IV. The Allegations Concerning Miami International Airport

A.Background

1.Description and Management of Miami International Airport

The Miami International Airport has two terminals, designated Terminal E and Terminal B. All of the allegations regarding Miami Airport relate to events that occurred in Terminal E, where the Delegation spent most of its time.

Each terminal contains a primary inspection area and a secondary inspection area. There is a total of 60 primary inspection booths for the two terminals, 36 booths in Terminal E (which is the busiest terminal), and 24 booths in Terminal B. The secondary inspection area is divided into "soft secondary" and "hard secondary." Terminal E's soft secondary area consists of several rows of seating and a counter, behind which Immigration Inspectors work. Terminal E's hard secondary area has a similar physical setup. Behind the counter in hard secondary, however, is an entrance to a corridor which contains two small holding cells. A floor plan showing those areas within Terminal E is attached as Appendix 45.

At the time of the Delegation's visit, Miami Airport was managed by Roger Miller, the Port Director, and Jerry Emory, the Deputy Port Director. Miami Airport is further administered by Assistant Port Directors, who have overall responsibility for an entire tour of employees; and Supervisory Immigration Inspectors, who have immediate control over Immigration Inspectors assigned to perform primary and secondary inspections and special unit assignments (e.g., the Terrorist, Drug and Fraud Unit). Immigration Inspectors assigned to Miami Airport inspect aliens to determine if they are eligible to enter and remain in the United States. An adapted table of organization for Miami Airport as it relates to the participants in this investigation is attached as Appendix 13.

2.Passenger Processing at Miami International Airport

All persons arriving at Miami Airport from foreign countries are subjected to examination or inspection [ Citizens are subject to examination; aliens are subject to inspection.] by the INS at either Terminal E or B prior to being admitted into the United States. [ Miami Airport has other terminals which are used for domestic flights and which have other letter designations.] The immigration inspection areas of both Terminals E and B are operated identically in terms of inspection procedures. At the primary inspections area, arriving international airline passengers are categorized as United States citizens and non-citizens (aliens). When international flights arrive and passengers disembark, lines form in the primary inspections area where passengers await processing by individual Immigration Inspectors who staff the inspection booths.

Once at the booth, citizens are required to show proof of citizenship to the Immigration Inspector. If satisfactory, the passenger enters the United States. If the inspector conducting primary inspections has a suspicion or an uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of the passenger's claim to citizenship, the inspector may refer the passenger to secondary inspection for further inquiry.

Once at the primary inspection booth, aliens must present the Immigration Inspector with documentation establishing that the alien may be legally admitted to the United States (e.g., passport with appropriate visa, resident alien card, etc.). The inspector will ask questions and conduct certain checks regarding the alien's history through the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) and the INS Central Index System (CIS). If the alien's documents are found to be in order and the alien is otherwise admissible, the alien is admitted.

If, however, after following the above-described procedures the Immigration Inspector in primary inspection believes that the alien should be inspected more thoroughly or is not admissible, the alien is referred to the secondary inspection area. The referral may be based on a number of reasons, including suspicion that the alien plans illegally to stay permanently in the United States, the concern that the alien has presented potentially fraudulent documents, or information that an

outstanding arrest warrant exists for the alien. An alien may also be referred to secondary inspection simply to be processed for permanent residency.

Passengers referred for secondary inspection will be brought either to the soft or hard secondary inspection areas. Aliens seeking permanent residency are sent for further processing at soft secondary. Hard secondary is reserved for aliens who already appear to be inadmissible based upon the primary inspection.

During the course of this investigation, OIG was advised by management and supervisory personnel at Miami Airport that there are no written criteria for the incarceration of aliens subjected to inspection in the hard secondary area. Based upon interviews of management, supervisory, and line personnel, the custom and practice at Miami Airport is to place aliens in a detention cell in hard secondary if the alien has an active arrest warrant; possesses fraudulent documents or has no documents at all; or is either dangerous or poses a risk of flight.

B.The Overstaffing of Miami International Airport

1.The Allegation

The Complaint alleged that INS management misrepresented existing conditions at Miami Airport by increasing staffing levels in the primary inspection area during the Delegation's visit on Saturday, June 10, 1995. The Complaint alleged that the number of Immigration Inspectors assigned to work on June 10, 1995 was abnormally high and that payment for that work was made through the improper use of overtime funding. Specifically, the Complaint indicated that on any normal Saturday, 12 inspectors would submit bills for 31 Act overtime, but on

June 10, 1995, nearly twice that number, 23 inspectors, submitted overtime bills. [ The Act of March 2, 1931, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1353a-1352b, commonly called the "31 Act," grants Immigration Inspectors overtime pay for performing inspections on Sundays and holidays and, on other days, for overtime worked between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m. The Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, 5 U.S.C. Sec 5541-5549, commonly called the "45 Act," provides the basic overtime compensation for overtime duty not compensated under the 31 Act, that is, overtime performed between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. The 45 Act generally provides for lower compensation rates than does the 31 Act.]

2.The District's Initial Response

In the July 13 Memorandum, Cadman acknowledged that additional staff was assigned to work due to the Delegation's visit. Specifically, Cadman stated that in addition to the Assistant District Director for Inspections, Port Director, and Deputy Port Director, seven extra inspectors and three extra supervisors were assigned to work at Miami Airport on June 10, 1995. While he acknowledged the nexus between the additional staffing and the Delegation's visit, Cadman essentially asserted that the assignments were justifiable. Cadman stated that Miami Airport and inspections program managers were available to answer questions relating to operations under their control. According to Cadman, the ten additional inspectors and supervisors "were assigned as escorts for the delegation, which district management had been told in advance might include as many as 45 Representatives and support staff," and were only reassigned to the primary lines once it became apparent they were not needed as escorts. Cadman further explained that the additional assignments were originally made to avoid taking inspectors off the primary line to escort the Delegation. Moreover, Cadman asserted, the inspectors and supervisors were paid 45 Act overtime and not 31 Act overtime as the Complaint letter suggested.

Cadman has also argued that Miami District management had no motive to deceive Congress regarding the need for additional inspectional staff at Miami Airport. Cadman has claimed that because the District has repeatedly made that need publicly known, it would have had no reason to present a different picture to the Task Force. Furthermore, Cadman asserted that it would be impossible to have hidden the need for increased inspectional staff from the Delegation since Miami Airport is run in full view of the Dade County Aviation Department and the airlines, who have full knowledge of INS staffing and budget levels. In support of his claim, Cadman presented OIG with numerous documents in which the need for additional inspectors at Miami Airport was discussed. The documents provided by Cadman are listed as Appendix 46. [ During the course of this investigation, pursuant to OIG's request, agents did obtain numerous documents that attest to the Miami District's efforts to obtain incr eased staffing at Miami Airport. The documents indicated that the Miami District repeatedly made requests to the Eastern Region and INS Headquarters to increase the resources for the Miami District, specifically to alleviate staffing shortages at Miami Airport. ]

3.Evidentiary Findings

a.OIG Analysis of Miami International Airport's Staffing and Overtime Records

To determine the staffing, overtime, and cost levels on the day of the Delegation's visit and to determine whether those levels were consistent with normal levels for Miami Airport, we reviewed numerous documents that were kept by the District in the normal course of business. Specifically, we reviewed Miami Airport staffing and overtime documents for every Saturday from March through June 1995, including sign-in sheets, Port of Entry Management System (POMS) reports (showing daily overtime), 31 Act and 45 Act bills, [ For an explanation of 31 Act and 45 Act overtime, see footnote 105, above.] PC Tare, [ PC TARE is an automation software system containing the time and attendance records transmitted to the National Finance Center, which maintains such records for federal employees.] and scheduling documents. Our aim was to identify personnel who worked: (1) regular tours of duty at any time on Saturdays, (2) between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m., [ This two-hour time period was selected because it covered the time frame of the Delegation's visit to Terminal E.] and (3) overtime under the 31 Act and the 45 Act, and the cost of that overtime. OIG's analysis of those documents showed that on June 10, 1995, regular and overtime staffing significantly exceeded the four-month average, as did overtime spending.

With regard to the number of Immigration Inspectors working regular tours of duty on Saturdays during the period from March 4 to June 24, 1995, an average of 91 Immigration Inspectors and Supervisory Immigration Inspectors worked on regular tours of duty on Saturdays. On Saturday, June 10, 1995, however, the number of inspectors and supervisors on regular duty was 98, exceeding the average by seven. On the two Saturdays following June 10, 1995 the number of inspectors on duty was closer to the average. These results are summarized in the table shown below and attached as Appendix 47.

We also determined that the number of inspectors and supervisors on duty June 10, 1995, between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. -- the time frame of the Delegation's visit to Terminal E -- was above average. Prior to June 10, 1995 the rounded average number of Immigration Inspectors who were working between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. was 53, but on Saturday, June 10, 1995 the number of inspectors was 65. Similarly, the average number of Supervisory Immigration Inspectors who worked between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. was 7, but on Saturday, June 10, 1995, the number of supervisors was 9. Taken together, 60 inspectors and supervisors normally work on Saturdays between 1:30 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. However, on June 10, 1995, a total of 74 inspectors and supervisors worked during that time period. [ These figures controlled for those Immigration Inspectors and supervisors whose work shift could not be determined.] These result s are summarized in the table shown below and attached as Appendix 48.

