeared that most of the districts had made progress in developing these plans.

Additionally, a senior USMS headquarters official involved in the USMS’s strategic planning efforts stated that the responsibility for ensuring that the Unit Performance Plans were complete, accurate, and meaningful had not yet been assigned. For example, a senior district official told us that local management did not take the Unit Performance Plan seriously, and that they did not attempt to define objective, specific, and relevant performance measures.

To effectively implement the strategic plan, the USMS must ensure that its program and district offices establish meaningful Unit Performance Plans. We believe that the USMS should develop a process to ensure that the Unit Performance Plans provide reasonable steps for implementing and monitoring progress relative to the overall strategic plan.

Workforce Management Planning

According to the USMS, in 1986 the USMS began using quantitative methods to determine its resource needs. The USMS developed methods to assess its ability to meet current workload levels according to acceptable performance standards. In addition, the USMS has attempted to estimate future changes in its workload resulting from changes in its environment, including new legislation, new program initiatives, and resource changes in other agencies. For example, as the number of federal law enforcement agents increases, the number of individuals taken into custody is also likely to increase and result in an increased workload for the USMS.

In the formulation of its budgets for FYs 2000 through 2005, the USMS primarily employed three workforce planning models.

Uncontrollable Workload Growth and Courthouse Personnel Models

For the FY 2000 budget request, the Uncontrollable Workload Growth Model was used, which attempted to predict the level of resources that the USMS would need based upon staffing increases in other law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and United States Attorneys’ Offices (USAO). The underlying theory for the model was that as these agencies realize increases in staffing levels, the number of prisoners, court appearances, fugitives, and seized assets would also increase and add to the workload for the USMS. Additionally, the USMS augmented its resource planning at that time through the use of the Courthouse Personnel Model, which attempted to determine the number of additional positions needed to provide security for locations in which new courthouses were being constructed or existing courthouses were being expanded.

District Budget and Workforce Equalization Models

Beginning with the FY 2002 budget request, the USMS began using a third model, the District Budget Model (DBM), in conjunction with its two existing models to formulate its budget request.27 The DBM examines how the USMS accomplishes its district office workload within the framework of agency performance and safety practices. The model was initially developed in-house by a working group of headquarters staff, U.S. Marshals, Chief Deputy Marshals, and administrative officers.

According to the USMS, the model uses mathematical formulas and relationships to measure workload, taking into account performance, safety, and geographical variables of the district offices. In developing the DBM, the USMS established work standards by determining the length of time it takes to complete various day-to-day functions (both operational and administrative).

The DBM addresses workload associated with “core” district activities, including fugitive warrant investigations, courtroom and judicial security, prisoner processing, prisoner transportation, and service of process. However, certain activities, such as those related to the protection of witnesses and special operations, are not included in the DBM calculations because they are centrally managed at the headquarters level. The DBM combines work standards and historical workload data from multiple sources to generate the number of district personnel needed to accomplish the USMS’s mission. The DBM projects staffing levels using 150 data inputs and 110 formulas.

According to the USMS, because the DBM is based on historical workload information, the resulting figures indicate the optimal level of resources for that historical period. In light of this, the USMS supplements the quantitative DBM model with qualitative information obtained from district surveys. In addition, the USMS has adjusted the DBM figures to incorporate known, future events that are not portrayed in the initial DBM computations and will require additional resources.

While the DBM represents optimal staffing, budgetary realities prevent an optimal state from ever occurring. To compensate for this, the USMS developed the Workforce Equalization Model (WEM), which sought to equalize the proportion of staff for each district based on the amount provided for USMS personnel in the annual budget. The USMS described the WEM as identifying what the agency can afford to provide each district if the available positions were proportionally distributed according to the DBM. For example, in one fiscal year of our review period, if applied according to the WEM, the funding allowed for each USMS district office to be staffed at 73 percent. In order to reach this level, offices with authorized positions above this threshold may have been required to relinquish positions to other offices that were operating below the 73 percent threshold.28

Many USMS district representatives believed the creation of the DBM was a good starting point for determining the resource needs of district offices. For example, one senior USMS official within the Management and Budget Division expressed the opinion that the DBM provided an accurate reflection of resource needs and was an effective budgetary tool that assisted the USMS with supporting its budget requests with qualitative data, as directed by the Office of Management and Budget.

However, several USMS officials criticized the allocation process using the DBM and WEM. Specifically, they expressed their displeasure that the staffing levels identified by the DBM and WEM were never actually realized in the district offices. Additionally, some were uncertain as to what items factored into the DBM.

