



# U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General

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## Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act

*(as required by Section 1001(3) of Public Law 107-56)*

August 2009

Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act), Public Law 107-56, directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) to undertake a series of actions related to claims of civil rights or civil liberties violations allegedly committed by DOJ employees. It also requires the OIG to provide semiannual reports to Congress on the implementation of the OIG's responsibilities under Section 1001. This report – the fifteenth since enactment of the legislation in October 2001 – summarizes the OIG's Section 1001-related activities from January 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The OIG is an independent entity within the DOJ that reports to both the Attorney General and Congress. The OIG's mission is to investigate allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse in DOJ programs and personnel and to promote economy and efficiency in DOJ operations.

The OIG has jurisdiction to review programs and personnel in all DOJ components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, and other DOJ components.<sup>1</sup>

The OIG consists of the Immediate Office of the Inspector General and the following divisions and offices:

- **Audit Division** is responsible for independent audits of Department programs, computer systems, and financial statements.
- **Evaluation and Inspections Division** conducts program and management reviews that involve on-site inspection, statistical analysis, and other techniques to review Department programs and activities and make recommendations for improvement.
- **Investigations Division** is responsible for investigating allegations of bribery, fraud, abuse, civil rights violations, and violations of other criminal laws and administrative procedures that govern Department employees, contractors, and grantees.
- **Oversight and Review Division** blends the skills of attorneys, investigators, and program analysts to investigate or review high

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<sup>1</sup> The OIG has authority to investigate allegations of misconduct by any Department employee, except for allegations of misconduct "involving Department attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement personnel, where the allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal advice . . . ." See 5 U.S.C. App. 3 §8E(b)(3).

profile or sensitive matters involving Department programs or employees.

- **Management and Planning Division** provides planning, budget, finance, personnel, training, procurement, automated data processing, computer network communications, and general support services for the OIG.
- **Office of General Counsel** provides legal advice to OIG management and staff. In addition, the office drafts memoranda on issues of law; prepares administrative subpoenas; represents the OIG in personnel, contractual, and legal matters; and responds to Freedom of Information Act requests.

The OIG has a staff of approximately 420 employees, about half of whom are based in Washington, D.C., while the rest work from 16 Investigations Division field and area offices and 7 Audit Division regional offices located throughout the country.

## **II. SECTION 1001 OF THE PATRIOT ACT**

Section 1001 of the Patriot Act provides the following:

The Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall designate one official who shall —

- (1) review information and receive complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by employees and officials of the Department of Justice;
- (2) make public through the Internet, radio, television, and newspaper advertisements information on the responsibilities and functions of, and how to contact, the official; and
- (3) submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on a semi-annual basis a report on the implementation of this subsection and detailing any abuses described in paragraph (1), including a description of the use of funds appropriations used to carry out this subsection.

### **III. CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPLAINTS**

*Review information and receive complaints alleging abuses of civil rights and civil liberties by employees and officials of the Department of Justice.*

The OIG's Special Operations Branch in its Investigations Division manages the OIG's investigative responsibilities outlined in Section 1001.<sup>2</sup> The Special Agent in Charge who directs this unit is assisted by three Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASAC), one of whom assists on Section 1001 matters, a second who assists on FBI matters, and a third who provides support on DEA and ATF cases. In addition, five Investigative Specialists support the unit and divide their time between Section 1001 and FBI/DEA/ATF responsibilities.

The Special Operations Branch receives civil rights and civil liberties complaints via mail, e-mail, telephone, and facsimile. The complaints are reviewed by an ASAC who makes a decision concerning the disposition of each complaint. After review, each complaint is entered into an OIG database by an Investigative Specialist. The more serious civil rights and civil liberties allegations that relate to actions of DOJ employees or DOJ contractors normally are assigned to an OIG Investigations Division field office, where OIG special agents conduct investigations of criminal violations and administrative misconduct.<sup>3</sup> Some complaints are assigned to the OIG's Oversight and Review Division for investigation.

