



U.S. Department of Justice | Office of the Inspector General



SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025

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
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MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



Source: OIG

It is my pleasure to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress on the operations of the U.S. Department of Justice (the Department or DOJ) OIG, which covers the period from October 1, 2024, to March 31, 2025.

Within the past 6 months, the OIG has completed and released many noteworthy reports. For example, the OIG released its review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) handling of its confidential human sources (CHS) and intelligence collection efforts in the lead up to the January 6, 2021, electoral certification. This report found that, while the FBI recognized the potential for violence and took significant and appropriate steps to prepare for its supporting role, including attempting to identify known domestic terrorism subjects who planned to travel to Washington, D.C., the FBI did not canvass its field offices in advance of January 6, 2021. This step could have helped the FBI, and its law enforcement partners with their preparations for January 6 by identifying potential threats to the electoral certification using intelligence, including confidential human sources reporting, gathered by FBI field offices.

During this reporting period, the OIG also released a review of the Department's issuance of compulsory process to obtain records of Members of Congress, congressional staffers, and members of the news media and a Management Advisory Memorandum (MAM) identifying concerns in the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) transportation interdiction activities.

Additionally, the OIG has returned to the office full-time under the Office of Personnel Management's Return to In-Person Work memorandum.

The OIG also issued several investigative summaries during this reporting period, including a report detailing the investigation into a then DOJ Attorney Advisor for conduct prejudicial to the government in connection with the Attorney Advisor engaging in inappropriate sexual contact with an intern in the Attorney Advisor's office. Also, during this period, an OIG investigation resulted in the arrest of a former FBI Special Agent (SA) for the disclosure of confidential information. Further, the OIG's Investigation's Division closed 98 criminal or administrative misconduct cases, and its work resulted in 30 convictions or pleas and 82 terminations, administrative disciplinary actions, and resignations. The quality of the investigations described in this report demonstrates the importance of effective, fair, and independent investigative oversight conducted by our office.

The OIG remains committed to its mission for promoting the rule of law through objective, independent oversight of DOJ—as is exemplified in our work over the past 6 months. As usual, the Semiannual Report to Congress reflects the exceptional work of OIG personnel.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael E. Horowitz". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized initial "M" and "H".

Michael E. Horowitz
Inspector General
April 30, 2025

HIGHLIGHTS

Statistical Highlights

The following summaries highlight some of the OIG's audits, evaluations, inspections, special reviews, and investigations, which are discussed further in this report. As the highlights illustrate, the OIG continues to conduct wide-ranging oversight of DOJ programs and operations.

OIG-wide



42

Total Number of OIG Reports Issued¹



156

Total Number of Recommendations in OIG Reports (including dollar-related recommendations)²

Audit Division



36

Reports Issued

\$585,629

Questioned Costs

¹ This figure includes OIG audits, reports, evaluations, inspections, special reviews, surveys, issue alerts, and MAMs issued during the reporting period. This figure does not include Single Audit Act reports, which are identified below, or Reports of Investigation.

² This figure includes all recommendations, including those for management improvements and dollar-related recommendations, which are recommendations for components to remedy questioned costs and funds to be put to better use.

118

Recommendations for Management Improvements



22

Single Audit Act Transmittal Reports Issued

\$575,223

Questioned Costs

36

Recommendations for Management Improvements

Evaluation and Inspections Division



2

Reports Issued

20

Recommendations for Management Improvements

Investigations Division



8,109

Allegations Received by the Investigations Division³



99

Investigations Opened



102

Investigations Closed



40

Arrests



30

Indictments & Informations



30

Convictions & Pleas



82

Administrative Actions⁴



\$9,807,637.79

Monetary Recoveries⁵

³ These figures represent allegations entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. They do not include the approximate 4,654 additional hotline, email, and phone contacts that were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government.

⁴ See the Glossary for a definition of "Administrative Actions."

⁵ Monetary Recoveries" include civil, criminal and nonjudicial fines, restitutions, recoveries, assessments, penalties, and forfeitures.

Audits, Evaluations, Inspections, and Special Reviews Highlights

Examples of OIG audits, evaluations, inspections, and special reviews completed during this semiannual reporting period are:

[Findings of Misconduct by Three then Senior DOJ Officials for Violating the Department's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy; and by One of these Senior Officials for Violating the Department's Social Media Policy](#)

The OIG found that three then Senior DOJ Officials violated DOJ's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy by leaking to select reporters, days before an election, nonpublic DOJ investigative information regarding ongoing DOJ investigative matters, resulting in the publication of two news articles that included the nonpublic DOJ investigative information. The OIG investigation also found that one of these three then Senior DOJ Officials violated the Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy and DOJ's Social Media Policy by reposting through a DOJ social media account links to the news articles.*⁶

[Notification of Concerns Identified in the DEA's Transportation Interdiction Activities](#)

The OIG found that the DEA was not complying with its own policy on consensual encounters at mass transportation facilities, creating potentially significant operational and legal risks. The then Deputy Attorney General suspended all consensual encounters at mass transportation facilities unless connected to an ongoing, predicated investigation or approved by the DEA Administrator. The OIG made five recommendations to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) and four recommendations to the DEA. ODAG and the DEA agreed with all of them.

[A Review of DOJ's Issuance of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and Members of the News Media](#)

The OIG reviewed DOJ's use of compulsory process in media leak investigations to compel third parties to provide to DOJ non-content communications records of Members of Congress, congressional staffers, and members of the news media. The process was issued between 2017 and 2020 to attempt to identify the sources of leaked classified information that had been published in 2017. DOJ also obtained non-disclosure orders that prevented the Members of Congress, congressional staffers, reporters, and newsroom leadership from learning about the use of some of the compulsory process to seek these records. DOJ concurred with the OIG's three recommendations.

[Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' \(BOP\) Federal Medical Center Devens](#)

The unannounced inspection identified several serious issues related to staffing, inmate healthcare quality, infrastructure, inmate programming, failure to complete rounds, and radio system deficiencies. Notably, substantial shortages of Correctional Officers (CO) and healthcare employees—an issue at many BOP institutions but particularly problematic for a medical institution—have created widespread and troubling operational challenges that substantially affect the health, welfare, and safety of employees and inmates. The BOP agreed with all 11 recommendations the OIG made.

⁶ An asterisk ("*") indicates that the investigative summary is responsive to the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(13).


[A Review of the FBI's Handling of Its CHS and Intelligence Collection Efforts in the Lead Up to the January 6, 2021 Electoral Certification](#)

The OIG found that the FBI could have canvassed its field offices in advance of January 6 to identify any intelligence, including CHS reporting, that might have assisted with the FBI's and law enforcement partners' preparations for January 6. The OIG also found that no undercover FBI employees were in the various protest crowds, or at the Capitol, on January 6. The OIG identified 26 FBI CHSs, none of whom were authorized to engage in illegal activity, that were in Washington, D.C., in connection with the events of January 6. The FBI concurred with the OIG's one recommendation.

Investigative Highlights


As shown in the statistics at the beginning of this section and in the charts below, the OIG investigates many allegations of misconduct involving DOJ employees or contractors and grantees who receive DOJ funds.

**All Cases Opened by Offense Category
October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025**



Source: Investigations Data Management System

All Cases Referred and Convictions/Pleas October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025



Note: The convictions/pleas reported in this chart do not necessarily arise from the matters referred for prosecution during this reporting period.

Source: Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of such investigations:

[Business Owner Found Guilty of Multiple Violations of Federal Statutes](#)

On December 27, 2024, the principal operator of a Buffalo, New York, Gentlemen’s Club was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, one count of paying a bribe to a public official, one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises, one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of narcotics distribution. The individual was convicted in the Western District of New York. According to the evidence presented at trial, from 2005 to 2019, the individual conspired to defraud the United States and paid cash bribes to DEA SA Joseph Bongiovanni in exchange for Bongiovanni protecting the individual and utilizing Bongiovanni’s position to dissuade law enforcement officials from conducting investigations into the individual’s activities at the Gentleman’s Club. Bongiovanni was found guilty of one count each of obstruction of justice and making false statements in April 2024.

[Former DEA Task Force Member Sentenced for Possession with Intent to Distribute](#)

On January 27, 2025, a former DEA Task Force Officer (TFO) was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment, 10 years of supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit \$42,168, which were proceeds from the sale of narcotics. James Hickox was sentenced in the Middle District of Florida. Hickox pleaded guilty in May 2024 to conspiracy to defraud the United States, tax evasion, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, in the course of his duties as a DEA TFO and Nassau County Sheriff's Office (NCSO) Sergeant, Hickox stole narcotics, including marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl seized in DEA investigations, then falsely represented to the DEA and NCSO that the narcotics had been destroyed by preparing and submitting forged certificates of destruction to the agencies. The stolen narcotics were provided to other individuals to sell on Hickox's behalf for his personal gain.

[BOP Contractor Settles to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations](#)

On December 19, 2024, a BOP contractor entered into an agreement with the United States, acting through the Department, to pay \$949,696.90, of which \$633,131.27 was restitution, to resolve allegations that it submitted false claims to the government. According to the settlement agreement, on March 27, 2024, GS Foods Group, Inc (GS Foods) self-disclosed that from in or about October 2018 through in or about March 2024, GS Foods did not qualify as a small business due to its affiliation with GoodSource Solutions, Inc. and Dori Foods, Inc., because the combined number of employees of the three entities exceeded the limit of a small business. GS Foods identified multiple government contracts it was awarded, and under which it received payments, based on its representation that it was a small business.

[Former BOP CO Sentenced for Sexual Abuse of a Ward](#)

On December 13, 2024, a former BOP CO assigned to Federal Medical Center (FMC) Lexington in Kentucky was sentenced to 100 months incarceration, life on supervised release, a \$5,300 assessment, and ordered to pay \$21,000 to each of three victims for three counts of sexual abuse of a ward. Jacob I. Salcido was sentenced in the Eastern District of Kentucky. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from on or about September 5, 2020, through on or about December 21, 2020, Salcido knowingly engaged in sexual acts with three inmates at FMC Lexington.

[Former BOP CO Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Alteration and Falsification of Records in Federal Investigations](#)

On February 24, 2025, a former BOP CO previously assigned to the United States Penitentiary Hazelton in West Virginia, was sentenced to 16 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and a \$100 special assessment following a guilty plea of conspiracy to commit alteration and falsification of records in an OIG investigation by including false information in a memorandum regarding the assault of an inmate. Joshua David Sines was charged and sentenced in the Northern District of West Virginia. According to the superseding Indictment, on or about March 21, 2019, Sines knowingly and willfully conspired with BOP CO Robert David Sims to alter and falsify records and documents with the intent to impede, obstruct, and influence an OIG investigation regarding deprivation of rights under color of law and assault resulting in serious bodily injury.