USMS Re-evaluation of Workforce Planning Models

In January 2006, the USMS Director suspended use of the DBM and the WEM in an attempt to ensure a more balanced approach to allocating human and financial resources. The Director established a working group – the Resource Allocation Advisory Board (RAAB) – to review current USMS staffing and funding resource allocation processes and to recommend improvements. The RAAB issued a report to the Director in June 2006 and made several recommendations related to the DBM. In general, the RAAB determined that the DBM was a valid and useful model for determining the appropriate staffing requirements of the USMS’s district offices and the USMS should continue to use it as a staffing model.29

The RAAB concluded, however, that the WEM’s threshold was not the best way to reallocate positions. The RAAB suggested raising the threshold at which offices would be required to relinquish positions to a minimum of 85 percent. By doing so, the RAAB stated that the USMS would avoid deliberately placing a larger number of offices in unmanageable staffing situations. In addition, the RAAB stated that the threshold could be adjusted annually after USMS review of changes in workload and newly appropriated positions. The RAAB also noted that because the DBM is a historical model and is not predictive, data trends and district environmental factors should play a larger role in allocation and re-allocation decisions.

The RAAB noted that one strength of the DBM is its use of data from automated systems that the USMS uses to track or conduct its missions because it is unlikely that this data would be manipulated. The RAAB further recognized the importance of data verification as a critical element of the model’s integrity and suggested procedures for conducting data checks.

OIG Analysis of USMS Workforce Planning

The USMS has initiated several efforts to develop quantitative models to identify its resource needs in association with its workload. Further, the USMS has proactively sought to improve its efforts to manage its personnel resources through the revision and replacement of different models throughout our review period.

We concur with the overall findings of the RAAB and believe that the USMS should continue to use the DBM and seek continual improvements to its resource planning process. Moreover, we agree with the RAAB’s findings that data validity is critical to the integrity of the staffing model. Resource calculations that utilize inaccurate or unreliable data can undermine the allocation decisions that result from these calculations.

The USMS utilizes information from a number of data systems that feed into the DBM and the USMS’s budget decisions to track and monitor employee utilization and workload by function. While we did not perform an analysis of each of the systems, we identified several areas of concern regarding the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in three of the systems – the USM 7, the Warrant Information Network (WIN), and the Prisoner Transportation System (PTS).


The USMS uses the USM 7 to track the amount of time spent by all employees and some independent contractors performing various work-related activities.30 The USM 7 supplies the DBM with data related to time spent on certain activities. In addition, the USMS uses USM-7 personnel resource utilization data in the annual budget development process.

USMS personnel complete a USM 7 form every 2 weeks and record the number of hours worked (tracked to the quarter-hour) to project codes that are attributed to the type of function or duty being performed. For example, for any 8 hour day a Deputy U.S. Marshal might record working 4 hours apprehending fugitives, 2 hours transporting prisoners for court, and 2 hours in annual leave status. The system relies upon the self-reporting of each employee. Although the USMS requires supervisors to review staff submissions, the data derived from the USM 7 system is only as valid as the information reported by USMS personnel and reviewed by the supervisor. The USMS considers the USM-7 system’s data to be the best way to assess the actual time worked by USMS employees and independent contractors in specific mission areas. Further, it is the only source of empirical USMS employee resource utilization data.

Program and Project Codes – When completing the USM 7 form, individuals assign time to various project codes according to the types of tasks they have performed, such as federal felony warrant investigations. The USMS tracks its resource utilization by project codes, which is the greatest level of detail contained in the USM-7. The USM-7 system is designed so that each project code can be linked to a broader program code associated with a USMS mission area.31

According to documentation provided by the USMS, there are 18 possible program codes in the USM 7.32 However, we reviewed USM 7 data and found that the database contained 80 different program codes, as well as some timekeeping records for which no program code was listed. We discussed this issue with USMS headquarters officials, who stated that they believed these instances were errors of some sort. However, they were uncertain as to how this field was populated, and wondered if it was a result of individuals typing in the wrong program code value or if the system automatically populated this field based on other information entered.

The USMS had a total of 1,607 project codes that were in existence between FYs 2000 through 2005. USMS headquarters officials explained that the USMS does not have distinct project code manuals for discrete time periods and that project codes change frequently as new activities or duties occur. Further, officials stated that all project codes do not apply to every district office. When a specific event occurs and a project code is subsequently created, USMS headquarters informs the applicable district offices about the existence of the new project code.