In addition, we determined that on June 10, 1995, both the number of MiamiAirport staff who worked overtime and the cost of that overtime far exceeded the average of Saturdays during the four-month period. On June 10, 1995 the number of inspectors (28) and supervisors (4) who earned 31 Act and/or 45 Act overtime was 32. On Saturdays, for the period March 4, 1995 to June 24, 1995 the average number of inspectors and supervisors who earned 31 Act and/or 45 Act overtime was 19. The cost for overtime for June 10, 1995, was $3,897, compared to the average, which was $2,288 spent for Saturday overtime from March through June 1995. Delineated by type of overtime earned, the rounded average total cost of overtime for inspectors and supervisors paid 45 Act overtime for Saturdays from March 4, 1995 to June 24, 1995 was $611. On June 10, 1995 the overtime cost for inspectors and supervisors was $1,253 -- more than double. For 31 Act overtime the rounded average was $1,677, as compared to June 10, 1995, when it was $2,644 -- about 60% more than the average. These results are summarized in the table shown below and attached as Appendix 49.

b.Results of Witness Interviews

During the planning stages of the Delegation's visit, Headquarters and Regional managers repeatedly communicated to District managers the importance of the Task Force's visit and the need to convey information about the District's successes, including positive results at Miami Airport. While it was generally known in the Eastern Regional Office and INS Headquarters that Miami Airport had long been experiencing staffing shortages, Headquarters and Regional managers conveyed the message that Miami District managers, employees, and other participants in the Delegation's visit should not raise that issue or complain about a lack of resources during the Task Force's trip.

INS Commissioner Meissner and Eastern Regional Director Chasse communicated the message to Miami District management that the Delegation's visit was "extremely important." As Cadman wrote in an e-mail to his managers after meeting with Commissioner Meissner at Headquarters, the visit is considered so important that:

she is considering (1) coming down for the visit herself, and (2) an advance visit a few days before (either by Pam Barry, herself, both, or several people), to make sure that things are well planned out.

Cadman went on, in essence, to advise his managers that members of the Delegation might "[pull] some employees to the side to get the 'real story' and that "[t]his, of course, carries with it some real risks." Cadman further reported that the "Commissioner is concerned that it would take very little to put the kiss of death on [the Congressional Delegation's] views toward INS, with significant adverse consequences for some time thereafter." Cadman instructed that the Commissioner wanted "ALL parties ready for this visit . . . down to and including, first line supervisors at Krome SPC and the airport, etc."

The next day, Chasse responded to Cadman's e-mail and wrote, in relevant part:

Dan, your message was very much on point and should be shared with employees almost verbatim. Employees who are doing the best job under adverse conditions sendthe message we want to send. Employees complaining that they can't do their job due to lack of resources communicate only one message, "INS can't do its job." It might be a good idea to get with the other components of the visit, ie CRS [Community Relations Services], CG [Coast Guard], and especially Dade Co. [Dade County Aviation Department] to explain this. They may think that they are doing us a favor by mentioning that we cannot do our job with the resources given when in fact the opposite is true. [Miami Airport] is an especially tricky area since it is all fee funded and there is no reason, from a Congressional point of view, why we shouldn't have all the staff we need.

(E-Mail from Chasse to Waldroup, Blake, Wooley and Cadman dated May 23, 1995 at 7:37 a.m. re[2]: "June 10th visit by Representative Gallegly, et al," attached as Appendix 7) (emphasis added). The Dade County Aviation Department referred to by Chasse oversees the physical operation of Miami Airport. As such, DCAD is responsible for managing passenger, airline, and freight traffic through Miami Airport. In an effort to ensure a smooth flow of international passenger traffic through Miami Airport, DCAD has historically voiced strong concerns about the perceived lack of sufficient INS Immigration Inspectors available to conduct primary inspections.

In her interview in this investigation, Chasse acknowledged it was fair to say that during the Delegation's visit, INS did not want to show its warts and boils or that things were not working well, but rather that the Miami Airport and Krome were being well-managed.

In addition to her e-mail message to Cadman, Chasse had a telephone conversation with Cadman in which she voiced concern that "there might be some people at the journeyman level, perhaps Union members, who would be a little unbalanced in their presentation if they had the opportunity to do so." In addition, Chasse expressed concern that "there might be comparisons with JFK International Airport that might cause questions that were difficult to answer. . . ." It was clear to

Cadman that in responding to questions or making presentations, Chasse did not want anyone to volunteer negative comparisons to staffing levels at JFK. [ Chasse denied any knowledge that anyone at INS prohibited Miami District employees from comparing Miami Airport to JFK.]

Chasse's direction to advise INS employees and DCAD that complaints about a lack of resources (specifically as to Miami Airport staffing) would be damaging to INS, and to discourage comparisons to JFK, was strongly echoed by Pam Barry, Director of Congressional Affairs at INS Headquarters. During the planning of the visit, Barry had advised Assistant District Director for External Affairs George Waldroup that they "were not to discuss staffing problems with the [Delegation], nor were [they] to compare our staffing levels with staffing levels at John F. Kennedy International Airport." [ The Dade County Aviation Department had previously used such a comparison to argue for more inspectional staff at Miami Airport. Stated simply, the argument is that Miami Airport has approximately half the number of inspectors as JFK to handle about the same volume of international passenger traffic. The statistics on which such a comparison could be drawn were provided to the Delegat ion in the Congressional Briefing Book.]

On May 25, 1995, Barry made an advance trip to Miami in preparation for the Delegation's visit. As part of that visit, Barry had a planning meeting at Miami Airport with Miami District, Miami Airport and DCAD representatives. The meeting was attended by, among others, Dickie Davis, DCAD's Manager of Terminal Facilities; George Waldroup, Assistant Director for External Affairs in the Miami District office; and Angel Barbosa, then Acting Assistant Port Director for Miami Airport.

During the course of the meeting, Barry directed that "no one should discuss staffing problems with the [Delegation]." On two separate occasions during the meeting, Davis asked that the issue of insufficient Immigration Inspector staffing be incorporated into the agenda for the visit. On both occasions, Barry insisted that the issue would not be discussed, citing the tight time schedule for the visit and its different purpose. Barry also stated that "it was 'inappropriate' to make comparisons with Miami Airport and the JFK airport as there were other variables that made such comparisons unfair."

Davis, who was reportedly "very upset" about Barry's directives, shared them with Ana Sotorrio, Dade County's Associate Aviation Director for Government Affairs at Miami Airport, in preparing Sotorrio to address the Delegation on June 10, 1995. Waldroup told Blake that Barry had "told the people at the airport not to whine, and I'm using that word specifically because that's the way it was used to me, about lack of staff; that this was not the appropriate time to do that in front of this group of people." [ Barry denied ever telling Waldroup that no one should raise staffing issues. She further denied prohibiting DCAD from mentioning the staffing problem or saying that it was a not relevant issue. In fact, Barry testified that during the May 25 planning meeting, she "made it clear that the [Immigration Inspectors] could feel free to speak about the [Immigration Inspector] staffing problems with the [Delegation]."]

In accordance with Chasse's advice to communicate the message contained in the May 22 Cadman E-mail to the employees, and after discussions with Chasse and Kellner, Blake scheduled a meeting of Miami Airport management personnel to discuss the importance of and preparations for the Delegation's visit, as well as what management expected from supervisors and inspectors. The meeting was scheduled to occur on June 8, 1995, at 1:00 p.m. after Blake returned from the Region, where she had been on detail. [ Neither Blake nor Cadman normally hold meetings with Miami Airport staff. The last time that Cadman met with Miami Airport staff was 1992.]

On June 2, 1995, Commissioner Meissner conducted a telephone conference call with, among others, Chasse and Cadman to discuss the upcoming visit by the Delegation. Blake did not participate in the teleconference. During the teleconference, Meissner stated that she wanted to see the INS "putting its best foot forward," but told the participants that she did not want a distortion of normal operations. The Commissioner wanted the District "to be positive and display a 'can do' attitude." During the call, the issue of staffing at Miami Airport was raised. Andrea Quarantillo, Director of the Services Branch who on that day was serving as Acting Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, "specifically said at the teleconference that we should not bring on extra staff or order extra overtime for the Delegation." Quarantillo remembered telling the District: "Don't contrive it." Quarantillo explained that she issued those instructi ons because from her "past experience as an II [Immigration Inspector] and SII [Supervisory Immigration Inspector] [she] knew the tendency to bring on additional staff might exist."

On June 8, 1995, Blake flew into Miami Airport and began the previously scheduled meeting on time. The meeting was attended by Cadman, Blake, Kellner, Waldroup, and Miller, and was mandatory for all supervisory personnel at Miami Airport -- including the Assistant Port Directors and Supervisory Immigration Inspectors who were scheduled to work on the day of the Delegation's visit. Blake ran the meeting, which lasted approximately two hours. Cadman and Waldroup arrived late, after having participated in a walk-through of Miami Airport in preparation for the Delegation's visit, and were present for approximately the last one-half hour.

During the June 8, 1995, meeting, Blake conveyed the substance of Barry's and Chasse's instructions to the assembled managers and supervisors. Specifically, she directed that "we should not whine -- and I used that same word -- about staffing shortages." Blake testified that her instruction accorded with Chasse's May 23 E-Mail. According to Blake, "[Chasse] and Pam Barry were in sync." [ While Blake admitted conveying Barry's instructions, she testified that she "thought [Barry] was nuts" in regards to the instructions. Blake testified that she communicated the instructions to her subordinates because "it was something that had originated in Headquarters." Though Blake had challenged other instructions by Barry (specifically regarding the provision of lunch to the Delegation), she did not report back through her chain of command to challenge the instructions precluding discussion of the inspectional staffing shortage at Miami Airport. Blake stated that she did not challenge the instructions because she "just didn't care and . . . was going to ignore her." Although she conveyed Barry's instructions practically verbatim, she testified that because of her "tone of voice" she "didn't think anybody was going to pay attention to Pam Barry." Blake conceded, however, that Barry's instructions were consistent with those given by Chasse. She also conceded that some supervisors at the meeting could have taken her instructions seriously and would then have felt constrained from speaking about certain issues.] Blake further instructed that Miami Airport should not be compared with JFK. [ Miami Airport management understood that instruction to mean that they were expected not to tell the Delegation that JFK had almost double the amount of inspections staff as Miami Airport, though Miami Airport has about the same passenger volume.] Blake told Miami Airport's managers and supervisors that if the Delegation spoke to them, they should avoi d discussing substantive issues like staffing and overtime. Blake stated that line inspectors should summon a supervisor in the event a question by the Delegation required an extensive answer. At least one supervisor left the June 8 meeting with the impression that Blake was trying to "muzzle" people about speaking about the airport, and create a false impression.