[Federal Contractors Settle to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations](#)

On November 19, 2024, two federal contractors entered into agreements with DOJ to resolve allegations that they submitted false claims to the government. According to the settlement agreements, the United States alleged that between in or about May 2020 and in or about April 2024, federal contractor Dell Federal Systems Inc. (Dell), which has contracts with DOJ, the Army, and other agencies, entered into an agreement with its reseller, Iron Bow Technologies LLC (Iron Bow), that led to the Department of the Army being overcharged for products under the Army Desktop and Mobile Computing-3 acquisition vehicle. Specifically, the United States alleged that Dell submitted direct bids to the Army for the same contracts as Iron Bow, knowing its prices would be higher than Iron Bow's and thereby creating a false appearance of competition. Dell's agreement also settled a *qui tam* lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Alabama. Under the settlement agreements, Dell will pay \$2,300,000, of which \$1,358,475 is restitution, and Iron Bow will pay \$2,051,000, of which \$1,204,685 is restitution. The relator will receive \$345,000. No determination of liability was made pursuant to the settlement.

[DEA Accounting Technician Sentenced for Embezzlement](#)

On January 6, 2025, a former DEA Accounting Technician was sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay \$75,546 in restitution for one count of embezzlement. Scott Knox was sentenced in the District of Arizona. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about September 2023 through in or about March 2024, Knox willfully and knowingly embezzled \$75,546 from a DEA Imprest Fund by unlawfully removing cash deposits from the vault.

OIG PROFILE


The OIG is a statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to promote the rule of law through objective, independent oversight of DOJ. The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, regulations, and ethical standards arising from the conduct of DOJ employees in their numerous and diverse activities. The OIG also audits and inspects DOJ programs and assists management in promoting integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The OIG has jurisdiction to review the programs and personnel of the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); BOP; DEA; U.S. Attorney's Offices, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and all other organizations within DOJ, as well as DOJ's contractors and grant recipients.

The OIG consists of the following divisions and offices:

- **Immediate Office of the Inspector General** is the leadership office of the OIG. It is comprised of the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, and staff who contribute to the leadership and direction of the OIG, congressional relations, media relations and internal communications, employee engagement, special projects, sensitive investigations, administrative duties, and other responsibilities. The Immediate Office engages with the Department's leadership, members of Congress and their staffs, and other stakeholders. It also coordinates awareness of whistleblower rights and protections and publication of the OIG's mission reports, including the Top Management and Performance Challenges Report and the Semiannual Report to Congress.
- **Audit Division** is responsible for independent audits of DOJ programs, computer systems, and financial statements. The Audit Division has regional offices in the Atlanta; Chicago; Denver; Philadelphia; San Francisco; and Washington, D.C., areas. Its Financial Statement Audit Office and Computer Security and Information Technology Audit Office are located in Washington, D.C., along with Audit headquarters. Audit headquarters consists of the Immediate Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of Operations, Office of Management Services, Office of Quality Assurance, and Office of Data Analytics.
- **Investigations Division** investigates alleged violations of fraud, abuse, and misconduct by DOJ employees, contractors, grantees, and other outside parties. The division's SAs develop cases for criminal or civil prosecution, or administrative action. The Investigations Division has seven regions with offices in Arlington, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, El Paso, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Trenton, and Tucson. Its Fraud Detection Office and Cyber Investigations Office are co-located in Arlington, Virginia, with personnel in offices nationwide. Investigations headquarters in Washington, D.C., consists of the Immediate Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and the following branches: Operations I, Operations II, Investigative Support, Administrative Support, and Hotline Operations.

The following map shows the locations for the Audit and Investigations Divisions:

Audit and Investigations Division Locations



Source: OIG

- **Evaluation and Inspections Division** conducts program evaluations and on-site inspections that serve as an adaptable and agile format for OIG oversight of DOJ programs and activities and yield recommendations for improvement in DOJ operations.
- **Oversight and Review Division** blends the skills of Attorneys, Investigators, Program Analysts, and Paralegals to conduct special reviews and investigations of sensitive allegations involving DOJ employees and operations.
- **Management and Planning Division** provides the Inspector General with advice on administrative and fiscal policy and assists OIG components by providing services in the areas of planning, budget, finance, quality assurance, human resources, training, procurement, facilities, asset management, telecommunications, security, records management, and general mission support.
- **Information Technology Division** executes the OIG's information technology strategic vision and goals by directing technology and business process integration, network administration, implementation of computer hardware and software, cybersecurity, applications development, programming services, policy formulation, and other mission support activities.

- **Office of General Counsel** provides legal advice to OIG management and staff. It also drafts memoranda on issues of law; prepares administrative subpoenas; represents the OIG in personnel, contractual, and legal matters; and responds to Freedom of Information Act requests.

The OIG has a nationwide workforce of more than 500 SAs, Auditors, Inspectors, Attorneys, and administrative professionals. For fiscal year (FY) 2024, the OIG's direct appropriation was \$139 million; the OIG also received a transfer-in of \$10 million and an additional \$16.9 million in reimbursements.

As required by Section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 405, this Semiannual Report to Congress is reviewing the accomplishments of the OIG for the 6-month period of October 1, 2024, to March 31, 2025.

Additional information about the OIG and full-text versions of many of its reports are available on the [OIG website](#).

PANDEMIC RESPONSE OVERSIGHT

Beginning in early March 2020, the OIG shifted a significant portion of its oversight efforts toward assessing DOJ's readiness to respond to the then emerging Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Through its initial assessment, and the subsequent passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act on March 27, 2020, the OIG determined that the most immediate challenges to DOJ operations involved preventing the spread of the virus among federal inmates and detainees; safely operating immigration courts; and ensuring robust oversight of \$850 million in pandemic-related grant funding being disbursed by DOJ to state, local, and tribal organizations. The OIG subsequently expanded its efforts to include areas such as the impact of COVID-19 on DOJ law enforcement and other day-to-day operations.