We reviewed the listing of project codes and found that many have the same or very similar descriptions. For example, there are two project codes (FWF2008F and FWF2009F) with the same description – Gulf Coast Regional Task Force.33 Because of this and the sheer number of available codes, we question the ability of USMS employees to consistently select the correct project code. In fact, we were informed by USMS personnel that if an employee did not know which project code to use, they would attempt to guess or ask a fellow deputy, supervisor, or the district’s administrative officer. We believe that the USMS’s list of project codes could be reduced significantly, which would result in more accurate time recording and resource utilization analysis.

At the conclusion of our audit, a USMS headquarters official stated that not all 1,607 project codes were available for use during each fiscal year of our review period. Specifically, this official stated that certain project codes that were available for use in FYs 2000 through 2002 were not available for use in FYs 2003 through 2005. The official further remarked that in any given fiscal year of our review period, there were fewer than 250 project codes available for use.

We reviewed the data and did determine that no more than 231 project codes were utilized during any 1 given fiscal year of our review period. However, while we were able to determine how many project codes were used in each fiscal year, we were not able to determine how many project codes could have been used in each fiscal year. Specifically, while the USMS stated that no more than 250 project codes were available for use, the USMS could not provide us with a listing of which project codes were available for each fiscal year. Therefore, we were unable to determine if more than 250 project codes were available during any fiscal year or whether the project codes utilized in each fiscal year were active for those fiscal years.

At the conclusion of our audit, a USMS official spoke to this issue by stating that the USM-7’s interface with the USMS’s payroll system prevented personnel from charging time to discontinued project codes. However, during fieldwork, USMS headquarters officials explained that instances have occurred where individuals recorded time to project codes that were no longer in existence and that they had to amend these records to reflect the proper project codes. In light of this ambiguity, we believe it would be worthwhile for the USMS to ensure that its timekeeping system has an automated control in place to prevent time from being charged to project codes no longer in existence.

During additional analyses of USM-7 data, we found 171 instances where the program and project codes were incorrectly associated. For example, the USMS had project codes involving emergency operations that were placed under the fugitive warrants program code. Moreover, USMS analysts indicated that multiple program codes could be associated with the same project code. For example, project code TERROTHP (Track Terrorism Activity) at times corresponds to the “In Court with Prisoners” mission activity, while in other instances it applies to the “Judicial/Other Protection” mission activity. This illogical construct makes it impossible for the USMS to distinctly identify efforts expended in each of its mission areas.

We also identified at least 369 instances in which no project code was recorded during FY 2005. As a result, USMS management officials responsible for the analysis of the USM 7 data were uncertain as to which mission or program area these work hours applied. Although this accounted for only about 7,000 out of approximately 11.7 million total work hours, we are concerned that if left unchecked this issue could contribute to an inaccurate portrayal of resource utilization. Additionally, although USMS officials stated that they would recognize if there were significant numbers of records without project codes, there is no automated control in the USM-7 to prevent a record from being created without a project code. Therefore, we believe that implementing an automated control requiring active project codes to be entered in order to record time would eliminate this issue and assist the USMS in developing more accurate resource utilization data.

USMS headquarters officials who review USM 7 utilization data commented that program codes are essentially meaningless, and instead said they focus on the individual project codes for any type of resource utilization analysis. However, we believe that the USM 7 program codes can be of value to the USMS in determining its resource utilization. If coded accurately and consistently, it would be relatively simple to determine how much time was spent on each mission area. Instead, USMS personnel must review a multitude of individual project codes, which we believe could be a very arduous, time-intensive, and possibly unnecessary process.

Each of these issues with USMS program and project codes contributes to the lack of an accurate, consistent timekeeping system. This, in turn, can result in inaccurate requests for resources because the USMS relies, in part, on data from its timekeeping system for budgetary submissions. As a result, the utilization data may portray more or fewer resources addressing certain mission activities than the number actually involved in those areas.

Contractor Utilization – The USMS utilizes a large number of contractors at a significant cost to accomplish its various mission activities. Specifically, in FY 2005 the USMS expended approximately $235.7 million to procure the services of 3,862 Court Security Officers (CSO). For the same period, the USMS expended an additional $18.5 million to procure the services of an unknown number of personnel provided through contracts with national vendors for guard services. Further, in FY 2005 the USMS expended almost $10.5 million on 2,528 independent contractors who performed certain activities, such as processing and transporting federal prisoners.

