The United States Marshals Service's Workforce Planning and Management
(Redacted for Public Release)

Audit Report 07-38
July 2007
Office of the Inspector General

Chapter 3: USMS Resource Utilization and Workload

In this chapter, we review the USMS’s efforts to execute and evaluate its performance relative to its workforce. While the USMS uses several information technology systems to track resource utilization and workload, we found that it does not allocate resources to district offices for specific activities, nor does it routinely review how the utilization of its resources affects all aspects of USMS operations. Instead, district offices receive general allocations of operational and administrative positions. As a result, the USMS cannot definitively determine if its resources are being appropriately used in line with its varying priorities and responsibilities, nor can it ascertain how efficiently it is achieving its organizational objectives.

We conducted an in depth examination of the USMS’s use of its personnel resources and the workload addressed between FYs 2000 and 2005 to determine if staff were utilized in line with USMS priorities. We found that in FY 2005 the USMS expended the largest portion of its operational workforce on its highest priority – judicial and courthouse security matters. However, we found that although the USMS stated that investigating judicial threats, which is a task within the broad area of judicial and courthouse security, is a high priority and indicated the workload was rising and significant resources were being expended, USMS data indicates that minimal resources were utilized on protective investigations in FY 2005.

We obtained this data from the USMS’s automated system, and as noted in Chapter 2 we identified several concerns with the accuracy and reliability of the data contained within the USMS’s automated systems. However, we believe that the overall results presented in this chapter have utility for examining the USMS’s resource utilization and workload.

USMS Resource Utilization

To determine the specific mission areas in which the USMS concentrated its efforts during the scope of our audit, we reviewed data from the USM-7, and organized it into six categories, as displayed in Exhibit 3-1.38

Decision Unit Program
Judicial and Courthouse Security Court Security
In Court with Prisoners
Judicial/Other Protection
Judicial Protection without Prisoners
Threat Investigations
Protection of the Judicial Process39
Fugitive Apprehension Fugitive Warrants
Seized Assets
Service of Process
Prisoner Security and Transportation Community Detention
Receipt/Process of Prisoners
In-District Movement
JPATS Prisoner Movements
Protection of Witnesses Witness Security
Operations Support Emergency Operations
Missile Escort
Special Operations
Other40 Information Technology
Management & Administration

We found that, during most of our review period, the USMS utilized the largest portion of its operational personnel on its primary mission area, Judicial and Courthouse Security. The only exception to this occurred in FY 2003, when the USMS utilized the largest portion of its operational personnel on Other matters, which according to the USMS occurred as a result of the agency’s significant hiring push in FY 2003.41 The USMS had 1,006 operational full-time equivalent (FTE) positions addressing Judicial and Courthouse Security matters during FY 2000.42 This increased to 1,129 FTEs during FY 2005 – an increase of 12 percent. Similarly, between FYs 2000 and 2005 the USMS utilized a significant portion of its workforce on Fugitive Apprehension matters. The USMS’s utilization of resources in this area increased from 781 FTEs in FY 2000 to 1,060 during FY 2005, an increase of 36 percent. Exhibit 3-2 displays the number of USMS operational FTEs working in each decision unit over the course of our review period.


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Source: OIG analysis of USM-7 data

In sum, the USMS expended 1,129 operational FTEs on Judicial and Courthouse Security matters during FY 2005, while using 1,060 operational FTEs on Fugitive Apprehension matters during this same period. These two areas accounted for 56 percent of the USMS operational workforce.

USMS Workload

To accompany our analysis of the USMS’s resource utilization, we reviewed data related to selected areas of the USMS’s workload to identify the number and types of fugitive warrant investigations, the number of prisoner movements, and the number of matters related to potential threats against the federal judicial system that the USMS handled during our review period. We examined data between FYs 2000 and 2005 to identify workload changes in these areas.

Fugitive Apprehension

We analyzed the USMS’s WIN system to determine the total number of warrants opened or received by the USMS during each fiscal year of our review period, as well as those closed or cleared during the same timeframe. From our analysis, we determined that the USMS received 102,371 warrants during FY 2000, and 148,693 in FY 2005, resulting in an overall increase of 46,322 warrants, or 45 percent. Similarly, the USMS closed over 56,500 more warrants in FY 2005 than in FY 2000 (94,038 warrants closed during FY 2000 rising to 150,560 warrants closed during FY 2005) – an increase of 60 percent.