Although the COVID-19 public health emergency ended in May 2023, the OIG, working in part through the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), has continued its oversight of pandemic-era programs and operations to increase transparency, reduce fraud, and hold accountable those who have stolen from and defrauded these programs. The PRAC is scheduled to sunset on September 30, 2025.

The OIG's completed pandemic-related work for this reporting period is listed below, along with the OIG's ongoing work. More information about the OIG's pandemic oversight activities is available on the [OIG website](#).

Investigations

In January 2021, the PRAC stood up a Fraud Task Force to serve as a resource for the Inspector General community by surging investigative resources into those areas where the need is the greatest, which is currently pandemic loan fraud. Agents from OIGs across the government are detailed to work on Task Force cases. These agents have partnered with prosecutors at the Department's Fraud Section and U.S. Attorney's Offices across the country.

The Investigations Division has nine agents who are assigned to the PRAC Fraud Task Force on a part-time basis. The PRAC has extended its authority to investigate pandemic-related fraud to the DOJ OIG through a memorandum of understanding. The agents are assigned Paycheck Protection Program cases while continuing to work their existing OIG caseloads. This initiative allows the OIG to make a broader contribution to the Inspector General community by assisting with investigations that might otherwise remain unstaffed.

The idea behind the PRAC Fraud Task Force is to harness the expertise of the oversight community and attack this problem with every available tool. The Task Force works closely with other initiatives to combat pandemic fraud such as the Department's COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force.

The following is an example of an investigation that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[BOP CO Pleaded Guilty to Wire Fraud](#)

On March 4, 2025, a former BOP CO previously assigned to Federal Correctional Institution Miami in Florida, pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. Angelo Stephen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Florida. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about August 2020 through in or about May 2021, Stephen received fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster loans from the Small Business Administration. The total loss was approximately \$60,000. In addition, from in or about March 2023 through in or about July 2023, Stephen engaged in account takeover fraud and check fraud.

Program Review

Review of the BOP's Use of Home Confinement to Mitigate the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Federal Prison Population

In February 2025, the OIG closed its review into the BOP use of home confinement to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the federal prison population without completing a final report. Since initiating this review in September 2020, the OIG has engaged in a significant amount of now-published work focused on the BOP's operations during and related to the COVID-19 pandemic, including work that addressed the BOP's use of its home confinement authorities. Moreover, the unique home confinement authority that Congress granted to the BOP under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act ended in May 2023, and the procedures and decision making that the OIG examined occurred under circumstances that no longer exist. Accordingly, the OIG determined there would not be significant value in issuing a final report in 2025. The OIG previously notified the Department and the BOP of the decision.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women's Grant Administration Immediately Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic

MULTICOMPONENT

While many of the OIG's activities are specific to a particular component of DOJ, other work covers more than one component and, in some instances, extends to DOJ contractors and grant recipients. The following describes OIG audits, evaluations, inspections, reviews, and investigations that involve more than one DOJ component.

Reports Issued

[A Review of DOJ's Issuance of Compulsory Process to Obtain Records of Members of Congress, Congressional Staffers, and Members of the News Media](#)

On December 10, 2024, the OIG released a report examining DOJ's use of compulsory process in media leak investigations to compel third parties to provide to DOJ non-content communications records of Members of Congress, congressional staffers, and members of the news media. The process was issued between 2017 and 2020 to attempt to identify the sources of leaked classified information that had been published in 2017. DOJ also obtained non-disclosure orders that prevented the Members of Congress, congressional staffers, reporters, and newsroom leadership from learning about the use of some of the compulsory process to seek these records. The OIG found that DOJ issued compulsory process to third parties for the non-content communications records of 2 Members of Congress and 43 individuals who were congressional staffers. The OIG did not find evidence of retaliatory motivation by the career prosecutors who issued the compulsory process for the records, or that they sought the compulsory process based on party affiliation. The OIG found that in seeking compulsory process for members of the news media, DOJ complied with some but not all of the then applicable provisions of DOJ's News Media Policy. DOJ concurred with the OIG's three recommendations.

[A Review of the FBI's Handling of Its CHS and Intelligence Collection Efforts in the Lead Up to the January 6, 2021 Electoral Certification](#)

The OIG found that the FBI could have canvassed its field offices in advance of January 6 to identify any intelligence, including CHS reporting, that might have assisted with the FBI's and law enforcement partners' preparations for January 6. The OIG also found that no undercover FBI employees were in the various protest crowds, or at the Capitol, on January 6. The OIG identified 26 FBI CHSs, none of whom were authorized to engage in illegal activity, that were in Washington, D.C., in connection with the events of January 6. Three of those CHSs had been tasked by FBI field offices to report on specific domestic terrorism case subjects. One of these three CHSs entered the Capitol. The other two entered the restricted area around the Capitol. Twenty-three additional untasked FBI CHSs attended January 6 events. Of these 23 CHSs, 3 CHSs entered the Capitol during the riot and an additional 11 entered the restricted area around the Capitol. The remaining nine CHSs who attended the events of January 6 did not enter the Capitol or the restricted area or otherwise engage in illegal activity. The OIG made one recommendation to the FBI, and the FBI agreed with the OIG's recommendation.