Despite its extensive use of contractors, only contract guards obtained through individual personal services contracts track their time in the USM-7, which identifies specific activities through project codes. The USMS does not have a mechanism for recording, in a similar manner, time worked by contractors procured through national vendor contracts who perform many of the same duties as operational personnel.34 Instead, these types of contractors use timesheets provided by the vendors who are responsible for their maintenance. As a result, we are concerned that the USMS is unable to completely define its total workload or the total level of effort expended in each mission area in which contractors procured through national contracts, excluding CSOs, are utilized. We believe that tracking the activity of these types of contractors in a similar manner to USMS operational personnel would benefit the USMS because it would provide a more accurate depiction of the total level of effort needed to accomplish the many functions of the USMS.

Warrant Information Network

The WIN is a computer-based, automated system used to manage records and information collected during investigations of fugitives and potential threats directed at the federal judicial system. It contains both historical and current case data for all USMS investigations. All USMS facilities, including district offices, headquarters, and foreign offices, have access to the WIN. The system has several capabilities including the ability to: (1) enter, collate, and retrieve case information, including photographs; (2) access and interface with the FBI’s National Crime Information Center; (3) assign cases to staff; and (4) notify district offices of action to take on shared investigations.

The OIG previously reviewed the WIN and identified vulnerabilities in 16 of the 17 areas used to assess management, operational, and technical controls in information systems.35 While our analysis was not intended to verify the accuracy of the system, certain irregularities came to our attention during our analysis of the WIN data. Although these inconsistencies accounted for less than 1 percent of the total number of records contained in the data file we reviewed, we believe these errors, if left unchecked, could affect the overall accuracy of the system.36 According to a USMS headquarters official, the USMS performs various reviews of data in the WIN throughout the year. However, our identification of these inconsistencies indicates that the system does not have adequate automated controls to ensure that these types of errors do not occur in the future and do not negatively affect USMS planning efforts. These issues are as follows:

Prisoner Tracking System

The PTS was implemented by the USMS in March 1993 to maintain tracking information for federal prisoners and to monitor those prisoners in various detention facilities. The PTS is also used as an informational and scheduling tool. For instance, the PTS contains information specific to each individual prisoner, including the prisoner's personal data, property, medical information, criminal information, and location. Additionally, PTS information assists USMS personnel in locating prisoners to be transported for court appearances. Moreover, this system catalogs the USMS’s activity during the day-to-day processing and disposition of prisoners.

USMS headquarters officials stated that there are inconsistencies in how the 94 district offices utilize the system. Further, because of administrative staff shortages within the district offices and the increasing volume of prisoners, USMS headquarters officials stated that many prisoner movements are not entered into the PTS. A USMS official estimated that the district offices are capturing only about 80 percent of their prisoner transports. Our review of PTS information revealed an example of this lack of data entry. According to data in the PTS, the USMS D.C. Superior Court office performed 52 prisoner movements during FY 2000. The number of prisoner movements recorded progressively increased from one fiscal year to the next, reaching 5,625 in FY 2004 and 34,503 movements during FY 2005. According to USMS officials, this dramatic increase in prisoner movements was a result of a change in the USMS D.C. Superior Court office’s method for processing prisoners, which resulted in more data captured in the PTS, rather than a dramatic increase in the number of prisoner movements. We believe that the USMS needs to address this known inconsistent use of the PTS to help ensure that the system provides accurate workload data for the agency’s management and planning activities. Without accurate data, the USMS runs the risk of making ill-informed resource request and allocation decisions.

We reviewed over 4 million PTS records, encompassing data for all district offices for the period FYs 2000 through 2005. We found 179,330 records (which accounts for approximately 5 percent of all records reviewed) that reflected a prisoner identification number of “0.” According to USMS officials, these instances reflect “unknown” prisoners. In other words, the person did not have a USMS prisoner identification number because the individual was not yet in USMS custody. However, a “0” was entered into PTS for scheduling purposes in order to notify USMS staff that an individual might need to be processed after the hearing. USMS officials informed us that these records are excluded from analyses performed by its Management and Budget Division. In our opinion, excluding these instances from budget and workforce planning computations does not present an accurate assessment of the USMS’s prisoner-related workload. Because prisoner movements represent a significant workload indicator for the USMS, it is critical for workforce planning that this system is as accurate as possible.

Although the problems identified with the USM-7, WIN, and PTS data do not account for a significant portion of the total records, we believe that, if uncorrected, they could have a significant effect on the operations of the USMS. Because these data systems directly feed the DBM and the USMS budget development process, we are concerned that the USMS may be basing its resource request, allocation, and utilization decisions on inaccurate and inconsistent data. If the systems from which the USMS obtains data to perform its planning activities are not reliable, then the USMS cannot accurately identify its needs within individual mission areas and cannot effectively plan for its future.