In addition to conveying Barry's instructions barring discussion of staffing shortages and related comparisons to JFK, Blake issued a series of instructions

designed to ensure that the Delegation would see a smoothly running operation, notwithstanding Miami Airport's chronic staffing and management problems.

Blake instructed Miami Airport managers and supervisors that she wanted to create a good impression, did not want long inspection lines, did not want passenger backup, and wanted things to run "smoothly." Blake instructed that in order to make a good impression, the supervisor responsible for staffing should make sure that all inspection booths were filled in the primary inspection area. The supervisor for the Terrorist, Drug, and Fraud Unit was told to have the five Immigration Inspectors that were assigned to him "to be prepared to return to the primary inspection area if needed." Blake also admitted authorizing "whatever overtime would be needed" to make sure that the day ran smoothly and there was no passenger backup. [ At that time, Miami Airport had experienced severe shortages of overtime funding. In or about October 1994, Kellner issued a directive restricting Miami Airport's overtime funding. As a result of the deficit, in or about Mar ch, 1995, the Region had authorized additional overtime funding for the Miami District in the amount of $1.6 million a portion of which was to be distributed to Miami Airport. Blake claimed that as a result of that additional funding, among other things, there was no shortage of overtime funding at the time of the Delegation's visit. It is clear, however, that was not the perception at the Airport. According to Deputy Port Director Jerry Emory, Prior to June 10, 1995, [Miami Airport was] given a very small overtime budget and told to operate within the budget. Kellner told me and Miller that if we exceeded the budget we would be in violation and our Performance Work Plan would reflect that. Based on these directives, each day I announced to the Assistant Port Directors (usually in a memo) how much money was available for overtime each day. The Assistant Port Directors were expected to calculate how many people they could use each day and the money was allotted accordingly. On Jun e 10, the cap on overtime spending was removed pursuant to Blake's instructions at the June 8 meeting (emphasis added). ] In short, Blake instructed Miami Airport managers and supervisors "to take whatever liberties they needed to avoid any problems" on the day the Delegation visited.

Reacting to Blake's instructions, Port Director Miller said, in substance, that members of the Miami Airport staff were the victims, had nothing to hide, and that he was tired of not having enough people to do the job properly. Miller stated that he "did not plan to effect any staffing changes and that the [Delegation] should see MIA as it normally operates." [ Prior to the Delegation's visit, Miller told various inspectors and Union officials that he wanted to conduct business as usual at Miami Airport and was not going to put on extra staff.] Miller said, in essence, that the District management's order to increase staffing levels would "make things look good,when things were not good." [ Miller was not the only one who believed that things were not good at Miami Airport. In fact, following the meeting with MIA managers and supervisors, Blake, Cadman and Keller had a separate meeting with Miller because the airport was not being effectively managed a nd was not running smoothly.] Miller stated that he was not going to instruct his subordinates to misrepresent how Miami Airport functioned. Blake appeared agitated by Miller's comments and said to keep management topics confined to management's position. Miller, who was reportedly "criticized and belittled" by District management, ultimately agreed to go along with Blake's orders. [ Blake also discussed the composition of the inspectional workforce that day. She directed that there be some ethnic diversity on the inspectional line. She also discussed the possibility of preventing certain inspectors who were considered "troublemakers" from being present during the Delegation's visit by switching their work schedules. The two individuals specifically discussed in that regard were associated with the Union. ]

Chasse stated that INS wanted to show the Delegation that the airport was well-managed, but acknowledged that, in fact, as of the time of the Delegation's visit, Miami Airport was not being well-managed. She stated that by June 1995, "it was clear that [Miller and Emory] weren't capable of running the airport" and the airport had been "chronically mismanaged." Chasse testified that Miller and Emory:

were having serious overtime management problems. They were nonresponsive to the fluctuations in flight schedule . . . and we were looking for places where they could move because they obviously couldn't do the job they were doing. [ When asked whether, in light of these problems, a true picture would then be presented to the Delegation, Chasse sought to explain: "Well, you know, we weren't just letting Roger and Jerry fumble-futz around on their own; we were micromanaging the Miami International Airport from the Regional level. So I think there were some good management decisions being made, but they weren't making them." The evidence indicates, however, that management problems persisted at the Miami Airport through the end of June, if not longer. On June 29, 1995, incoming alien passenger traffic was delayed two and one-half hours in clearing primary inspection at Miami Airport. Dade County Aviation Department called Attorney General Janet Reno complaining of the inordina te delays during what became known as "Black Monday." At that time, Blake was called to the Region to address specifically the understaffing problem, which arose because Miami had an authorized allotment of positions for 220 Immigration Inspectors, but were staffed at only 170. Devine testified that the problem stemmed from problems in Miami's hiring procedures that were "still screwed up." ]

Upon his arrival at the June 8 meeting, Cadman spoke briefly regarding the composition of the Delegation and the members' political affiliations and orientation. A hand-out including the names and short biographies of the memberswas provided. Cadman said the Commissioner could help Miami Airport with staffing more than the Delegation, so he wanted Miami Airport to look good for the Commissioner. Cadman also expressed concern that Union President Wixted would attempt to cause a disruption during the Delegation's visit. [ One supervisor, who believed that Cadman entered the meeting only about forty minutes after it began, attributed most of the aforementioned instructions regarding the smooth functioning of the airport, avoidance of passenger backup, increased staffing, and authorization of overtime to Cadman. Based upon the other testimony concerning Blake's and Cadman's remarks, it is likely that the supervisor misattributed remarks made by Blake to Cadman, who was not yet present.]

The next day, Miller asked Assistant Port Director Paul Candemeres whether he would work on the day of the Delegation's visit. Miller asked Candemeres to work that day because he was "phenomenal at staffing and knows the airport well." Miller testified that he knew that Candemeres "would be able to bring on whatever staff was needed and re-assign existing staff to make sure things ran smoothly" on the day of the Delegation's visit. Candemeres advised Miller that it was his regularly scheduled day off, but consented to work.

Miller and Candemeres agreed that four or five additional inspectors should be brought in to work on the day of the Delegation's visit. In speaking with Miller, Candemeres raised the issue that "some IIs [Immigration Inspectors] could be 'burned' from the line to escort the [Delegation] members." By "burned," Candemeres meant that the inspectors might be taken away from their inspectional duties on the primary line if needed to accompany members of the Delegation or if they had to answer questions.

Candemeres called in the four additional inspectors from days off or annual leave. He asked them to report for work at 1 p.m., an hour earlier than he would have otherwise, "to ensure that we were prepared for the Delegation's arrival at 1 p.m." even though he knew that at 1 p.m. "things were 'dead' in Concourses B and E."

Miller said he directed Candemeres to bring in the extra four inspectors as escorts for the Delegation. But Candemeres claimed that he was never instructed to call in those four or any other inspectors as escorts for the Delegation. Candemeres stated, however, that his "intent was to have these inspectors available if they were needed for escort duty or to replace other inspectors who may have had to do escort duties." Candemeres did not inform the four additional inspectors that theywere expected to act as escorts to the Delegation.

When Candemeres reported for work at approximately 10 a.m., he was designated as "board supervisor," and was responsible for insuring that "there is proper staffing on the primary, secondary, and special assignment designations." According to Candemeres, running the board entailed "reassigning and repositioning II's on a constant basis to meet the inspectional demands of the shift." That morning, Candemeres authorized approximately 13 inspectors (aside from the four he had called in on their days off) to work overtime beyond their regular morning shift (which begins at 5 a.m. and ends at 1 p.m.). Candemeres testified that those inspectors were "held over to work either primary or secondary inspection and to work the rush" and would have been brought on to work regardless of the Delegation's visit. As was the case with the four called in from their days off, none of the additional 13 was told that they would be acting as escorts for the Dele gation. [ Included in this group are the seven inspectors that Cadman identified as having been brought on as escorts for the Delegation. Candemeres testified that he personally authorized the overtime for those individuals. ] In addition, Candemeres authorized the overtime assignment of eight other inspectors to work in Terminal B. Candemeres stated that Terminal B needed additional staffing for a morning rush because on June 8, 1995, an additional concourse (Concourse A) had opened for early morning international flights, whose passengers were being sent through Terminal B.

The weight of the substantial credible evidence establishes, therefore, that the only inspectors called in to work overtime expressly because of the Delegation's visit were the four additional inspectors discussed above, who were notified to come in on their days off and who reported for work at 1 p.m., just before the Delegation's scheduled arrival for welcome and briefing at 1:15 p.m. [ Including the (1) four inspectors called in on overtime for the Delegation's visit, (2) eight inspectors called in on overtime to work on Concourse B, and (3) three Miami Airport supervisors (Miller, Emory and Candemeres) who worked because of the Delegation's visit, thirty-two inspectors and supervisors were paid overtime on June 10, 1995. In addition, on June 10, 1995, fewer inspectors called in sick than usual. All told, the resulting number of inspectors and supervisors paid for overtime was consistent with the average overtime staffing for the four month period surveyed.]

It is technically correct that for the hours they worked during the Delegation's visit, those inspectors earned their overtime under the 45 Act (since the visit occurred during the day, and not in the evening). However, each inspector was permitted to work that day at least one and one-half hours of overtime before 8a.m. or beyond 5 p.m., enabling them to earn overtime under the 31 Act during the time the Delegation was not visiting. Candemeres stated that as an incentive to the inspectors to work daytime overtime under the 45 Act, he generally allows them to work sufficient additional hours to "earn the dot," that is, to be further compensated under the 31 Act. Accordingly, inspectors who were brought on to work 45 Act overtime during the Delegation's visit, were also permitted to work the necessary hours to be further compensated under the more generous provisions of the 31 Act.