Given the number of complaints received compared to its limited resources, the OIG does not investigate all allegations of misconduct against DOJ employees. The OIG refers many complaints involving DOJ employees to internal affairs offices in DOJ components such as the FBI Inspection Division, the DEA Office of Professional Responsibility, and the BOP Office of Internal Affairs. In certain referrals, the OIG requires the components to report the results of their investigations to the OIG. In most cases, the OIG notifies the complainant of the referral.

Many complaints received by the OIG involve matters outside our jurisdiction. The ones that identify a specific issue for investigation are forwarded to the appropriate investigative entity. For example, complaints of mistreatment by airport security staff or by the Border Patrol are sent to the

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<sup>2</sup> This unit also is responsible for coordinating the OIG's review of allegations of misconduct by employees in the FBI, DEA, and ATF.

<sup>3</sup> The OIG can pursue an allegation either criminally or administratively. Many OIG investigations begin with allegations of criminal activity but, as is the case for any law enforcement agency, do not end in prosecution. When this occurs, the OIG is able to continue the investigation and treat the matter as a case for potential administrative discipline. The OIG's ability to handle matters criminally or administratively helps to ensure that a matter can be pursued administratively even if a prosecutor declines to prosecute a matter criminally.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG. We also have forwarded complaints to the OIGs of the Department of State, the Social Security Administration, the Department of Education, and the Navy Criminal Investigative Service. In addition, we have referred complainants to state Departments of Correction that have jurisdiction over the subject of the complaints.

When an allegation received from any source involves a potential violation of federal civil rights statutes by a DOJ employee, we discuss the complaint with the DOJ Civil Rights Division for possible prosecution. In some cases, the Civil Rights Division accepts the case and requests additional investigation either by the OIG or the FBI. In other cases, the Civil Rights Division declines prosecution and either the OIG or the appropriate DOJ internal affairs office reviews the case for possible administrative misconduct.

### **A. Complaints Processed This Reporting Period**

From January 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009, the period covered by this report, the OIG processed **600** Section 1001-related complaints.<sup>4</sup>

Of these complaints, we concluded that **428** did not fall within the OIG's jurisdiction or did not warrant further investigation. Approximately 409 of these 428 complaints involved allegations against agencies or entities outside the DOJ, including other federal agencies, local governments, or private businesses. When possible, we referred those complaints to the appropriate entity or advised complainants of the entity with jurisdiction over their allegations. The remaining 19 of the 428 complaints raised allegations that, on their face, did not warrant investigation. Complaints in this category included, for example, allegations that the FBI was harassing individuals through the use of electromagnetic, chemical, and electronic mind control devices.

The remaining **172** of the 600 total complaints involved DOJ employees or components and included allegations that required further review. We determined that **165** complaints raised management issues that generally were not related to the OIG's Section 1001 duties, and we referred these complaints to DOJ components for appropriate handling. Examples of complaints in this category included inmates' allegations about the general conditions at federal prisons or complaints that the FBI did not initiate an investigation into particular allegations.

The OIG identified the **7** remaining complaints as matters that we believed warranted an investigation to determine if Section 1001-related abuse occurred. Two of the seven matters were investigated by the OIG, and we

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<sup>4</sup> This number includes all complaints in which the complainant makes any mention of a Section 1001-related civil rights or civil liberties violation, even if the allegation is not within the OIG's jurisdiction.

referred the other five matters to the BOP for investigation. We discuss the substance of these 7 complaints in the next section of this report.

None of the 600 complaints we processed during this reporting period specifically alleged misconduct by DOJ employees relating to use of a provision in the Patriot Act.

The following is a synopsis of the complaints processed during this reporting period:

<b>Complaints processed:</b>	<b>600</b>
<b>Unrelated complaints:</b>	<b>428</b>
<b>Total complaints within OIG's jurisdiction warranting review:</b>	<b>172</b>
<b>Management issues:</b>	<b>165</b>
<b>Possible Section 1001 matters warranting investigation:</b>	<b>7</b>

## **B. Section 1001 Cases This Reporting Period**

### **1. New matters**

During this reporting period, the OIG opened two new Section 1001 investigations. Additionally, the OIG referred 5 Section 1001-related complaints to the BOP for investigation.