[Audit of the DEA's and FBI's Efforts to Integrate Artificial Intelligence \(AI\) and Other Emerging Technology within the U.S. Intelligence Community \(as required by the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act\)](#)

The OIG released a report on the DEA's and FBI's compliance with AI and other emerging technology requirements contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2023. These requirements apply to U.S. Intelligence Community elements, including the entire FBI and the DEA's Office of National Security Intelligence. The OIG found both agencies are in the early stages of AI integration, with some progress made. The FBI published an AI policy, established an AI Ethics Council, and is inventorying AI use. The DEA's Office of National Security Intelligence is leveraging a partner agency's AI tool. Barriers to these agencies' accelerated adoption of AI include funding constraints, difficulties hiring and retaining a technical workforce, and the need to modernize data architecture. Both agencies are still required to submit reports to Congress on their AI efforts. The OIG made three recommendations to the FBI and two to the DEA; both agencies concurred.

[Reviews of Select DOJ Components' Accounting of Drug Control Funding for FY 2024](#)

The OIG released a review of DOJ's detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities for FY 2024. The report contains the OIG's conclusion about the reliability of the Department's assertions over the budget formulation compliance submission and detailed accounting submission, which included \$8.32 billion of drug control obligations. The OIG reported that it is not aware of any material modifications that should be made to management's assertions.

[Audits of DOJ and Selected Components' Annual Financial Statements, FY 2024](#)

The OIG issued three audit reports on the FY 2024 annual financial statements for DOJ, Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund, and FBI. Under the direction of the OIG, KPMG performed the audits in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States, which resulted in unmodified opinions on the financial statements. KPMG identified one material weakness in DOJ's FY 2024 Independent Auditors' Report noting that internal control weaknesses identified in the prior years' financial statements audit reports related to financial management and reporting controls and risk assessment remain throughout the Department. In addition, the report noted that improvements are needed related to monitoring and timely remediation of prior years' deficiencies. KPMG reported one material weakness and one significant deficiency in the Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund's report. The material weakness is new and pertains to the controls over recording and disclosing gross costs and liabilities. In addition, although substantial progress was made, the significant deficiency that was identified in the prior year report related to improvements needed in controls over seized property, continues to exist. KPMG also reported a significant deficiency in the FBI's report, noting that improvements are needed in the FBI's identification and recording of prepayments, capitalized additions, and certain year-end accruals. The Department, Asset Forfeiture management staff, and the FBI agreed with the findings and recommendations. No instances of non-compliance or other matters were identified by KPMG in the audits. Additionally, KPMG's tests disclosed no instances in which the Department's financial management systems did not substantially comply with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996.

[Federal Information Security Modernization Act \(FISMA\) Audits](#)

The FISMA requires the Inspector General for each agency to perform annual independent evaluations of an agency's information security programs and practices. The evaluation includes testing the effectiveness of information security policies, procedures, and practices of representative subsets of systems.

The OIG issued separate public summaries and nonpublic reports for its reviews of the Information Security Management Program (ISMP) of the DEA; Executive Office for United States Attorneys; the FBI; the Justice Management Division; INTERPOL Washington, the U.S. National Central Bureau; the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces; and a sample of 15 systems within these components. The OIG identified weaknesses in eight of the nine FISMA domain areas, two of the eight Congressional Letter objective areas, and in the required action of Binding Operational Directive 23-01. The OIG issued 49 recommendations to improve the ISMP's reviewed, and the respective DOJ components agreed with all recommendations. In addition, the OIG issued separate public summaries and nonpublic reports for its review of the ISMP and a system at the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, an independent, federal executive branch agency.

Single Audit Act Reports

The Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, promotes sound financial management of federal financial assistance provided to state, local, and tribal governments, colleges, universities, and nonprofit organizations. Under 2 C.F.R. § 200, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, such entities that expend \$1,000,000 or more in federal funds in 1 year must have a single audit performed annually covering all federal funds expended that year. These audits are conducted by nonfederal auditors. The OIG performs quality reviews of these audit reports when they pertain to DOJ funds and to determine whether they contain audit findings related to DOJ funds. The OIG's oversight of nonfederal audit activity informs federal managers about the soundness of the management of federal programs and identifies any significant areas of internal control weakness, non-compliance, and questioned costs for resolution or follow-up. The OIG transmitted to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 22 single audit reports covering expenditures totaling more than \$45 million in 85 grants and other agreements. To address these deficiencies, the auditors recommended 36 management improvements and identified questioned costs totaling more than \$575,000. The OIG monitors these audits through the resolution and closure process.

Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Section 1001 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act directs the OIG to receive and review complaints of civil rights and civil liberties violations by DOJ employees, to publicize how people can contact the OIG to file a complaint, and to send a Semiannual Report to Congress discussing the OIG's implementation of these responsibilities. In March 2025, the OIG released its most recent report, which summarized the OIG's Section 1001 activities from July 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024. The report described the number of complaints the OIG received under this section, the status of investigations conducted by the OIG and DOJ components in response to those complaints, and an estimate of the OIG's expenses for conducting these activities.

Management Advisory Memorandum

[Notification of Concerns Regarding the DEA's and the FBI's Handling of Employee Issued Firearms Pending Destruction](#)

The OIG released a MAM to the DEA and the FBI regarding the handling of employee issued firearms pending destruction. The OIG identified these concerns in connection with an investigation of a recovered privately made firearm, also known as a "Ghost Gun," that contained an unserialized frame attached to a slide and barrel of a DEA employee issued firearm. The OIG made four recommendations to address the concerns identified, and the DEA and FBI agreed with the recommendations and have taken the necessary corrective actions to close them.