While an inordinate number of inspectors was not specially assigned to work overtime during the Delegation's visit, the overwhelming impression among the inspectors (52) was that extra staff had been assigned to work overtime that day. That impression is largely attributable to the fact that they observed that almost all of the primary inspection booths were filled when the Delegation came through, which was unusual for a time period that typically has a lull in passenger traffic. [ Only two inspectors stated that there was not an increase of inspectors on duty on that day. ]

In the normal course of its daily activities DCAD prepares a report entitled "Immigration Survey." The survey is performed every half hour and contains, among other information, the number of Immigration Inspectors on duty at Concourse E, the number of inspection booths that are open, and the approximate volume of passenger traffic on line in the primary inspection area. OIG analyzed and summarized this survey for Saturdays between January 1995 and July 15, 1995. OIG also analyzed the daily surveys for June 8, 1995 through June 11, 1995. Based on that analysis, we determined that the rounded average number of open primary inspection booths on Saturdays between 1:30 p.m. and 3 p.m. was 18 out of a total of 36 booths. On June 10, 1995, however, the rounded average was significantly higher -- 26. Those results are summarized in the table shown below and attached as Appendix 50.

It is worth noting that at approximately 2 p.m., just about the time the Delegation was walking through the primary inspection lines, there were 29 booths open, more than any other Saturday during the entire seven-month period. In addition, between 1:30 p.m. and 2 p.m., while the Delegation was being briefed in the soft secondary area, the booths went from 16 open to 29 open, while the passenger traffic remained exactly the same (approximately one-eighth of the room was filled). [ Blake testified that she was unaware of the DCAD survey.] As the Delegation was leaving the area around 2:30 p.m., the passenger traffic increased so that the room was approximately one-half full.

Assistant Port Director Donald Peck commented that there were approximately 60 Immigration Inspectors on duty at noon on June 10, 1995, which is usual. What was unusual, Peck said, was that all the booths were staffed when the passenger traffic did not warrant it.

Miller testified that Candemeres "repositioned IIs [Immigration Inspectors] to accommodate the inspectional booths. He took inspectors from the Terrorist, Drug, and Fraud Unit, soft secondary, Accelerated Passenger Information System (APIS) and Special Operations and put them on the primary line." Miller was aware that such "repositioning [was] Candemeres' style of management." Personnel was shifted to fully staff the primary inspection booths even though it was generally known that there was a lull in passenger traffic at that time. [ One Immigration Inspector even commented to Special Assistant of External Affairs for the Miami District George Waldroup that emptying the airport of passengers would cause the Delegation to believe that Miami Airport inspectors have nothing to do. Waldroup responded, "SHHHHHHH."] Miller acknowledged that the inspectors were shifted to ensure that there were no long lines of aliens waiting to be inspected when the Delegat ion walked through the primary inspection area.

After the visit, Miller commented to various inspectors that, contrary to his original intentions, the day of the Delegation's visit was not typical. Miller told Union officers he was ordered from "upper-upper" INS management in Headquarters to increase the staffing at Miami Airport on June 10, 1995.

During the course of his interview, Cadman admitted that the July 13 Memorandum was false. He stated that he did not direct that extra inspectors be brought on as escorts; that only supervisors and people who had some programoverview and knowledge were to serve as escorts. Cadman said he had no knowledge that inspectors were ever to be used as escorts during the Delegation's visit. Similarly, Cadman stated that he did not direct that Immigration Inspectors should go back to the primary line when he realized that the Delegation was smaller than originally anticipated. Cadman was unable to provide any explanation for the difference between the original response in the July 13 Memorandum and events as they actually happened. He stated that he "felt . . . a combination of shell shock and desire to respond and I wasn't terribly analytical in reviewing it other than to say is this accurate."

4.Conclusions

Deputy District Director Valerie Blake instructed Miami Airport managers and supervisors to make sure that on the day of the Delegation's visit, the Airport ran smoothly, there was no passenger backup, and as many inspectors as necessary were brought in on overtime to achieve those results. The instructions were designed to create an appearance of an efficiently managed facility, which did not comport with the reality at that time.

Blake also instructed Miami Airport personnel not to complain about the lack of inspectional staff or to make negative comparisons with staffing levels at JFK. This instruction comported with directions received from Pam Barry, the Director of Congressional Affairs at INS Headquarters, and Carole Chasse, the Eastern Regional Commissioner.

To achieve the results ordered by Blake, Assistant Port Director Paul Candemeres was called in from a day off to act as board supervisor. Port Director Roger Miller and Candemeres called in four Immigration Inspectors from days off to help ensure that the primary lines were fully staffed when the Delegation came through the primary inspection area. Those inspectors received overtime under the 45 Act and were subsequently permitted to earn more lucrative overtime under the 31 Act.

Perhaps more importantly, between 1:30 p.m. and 2 p.m., Candemeres repositioned inspections personnel normally assigned to other areas to fully staff the primary inspection booths during the Delegation's walk-through, despite a lull in passenger traffic. At the time the Delegation toured the primary inspections area, 29 out of 36 booths were filled while the room was only one-eighth full ofpassengers. The number of booths open at that time exceeded the seven-month average for Saturdays between January and July 1995 by 11 booths. The enormous number of staffed primary booths starkly contrasted with the low passenger volume and created the overwhelming impression among inspectional staff at Miami Airport that many additional inspectors had been assigned to work overtime. The increased staffing of the primary inspections booth (with overtime or reassigned inspectors) was motivated by the Delegation's visit and occurred pursuant to Blake's instructions.

In its initial response to this allegation, Cadman's July 13 Memorandum asserted that additional inspectors were brought on purely as escorts for the delegation and were reassigned to the primary lines because they were not needed. This response was not consistent with the substantial weight of the credible evidence. In his administratively-compelled interview with OIG, Cadman admitted that the July 13 Memorandum was false on this issue.

C.The Evacuation of Hard Secondary

1.The Allegation

The Complaint alleged that normal operating procedures relating to the incarceration of aliens at Miami Airport were violated in order to present an appearance of calm and order in hard secondary. Specifically, the Complaint asserted that ordinarily, an alien who is undocumented or presents fraudulent documents is detained in a hard secondary holding cell until an inspector begins to investigate the case. Once the inspector completes that investigation, the alien would again be placed in the detention cell until being transported to Krome or released to the public. The Complaint alleged that on June 10, 1995, contrary to that procedure, only criminal aliens were detained in the hard secondary holding cells. The Complaint alleges that all other aliens who had been detained in the holding cells were removed and told to sit in the front lobby of hard secondary. The Complaint alleged that the violation of normal procedures in hard secondary on the day of the Delegation's visit refl ected INS management's intent to conceal the true conditions at Miami Airport -- specifically, overcrowded detention cells hazardous to the health of the aliens and the safety of the inspectors.

2.The District's Initial Response

In the July 13, 1995, Memorandum, Cadman did not specifically deny the allegation, but he implied that no aliens had been removed from the detention cells prior to the Delegation's arrival. Cadman stated that Miami Airport secondary inspections logs reflected that only two aliens were detained in holding cells in Miami Airport's Terminal E during the time the Delegation visited, and that no other aliens had been held there since at least 6 a.m. that morning. He identified one alien as a criminal with an outstanding arrest warrant and the other alien as an exclusion case. Cadman also pointed out that the Delegation asked questions regarding the "nature of their violations" of the aliens detained in the hard secondary holding cells.

3.Method and Scope of Investigation

In connection with this allegation, OIG agents conducted interviews of approximately 104 Immigration Inspectors and 20 Supervisory Immigration Inspectors at Miami Airport. Managerial personnel at Miami Airport (including the supervisors with direct responsibility for hard secondary) and within the inspection division chain of command at the Miami District Office were also interviewed. We also obtained and analyzed various handwritten logs and computerized printouts documenting secondary inspections done at Terminal E on June 10, 1995 and recording those detained in the cells.

4.Evidentiary Findings

At the June 8, 1995 meeting held at the Airport by Blake to prepare Miami Airport supervisory personnel for the Delegation's upcoming visit, supervisors were directed to keep the hard secondary detention cells "clean." [ Blake also stated that she did not want to see long lines, did not want any backup in the hard secondary area, and authorized overtime to insure that things ran smoothly. Blake admitted that she instructed the supervisors that she didn't want to have a backlog in hard secondary and wanted things to run smoothly there. For a discussion of additional instructions issued by district managers at the June 8, 1995 Miami Airport meeting, see Section IV.B.3.b., above.] The supervisors did not take this directive literally, but generally understood that the cells should be kept empty. [ One of the Supervisory Immigration Inspectors testified that Cadman stated that he "wanted everything to go smoothly. He did not want to see the normal backup of aliens that usually occur [sic] on a Saturday. . . he wanted us to keep the cells in the hard secondary area clean (meaning empty)." In light of Cadman's late appearance at the June 8 meeting, and all of the other testimony concerning the nature of Cadman's brief remarks, as well as other testimony attributing those statements to Blake, it is likely that the inspector misattributed those remarks to Cadman. Cadman denied giving any instructions on the operation of hard secondary for the day of the Delegation's visit. Cadman, who was present only for the last approximately one- half hour of the meeting, also testified that he did not hear Blake or Kellner give any such instructions.] Miami District managers also issued specific instructions aboutwhich types of aliens should and should not be placed in the hard secondary cells.

In addition, supervisors were directed to instruct inspectors to provide the Task Force with false information concerning detention practices. Specifically, Blake or Kellner instructed that when Congress visited, only criminal aliens were to be kept in the cells in the hard secondary area. [ Blake first indicated her preference that the Delegation not see the hard secondary cells at all. Blake said that she did not want the Delegation to see the hard secondary cell area, "because it wasn't a proper cell that we wanted to show off, but if they wanted to see it, they could see it." ] Blake further directed that, if asked by a member of the Delegation "who is placed in the cells," the Immigration Inspectors should respond that "only criminal aliens are placed there." [ While Blake stated that she didn't remember issuing an instruction restricting hard secondary detention to criminal aliens, she admitted that she "could have" issued such an instruction. Blake also testified that she did not remember directing that upon Congressional inquiry, inspectors should say that only criminal aliens are kept in the cells.]

The instructions were inconsistent with the custom and practice followed by Immigration Inspectors and supervisors in hard secondary at Miami Airport. There are apparently no written criteria for the detention of aliens in hard secondary at Miami Airport. [ Chasse also testified that she was not aware of any regional policy regarding who is placed in the secondary holding cell.] Our investigation revealed, however, that aliens who are undocumented or present fraudulent documents are considered dangerous or flight risks, and thus are detained in the hard secondary holding cells, in addition to criminal aliens. Aliens are also often detained in cells pending questioning by the inspector conducting the hard secondary inspection.