The following is a summary of the new matters opened by the OIG during this reporting period:

- The OIG is investigating an allegation made by the spouse of a Muslim inmate that the inmate was assaulted by BOP correctional officers, placed in the prison's Special Housing Unit (SHU), and prevented from participating in a religious program. The complainant alleged further that BOP staff told her that her husband had engaged in an unprovoked assault on BOP staff members, which gave rise to staff's use of force against him.
- The OIG is investigating a Muslim inmate's allegations that two BOP staff members told him they and others hated him because he is Arab and Muslim, and made crude statements to him relating to his religious articles. The inmate alleged further that BOP correctional officers directed other inmates to attack him and that

he did not receive timely medical treatment for injuries resulting from the assault. In addition, the inmate alleged that several prison officials have threatened him in an effort to force him to withdraw these complaints. Other allegations made by the inmate include that his mail was withheld from him and that he was denied a transfer to another facility.

The following 5 complaints were referred by the OIG to the BOP for investigation during this reporting period. While the investigations of 2 of these matters are continuing, the BOP completed its investigations of the other 3 matters and did not substantiate those complaints. For each of these referrals, we requested that the BOP provide the OIG with a copy of its investigative report upon completion of the investigation.

Continuing investigations:

- A Muslim inmate alleged that BOP staff refused to allow him to return to his cell from the recreation yard despite his repeated requests to use the restroom. The inmate alleged that he has irritable bowel syndrome and suffered from stomach pain, cramping, and bloating when he was forced to stay in the recreation yard for 2 hours. The inmate alleged that non-Arab inmates were allowed to return to their cells to use the restroom.
- An inmate reported that he sent a complaint to the Department of Health and Human Services regarding his concerns about the public health and safety of inmates at a BOP facility. The inmate alleged that subsequent to his sending that complaint, he was fired from his job at the facility where he was housed, subjected to a strip search without cause, sexually harassed, humiliated, and had his property confiscated by prison officials without their following proper procedures.

BOP investigations closed during this reporting period:

- A Muslim inmate alleged that a correctional officer directed other staff to harass the inmate so that he would drop a lawsuit he filed against BOP personnel. The inmate also alleged that staff made sexually and racially discriminatory remarks towards him and endangered his safety by opening two cell doors at the same time. The BOP interviewed relevant staff who all denied making racially or sexually derogatory remarks toward the inmate. The BOP also found no evidence that two cell doors next to each other were opened at the same time. The BOP's investigation determined that trash and contraband were removed from the inmate's cell daily and that the inmate converts his clothing and sheets into robes

and headgear, causing staff to issue new clothes to him daily. The BOP also determined that the inmate has a history of incident reports for being unsanitary and for destruction of government property. Interviews of staff revealed that the inmate is resentful that he is held accountable for his personal hygiene and cell sanitation. The BOP concluded that the inmate's allegations were unsubstantiated.

- An inmate alleged that a correctional officer placed him in the SHU for approximately 3 months and that the correctional officer transferred him from the facility because he was a member of the Nation of Islam. BOP investigators interviewed the correctional officer and the chaplain, both of whom denied that they plotted to have the inmate transferred to another facility. BOP's investigation determined that a conflict had arisen between Nation of Islam inmates and Sunni Muslim inmates stemming from a softball game and that the complainant was a leader of the Nation of Islam group. BOP's investigation also found that the decision to transfer the inmate to another facility was related to concerns over security at the facility. The BOP concluded that the inmate's allegations were unsubstantiated.
- An attorney representing a Muslim inmate who was convicted of terrorism offenses and is subject to special administrative measures alleged that the inmate has been kept in isolation since September 11, 2001, and that the inmate's communications with persons outside the facility have been restricted in an effort to coerce the inmate to provide information to the U.S. government. The BOP investigated the allegations and determined that the inmate has daily contact with BOP staff, including medical staff, educational staff, and religious services staff. The BOP also determined that the inmate has the opportunity to visit and speak by telephone with members of his immediate family, and that he receives general and legal correspondence. The BOP also determined that the inmate has never been interrogated while in BOP custody. The BOP concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated.