Investigations

The following are examples of investigations the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Findings of Misconduct by Three then Senior DOJ Officials for Violating the Department's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy; and by One of these Senior Officials for Violating the Department's Social Media Policy](#)

On December 30, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary announcing its finding that three then Senior DOJ Officials violated DOJ's Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy by leaking to select reporters, days before an election, nonpublic DOJ investigative information regarding ongoing DOJ investigative matters, resulting in the publication of two news articles that included the nonpublic DOJ investigative information. The OIG investigation also found that one of these three then Senior DOJ Officials violated the Confidentiality and Media Contacts Policy and DOJ's Social Media Policy by reposting through a DOJ social media account links to the news articles. The OIG has completed its investigation and provided its report to ODAG and, because the report contained misconduct findings against attorneys, provided its report to the Professional Misconduct Review Unit for appropriate action. The OIG also provided its report to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, which has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate alleged Hatch Act violations, for its consideration of whether the conduct of these officials violated the Hatch Act.*

[Executive at a Non-Profit Receiving DOJ Funds Sentenced for Conspiracy](#)

On February 6, 2025, a former executive at a nonprofit corporation receiving federal grants, contracts, loans, guarantees, insurance, and other forms of federal assistance was sentenced to 5 years of supervised probation and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of \$3,620,848.36 for one count of conspiracy. The former executive was sentenced in the Western District of Missouri. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, the former executive admitted she conspired with the other executives of a Springfield-based healthcare nonprofit corporation to use its money for unlawful political contributions, lobbying, and bribery, as well as to enrich themselves.

[Business Owner Found Guilty of Multiple Violations of Federal Statutes](#)

On December 27, 2024, the principal operator of a Buffalo, New York, Gentlemen's Club was found guilty of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, one count of paying a bribe to a public official, one count of maintaining a drug-involved premises, one count of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, two counts of witness tampering, and one count of narcotics distribution. The individual was convicted in the Western District of New York. According to the evidence presented at trial, from 2005 to 2019, the individual conspired to defraud the United States and paid cash bribes to DEA SA Joseph Bongiovanni in exchange for Bongiovanni protecting the individual and utilizing Bongiovanni's position to dissuade law enforcement officials from conducting investigations into the individual's activities at the Gentleman's Club. Bongiovanni was found guilty of one count each of obstruction of justice and making false statements in April 2024.

[Federal Contractors Settle to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations](#)

On November 19, 2024, two federal contractors entered into agreements with DOJ to resolve allegations that they submitted false claims to the government. According to the settlement agreements, the United States alleged that between in or about May 2020 and in or about April 2024, federal contractor Dell, which has contracts with DOJ, the Army, and other agencies, entered into an agreement with its reseller,

Iron Bow, that led to the Department of the Army being overcharged for products under the Army Desktop and Mobile Computing-3 acquisition vehicle. Specifically, the United States alleged that Dell submitted direct bids to the Army for the same contracts as Iron Bow, knowing its prices would be higher than Iron Bow's and thereby creating a false appearance of competition. Dell's agreement also settled a *qui tam* lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Alabama. Under the settlement agreements, Dell will pay \$2,300,000, of which \$1,358,475 is restitution, and Iron Bow will pay \$2,051,000, of which \$1,204,685 is restitution. The relator will receive \$345,000. No determination of liability was made pursuant to the settlement.

[Retired Boston Police Department Captain Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Theft from a Program Receiving Federal Funds, Theft from a Program Receiving Federal Funds, Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud and Wire Fraud](#)

On October 24, 2024, a retired Boston Police Department (BPD) Captain previously assigned to the Evidence Control Unit, was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day of imprisonment, 2 years of supervised release, a fine of \$15,000, restitution of \$154,249.20, and a special assessment of \$600 for conspiracy to commit theft from a program receiving federal funds, theft from a program receiving federal funds, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and three counts of wire fraud. The retired BPD Captain was sentenced in the District of Massachusetts. According to the evidence presented at trial, from in or about May 2012 through in or about March 2016, as commander of BPD's Evidence Control Unit, he submitted and approved overtime slips that grossly inflated the number of hours he and his subordinates worked.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audits of the FY 2025 Annual Information Technology Security Evaluation Pursuant to the FISMA

Audit of DOJ's Information Technology Inventory Management

Audit of DOJ's Efforts to Mitigate the Effects of Ubiquitous Technical Surveillance

Audit of DOJ Contracts Inaccurately Reported as Expired

Audit of DOJ's FY 2024 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019

Audits of DOJ and Selected Components' Annual Financial Statements, FY 2025

Reviews of Select DOJ Components' Accounting of Drug Control Funding for FY 2025

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Report Issued

[Audit of the FBI's Media Destruction Services Contract Awarded to Articus Solutions, LLC \(Articus\)](#)


The OIG released a report on a media destruction services contract valued at \$21.6 million the FBI awarded to Articus. The OIG found that Articus's Statement of Work did not include quality assurance measures to help the FBI assess contract performance, the FBI did not use available data to make informed management decisions and protect against low contractor productivity, and Articus's Media Destruction Team was operating without standard operating procedures or other guidance. In addition, the FBI failed to timely complete required contractor assessment reports and other required paperwork, though the FBI took action to correct these deficiencies during the audit. The OIG made four recommendations for the FBI to improve the management of its contract, which will improve its ability to assess Articus's performance, protect the FBI from unsatisfactory contractor performance, and establish consistent operating procedures and training methods across the media destruction program. The FBI agreed with all of them.

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 876 complaints involving the FBI. The most common allegations made against FBI employees were Official Misconduct and Off-Duty Violations. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the FBI for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 11 investigations and referred 49 allegations to the FBI's Inspection Division for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 61 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to FBI employees. The investigations included Off-Duty Violations, Official Misconduct, and Fraud.