With regard to those aliens who were not to be incarcerated during the Congressional visit, Blake specifically instructed that children were not to be kept in the hard secondary holding cells. [ Blake only grudgingly admitted that her instruction barring the detention of children in the hard secondary cells applied only to the day of the Delegation's visit. She testified as follows: Q: Has it come to your attention on occasion that children can be in the cells? A: Yes. Q: Is that something that you did not want the Congress to see? A: I don't want it at all, let alone congressional visit or not. * * * Q: . . . you believe you gave that instruction [not to place children in the cells]. Is that correct? A: About not having children in there? Q: Yes. A: Yes. Q: So it obviously was a concern that you had? A: For the children, not for the congressmen. Q: But you didn't give that instruction the next day? I mean you didn't say never should children be in the cells? A: No. You can't say never should children -- you might have people breast feeding and stuff. You can't separate the mothers and families under those circumstances. Q: Okay. But you gave an instruction for the day the Congress was coming but you didn't do anything to ensure that that would never -- A: I said I prefer that they not -- yes, I prefer that they not have children in there because it's an ugly place to be. Q: Okay, specifically on the day that the Congress was coming, right? A: I don't know that I said specifically on the day that the Congress -- but we did talk about the Congress. Q: That was the purpose of the meeting, right? A: Yes. Q: It wasn't just to give them a general overview of what they should or shouldn't be doing in general, right? A: Correct. Q: And you haven't had any meetings since then in which you told them, "I don't want children in the cells"? A: No, I haven't.] Blake also directed that it was "inappropriate" tohave men and women together in the sam e cell. Kellner similarly instructed that family groups were not to be placed in the cells that day "because she did not want it to look overcrowded." [ Kellner testified that she did not recall Blake or anyone else giving instructions concerning the type of individual to be detained in hard secondary and claimed that she did not give any instructions on that subject. Kellner testified that she did not specifically recall Blake or anyone else giving instructions that only criminal aliens were to be placed in the cells that day or that if Congress were to ask who is placed in cells, that employees were to say that only criminal aliens are placed there. Kellner also did not recall any instructions that no children were to be placed in cells. Kellner denied giving the instruction that no family units were to be placed in the cells.]

On June 10, 1995, when the Delegation arrived at Miami Airport, Candemeres had been assigned as board supervisor, and as such was responsiblefor insuring that "there [was] proper staffing on the primary, secondary, and special assignment designations." Shortly before noon, about an hour before the Delegation was scheduled to arrive at Miami Airport, Candemeres asked Supervisory Immigration Inspector Charlene Edwards if there were aliens in the hard secondary cells. After speaking with Luis Fuentes, the Supervisory Immigration Inspector in hard secondary at that time, Edwards determined that there were aliens in the cells, "including some Cuban aliens," and reported that information to Candemeres. Edwards also briefed Candemeres on who was in the cells and why they were being detained. Candemeres specifically asked why the Cubans were in the cells. [ Edwards stated that she believed that Candemeres was concerned about Cubans being detained in the cells be cause the local Florida Congressional representatives, Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, were expected to be among the Delegation and were of Cuban descent. See Section III.A.4.d.] Candemeres then instructed Edwards to tell Fuentes to "try to get all the aliens out of the cell if possible." Edwards relayed this instruction to Fuentes, who later reported to her that he had moved the aliens from the cells in hard secondary to the hard secondary seating area. [ Candemeres testified that he did not recall if Blake directed that only criminal aliens should be placed in the holding cells during the Delegation's visit. Candemeres also claimed not to recall whether Blake "mentioned any restriction about holding Cuban aliens in cells." It appears, however, from his subsequent actions that he was aware of those directions on June 10, 1995.]

Supervisory Immigration Inspector Luis Fuentes asked either Immigration Inspector Venancio McLean or Freddy Barragan to move all the aliens from the hard secondary holding cells to the seating area. [ McLean testified that while he observed the aliens being moved from the hard secondary cells to the seating area around noon that day, he did not himself move the aliens. Barragan did not work that day.] At that time, there were approximately eight aliens in the hard secondary holding cells in Miami Airport. [ This estimate is based on testimony and is inconsistent with the handwritten detention logs. According to airport staff the detention logs are not reliably kept. Apparently practices vary among inspectors with regard to whether an alien ’s placement in a cell is logged.] At around 12 p.m., the aliens were removed from the holding cells and placed in the hard secondary seating area. At least two criminal aliens were among that group. There was also at least one (and possibly two) aliens in that group who had attempted to enter the United States by means of fraudulent documents and were awaiting voluntary departure. [ McLean stated that this was the first time in the four years since he had started at Miami Airport as an inspector that he had seen or heard of aliens being moved from the hard secondary holding cells to the seating area. McLean stated that he could not remember which Supervisory Immigration Inspector ordered the removal of the aliens from the hard secondary cells to the seating area.]

Fuentes allowed the aliens to remain in the seating area through the end of his tour of duty, at 1 p.m. Prior to completing his tour, however, Fuentes authorized the two criminal aliens to be returned to the holding cells. The others remained in the seating area.

Once the aliens had been moved to the seating area, Candemeres assigned Immigration Inspector Stephen Kroger to guard the door to the hard secondary seating area. Candemeres told Kroger to guard the door "in case any alien attempted to flee because the detention cells had been emptied and the aliens had been placed in the hard secondary seating area." [ Fuentes claimed that the decision to move the aliens from the hard secondary holding cells to the seating area was "[his] decision alone." He claimed to have issued the instruction to move the aliens to allow the cells to be cleaned by a private cleaning company, pursuant to instructions from either Candemeres or Alger to make sure that the hard secondary area was tidied up for the Delegation's visit. It is worth noting that Alger was not working in hard secondary in Terminal E that day; rather, he was supervising hard secondary in Terminal B. Fuentes testified that once the aliens had been removed in order to phy sically clean the cells, he left them in the seating area because he did not view them as flight risks. Fuentes further denied having received "any orders, instructions, or directives from any of [his] supervisors to remove aliens from the hard secondary cell area." He claimed that he "did not refrain in any way of [sic] putting aliens in cells that [he] would have normally authorized to be placed there, because of the [Delegation's] visit. Fuentes testimony is contrary to the substantial weight of the credible evidence relating to this allegation.] Miller testified that Immigration Inspectors are not normally posted at the hard secondary door for security.

At approximately 12:30 p.m., Immigration Inspector Leonardo Reyes was reassigned to process aliens in hard secondary. Upon his arrival there, Reyes noticed that:

the area was not normal. The detention cells were clean and open and there were aliens sitting in the back of the room waiting to be processed. The detention cells are usually filthy, smelly and packed with aliens waiting for processing. (Emphasis added.)

Upon Fuentes' departure at 1 p.m., Supervisory Immigration Inspector Jose Leon reported to work at Miami Airport in hard secondary. Leon was then informed about the Delegation's impending arrival and instructed by Candemeres that "only criminal aliens should be placed in the cells at that time." Upon beginning his tour of duty, Leon noticed that two male aliens were in the holding cells in hard secondary and between 10 and 15 aliens were in the hard secondary seating area. Leon testified that at the time, he thought it was "unusual" that so few aliens were in the hard secondary cells.

After the aliens were moved from the cells to the seating area and following Leon's arrival, inspectors continued to process aliens in hard secondary. Rather than detaining aliens presenting fraudulent documents in the cells as they normally would, the inspectors allowed those aliens to wait in the hard secondary seating area. As Immigration Inspector Leonardo Reyes testified:

I was assigned to process one of the aliens who was sitting in the back of the room [in hard secondary]. She had entered illegally with a bad document and normally would have been locked up in the cells. During her interview, she admitted to possessing the bad passport and agreed to voluntarily depart the country. In all instances she would have been locked up in the detention cell after processing. However, I was following the lead of the other inspectors and she went back to sit with the other aliens in the waiting room.

Reyes explained, "I wasn't about to ask any questions as I assumed the supervisors knew what they were doing."

Based upon Miami Airport's computerized and handwritten records, [ The records include the computer-generated INS Secondary Inspection Log for Concourse E on June 10, 1995 and Secondary Disposition Query Results and the handwritten detention logs for hard secondary holding cells on Concourse E.] at least six potentially inadmissible aliens -- who were criminals or had presented fraudulent documents to gain admission to the U.S. -- were present in hard secondary when theDelegation toured there. [ The INS Secondary Inspection Log for Concourse E of Miami Airport for June 10, 1995 also shows that from midnight to approximately 2:30 p.m., a total of 78 arriving passengers to Miami Airport were referred from primary immigration inspection to secondary for additional inspection prior to being admitted into the United States. Of these 78, six were denied admission for the reasons discussed below. ] No more than two of them were present in the holding cells when the Delegation to ured the area. Accordingly, contrary to Miami Airport custom and practice, at least four aliens were not incarcerated that day because of the Delegation's visit.

The testimony and records indicate that the two incarcerated aliens were criminals with multiple convictions; one of the criminals had an active arrest warrant. [ As described above, the testimony indicates that those two criminals were initially incarcerated, removed from the cells, and subsequently returned to the cells, all just prior to the Delegation's arrival.] The four aliens who were not incarcerated, but rather kept in the hard secondary seating area, had presented fraudulent documents and were awaiting voluntary departure. At least one of those four aliens had initially been placed in a cell, but was removed to the seating area for the Delegation's visit. Contrary to normal practice, the other three were simply never placed in the cells because of the Delegation's impending arrival. Those results are summarized in the table shown below, and attached as Appendix 51. In addition, testimony indicates that at least two other aliens had been removed from the cells bef ore the Delegation’s visit; the detention of those aliens was never recorded on the detention logs.