## **2. Cases referred to BOP during previous reporting periods that the OIG continues to monitor**

The OIG referred the following 5 complaints to the BOP for investigation during a prior reporting period. The investigations of 2 of these matters are completed, with BOP finding that the allegations were substantiated. The OIG continues to monitor the ongoing BOP disciplinary proceedings in these 2 matters. The investigations of the other 3 matters continue. For each of these



referrals, we requested that the BOP provide the OIG with a copy of its investigative report upon completion of the investigation.

- An inmate alleged that he has been subjected to continuous discrimination and verbal abuse by BOP employees because he is from Afghanistan. The BOP's investigation sustained the allegation of unprofessional conduct against two BOP employees, and this matter is pending disciplinary action.
- A BOP employee alleged that he was being verbally abused by BOP staff because he is Muslim. The BOP's investigation substantiated that a correctional officer acted unprofessionally during a conversation with the complainant. However, the complainant's allegation that the correctional officer and others made disparaging remarks to him about his national origin and sexual relations with his wife were not substantiated. This matter is pending disciplinary action.
- An inmate alleged that a BOP physician's assistant refused to provide him with medical treatment and called him a terrorist. The inmate further alleged that the physician's assistant made false entries to his medical records chart that tarnished his character. The BOP continues to investigate this matter.
- An inmate who is originally from Pakistan alleged that he has been discriminated against by BOP employees because of his race and religion. The inmate alleged that he has been transferred several times and unfairly placed in the Special Housing Unit, where he was harassed by correctional officers, did not receive timely medical treatment, had his legal documents confiscated, and was forced to sleep on dirty bed linens. The BOP continues its investigation of this matter.
- A Muslim inmate alleged that a BOP facility did not provide adequate locations within the housing unit for prayer. The inmate also claimed that he and other Muslim inmates were forced to work during times when they are required by their religion to pray, and that they were not permitted to bring their prayer rugs to their job sites within the facility. The inmate alleged further that BOP staff interrupted him when he attempted to pray in the recreation yard or in other areas of the facility, reportedly telling him that BOP rules do not allow prayer in public locations where inmates congregate or at job sites. Finally, the inmate also alleged that the facility does not offer a Halal diet, and as a result he is forced to eat foods prohibited by his religion. The BOP's investigation of this matter is ongoing.

### **3. Previously opened investigations that were closed during this reporting period**

BOP completed its investigations of 3 Section 1001-related matters during this reporting period that had been referred by the OIG in prior periods. For each of these referrals, we requested that the BOP provide the OIG with a copy of its investigative report.

- The spouse of a Muslim inmate alleged that she was mistreated by BOP staff when she visited her husband because she is Muslim. The complainant alleged that on one occasion she was ordered to remove her bra when a metal detector alerted as she entered the facility. The complainant also alleged that BOP staff treated her differently from another female visitor who was not Muslim. Specifically, she complained that she was subjected to a physical search while the other female visitor was only required to be screened by a hand-held metal detector. The BOP interviewed involved staff members and they denied treating the complainant in a discriminatory manner. The correctional officer who conducted the pat search of the complainant stated that she did not direct the complainant to remove her bra and did not witness her do so. The correctional officer stated that during the pat search, she felt something hard under the complainant's head covering. She said she asked the complainant if she had beads in her hair and removed a portion of the head covering when the complainant denied wearing beads in her hair. The correctional officer said she observed beads on the ends of complainant's hair. The BOP concluded there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the complainant's allegations of mistreatment.
- An inmate alleged that he and another inmate were verbally abused by a correctional officer because they are Muslim. The inmate also alleged that another correctional officer issued him 14 days of "extra duty" "for what Muslims did on 9/11." The BOP interviewed the correctional officers, and they denied acting in an unprofessional manner toward the inmate. Additionally, the BOP's investigation did not find any evidence or witnesses to corroborate the inmate's allegations. The BOP concluded that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the complainant's allegations.
- An inmate alleged that a BOP correctional officer ridiculed his Muslim faith and made disparaging remarks about Islam. The correctional officer allegedly told the inmate that Muslim inmates should not have special rights in prison and that all inmates should