**FBI Cases Opened by Offense Category
October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025**



Source: Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the FBI that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Former FBI SA Indicted and Arrested for Cyberstalking, Witness Tampering, and Obstruction](#)

On December 17, 2024, a former FBI SA previously assigned to the Oakland Resident Agency was arrested following a May 16, 2024, Indictment charging him with one count of cyberstalking; two counts of witness tampering by intimidation, corrupt persuasion, or misleading conduct; one count of witness tampering by harassment; and one count of obstruction of criminal investigation by bribery. Paul Flood was charged in the Northern District of California. According to the Indictment, from in or about October 2018 through in or about October 2019, Flood, with the intent to harass, intimidate, and place under surveillance, used the mail, an interactive computer service, an electronic communication service, an electronic communications system of interstate commerce, and other facilities of interstate and foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that caused substantial emotional distress to the victim.

[Findings of Misconduct by an FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge for Harassment, Sexual Harassment, Discrimination Against an Applicant Based on Applicant's Disability, and Lack of Candor and by an FBI Special Agent in Charge for Failing to Properly Report Harassment Allegations](#)

On November 6, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by an FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge. The OIG initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information from the FBI alleging that an Assistant Special Agent in Charge sexually harassed an FBI employee and a Special Agent in Charge failed to make a mandatory referral of harassment allegations to the FBI Inspection Division.*

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the FBI's Contract Awarded to Clark Construction Group, LLC for the Innovation Center

Audit of the FBI's Efforts to Respond to Changing Operational Technologies

Audit of the FBI's Participation in Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome

Audit of the FBI's Federal DNA Database Unit

Audit of the FBI's Use of Special Deputations

Review of the FBI's Querying Practices Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

Report Issued

[Inspection of the BOP's FMC Devens](#)

The unannounced inspection identified several serious issues at FMC Devens related to staffing, inmate healthcare quality, infrastructure, inmate programming, failure to complete rounds, and radio system deficiencies. Notably, substantial shortages of COs and healthcare employees—which is an issue at many BOP institutions but particularly problematic for a medical institution—have created widespread and troubling operational challenges at FMC Devens that substantially affect the health, welfare, and safety of employees and inmates. The OIG made 11 recommendations, and the BOP agreed with all of them.


The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 6,180 complaints involving the BOP. The most common allegations made against BOP employees were Official Misconduct; and Force, Abuse, Rights Violations. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the BOP for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 55 investigations and referred 219 allegations to the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 310 open cases of alleged misconduct related to BOP employees. The investigations included Official Misconduct; and Force, Abuse, Rights Violations.

**BOP Cases Opened by Offense Category
October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025**



Source: Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the BOP that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Former BOP CO Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Alteration and Falsification of Records in Federal Investigations](#)

On February 24, 2025, a former BOP CO previously assigned to the United States Penitentiary Hazelton in West Virginia, was sentenced to 16 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and a \$100 special assessment following a guilty plea of conspiracy to commit alteration and falsification of records in an OIG investigation by including false information in a memorandum regarding the assault of an inmate. Joshua David Sines was charged and sentenced in the Northern District of West Virginia. According to the superseding Indictment, on or about March 21, 2019, Sines knowingly and willfully conspired with BOP CO Robert David Sims to alter and falsify records and documents with the intent to impede, obstruct, and influence an OIG investigation regarding deprivation of rights under color of law and assault resulting in serious bodily injury.

[BOP CO Pleaded Guilty and Sentenced for Encouraging Child Sexual Abuse](#)

On February 4, 2025, a former BOP CO previously assigned to Federal Correctional Institution Sheridan in Oregon, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 35 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to register as a sex offender for three counts of encouraging child sexual abuse in the first degree. Brendan Haynes pleaded guilty and was sentenced in the Yamhill County Circuit Court in Oregon. According to the Indictment, from in or about February 2023 through in or about September 2023, Haynes unlawfully and knowingly duplicated a visual recording of sexually explicit conduct involving a child while knowing or being aware of and consciously disregarding the fact that creation of the visual recording of sexually explicit conduct involved child abuse.

[BOP Contractor Settles to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations](#)

On December 19, 2024, a BOP contractor entered into an agreement with the United States, acting through the Department, to pay \$949,696.90, of which \$633,131.27 was restitution, to resolve allegations that it submitted false claims to the government. According to the settlement agreement, on March 27, 2024, GS Foods self-disclosed that from in or about October 2018 through in or about March 2024, GS Foods did not qualify as a small business due to its affiliation with GoodSource Solutions, Inc. and Dori Foods, Inc., because the combined number of employees of the three entities exceeded the limit of a small business. GS Foods identified multiple government contracts it was awarded, and under which it received payments, based on its representation that it was a small business.

[Former BOP CO Sentenced for Sexual Abuse of a Ward](#)

On December 13, 2024, a former BOP CO assigned to FMC Lexington in Kentucky was sentenced to 100 months incarceration, life on supervised release, a \$5,300 assessment, and ordered to pay \$21,000 to each of three victims for three counts of sexual abuse of a ward. Jacob I. Salcido was sentenced in the Eastern District of Kentucky. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from on or about September 5, 2020, through on or about December 21, 2020, Salcido knowingly engaged in sexual acts with three inmates at FMC Lexington.

[BOP Inmate Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Honest Services Wire Fraud and Conspiracy to Possess and Provide Prison Contraband](#)

On November 14, 2024, an inmate previously incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) New York, was sentenced to 27 months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release for one count of conspiring to commit honest services wire fraud and one count of conspiring to possess and provide prison contraband. The inmate was sentenced in the Southern District of New York. According to the Indictment, public court filings and proceedings, and the evidence presented at trial, between 2019 and 2020, at least 10 inmates housed in MCC New York paid nearly \$80,000 in bribes to a CO in exchange for the CO introducing large amounts of contraband into the facility, including drugs such as oxycodone, alprazolam, Suboxone, marijuana, and synthetic cannabinoids, as well as cellular phones and cartons of cigarettes into MCC New York.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the BOP's Use of Restraints

Audit of the BOP's Residential Reentry Center Contracts Awarded to The Kintock Group, Inc.