We further reviewed the data according to the three types of warrants received by the USMS: Class I, Class II, and Other warrants.

As presented in Exhibit 3-3, we compared the proportion of the total number of warrants received in each category in FY 2000 to those received in FY 2005. As reflected in this exhibit, the composition of the USMS’s fugitive warrant workload has changed significantly from FY 2000 to FY 2005. During FY 2000, 20 percent of the warrants received by the USMS were state and local warrants. However, for FY 2005 the proportion of state and local warrants increased to 43 percent of the total warrants received. According to USMS officials, this significant increase in state and local warrants is primarily the result of the USMS’s establishment of Regional Fugitive Task Forces.44


chart legend
FY 2000 FY 2005
31% Class I warrants, 49% Class II warrants, 20% state/local warrants. 27% Class I warrants, 30% Class II warrants, 43% state/local warrants.
Source: OIG analysis of WIN data

We also reviewed warrant closures. We found that the number of Class I and other warrants closed by the USMS increased from FY 2000 to FY 2005, while the number of Class II warrants closed declined during the same time period. Similarly, the most noticeable change occurred in the number of other, or state and local, warrants closed by the USMS. The USMS closed 45,622 more state and local warrants during FY 2005 than in FY 2000 – increasing from 19,535 warrants in FY 2000 to 65,157 in FY 2005. The results of this analysis mirror those identified with the change in USMS warrants received by category and indicate that the USMS is performing more work on state and local warrants.

Prisoner Security and Transportation

The USMS is responsible for transporting prisoners to and from court appearances as well as to health care facilities. Based on our analysis of data from the PTS, the number of prisoner movements recorded by the USMS increased between FYs 2000 and 2005, as did the number of prisoners handled, which are reflected in the following exhibit.


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Source: OIG analysis of PTS data

Specifically, we found that the USMS recorded 587,544 prisoner movements in FY 2000 and 807,476 movements in FY 2005 – an increase of almost 220,000 movements, or 37 percent. Further, we determined that the USMS reported handling 532,148 prisoners during FY 2000 and 705,341 prisoners during FY 2005.45 This computes to an overall increase of 173,193 prisoners, or 33 percent, transported by the USMS.

According to USMS headquarters officials, these increases are caused partly by a growth in prisoner population and partly by the increased use of the PTS.46 The USMS stated that its average daily prisoner population was 34,531 during FY 2000 and 53,446 during FY 2005, which equated to a 55 percent growth.

Potential Threats to the Federal Judicial System

The USMS addresses potential threats to federal protectees, including federal judges, prosecutors, jurors, and other court personnel. The USMS conducts a protective investigation primarily in response to inappropriate communications or direct threats.47 Using data from the WIN system, we determined that the total number of potential threats reported to USMS district offices more than doubled from FY 2000 to FY 2005. Specifically, we computed that USMS district offices received information on 703 potential threats during FY 2000, while receiving 922 in FY 2005 – an overall increase of 219 potential threats, or 31 percent. According to USMS officials, a portion of this increase can be attributed to the USMS’s efforts in educating the judiciary on security-related topics and the USMS’s responsibilities related to these matters.

Subsequent to our analyses of FYs 2000 through 2005 potential threat data, we obtained and performed similar analyses on data from FY 2006. We found that between FYs 2005 and 2006, the USMS experienced a 14 percent increase in the number of potential threats reported to USMS district offices. Moreover, the USMS received 349 more potential threats in FY 2006 than in FY 2000, an overall increase of 50 percent. Exhibit 3 5 illustrates the number of potential threats reported to USMS district offices from FYs 2000 through 2006.

FY 2000: 703; FY 2001: 697; FY 2002: 545; FY 2003: 591; FY 2004: 678; FY 2005: 922; FY 2006: 1,052.
Source: OIG analysis of WIN data

USMS Efforts to Monitor and Assess its Performance

The USMS does not allocate resources among its district offices according to specific mission areas, such as fugitive apprehension. Instead, the authorized positions are allocated among two position types – operational and administrative. Therefore, each district is allocated a “pool” of operational and administrative resources that the U.S. Marshal may utilize as he or she deems appropriate.