be required to eat the same food. The inmate alleged further that the correctional officer told the inmate that the Prophet Mohammad was only a man. The inmate also alleged that BOP personnel conspired illegally to prevent him from consuming a diet in accordance with his religious beliefs. The BOP attempted to interview the inmate about his allegations, but the inmate was unwilling to provide a verbal statement or affidavit because he said the issue had been resolved and that no further action was necessary. The inmate stated that he was being provided with foods he was permitted to eat under his religious beliefs. The BOP's interviews of its staff showed that the inmate had been removed from his religious diet because he violated the religious diet agreement. Under BOP regulations, only a chaplain can remove an inmate from his religious diet. The inmate was reinstated to the religious diet list after it was determined that the chaplain had not removed him from the list. The BOP interviewed the correctional officer who allegedly made derogatory remarks about the Muslim faith, and the officer denied the allegations. The BOP concluded that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate those allegations.

#### **IV. OTHER ACTIVITIES RELATED TO POTENTIAL CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES**

The OIG conducts other reviews that go beyond the explicit requirements of Section 1001 in order to implement more fully its civil rights and civil liberties oversight responsibilities. The OIG has initiated or continued several such special reviews that relate to the OIG's duties under Section 1001. These reviews are discussed in this section of the report.

##### **A. Review of the Department's Involvement with the President's Surveillance Program**

In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President authorized National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a classified program to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. The program was reauthorized by the President every 45 days with certain modifications. Collectively, the activities carried out under these Authorizations are referred to as the "President's Surveillance Program" ("PSP" or "Program").

In July 2009, the OIG completed a 407-page classified report, entitled "A Review of the Department of Justice's Involvement with the President's Surveillance Program," detailing the Department's role in the PSP. The report examined the Department's controls over and use of information related to the PSP and the Department's compliance with legal requirements governing the

PSP. The OIG focused in particular on the Department's role in providing legal advice concerning the Program and on the FBI's role as a consumer of information from the Program. The OIG found that only one Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) attorney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, was read into the PSP during its first year and a half of operation. Other Department officials who were later read into the PSP became concerned about the factual and legal basis for Yoo's legal memoranda and conducted a comprehensive reassessment of the legal basis for the PSP.

The OIG concluded that it was extraordinary and inappropriate that a single DOJ attorney was relied upon to conduct the initial legal assessment of the PSP, and that the lack of oversight and review of Yoo's work, as customarily is the practice of OLC, contributed to a legal analysis of the PSP that at a minimum was factually flawed. Deficiencies in the legal memoranda became apparent once additional DOJ attorneys were read into the program in 2003 and when those attorneys sought a greater understanding of the PSP's operation. The OIG concluded that the strict controls over DOJ access to the PSP undermined DOJ's ability to perform its critical legal function during the PSP's early phase of operation.

The OIG also sought as part of its review to assess the role of PSP-derived information and its value to the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts. FBI Director Mueller stated that he believes the PSP was useful, and he based this conclusion in part on the results of a survey the FBI conducted in 2006 to assess the impact of PSP-derived information.

The OIG also interviewed FBI officials, agents, and analysts responsible for handling PSP information about their experiences with the program. These assessments generally were supportive of the program as "one tool of many" in the FBI's anti-terrorism efforts that "could help move cases forward," although most PSP leads were determined not to have any connection to terrorism. The OIG also examined several cases that have frequently been cited as examples of the PSP's contribution to the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism efforts.

However, the OIG also found that the exceptionally compartmented nature of the program created some frustration for FBI personnel. Some agents and analysts criticized the PSP-derived information they received for providing insufficient details, and the agents who managed counterterrorism programs at the FBI field offices the OIG visited said the FBI's process for disseminating PSP-derived information failed to adequately prioritize the information for investigation.

In sum, the OIG found it difficult to assess or quantify the overall effectiveness of the PSP program as it relates to the FBI's counterterrorism activities. However, based on the interviews conducted and documents

reviewed, the OIG concluded that although PSP-derived information had value in some counterterrorism investigations, it generally played a limited role in the FBI's overall counterterrorism efforts.