Chapter Summary

In reviewing the USMS’s workforce planning processes, we found that the USMS has taken steps to improve its strategic planning and develop quantitative models to determine its resource needs in association with its workload. However, the USMS needs to take further steps to ensure that its strategic plan is more aggressively promoted and its Unit Performance Plan process is fully implemented.

To improve its workforce management planning, a USMS working group recently completed a review of the current model. This group concluded that the DBM was a valid tool to assess staffing requirements, in part because this model relies on data from automated systems that it believed to be accurate. We concur that data verification is important in developing an effective allocation model, but believe the USMS must do a better job of ensuring the integrity of its data systems.

We found several areas of concern regarding the accuracy and consistency of the data contained in the USM-7, WIN, and PTS, all of which contribute to the DBM and the budgetary process. For example, we noted numerous deficiencies in the USM-7 database, which tracks resource utilization, including missing, poorly defined, and an excessively large number of project codes, as well as undefined program codes. Our review of WIN identified missing district office markers, improper status indicators, and improper use of system codes. Finally, we found that district offices were not recording prisoner movements in PTS consistently. These errors and inconsistencies could affect the USMS’s planning decisions and result in an inefficient use of personnel resources.


We recommend that the USMS:

  1. Ensure that the USMS’s strategic planning efforts are improved through oversight of the Unit Performance Plan initiative and stronger promotion of the strategic plan by district management.

  2. Improve its time reporting system and ensure the integrity of system data by: (1) allowing for the tracking of time by the minimum number of project codes necessary; and (2) implementing an automated control to ensure that all records entered into the time reporting system contain an active project code.

  3. Ensure it has a reliable, standardized process of tracking, by activity, the time of contractors procured through national vendor contracts (other than CSOs). The process should enable the USMS to generate cumulative reports of such activity so that the USMS is able to determine the total number of resources it requires to accomplish its various mission activities.

  4. Implement adequate automated controls into the WIN to ensure that: (1) warrants that have valid warrant closing dates are in a closed status, and (2) fugitive warrants are assigned a proper execution code when closed.

  5. Perform regular reviews of PTS to ensure the accuracy of the information contained within this system.

  6. Review alternative options for assigning prisoner identification numbers within PTS to ensure that all prisoner movements are accurately tracked.

  1. According to the 1993 Government Performance and Results Act (P.L. 103-62), a strategic plan should cover a minimum of a 5 year period and contain a comprehensive mission statement, define and prioritize the organization’s mission, identify key factors external to the agency that might affect its ability to achieve its goals and objectives, and assess current and future workload levels. In addition, the plan should outline the quantity and mix of resources that the organization needs to achieve its priority strategic goals and objectives. The plan should also detail the methods for measuring the progress and controlling the performance of the organization.

  2. Although the previous strategic plan was issued in 1997, the USMS did not develop another strategic plan until this effort in FY 2006.

  3. Organizational units include headquarters program offices, as well as district offices.

  4. The USMS used all three models until FY 2004 when USMS management decided to stop using the Uncontrollable Workload Growth Model. According to USMS officials, the model no longer suited the agency’s needs.

  5. According to the USMS, reallocations generally involve vacant positions rather than personnel relocations.

  6. The RAAB also recommended that a review be conducted to properly allocate headquarters resources because these positions are not included in the DBM.

  7. Only independent contractors procured through personal services contracts record their time on the USM-7. Independent contractors procured through national vendor contracts and Court Security Officers do not record their time on the USM-7.

  8. For example, a Criminal Investigator Deputy U.S. Marshal working on a 15 Most Wanted Fugitive investigation would record the number of hours he or she spends addressing that investigation to project code FWF2200F, which falls under the Fugitive Warrants program code.

  9. Appendix V contains a listing of all 18 program codes.

  10. The Gulf Coast Regional Fugitive Task Force’s jurisdiction covers the district offices located in Alabama and Mississippi. One of the project codes was to be used by the task force members in Alabama, while the other was to be used by those working in Mississippi.

  11. According to USMS officials, contracts for CSOs, which are funded by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, are very detailed with clearly defined duties. Further, USMS officials stated that USMS district Contracting Officer Technical Representatives monitor the activity of CSOs in their districts to ensure that the activities defined in the contracts are fulfilled.

  12. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. The United States Marshals Service’s Warrant Information Network, Audit Report 03-03, November 2002.

  13. Appendix I contains detailed information on all USMS data we reviewed.

  14. At the conclusion of our audit, a USMS headquarters official stated that as of FY 2005, foreign fugitive warrants can be entered into the WIN by a USMS headquarters component.

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