HANDLING OF INADMISSIBLE ALIENS IN HARD SECONDARY

DURING THE DELEGATION'S VISIT [ It should be noted that the Miami Airport records that form the basis for this exhibit are internally inconsistent. For example, the records indicate that certain aliens were placed in cells before they were even referred to hard secondary. In addition, two sets of detention logs were discovered. On one of the logs, the entries for June 10 appear to have been copied or entered at one time in the same handwriting. In connection with that log, the June 10, 1995 entries are out of date sequence with the other entries in the log. That log sheet, which indicates the incarceration of only one alien on June 10, 1995, is inconsistent with the other log sheet. Both sets of log sheets are inconsistent with the testimony. Moreover, inspectors and supervisors in hard secondary have testified that the detention log sheets are unreliable in that aliens are placed in or removed from cells without notations in the log.]

NAME	CITIZENSHIP	TIME REFERRED TO HARD SECONDARY * 1	TIME COMPLETED HARD SECONDARY * 2	TIME PLACED IN DETENTION CELL * 3	TIME OUT OF CELL * 4	STATUS
Arnas, Roberto	Cuba	6/10/95 12:59 am	6/10/95 1:10 am	6/9/95 1:45 pm	6/10/95 12:15 am ----------- 6/10/95 8:50 pm *5	Multiple Criminal Convictions
Pinto, Maywick Paulo Montrez	Brazil	6/10/95 7:27 am	6/10/95 9:09 am	6/10/95 6:00 am	6/10/95 8:30 pm	Fraudulent Passport
Nuneztapia, Jesusman	Dominican Republic	6/10/95 10:24 am	6/10/95 4:03 pm	6/10/95 12:30 pm	6/11/95 12:15 am	Multiple Criminal Convictions Active Arrest Warrant
Castellanous, Zulay	Venezuela	6/10/95 12:41 pm	6/10/95 4:05 pm	No Entry	No Entry	Fraudulent Passport
Allen, Neilson	Jamaica	6/10/95 12:47 pm	6/10/95 5:49 pm	No Entry	No Entry	Fraudulent Visa
Valdez, Luz	Colombia	6/10/95 1:25 pm	6/10/95 6:38 pm	No Entry	No Entry	Fraudulent Admission Stamp

*1 According to TECS II printout

*2 According to TECS II printout

*3 According to Manual Detention Log

*4 According to Manual Detention Log

*5 The Detention Log contains two entries indicating the time this alien was removed from the cell, but only one entry reflecting the time the alien was placed into the cells.

Between approximately 1:15 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., the Delegation toured hard secondary. The weight of the substantial credible evidence is that the two criminal aliens described above were in the hard secondary cells at that time. At least four other aliens who had presented fraudulent documents were in the seating area. While touring hard secondary, members of the Delegation asked Leon, "What typeor class of aliens get detained in the cell?" In accordance with the instructions he had received from Candemeres, Leon responded, "Only criminal aliens." When asked by members of the Delegation whether there is any other reason that aliens would be detained in cells, Leon answered "No." Leon has admitted that he knew that he was giving false information to the Delegation, but explained that he did what he had been instructed to do.

Port Director Miller, who had attended the June 8 meeting, was standing near Leon at the time of the Delegation's questioning. Miller testified that he heard Leon tell the Delegation that "only criminal aliens are locked up in the holding cell." Miller admitted that he knew that Leon's response was a "misrepresentation" but did not correct it. When asked why he did not correct it, Miller stated that OIG would "have to ask the District why I did not respond to correct this misrepresentation." [ Deputy Port Director Jerry Emory also generally heard Leon answering the Delegation's questions about hard secondary. ]

Blake admitted that she was standing "right next to" Leon when he was "giving the briefing about who is in secondary and what it's about." Blake claimed, however, that she did not recall hearing a question from the Delegation about the type of aliens kept in the hard secondary cells or Leon's response that only criminal aliens are kept in the cells. Blake stated, "I might have corrected that misinformation if that's what I had heard so I'd have to think that I didn't hear it (emphasis added)."

5.Conclusions

Approximately two hours before the Delegation arrived to view hard secondary, aliens who were detained in the holding cells were removed and kept in the outside seating area. Included in that group were two criminal aliens with multiple convictions, one of whom had an active warrant. At least one other had presented false documents in an attempt to gain admission to the United States. In addition, aliens who would normally have been detained in the cells were not placed in the cells, and rather were kept in the seating area awaiting voluntary departure. Included in that group were at least three other aliens who had presented false documents. Before the Delegation arrived, the two criminal aliens were placed back in the holding cells.

The testimony reveals that the removal of the aliens from the cells and the failure to place certain aliens in the cells was not consistent with the standard operating procedure at Miami Airport. Moreover, the treatment of the aliens in hard secondary was motivated by the Delegation's impending visit and District management's interest in preventing the Delegation from seeing overcrowded cells. The evidence demonstrates that Blake issued the instructions to restrict the use of the holding cells to the incarceration of only criminal aliens. Her instructions were communicated to the supervisors and inspectors working in hard secondary by Candemeres, through supervisory inspectors Charlene Edwards, Luis Fuentes, and Jose Leon. Moreover, the evidence establishes that Blake directed supervisors to tell the line inspectors that, if asked, they were to provide false information to the Delegation regarding criteria for placing aliens in the hard secondary holding cells. Specifically, Bla ke instructed that the Delegation should be told that only criminal aliens are kept in those cells.

Testimony given to OIG further shows that Supervisory Immigration Inspector Jose Leon in fact carried out this order by lying to the Delegation when asked, "What type or class of aliens get detained in the cell." Although he had a chance to correct his erroneous information, Port Director Miller did not. On this point, Blake's testimony struck us as incredible. Although we cannot say for certain, it is likely that she was aware of Leon's statement and chose not to advise the Delegation of the truth. As the senior manager who gave the instruction to mislead Congress and to stand by while it was being carried out, Blake is the most culpable INS employee with respect to this issue. Miller exercised poor judgment in permitting this instruction and misrepresentation to be made without opposing it. It is regrettable that the culture at INS appears to be such that inspectors at Leon's level would feel that their jobs would be in jeopardy if they failed to obey an order to lie to Congress. Numerous witnesses conveyed the belief that they had no choice but to comply with Blake's directive. As a management matter, this episode suggests the need for stronger signals to be sent by upper-level INS managers to their employees about integrity, honesty, and complicity in communicating falsehoods to Congressional and other fact-finders.

D.The Instruction to Remove Gear Belts

1.The Allegation

The Complaint alleged that INS management ordered Immigration Inspectors conducting primary inspections to remove their leather belts during the Delegation's visit to Miami Airport in order "to present a 'kinder gentler' image." The leather gear belts generally contain a holster for a firearm, ammunition pouches, and handcuffs inside a case. According to the Complaint, primary Immigration Inspectors at Miami Airport are "normally" allowed to wear the gear belt during the performance of their duties.

2.The District's Initial Response

In its initial response to this allegation, the District, in essence, admitted the substance of the allegation, acknowledging that "[o]fficers were reminded of [certain] routine uniform standards before the congressional visit." Specifically, Cadman acknowledged that officers were reminded that there was no rationale for Immigration Inspectors to wear a gun belt or an empty holster since INS policy forbids inspectors stationed at airports to carry firearms while performing primary inspection. Cadman also acknowledged that officers were reminded that "it is and has been District management's position that [handcuffs] should be contained in appropriate leather cases -- not dangle loosely from pants or belts." Cadman explained that the District's position is predicated on its "desire to preserve the professional appearance of this cadre of uniformed officers." The District was unable to provide any prior or subsequent written policy directing that Im migration Inspectors refrain from wearing gear belts or dangling handcuffs.

3.Method and Scope of Investigation

In connection with this allegation, OIG reviewed all current INS Headquarters, Regional, Miami District, and District of New York written policies that could be identified on the issuance and use of firearms and accompanying gear to Immigration Inspectors. OIG also interviewed witnesses from every level in the chain of command between Immigration Inspector and District Director, as well as Union officials, regarding the relevant custom and practice in the Miami District. Management officials in the District of New York were questioned on the samesubject. In addition, OIG interviewed a total of approximately 103 witnesses concerning their personal knowledge of the factual basis for this allegation, including all Immigration Inspectors and supervisory inspectors who were working on the day the Delegation visited, as well as all of those INS employees and others (including, e.g., DCAD employees) who participated in prior planning meetings in which the prohibition on the weari ng of leather gear may have been discussed. OIG also interviewed all INS management officials who played a role in the issuance or execution of the instruction on gear belts. Finally, OIG consulted with Union officials to obtain the Union's view on the significance of such an instruction and requested a written statement from them on this issue. No written statement from the Union was ever provided to OIG.

4.Evidentiary Findings

a.INS Policies and Practices on Firearms and Gear for Primary Inspectors

(1) Written Policy

In response to OIG's request for all written firearm and gear policy relating to this allegation, Cadman provided a copy of the 1986 INS Administrative Manual, •• 4210.01 and 4210.02, dated August 7, 1986 (hereinafter, the "1986 INS Firearms Policy" and attached as Appendix 52). Cadman also provided a Memorandum from the Office of the Commissioner dated October 5, 1989 entitled "Inspections Program Firearms Policy," which is attached as Appendix 53. [ In providing the INS headquarters inspection policy memorandum, Cadman explained that it could not be located in the Miami District Office's files, and that he obtained it from the port director in Orlando.]

This 1986 INS firearms policy was revised effective November 1, 1989. (INS Administrative Manual, Sec. 4210, effective November 1, 1989; Memorandum from the Office of the Commissioner to the Executive Staff dated October 26, 1989 re: "Revised AM Section 4210, Service Firearms Policy" or the "Revised INS Firearms Policy"). [ Though the Miami District provided OIG with an outdated version of the INS written policy on the subject, the 1989 revision of the INS Administrative manual was itself announced in the October 5, 1989 Memorandum on Inspections Program Firearms Policy that was provided by Cadman.] The Revised INS Firearms Policy expands the authorization forImmigration Inspectors to carry firearms, and directly conflicts with the 1986 INS Firearms Policy as it relates to this allegation. The Revised INS Firearms Policy is attached as Appendix 54. Deputy Regional Director Devine confirmed that under current INS policy as revised in 1989, all Immigrati on Inspectors who are qualified are authorized to carry firearms.