The OIG also considered public statements by former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales about the Program. Aspects of the PSP were first disclosed publicly in a series of articles in *The New York Times* in December 2005. Subsequently, Attorney General Gonzales was questioned about NSA surveillance activities in two public hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee in February 2006 and July 2007. As part of its review, the OIG examined whether Gonzales made false, inaccurate, or misleading statements to Congress in those hearings while testifying about a dispute between White House and Department officials in March 2004 concerning the PSP. The OIG concluded that Gonzales did not intend to mislead Congress, but found that his testimony was confusing, inaccurate, and had the effect of misleading those who were not knowledgeable about the Program.

Title III of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FISA Amendments Act) required the Inspectors General of Intelligence Community agencies that participated in the PSP to conduct a comprehensive review of the program. The Department of Justice OIG, worked with the Inspectors General of the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to conduct the review required under the FISA Amendments Act. On July 10, 2009, the group submitted to the Senate and House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees five classified reports from the OIGs of the individual agencies participating in the Program, a classified summary of the OIGs' reviews, and an unclassified report summarizing the portions of the collective results of the OIG reviews that could be released in unclassified form. The unclassified summary is available on the OIG's web site.

## **B. Review of the FBI's Use of Exigent Letters and Other Improper Requests for Telephone Records**

As a follow-up to our reviews of the FBI's use of national security letters (NSL), the OIG is investigating the FBI's use of exigent letters and other improper requests to obtain telephone records. In our first report on NSLs, issued in March 2007, we reported on a practice by which the FBI used over 700 exigent letters rather than NSLs to obtain telephone toll billing records. We determined that by issuing exigent letters, the FBI circumvented the NSL statutes and violated the Attorney General's Guidelines and internal FBI policy. Our investigation is examining in greater detail the FBI's use of exigent letters and its issuance of "blanket" NSLs used to "cover" or validate the information obtained from exigent letters and other improper requests.

### **C. The FBI's Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices**

In May 2009, the OIG issued an audit that examined the FBI's watchlist practices, focusing on watchlist nominations submitted by FBI field offices and headquarters divisions. This audit examined whether subjects of open FBI cases are appropriately and timely included on the terrorist watchlist and whether watchlist records are updated with new identifying information as required. The audit also examined whether subjects of closed FBI investigations are appropriately removed from the consolidated terrorist watchlist in a timely manner.

The consolidated terrorist watchlist is used by government frontline screening personnel to determine how to respond when a known or suspected terrorist requests entry into the United States. The failure either to place appropriate individuals on the watchlist or to place them on the watchlist in a timely manner increases the risk that these individuals are able to enter and move freely within the United States. On the other hand, failure to remove or timely remove individuals from the consolidated terrorist watchlist could result in the denial of a passport or visa, prevent an individual from boarding a flight or entering the United States, or cause an individual to be unnecessarily questioned.

The OIG audit concluded that the FBI did not consistently nominate known or suspected terrorists to the consolidated terrorist watchlist in accordance with FBI policy and did not update or remove watchlist records as required. In addition, the audit found that the internal controls over processes used to nominate individuals to the terrorist watchlist are weak or nonexistent.

During the audit, we notified FBI officials about the deficiencies in its watchlist practices, and the FBI began taking corrective actions, such as providing training to terrorism case agents and establishing dedicated watchlist coordinator positions in FBI field offices. However, our audit report concluded that weaknesses continue to exist, that significant improvements are still necessary, and that it is too early to tell whether the deficiencies identified in this audit have been fully addressed.

In the audit report, the OIG made 16 recommendations to the FBI regarding nominations to, modifications of, and removal of identities from the consolidated terrorist watchlist. The FBI agreed with all of these recommendations.

## **V. EXPENSE OF IMPLEMENTING SECTION 1001**

Section 1001 requires the OIG to:

*Submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on a semi-annual basis a report...including a description of the use of funds appropriations used to carry out this subsection.*

During this reporting period, the OIG spent approximately \$1,105,391 in personnel costs, \$935 in travel costs (for investigators to conduct interviews), and \$200 in miscellaneous costs, for a total of \$1,106,526 to implement its responsibilities under Section 1001. The total personnel and travel costs reflect the time and funds spent by OIG special agents, inspectors, and attorneys who have worked directly on investigating Section 1001-related complaints, conducting special reviews, and implementing the OIG's responsibilities under Section 1001.