A Review of the FBI's Handling of Intelligence Information Prior to the September 11 Attacks

Special Report
November 2004 (Released Publicly June 2005)
Office of the Inspector General


Table of Contents

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED


NOTE

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

  1. Introduction
  2. OIG investigation
  3. Organization of the OIG report

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND

  1. Introduction
    1. Introduction to international terrorism
    2. The FBI’s role in protecting against international terrorism

  2. The FBI’s organizational structure with respect to international terrorism
    1. Counterterrorism Program
      1. Organization of the Counterterrorism Division
      2. Management of counterterrorism cases at FBI Headquarters
    2. Field offices and counterterrorism investigations
    3. The Department’s Office of Intelligence Policy and Review

  3. The wall between intelligence and criminal terrorism investigations
    1. Introduction
      1. The “primary purpose” standard
      2. Institutional divide between criminal and intelligence investigations
      3. The Ames case and concerns about the primary purpose standard
      4. The 1995 Procedures
      5. Additional restrictions on sharing intelligence information
      6. Reports evaluating the impact of the 1995 Procedures
    2. FISA Court’s concern about accuracy of FISA applications
      1. Errors in FISA applications
      2. FISA Court’s new requirements regarding the wall
      3. Additional FISA errors and DOJ OPR’s investigation
    3. Deputy Attorney General Thompson’s August 2001 memorandum
    4. The impact of the wall
    5. Changes to the wall after September 11, 2001

  4. The process for obtaining a FISA warrant
    1. Legal requirements for a FISA warrant
      1. Agent of a foreign power
      2. The application filed with the FISA Court
    2. Assembling an application for submission to the FISA Court
      1. Investigation and LHM prepared by field office
      2. Role of SSAs and IOSs at FBI Headquarters
      3. Role of NSLU attorneys
      4. Role of OIPR attorneys
      5. Expedited FISA warrants

CHAPTER THREE: THE FBI’S HANDLING OF THE PHOENIX ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION AND OTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO USE OF AIRPLANES IN TERRORISTS ATTACKS

  1. Introduction
  2. The Phoenix EC
    1. Background
      1. Assigning leads in the FBI
    2. The Phoenix EC
      1. Information on individuals
      2. Recommendations in the Phoenix EC
      3. Addressees on the Phoenix EC
    3. Williams’ theory
    4. FBI Headquarters’ handling of the Phoenix EC
      1. Assignment to the RFU
      2. Assignment to the UBLU
    5. The New York Division’s handling of the EC

  3. OIG analysis
    1. Systemic problems
      1. Ineffective system for assigning and managing work
      2. Lack of adequate strategic analytical capabilities
      3. Resources and training for analysts
      4. Poor information flow and information sharing
      5. General complaints about the difficulties of working in ITOS
    2. Individual performance
      1. Kenneth Williams
      2. FBI Headquarters
      3. Lynn
      4. Jay
      5. FBI management
    3. Other pieces of intelligence concerning airplanes as weapons
    4. Conclusion

CHAPTER FOUR: [INFORMATION REDACTED]

CHAPTER FIVE: TWO SEPTEMBER 11 HIJACKERS: KHALID AL-MIHDHAR AND NAWAF AL-HAZMI

  1. Introduction
  2. Background
    1. OIG investigation
    2. Background on the CIA
      1. CIA authority and mission
      2. Organization of the CIA
      3. The CIA’s collection and internal dissemination of information
      4. Passing of intelligence information by the CIA to the FBI
    3. FBI detailees to the CIA Counterterrorist Center
      1. FBI Headquarters detailees
      2. Washington Field Office detailees
      3. New York Field Office detailee

  3. Factual chronology regarding Hazmi and Mihdhar
    1. Identification in January 2000 of Hazmi and Mihdhar as al Qaeda operatives
      1. Background
      2. NSA provides intelligence regarding planned travel by al Qaeda operatives to Malaysia
      3. Mihdhar’s travel and discovery of his U.S. visa
      4. CIR is drafted to pass Mihdhar’s visa information to the FBI
      5. Mihdhar in Dubai
      6. CIA cable stating that Mihdhar’s visa and passport information had been passed to FBI
      7. The Malaysia meetings and surveillance of Mihdhar
      8. OIG findings regarding FBI’s knowledge about Mihdhar and the Malaysia meetings
    2. Hazmi and Mihdhar in San Diego
      1. Introduction
      2. Hazmi and Mihdhar’s association with Bayoumi
      3. Hazmi and Mihdhar’s communications
      4. Hazmi and Mihdhar’s association with an FBI asset beginning in May 2000
      5. OIG conclusion
    3. Mihdhar’s association with Khallad, the purported mastermind of the Cole attack
      1. Background
      2. Source’s identification of Khallad
      3. OIG conclusions regarding whether the FBI was aware of the source’s identification of Khallad in the Kuala Lumpur photograph
    4. FBI and CIA discussions about the Cole investigation in May and June 2001
      1. Background
      2. Discussions in May 2001
      3. June 11, 2001, meeting
      4. OIG conclusions on May and June discussions
    5. The FBI’s efforts to locate Mihdhar in August and September 2001
      1. Continuing review of the Malaysia meetings in July and August 2001
      2. Discovery of Mihdhar’s entry into the United States
      3. The FBI’s intelligence investigation on Mihdhar
      4. The New York Field Office’s investigation
      5. OIG conclusions on the intelligence investigation
    6. Summary of the five opportunities for the FBI to learn about Mihdhar and Hazmi

  4. OIG’s analysis of the FBI’s handling of the intelligence information concerning Hazmi and Mihdhar
    1. Systemic impediments that hindered the sharing of information between the CIA and the FBI
      1. Use of detailees
      2. FBI employees’ lack of understanding of CIA reporting process
      3. Inadequate procedures for documenting receipt of CIA information
      4. Lack of appropriate infrastructure in FBI field offices
      5. OIG conclusion on impediments to information sharing
    2. The actions of the San Diego FBI
      1. The San Diego FBI’s preliminary investigation of Bayoumi
      2. The FBI’s handling of the informational asset
      3. San Diego FBI’s failure to prioritize counterterrorism investigations
    3. Events in the spring and summer of 2001
      1. Restrictions on the flow of information within the FBI
      2. Problems at the June 11 meeting
      3. The FBI’s investigation in August 2001 to find Mihdhar and Hazmi
    4. Individual performance
      1. Dwight
      2. Malcolm
      3. Stan
      4. Max
      5. Donna
      6. Rob
      7. Richard
      8. Mary

  5. OIG conclusions

CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

  1. Recommendations
    1. Recommendations related to the FBI’s analytical program
    2. Recommendations related to the FISA process
    3. Recommendations related to the FBI’s interactions with the Intelligence Community
    4. Other recommendations

  2. Conclusions

APPENDICES:

  1. List of Acronyms
  2. Phoenix EC
  3. FBI Response to the Report

REDACTED AND UNCLASSIFIED