CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
- Introduction
- OIG investigation
- Organization of the OIG report
CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND
- Introduction
- Introduction to international terrorism
- The FBI’s role in protecting against international terrorism
- The FBI’s organizational structure with respect to international terrorism
- Counterterrorism Program
- Organization of the Counterterrorism Division
- Management of counterterrorism cases at FBI Headquarters
- Field offices and counterterrorism investigations
- The Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
- The wall between intelligence and criminal terrorism investigations
- Introduction
- The “primary purpose” standard
- Institutional divide between criminal and intelligence investigations
- The Ames case and concerns about the primary purpose standard
- The 1995 Procedures
- Additional restrictions on sharing intelligence information
- Reports evaluating the impact of the 1995 Procedures
- FISA Court’s concern about accuracy of FISA applications
- Errors in FISA applications
- FISA Court’s new requirements regarding the wall
- Additional FISA errors and DOJ OPR’s investigation
- Deputy Attorney General Thompson’s August 2001 memorandum
- The impact of the wall
- Changes to the wall after September 11, 2001
- The process for obtaining a FISA warrant
- Legal requirements for a FISA warrant
- Agent of a foreign power
- The application filed with the FISA Court
- Assembling an application for submission to the FISA Court
- Investigation and LHM prepared by field office
- Role of SSAs and IOSs at FBI Headquarters
- Role of NSLU attorneys
- Role of OIPR attorneys
- Expedited FISA warrants
CHAPTER THREE: THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND OTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO USE OF AIRPLANES IN TERRORISTS ATTACKS
- Introduction
- The Phoenix EC
- Background
- Assigning leads in the FBI
- The Phoenix EC
- Information on individuals
- Recommendations in the Phoenix EC
- Addressees on the Phoenix EC
- Williams’ theory
- FBI Headquarters’ handling of the Phoenix EC
- Assignment to the RFU
- Assignment to the UBLU
- The New York Division’s handling of the EC
- OIG analysis
- Systemic problems
- Ineffective system for assigning and managing work
- Lack of adequate strategic analytical capabilities
- Resources and training for analysts
- Poor information flow and information sharing
- General complaints about the difficulties of working in ITOS
- Individual performance
- Kenneth Williams
- FBI Headquarters
- Lynn
- Jay
- FBI management
- Other pieces of intelligence concerning airplanes as weapons
- Conclusion
CHAPTER FOUR: THE FBI’S INVESTIGATION OF
ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI
- Introduction
- Statement of facts related to the FBI’s Moussaoui investigation
- Moussaoui’s background
- The FBI receives information about Moussaoui
- The Minneapolis FBI’s investigation
- The Minneapolis FBI opens an intelligence investigation
- Initial checks for information
- The investigation continues
- The decision to arrest Moussaoui
- Moussaoui’s arrest
- Search of hotel room and Al-Attas’ possessions
- Interview of Al-Attas
- Interview of Moussaoui
- Minneapolis FBI’s consultation with Minneapolis United States Attorney’s Office
- Al-Attas’ arrest
- Expedited deportation order
- Discussion regarding search warrant
- Henry’s 26-page EC
- Assignment of Moussaoui investigation at FBI Headquarters
- Prior relationship between the Minneapolis FBI and RFU
- Gary seeks advice from ASAC Charles
- Henry discusses with Don pursuing criminal warrant
- CDC Rowley’s recommendation
- The FISA request
- Minneapolis seeks to expedite the FISA process
- The RFU’s assessment of the Minneapolis FBI’s FISA request
- Additional information related to Moussaoui
- Consultations with NSLU attorney Howard
- French information about Moussaoui
- Martin advises Minneapolis FBI that French information is not sufficient to connect Moussaoui to a foreign power
- Robin’s research to link Moussaoui to recognized foreign power or terrorist organization
- Martin and Robin consult with NSLU attorney Tim
- Martin tells Minneapolis its FISA request was not an emergency
- Martin seeks information from FAA
- Minneapolis FBI seeks assistance from the CIA and London Legat
- Minneapolis prepares emergency FISA request
- Dispute between Minneapolis and Martin
- Minneapolis contacts RFU Unit Chief
- Martin and Robin’s consultation with NSLU attorney Susan
- Martin’s edits to Minneapolis’ FISA request
- Consultation with NSLU chief Spike Bowman
- Additional information about Al-Attas and Moussaoui