According to the 1986 INS Firearms Policy relied upon by Miami District management, only Immigration Inspectors assigned to certain duty stations were specifically authorized to carry firearms. Those duty stations included land border ports and seaports; they did not include airports. In fact, officers performing inspection duties at land and seaports of entry were required to carry firearms while on duty. Immigration Inspectors at airports who were conducting primary inspections were not authorized under the 1986 INS Firearms Policy to use or carry firearms in connection with their inspection duties.

Under the 1986 INS Firearms Policy, however, a District Director (or the District Director's designated representative) had some discretion to authorize and require Immigration Inspectors assigned to airports to wear firearms. The 1986 INS policy provided that a district director can authorize or require an Immigration Inspector to carry a firearm, when "the type of duty makes the carrying of sidearms advisable." (INS AM • 4210.02, August 7, 1986).

Contrary to the 1986 INS Firearms Policy, the 1989 Revised INS Firearms Policy authorizes all Immigration Inspectors (without regard to duty station) to carry firearms in the conduct of their official duties. In accordance with the Revised INS Firearms Policy, Supervisory and Senior Immigration Inspectors at airports were issued firearms for the performance of their duties. [ OIG has not identified any written policy specifically authorizing supervisors and senior inspectors at airports to carry their firearms while performing their duties, though such authority appears to be implicit. ] If available, firearms were to be provided to inspectors at airports to enable them to qualify with the weapon. Under the Revised INS Firearms Policy, the District Director, among others, may withdraw or restrict that authorization "in the best interests of the Service and/or the employee(s)." (INS Administrative Manual, • 4210, effective November 1, 1989).

We have been provided with no written policy or testimony from the Miami District, however, indicating that the District Director or his designated representative exercised his discretion under the 1986 or Revised INS Firearms Policy, or was even aware of the change in policy. [ In the District of New York, a written policy was issued reflecting the exercise of that discretion in 1994. The policy, issued by John Mirandona, Assistant Port Director for John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) and the Assistant District Director for Inspections, provided that, with the exception of supervisory and senior inspectors, firearms are not to be worn by inspectors unless specifically authorized to do so by a supervisor. The policy further provided that supervisors were authorized to allow no more than one inspector to be armed, and then only if a criminal alien was being held in the secondary inspections area. The policy further stated that the transportation of criminal aliens to t he INS processing center will continue to warrant inspectors to be armed. JFK's written policy is attached as Appendix 55.]

OIG's review of the INS Administrative Manual did not reveal any written policy regarding the wearing of leather gear by Immigration Inspectors conducting primary inspections. Cadman has acknowledged that he does not know of any such written policy and did not produce any such policy to OIG. Nor has Cadman issued a written policy in the Miami District regarding the wearing of leather gear or handcuffs by Immigration Inspectors conducting primary inspections. Cadman stated that in 1994 or 1995 he verbally directed the Union that handcuffs should be encased. [ Cadman testified that the issue arose after the District obtained funding to issue handcuffs to all Immigration Inspectors.] According to Blake, prior to her arrival in the Miami District, a policy directing that handcuffs be encased in a leather container was issued. [ Blake did not provide any written documentation of such a policy. Blake was unaware of any policy directing that empty holsters be removed because, she testified, "It seems . . . too stupid to even address."] Cadman acknowledged, however, that the verbal policy regarding the encasement of handcuffs was not consistently followed. [ By way of comparison, in 1994 the New York District issued a written policy precluding inspectors assigned to primary inspections from wearing leather gear (other than a uniform belt) and handcuffs.] Devine confirmed that, to his knowledge, no one has ever promulgated a written policy at Miami Airport proscribing the wearing of leather gear by Immigration Inspectors.

(2)Custom and Practice at Miami Airport

Our investigation disclosed that the custom and practice at Miami Airport as of the time of the Delegation's visit was that Immigration Inspectors were not permitted to wear their firearms while they served on the primary inspection line. However, supervisors and senior inspectors and any other Immigration Inspector performing a specialized function were permitted to wear firearms in the performance of their duties. For instance, when Immigration Inspectors escort deportable aliens to the airlines they are permitted to wear firearms. Since this duty occurs intermittently and with little notice, Immigration Inspectors have claimed that it is easier to keep their holsters on their belts without their weapon than to keep their holsters and weapons in their gun lockers. Inspectors assigned to the Terrorist, Drugs, and Fraud Unit are also armed.

Of the 86 Immigration Inspectors interviewed (who worked on June 9 and June 10), 41 said they normally do not wear their gear belts while conducting primary inspection. Twenty-nine indicated that they did. [ Sixteen inspectors were not specifically asked the question.] Many of those inspectors who wore leather gear stated that they did so to enable them to get ready more quickly when they need to carry a firearm (e.g., to escort a departing alien to a plane).

Miami Airport managers were aware of the practice followed by many Immigration Inspectors to wear leather gear during the course of their duties. In addition, Cadman and Blake had visited the airport on several occasions, and were in a position to know of that practice. Cadman testified that he was aware that some inspectors wore handcuffs dangling from their belts, rather than carrying them inside a leather case.

Prior to the Delegation's visit, no Miami Airport or District manager had issued instructions to prevent Immigration Inspectors from wearing full leather gear, including empty holsters. [ Cadman and Blake acknowledged that the only prior instruction on gear that they had issued was to preclude Immigration Inspectors from wearing dangling handcuffs from their belts. According to Cadman and Blake, directions had been issued that handcuffs were to be worn in cases only. ]

b.The Instruction to Remove Gear

At the June 8, 1995 planning meeting held at Miami Airport in anticipation of the Delegation's visit (see Section IV.B.3.b., above), Blake instructed Miami Airport's supervisory inspectors to prohibit Immigration Inspectors conducting primary inspections from wearing their leather gear on the day of the Task Force's visit. [ Blake initially testified that the gear issue was not discussed at the meeting of June 8, 1995. Upon further questioning, however, Blake admitted that it was possible that she did issue an instruction forbidding the wearing of gear, but stated that she had no recollection of issuing that instruction. Supervisory Immigration Inspector Jesus Cantu, who also attended the meeting, recalled that one of the Miami District managers who attended the June 8 meeting (either Cadman, Blake, Kellner or Waldroup) instructed the supervisors "to notify the inspectors who wear their leather not to wear it." ]

Cadman denied having given any instruction at this meeting that the Immigration Inspectors on primary were not to wear leather gear. He said he did not recall whether any directives were given by others at the June 8, 1995 meeting about whether the gear should be worn on the day of the Delegation's visit, stating that he did not attend the entire meeting.

Just prior to the Delegation's visit, Cadman acknowledged that he told either Kellner, Staff Officer Deborah Condon, or Miller that he wanted the inspections staff to wear their handcuffs encased in cases, and that he "did not want [the inspectors'] cuffs dangling from their uniforms." It was clear that Cadman's instruction regarding the encasement of handcuffs on the day of the Delegation's visit was special "because [he] wanted [the Delegation] to have the best impression of [the immigration] officers." Cadman denied having issued any prohibition against wearing all leather gear. He stated that he might have prohibited the wearing of empty holsters because he believes that looks unprofessional, but does not recall issuing such a prohibition. Cadman acknowledged not having issued an instruction to continue the prohibition on wearing leather gear after the Delegation left.

Miller testified that he did not recall if, at the June 8, 1995 Miami Airport meeting, Blake or anyone else issued an instruction prohibiting the Immigration Inspectors from wearing leather gear during the Delegation's visit. On June 9, 1995, Miller met with Emory to discuss "uniforms and the appearance of the IIs[Immigration Inspectors]" for the Delegation's visit. Miller decided that the Immigration Inspectors should remove their leather gear while working on the primary inspection line and advised Emory of that decision. Emory then issued that instruction to the Assistant Port Directors and Supervisory Immigration Inspectors; it was an instruction that Emory had never previously issued.

Of the 82 Immigration Inspectors interviewed by OIG who worked on the day of the Delegation's visit, 34 testified they were informed either by their supervisor or other inspectors that they were not to wear their gear during the Task Force's visit. Forty-eight Immigration Inspectors who also worked said they received no such instruction.

c.Management's Motivation

According to Miller, his decision to prohibit the Immigration Inspectors from wearing leather gear on the day of the Delegation's visit was based on his view that an empty weapon holster created a "Barney Fife" appearance. [ In the television series "The Andy Griffith Show," the inept and bungling Barney Fife character carried an unloaded gun and had to ask the sheriff for bullets.] Miller said that his intention was not to create a "'kinder and gentler'" image [of inspectors] or diminish any law enforcement identity." Miller acknowledged that on the day of the Delegation's visit, "things were not run as they were normally or typically run." Miller stated that he was "aware . . . that the District office, Cadman, Blake and Kellner, wanted to create an impression of a smooth running operation that did not comport with reality."

The instruction to prohibit the Immigration Inspectors from wearing gear that they normally wear and have continued to wear since the Delegation's visit, while apparently cosmetic, reflected INS management's overall desire to create a more favorable impression of the District's management than was real. The instruction was consistent with Cadman's admonition on May 22, 1995 to some of his managers that "[the INS Commissioner] wants a sharp-looking, heads-up group of employees doing their jobs visible to this influential group."

5.Conclusions

The substantial weight of the credible evidence demonstrates that INS district management, specifically Blake and Miller, did direct that the Immigration Inspectors conducting primary inspections remove their leather gear belts during the Delegation's visit. The instruction was issued to Supervisory Immigration Inspectors who were directed to convey the instruction to the Immigration Inspectors on the line. The instruction was not made pursuant to any written policy and was a deviation from the common practice at Miami Airport both before and after the Task Force's visit. The instruction appears to have been motivated by a desire to create the appearance of professionalism during the Delegation's visit to Miami Airport. The instruction concerned the Union for two reasons: (1) it exposed inspectors, the public, and the Delegation to potential harm from dangerous aliens, and (2) it could hamper the Union's efforts to obtain law enforcement officer status for Immigration Inspecto rs.