According to several management officials at USMS headquarters and the district offices we visited, they do not review overall resource utilization reports related to the activities and personnel for which they are responsible because they know how their resources are being used. Instead, they examine work-hour reports related to certain types of work hours, such as overtime, and specific assignments, such as the Moussaoui trial.49

Throughout our audit, several USMS officials described how they believed the USMS was expending its personnel resources and the types and amount of work performed. However, we identified discrepancies between our analyses of USMS resource utilization and casework and the descriptions provided by various USMS personnel. We believe that these discrepancies help to illustrate that periodic reviews of resource utilization would be beneficial to USMS management to ensure that the USMS is appropriately addressing priority tasks. Regular reviews would also help to ensure that the USMS is using the most accurate personnel and workload data possible in its resource planning processes.

Protective Investigations50

In the past few years, incidents including the murder of family members of a federal judge in Chicago, Illinois, as well as a shooting within a Georgia state courthouse, have raised the visibility and importance of investigating potential threats to court personnel. Congress has recognized this potential threat by funding the installation of home security systems for every federal judge, a project which is currently being overseen by the USMS. This is also reflected by the statements of several USMS officials, including the Director, who stated that the investigation of threats against the federal judiciary is a top priority of the agency.

Based upon the emphasis placed on this responsibility, we expected there to be a significant number of FTEs utilized in this area. However, we found that the USM-7 data reflects that it utilized just 24 FTEs on protective investigations during FY 2005, which includes all 94 district offices and headquarters, including the Office of Protective Intelligence (OPI).51 Additionally, according to the USMS data, approximately 1 of the 24 FTEs reflected work performed by USMS headquarters personnel.

When discussing the results of our analysis with an OPI official, he stated that he believes the amount of work in this area must have been underreported by USMS personnel. According to this official, the OPI had approximately five employees working solely on protective investigation matters during FY 2005. He further remarked that each district assigns its personnel to protective investigations based on what district management deems appropriate, and that some districts have specific squads detailed to this duty.

Despite the OPI official’s belief that the figures were underreported, it is conceivable that only 24 FTEs in the entire USMS worked on judicial threats during FY 2005. According to several USMS district office representatives, personnel have not been able to devote as much time to protective investigations as needed because they often have to assist with other court-related duties. For example, a USMS official from [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] commented that the caseload of [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] addressing protective investigations ranged from 10 to 45 cases each. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

Subsequent to the completion of our analysis, we obtained updated FTE data for the USMS’s FY 2006 activities related to protective investigations. We found that the number of USMS personnel addressing protective investigations only marginally increased from 24 FTEs in FY 2005 to 28 FTEs in FY 2006.

Based on our review, we found a great deal of uncertainty in the amount of work the USMS is performing in the area of protective investigations. We believe that the USMS should examine the use of its resources in this area and determine if the appropriate level of effort is being expended.

We also identified a backlog with headquarters’ review of potential threats. To assist in assessing risk and to help prioritize work, USMS headquarters is responsible for reviewing information related to each potential threat and assigning a threat level rating.52 This rating is reflected in the WIN system. During our review of threat-related data in the WIN system, we identified 211 FY 2005 records with a rating of “0.” According to the USMS, this is the default value recorded until the analysis is completed. The 211 unrated records as of October 2006 represent 23 percent of the 922 total potential threats recorded in FY 2005.

When we presented information on the missing mosaic ratings to a senior analyst assigned to the OPI, which is the unit responsible for identifying the ratings, the analyst stated that the office is continually short-staffed and that the unit is simply not able to review every potential threat in a timely manner. While the unit was aware that a backlog existed, the senior analyst expressed surprise at the extent of the backlog that we identified and stated that it would be helpful if the unit performed analyses similar to ours. When we subsequently analyzed FY 2006 threat-related casework data, we noted a similar backlog with USMS headquarters’ review of potential threats. Specifically, we found that 766 (or 73 percent) of the 1,052 total potential threats recorded in FY 2006 had not been assigned a mosaic rating as of March 2007. However, at the conclusion of our audit, a USMS official informed us that the agency had resolved the entire backlog as of March 2007.53

In addition, during our review, we identified a delay from the dates some potential threats were reported to USMS district offices and the dates that the district offices entered them into the WIN. The recording delays dated back to FY 1994, although the majority of the delays were 1 fiscal year in duration. The following table exhibits these delays.