- Failure to reconsider seeking a criminal warrant
- Additional French information received about Moussaoui
- Deportation plans
- Dissemination of information about Moussaoui
- September 11 attacks
- Information received from British authorities on September 12 and 13
- Moussaoui’s indictment
- OIG Analysis
- No intentional misconduct
- Probable cause was not clear
- Problems in the FBI’s handling of the Moussaoui investigation
- Initial evaluation of the request for a FISA warrant
- Failure to reconsider criminal warrant
- Conservatism with respect to FISA
- Assessment of probable cause
- Conflict between Minneapolis and FBI Headquarters
- Problems with legal review of FISA request
- The Phoenix EC
- Edits to Minneapolis FBI’s FISA request
- Inadequate dissemination of threat information
- Inadequate training
- Individual performance
- RFU
- Don
- Martin
- Robin
- NSLU attorneys
- Minneapolis FBI employees
- Conclusion
CHAPTER FIVE: TWO SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS: KHALID AL-MIHDHAR AND NAWAF AL-HAZMI
- Introduction
- Background
- OIG investigation
- Background on the CIA
- CIA authority and mission
- Organization of the CIA
- The CIA’s collection and internal dissemination of information
- Passing of intelligence information by the CIA to the FBI
- FBI detailees to the CIA Counterterrorist Center
- FBI Headquarters detailees
- Washington Field Office detailees
- New York Field Office detailee
- Factual chronology regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar
- Identification in January 2000 of Hazmi and Mihdhar as al Qaeda operatives
- Background
- NSA provides intelligence regarding planned travel by al Qaeda operatives to Malaysia
- Mihdhar’s travel and discovery of his U.S. visa
- CIR is drafted to pass Mihdhar’s visa information to the FBI
- Mihdhar in Dubai
- CIA cable stating that Mihdhar’s visa and passport information had been passed to FBI
- The Malaysia meetings and surveillance of Mihdhar
- OIG findings regarding FBI’s knowledge about Mihdhar and the Malaysia meetings
- Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego
- Introduction
- Hazmi and Mihdhar’s association with Bayoumi
- Hazmi and Mihdhar’s communications
- Hazmi and Mihdhar’s association with an FBI asset beginning in May 2000
- OIG conclusion
- Mihdhar’s association with Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole attack
- Background
- Source’s identification of Khallad
- OIG conclusions regarding whether the FBI was aware of the source’s identification of Khallad in the Kuala Lumpur photograph
- FBI and CIA discussions about the Cole investigation in May and June 2001
- Background
- Discussions in May 2001
- June 11, 2001, meeting
- OIG conclusions on May and June discussions
- The FBI’s efforts to locate Mihdhar in August and September 2001
- Continuing review of the Malaysia meetings in July and August 2001
- Discovery of Mihdhar’s entry into the United States
- The FBI’s intelligence investigation on Mihdhar
- The New York Field Office’s investigation
- OIG conclusions on the intelligence investigation
- Summary of the five opportunities for the FBI to learn about Mihdhar and Hazmi
- OIG’s analysis of the FBI’s handling of the intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar
- Systemic impediments that hindered the sharing of information between the CIA and the FBI
- Use of detailees
- FBI employees’ lack of understanding of CIA reporting process
- Inadequate procedures for documenting receipt of CIA information
- Lack of appropriate infrastructure in FBI field offices
- OIG conclusion on impediments to information sharing
- The actions of the San Diego FBI
- The San Diego FBI’s preliminary investigation of Bayoumi
- The FBI’s handling of the informational asset
- San Diego FBI’s failure to prioritize counterterrorism investigations
- Events in the spring and summer of 2001
- Restrictions on the flow of information within the FBI
- Problems at the June 11 meeting
- The FBI’s investigation in August 2001 to find Mihdhar and Hazmi
- Individual performance
- Dwight
- Malcolm
- Stan
- Max
- Donna
- Rob
- Richard
- Mary
- OIG conclusions
CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
- Recommendations
- Recommendations related to the FBI’s analytical program
- Recommendations related to the FISA process
- Recommendations related to the FBI’s interactions with the Intelligence Community
- Other recommendations
- Conclusions
APPENDICES:
- List of Acronyms
- Phoenix EC
[REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED]
- FBI Response to the Report
[REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED]
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