The direction by Cadman to encase handcuffs was a departure from standard procedure, but not one that appears to have materially altered the impression of conditions given to the Task Force during its visit. It is perfectly appropriate for managers to request that their employees comport themselves in a professional way for important visitors and to wear their uniforms accordingly. Where Blake and Miller crossed the line in this instance was in diverging from recognized custom and practice without ever promulgating standards, a failure compounded by the Union’s sensitivity on this issue.

E.The Failure to Notify and Exclusion of the Union from the Task Force Visit

1.The Allegation

The Complaint alleged that the employees were not fully informed about the upcoming Task Force visit until the day the Delegation arrived. The Complaint further alleged that the Union was prevented from representing the interests of the District's employees during the course of the Delegation's visit because District Director Cadman threatened to arrest the Union President, Michael Wixted, for

trespassing. The Union alleged that this action showed that INS management "did not want the employees to have a voice in the presentation to the delegation." [ Although not contained in the Complaint Letter, Wixted also alleged that he sustained an injury to his arm when Waldroup grabbed his arm in an attempt to force him to leave Miami Airport during the Delegation's visit, an allegation that formed the basis for a claim filed by Wixted with the United States Department of Labor for a continuation of regular pay and compensation for wage loss during his alleged disability for work. ]

2.The District's Initial Response

In the July 13 Memorandum, Cadman said that his memorandum dated June 26, 1995, written in connection with Waldroup's alleged assault of Wixted during the Delegation's visit (the "June 26 Memorandum"), fully addressed this allegation. The June 26 Memorandum, however, is limited to the events surrounding Cadman's alleged threat to arrest Wixted. It does not relate to the issues of notice raised in the Complaint.

Cadman's account of his alleged threat to arrest Wixted, as set forth in the June 26 Memorandum, is as follows. On June 9, 1995, Wixted sent two e-mail requests to Cadman asking to participate in and/or attend the events planned for the Congressional Delegation visiting Miami Airport on June 10, 1995. Cadman replied by e-mail and denied Wixted's requests. The e-mails were also attached to the July 13 Memorandum. [ It is worth noting that this inclusion is inconsistent with Cadman's position that he deleted e-mail messages shortly after reading them. It seems likely that he deleted this e-mail after OIG began this investigation on July 14, when he knew or should have known to preserve all relevant documents.] On June 10, Cadman was advised that Wixted and the Union Shop Steward, Michael Boze, were at Miami Airport. Cadman asked a member of his management staff to find Wixted and Boze and to advise them that they would not be allowed to disrupt the events. When the Delega tion arrived and was proceeding to the initial briefing in the soft secondary area, Cadman noticed that Regional Director Carol Chasse was accompanied by Wixted and Boze.

Cadman spoke with Chasse and Blake and it was decided that Wixted and Boze would not be allowed to accompany the Delegation past the initial briefing. Wixted and Boze, however, continued to accompany the group on the tour.

Cadman confronted Wixted and Boze and told them that they could not continue to accompany the Delegation. He said that he directed them to leave andadvised them of the consequences of insubordination. After several minutes of vigorous discussion, Wixted and Boze agreed to depart.

In addition to the information contained in the June 26 Memorandum, Cadman provided further details in a note sent to Blake in connection with her preparation of the draft of the July 13 Memorandum. [ The note took the form of a Routing and Transmittal Slip, which attached the June 26 Memorandum.] In this note Cadman explained that after seeing Wixted and Boze join the Delegation, he sent Waldroup to get the police. Cadman advised Wixted that he hoped Wixted did not intend to push the issue to the point of trespassing or disturbing the peace. He told Wixted that he would likely end up under arrest. According to Cadman's note, when the police arrived with Waldroup, Wixted and Boze chose to leave "out of respect" for Cadman.

3.Evidentiary Findings

In connection with this allegation, OIG interviewed approximately 100 persons, including all of those INS personnel involved in the planning of the Delegation's visit who had contact with Union representatives, all those who participated in the discussions or communications with Wixted and Boze, and all INS personnel and civilians who witnessed the confrontation among Cadman, Waldroup, Wixted, and Boze. Shortly before April 20, 1995, Pam Barry advised Blake that the Task Force would be visiting the Miami District on June 10, 1995. On April 20, 1995, Blake sent an e-mail to various district managers, including Cadman, to notify them of the visit. That e-mail is attached as Appendix 56. Coordination of logistics of the visit was assigned to Waldroup. Thereafter, Blake discussed the upcoming Congressional visit at various regular staff meetings attended by the program managers within the District, as well as Krome's Camp Administrator. The District Office did not notify the Union or District employees about the visit.

On May 25, 1995, Barry made an advance trip to Miami as part of the preparations for the Delegation's visit. At around that time, Miami Airport's upper management, including Miller, Emory and at least one Assistant Port Director, was made aware of the upcoming visit. Soon thereafter, Miller sent out a memorandum to the Miami Airport staff notifying them of the visit. He also told the supervisorsabout it during Miami Airport's regular weekly staff meeting. At Krome, Weiss advised her supervisors about the visit, but did not send out any notice to employees.

At the Airport, several Union members and officers asked Miller and Emory for additional information about the upcoming visit. No specific information was provided.

At the June 8, 1995, District management meeting at the Airport, Airport supervisors were directed to issue certain instructions to the line employees. Most employees at Miami Airport and Krome learned about the visit on the day before or the day of the visit. [ Approximately 122 employees at Miami Airport and Krome stated that they received some advance notice of the Delegation's visit.]

On June 7, Wixted sent an e-mail to Cadman in which he asked whether time had been allocated during the Delegation's visit for a discussion with the Union, or if the Union would "at least be invited to attend management presentations and tour of Miami Airport and Krome." Cadman responded by e-mail on June 9, 1995 that the schedule "has been set up in a very tight fashion . . . and does not permit for the kind of meeting you request." Wixted replied in about an hour, asking whether the Union would at least be invited to attend the tours and speeches already scheduled. Very shortly thereafter, Cadman responded, "Not this time." All four of the above-described e-mails are shown below and are attached as Appendix 57.

On June 10, 1995, the day of the Delegation's visit, Wixted went to the employee break room behind the primary inspection area in Terminal E and remained there until the Delegation arrived. Blake learned that Wixted was at Miami Airport and directed Waldroup and Emory to advise Wixted that she wished to speak with him. [ Blake testified that she informed Cadman that Wixted was at Miami Airport, and Cadman directed that Wixted be ordered off the premises. Cadman denied issuing any such instructions. Cadman testified that he first learned of Wixted's presence at Miami Airport when Cadman saw Wixted entering the initial briefing in soft secondary with Carol Chasse. Emory testified, however, that he was together with Cadman, Waldroup, and Blake just before the Delegation arrived, when Waldroup told Cadman that he had seen Wixted and Boze at the Airport. ] Blake, Emory, Waldroup, and other Miami Airport supervisors all began looking for Wixted and Boze.

Emory and another supervisor located Wixted and Boze in the inspectors' break room hanging up signs saying, "Don't Lie to Congress," "Whitewash for Congress" and "Tell The Congress The Truth!" A copy of one of those signs is shown below and attached as Appendix 58.

Wixted and Boze were told that Blake wished to speak to them. Wixted refused, and left through another door. [ Boze did agree to speak with Blake and advised her that he was on Union time. ] Wixted was subsequently approached by Waldroup and was again advised that Blake wanted to speak with him. An altercation ensued in which Wixted threatened to have Waldroup arrested if Waldroup did not release Wixted's arm. Wixted later filed an injury claim for an arm injury allegedly caused by his scuffle with Waldroup.

Subsequently, Chasse observed Wixted and Boze in the primary inspection area and approached them. After a brief conversation, Chasse permitted Wixted and Boze to accompany her into the initial briefing in soft secondary, and to walk with the Delegation. Cadman saw Chasse usher Wixted into the soft secondary briefing.

After Wixted and Boze had toured Terminal E with the Delegation, Cadman told Chasse that he thought it would be inappropriate for Wixted and Boze to enter the closed briefing that was scheduled next with the Coast Guard and United States Attorney. He further advised Chasse that he intended not to let Wixted enter that briefing. Chasse agreed.

Before the closed briefing began, Cadman told Wixted and Boze that they could not attend. After Wixted and Boze indicated that they were going to attend anyway, Cadman said, "I'm giving you a direct order and I'm reminding you that you are an employee of the Service." Wixted said he was off duty. Cadman reminded him that Boze was on duty, and the fact that Wixted was off duty was immaterial regarding a direct order.

Wixted stated that the airport was not Cadman's facility. Cadman responded that if required he would have Dade County "take him out," and at some point asked George Waldroup to get the police. When Wixted asked Cadman what he would do, Cadman responded that if necessary, he would have the Metro Dade police secure the gates and doors to the briefing room. Wixted asked, "You'd have me arrested?" Cadman responded, "If I had to; I wouldn't want to but if I had to. But you'll have to make that call." [ A senior agent for DCAD who was standing nearby heard Cadman say to Wixted, "Do you realize that I can have you arrested?" Wixted responded "Arrested for what? This is not private property. I am not breaking any laws by being here." Within minutes, the agent heard another DCAD employee calling for the police. Cadman had earlier testified that he had advised Wixted and Boze that they could be arrested for trespass. Either the President or Boze re sponded "go ahead and have me arrested."] At this point Boze departed. Shortly thereafter, Wixted also left, prior to the arrival of any police.

4.Conclusions

With respect to the issue of advance notice, the substantial weight of the credible evidence establishes that the Union was never formally told about the upcoming Delegation visit. Program managers within the District Office were notified well in advance of the visit. Miami Airport supervisory personnel were notified two days before the visit. For the most part, notice to line employees was given on the day of the Delegation's arrival. The Union was excluded from the visit, except to the extent that at the last minute, Chasse allowed the Union's President and Treasurer to accompany the Delegation on the tour.

With respect to Cadman's alleged threat to arrest Wixted, the substantial weight of the credible evidence is that Cadman told Wixted and Boze that he would have them arrested if they tried to accompany the Delegation into what he considered to be a secure briefing. They then left.