Recorded in FY 2005
Recorded in FY 2006
Fiscal Year
Threat was
Number of
Fiscal Year
Threat was
Number of
FY 1994 0 FY 1994 1
FY 1995 0 FY 1995 1
FY 1996 1 FY 1996 1
FY 1997 1 FY 1997 1
FY 1998 0 FY 1998 4
FY 1999 0 FY 1999 0
FY 2000 1 FY 2000 1
FY 2001 1 FY 2001 1
FY 2002 3 FY 2002 0
FY 2003 1 FY 2003 1
FY 2004 20 FY 2004 1
FY 2005 N/A FY 2005 40
Source: OIG analysis of USMS threat-related data.

The OPI offered two possible reasons for the delays noted in the preceding exhibit. Prior to FY 2005, both USMS district personnel and members of the federal judiciary did not fully understand what constituted potential threats and what the responsibilities were for addressing them. To remedy this, the USMS provided several training sessions on protective investigations to its personnel in FYs 2005 and 2006. Upon completion of this training, USMS district personnel reviewed dated materials and entered previously unreported potential threats into the WIN. Additionally, the OPI speculated that data entry errors made by USMS district personnel contributed to these delays. Specifically, one common error occurred when USMS district personnel entered the same person as both the victim and the source of the potential threat. In order to correct this problem, each record in error had to be deleted and re-entered into the data system, thus reflecting a more recent date of entry. According to the OPI, changes to the WIN have been made that now prevent this data entry error.

Fugitive Apprehension

According to USM-7 data, the USMS had 664 operational FTEs addressing fugitive apprehension matters during FY 2000, which increased to 981 operational FTEs during FY 2005 – an increase of 317 FTEs, or 48 percent. This significant increase in FTEs performing fugitive-related work is consistent with the increase we identified in the USMS’s fugitive warrant workload. We found that the total number of fugitive warrants received by the USMS had increased by 45 percent from FY 2000 to FY 2005. Similarly, the USMS closed 60 percent more warrants in FY 2005 than in FY 2000.

In contrast to the perceived correlation between the significant increase in FTEs addressing fugitive-related matters and the increase in fugitive warrant workload, several individuals from the district offices we reviewed had contradictory viewpoints on the USMS’s fugitive apprehension efforts. With the exception of [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED], personnel from each of the district offices we visited informed us that their fugitive apprehension activity had suffered during the past few years. Additionally, many of these district offices were not able to devote as many deputies to conduct fugitive apprehension work in FY 2005 as they had in FY 2000 even though their fugitive warrant workload had increased during this time. Instead, they commented that deputies often were pulled from fugitive investigations to assist with myriad court-related duties, causing a backlog on fugitive-related matters. USMS officials from [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED] also commented that they had encountered a backlog with their fugitive warrant workload due to a reduction in administrative personnel that caused deputies to perform administrative duties rather than conducting fugitive investigations.

This discrepancy between statements of USMS personnel and our review of empirical data again raises the question of whether work hours are being recorded accurately and if the USMS truly knows how its resources are being used. Exhibit 3-7 identifies the resource utilization changes of operational personnel performing fugitive-related work within the seven district offices where we conducted fieldwork. As shown, the Central District of California and Southern District of Florida had more deputies involved in fugitive-related matters during FY 2005 than during FY 2000, which is contradictory to statements made by officials at these districts.

District Office FY 2000
FY 2005
Change in
Change in
Central District of California 18 25 7 39%
D.C. Superior Court 19 18 -1 -5%
District of Rhode Island 3 5 2 67%
Northern District of Illinois 15 11 -4 -27%
Southern District of Florida 19 22 3 16%
Southern District of New York 21 17 -4 -19%
Western District of Texas 20 49 29 145%
Source: OIG analysis of USM-7 data

We reviewed the changes in fugitive warrant workload within these district offices to determine if there was any correlation between the change in FTEs addressing fugitive-related matters and the change in fugitive warrants closed. Exhibit 3-8 presents information on fugitive warrants closed. In all instances, a district office that experienced an increase in the number of FTEs addressing fugitive investigations also had an increase in the number of warrants closed. Likewise, one district office (D.C. Superior Court) that used fewer operational FTEs during FY 2005 than during FY 2000 on fugitive-related matters closed fewer fugitive warrants over this same period of time. However, there were some exceptions, namely in the Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of New York. The USM 7 data indicated that each of these district offices utilized four fewer FTES on fugitive matters in FY 2005 than in FY 2000. In contrast, the number of warrants closed in these districts increased between FYs 2000 and 2005.

District Office FY 2000 FY 2005 Change in
Change in
Central District of California 1,684 2,879 1,195 71%
D.C. Superior Court 3,295 2,044 -1,251 -38%
District of Rhode Island 283 342 59 21%
Northern District of Illinois 936 3,985 3,049 326%
Southern District of Florida 2,472 3,168 696 28%
Southern District of New York 1,699 1,881 182 11%
Western District of Texas 4,548 6,129 1,581 35%
Source: OIG analysis of WIN data

We believe that these inconsistencies illustrate that periodic reviews of resource utilization and workload statistics can provide USMS management with valuable information. For instance, as discussed USMS data indicated that the Southern District of New York utilized fewer operational FTEs on fugitive investigations during FY 2005 as compared to FY 2000, yet the USMS data also revealed that it had closed a significant number of fugitive warrants during this timeframe. Assuming that these figures are accurate, the Southern District of New York could be using a “best practice” technique to efficiently and effectively address its fugitive apprehension work.

Contract Guard Utilization

According to USMS directives, district offices may procure contract guards to perform certain activities, including securing and processing federal prisoners in the cellblock, courtroom, and during transportation; securing and transporting federal prisoners to and from medical appointments or hospitalization; and securing federally seized or forfeited property. However, these directives also state that contract guards are prohibited from conducting certain activities such as any type of investigation or personal security detail.55

As shown in the following exhibit, we determined that some contract guards had recorded time on activities that they were prohibited from performing.56 For example, the USM-7 data file indicated that contract guards worked on federal felony and non-felony warrants, 15 most wanted and major cases, terrorist investigations, and protective investigations. Similarly, we identified several instances in which contract guards had recorded time to protective details of, among others, three district court judges, Supreme Court Justices, and the Deputy Attorney General, as well as for judicial conferences and U.S. Attorneys’ conferences. In total, we computed that during our review period the USMS’s potential use of contract guards for restricted duties ranged from 22 to 43 FTEs.57

Decision Unit FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005
Judicial & Courthouse Security 14 14 18 24 21 24
Fugitive Apprehension 6 3 5 3 17 7
Prisoner Security & Transportation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Protection of Witnesses 1 1 1 2 4 1
Operations Support 0 0 1 0 0 4
Other 12 4 4 2 1 2
Total 33 22 29 31 43 38
Source: OIG analysis of USM-7 data

We discussed this issue with each of the headquarters unit Assistant Directors. These USMS officials did not know if contractors had performed restricted duties or had simply recorded their time to project codes associated with prohibited activities. Most expressed surprise and stated that contract guards should not be used on these types of activities and none had ever received a request from a district to use these resources in this manner. However, they offered possible explanations as to why this might have occurred. For instance, the Assistant Directors suggested that a district may have used contract guards as drivers during protective details since these individuals, who are often off-duty police officers, are most familiar with the local area.

Another common explanation provided by USMS officials for the time reporting of contract guards related to a USMS effort to track costs incurred on special assignments. They explained that contract guards are often hired in the districts to backfill positions left vacant when an operational employee is temporarily assigned to special tasks. The contractor records his work hours to the project code linked with the funding provided to the district for the special task, and because the financial and timekeeping systems are related, the result is that the contractor’s time is associated with the work performed by the individual whose position has been backfilled.

Despite these possibilities, the USMS could not verify that these contract guards were being used in accordance with USMS directives. Moreover, the Assistant Directors remarked that a U.S. Marshal may have granted approval, unbeknownst to headquarters, to allow contract guards to address these activities.

When recording time, personnel should use the project code associated with the task being performed by them, not someone else. This would help the USMS to accurately determine its resource utilization. A USMS official explained that the USMS plans to expand the use of another data field in its timekeeping system to identify the actual activity personnel are performing. We believe that USMS management should regularly review the utilization of contract guards in order to ensure that they are performing in accordance with USMS policy.

Familiarity with USMS Data Systems

During our fieldwork, we found that the manipulation and interpretation of information in the USMS’s automated data systems is limited to a very small number of staff at USMS headquarters. As a result, only one or two individuals from each program area were intimately familiar with the workload-related operational data systems, as well as how the districts utilized them. For example, the USMS has one headquarters-based individual who serves as the liaison with the district offices regarding the PTS. However, this individual was detailed on a temporary duty assignment for approximately 1 month during our review, and no one else was capable of fully answering our questions regarding the content and usage of the data system.

Further, we attempted to verify results of our data analyses with program officials. The program officials directed us to a single individual within the Management and Budget Division where, we were told, this individual is responsible for extracting, manipulating, and reporting all workload related data that is reflected in the USMS budgets. However, despite preparing the performance and workload-related reports, this official was unable to provide explanations about changes in USMS resource utilization and workload and referred us back to the program officials. We believe that the USMS should have an adequate number of staff familiar with the data systems, both to ensure continuity in the assessment of the USMS workload, as well as a contingency in the event the person who knows the system is not able to perform his or her duties.

Chapter Summary

We found that although the USMS uses several information technology systems to track resource utilization and activities by specific workload areas, it does not allocate resources to district offices in this manner. Further, USMS officials do not routinely review overall resource utilization reports related to the activities and personnel for which they are responsible. As a result, the USMS cannot definitively determine if its resources are being appropriately used in line with its varying priorities and responsibilities, nor can it ascertain how efficiently it is achieving its organizational objectives.

We believe that the USMS should frequently review resource utilization data to identify, and thereby address, any inconsistencies. For example, although the USMS stated that investigating judicial threats is a high priority and indicated the workload was rising and significant resources were being expended, USMS data indicates that only 24 operational FTEs were utilized in this area in FY 2005. By contrast, 981 operational FTEs were used on fugitive apprehension. Routine monitoring and evaluation of its workforce would also help ensure that personnel are being appropriately assigned to handle the priority areas of the agency. Moreover, these reviews, when examined in conjunction with workload statistics, can assist management in identifying any best practices or potential areas of improvement in the efficiency of the USMS.


We recommend that the USMS:

  1. Require that resource utilization reports be generated and reviewed regularly by USMS management to ensure USMS resources are being utilized as intended. Particular attention should be paid to the area of protective investigations.

  2. Ensure that there is an adequate number of staff familiar with the data systems to allow for continuity in the assessment of the USMS workload.

  1. As noted, each individual assigns time to a project code according to the task they have performed. The USMS had 1,607 project codes in existence between FYs 2000 and 2005. The USMS stated that not all 1,607 codes were available for use during each year; however, the USMS could not identify the specific project codes available for use during each fiscal year. Because the USMS has no formalized system by which it assigns project codes to specific mission activities, we considered input provided by USMS personnel and manually assigned each project code to a mission activity. With the assistance of USMS personnel, we further categorized the data by organizing the USMS’s mission activities in accordance with the five areas that the agency has recently proposed to use in budget formulation. We added the category entitled “Other” to capture data that did not correspond with one of these five areas (called decision units). We presented this to USMS personnel, and they concurred with our groupings.

  2. “Protection of the Judicial Process” is not one of the 18 program codes or mission activities used by the USMS. According to USMS officials, there were some project codes that applied to more than one mission activity. In these instances, the USMS categorized them under this name. Therefore, we considered utilization data pertaining to this category to be part of the “Judicial and Courthouse Security” decision unit.

  3. The “Other” category includes two USMS mission activities (Information Technology and Management & Administration) that do not correspond to one of its five proposed budgetary decision units. Additionally, this category includes those areas that the USMS was uncertain to which decision unit the activities applied.

  4. New USMS recruits attending basic training record their time on the USM-7 to a management and administration project code related to training.

  5. Individual USMS operational employees may record a percentage of their daily time on several different activities during the course of a single day or year. This means that a single FTE does not necessarily indicate 1 individual worked an entire year on a single matter; it could indicate that 4 employees each worked 25 percent of their time during the year on that specific matter. Yet in both cases the data would indicate that 1 FTE worked on that matter for the entire fiscal year.

  6. In 1988, the Attorney General issued a fugitive apprehension policy. Among other items, the policy states that the FBI and DEA shall have apprehension responsibility on all arrest warrants resulting from their own investigations.

  7. The Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000 established Fugitive Apprehension Task Forces in designated regions of the United States. The task forces consist of federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities and are directed and coordinated by the USMS. As of FY 2007, there were six Regional Fugitive Task Forces.

  8. In analyzing the number of prisoners handled by the USMS, we concentrated our efforts on determining the number of unique prisoners transported by the USMS on a daily basis. The same prisoner may be moved multiple times during the same day, such as for an initial court appearance and then for a meeting with an attorney. In this instance, we would consider that the USMS handled one prisoner during the day.

  9. As reported in Chapter 2, USMS headquarters officials remarked that there were inconsistencies in how district offices recorded information in the PTS.

  10. According to the USMS, an inappropriate communication is “any communication in writing, by telephone, verbally, through an informant, or by some suspicious activity that threatens, harasses, or makes unsettling overtures of an improper nature directed toward a USMS protectee.” Additionally, a threat is “any action, whether explicit or implied, of an intent to assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any member of the federal judiciary, or other USMS protectee.” For purposes of this report, we refer to all inappropriate communications/threats as “potential threats.”

  11. Because we focused on district office workload, we based our analysis of potential threats on the dates they were reported to USMS district offices. In contrast, the OPI bases its count of potential threats on the date the potential threat is reported to the OPI. For example, a potential threat may be reported to a USMS district office in September 2005 but not reported to the OPI until October 2005. In such a case, we would include this potential threat in our FY 2005 total, while the OPI would include this threat in its FY 2006 total. The OPI’s reported figures for our review period were 683 in FY 2000, 629 in FY 2001, 565 in FY 2002, 585 in FY 2003, 674 in FY 2004, 953 in FY 2005, and 1,111 in FY 2006.

  12. Zacarias Moussaoui is a French citizen of Moroccan descent who was convicted of conspiring to kill Americans as part of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Tried in the Eastern District of Virginia, he was sentenced on May 4, 2006, to life in prison.

  13. According to USMS officials, investigations of threats involving the federal judiciary are referred to as “protective investigations,” although the USM-7 project code refers to them as “threat investigations.”

  14. Established in February 2005, the mission of the OPI is to provide the USMS with aggressive and proactive protective investigation analyses. The OPI collects, analyzes, and disseminates information about groups, individuals, and activities that pose a potential threat to persons and property protected by the USMS.

  15. During our review period, the USMS used a rating system referred to as the mosaic rating. This rating system applied an algorithmic formula to answers for 31 multiple-choice questions. While this tool was used to assist in addressing protective investigations, the USMS stated that it did not imply that inappropriate communications with low or moderate threat levels were not handled. Instead, the USMS remarked that all inappropriate communications are to be investigated and assessed commensurate with the threat level.

  16. According to the USMS, it was not necessary to perform mosaic analyses on these cases in order to resolve them because the cases had already been closed by district offices without requests from district offices to the OPI for further analysis. Additionally, utilizing personnel to perform analyses on cases that had been determined by district offices to not be credible would be an inefficient use of resources.

  17. Between FYs 2002 through 2003, the USMS established Regional Fugitive Task Forces covering four of the seven district offices listed in this exhibit – Central District of California, D.C. Superior Court, Northern District of Illinois, and Southern District of New York.

  18. Contract guards involved with the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation Service (JPATS) may be an exception during prisoner movements involving international extraditions or witness security details. The JPATS, which is managed by the USMS, transports prisoners and aliens in federal custody within the United States and overseas using primarily air transportation. The JPATS serves not only the USMS, but also the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

  19. As noted in Chapter 2, guards hired as independent contractors are the only contract personnel who record their time in the USM-7. Therefore, we could not review the activities of those guards procured through national vendor contracts.

  20. We used a conservative approach for determining the number of contract guard FTEs that were not potentially used in accordance with USMS policy. The specific meaning of some project codes was not evident, and an accurate determination could not be made if they should be considered allowable or restricted duties. In these instances, we treated these project codes as being permissible.

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