Audit of the BOP's Acquisition and Life-Cycle Management of Major Equipment Supporting Food Services

Audit of the BOP's National Menu

Audit of the BOP's Efforts to Place Inmates Within 500 Driving Miles from Their Primary Residence

Evaluation of the BOP's Implementation and Operation of FIRST STEP Act Programming

Inspection of Six BOP Facilities: Food Service Operations

Inspection of Federal Detention Center SeaTac

Evaluation of the BOP's Colorectal Cancer Screening Practices for Inmates and Its Clinical Follow-up on Screenings


U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 255 complaints involving the USMS. The most common allegations made against USMS employees were Official Misconduct; and Force, Abuse, Rights Violations. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the USMS’s Office of Internal Affairs for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 6 investigations and referred 18 allegations to the USMS’s Office of Internal Affairs for its review. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 37 open cases of alleged misconduct related to USMS employees. The most common allegation was Official Misconduct.

**USMS Cases Opened by Offense Category
October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025**



Source: Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the USMS that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Former Contract Licensed Practical Nurse Pleaded Guilty for Bribery of a Public Official, Conspiracy, and Introduction of Contraband](#)

On November 26, 2024, a former contract licensed practical nurse previously assigned to the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, a USMS contract facility that houses federal inmates in Youngstown, Ohio, pleaded guilty to one count of bribery of a public official, one count of conspiracy, and one count of introduction of contraband. Alexis Schneider pleaded guilty in the Northern District of Ohio. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from on or about June 29, 2021, through on or about September 14, 2021, Schneider knowingly and intentionally conspired with others to provide prohibited objects, including

loose tobacco, to an inmate at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center in exchange for U.S. currency. The plea agreement included a forfeiture provision that requires Schneider to forfeit \$45,401.00.

[Former Contract CO Sentenced for Providing Contraband to an Inmate](#)

On November 14, 2024, a contract CO previously assigned to the Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, a USMS contract facility that houses pre-sentenced inmates in Central Falls, Rhode Island, was sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment followed by 2 years of supervised release, including 6 months of home confinement, for one count of providing contraband to an inmate. Kaii Almeida-Falcones was sentenced in the District of Rhode Island. According to the plea agreement, beginning on or about February 14, 2021, Almeida-Falcones provided 200 Suboxone strips containing buprenorphine and 4.5 grams of marijuana to an inmate housed at the facility.

[Non-DOJ Civilian Sentenced for Operating an Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business](#)

On December 11, 2024, a non-DOJ individual was sentenced to 2 years of probation, the conditions of which included 100 hours of community service and a restriction against leaving the state of Maryland for 3 months, for operating an unregistered money transmitting business. The non-DOJ individual was sentenced in the District of Maryland. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about September 2019 through in or about April 2020, the individual transferred funds from the United States to locations within the United States and abroad, including Nigeria. One of the civilian's clients, with whom they transferred over \$48,000 overseas to Nigeria, was a Special Deputy U.S. Marshal, who pleaded guilty to laundering funds from a romance scam.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the USMS's Contract Awarded to Heritage Health Solutions, Inc.

Audit of the USMS's Contract Awarded to Mayvin, Incorporated for Executive, Administrative, and Professional Support Services

Audit of the USMS's and Criminal Division Office of Enforcement Operations' Witness Security Program Procurements

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Management Advisory Memorandum

Notification of Concerns Identified in the DEA's Transportation Interdiction Activities


The OIG found, based on its recent evaluation work and a separate, ongoing investigative matter, that the DEA was not complying with its own policy on consensual encounters conducted at mass transportation facilities, resulting in DEA and DEA Task Force Group personnel creating potentially significant operational and legal risks. The OIG concluded that, by proceeding with such interdiction activities in the absence of critical controls, such as adequate policies, guidance, training, and data collection, the DEA is creating substantial risks that DEA SAs and TFOs will conduct these activities improperly; impose unwarranted burdens on, and violate the legal rights of, innocent travelers; imperil the Department's asset forfeiture and seizure activities; and waste law enforcement resources on ineffective interdiction actions. After receiving a draft of the MAM, the then Deputy Attorney General issued a directive to the DEA suspending all consensual encounters at mass transportation facilities unless they are connected to an ongoing, predicated investigation involving one or more identified targets or criminal networks or approved by the DEA Administrator based on exigent circumstances. The OIG made five recommendations to ODAG and four recommendations to the DEA. ODAG and the DEA agreed with all of them.

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 237 complaints involving the DEA. The most common allegations made against DEA employees were Official Misconduct and Waste, Mismanagement. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the DEA for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 10 investigations and referred 16 allegations to the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 51 open cases of alleged misconduct related to DEA employees. The most common allegations were Official Misconduct and Off-Duty Violations.

**DEA Cases Opened by Offense Category
October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025**



Source: Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the DEA that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Former DEA Task Force Member Sentenced for Possession with Intent to Distribute](#)

On January 27, 2025, a former DEA TFO was sentenced to 210 months of imprisonment, 10 years of supervised release, and was ordered to forfeit \$42,168, which were proceeds from the sale of narcotics. James Hickox was sentenced in the Middle District of Florida. Hickox pleaded guilty in May 2024 to conspiracy to defraud the United States, tax evasion, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, in the course of his duties as a DEA TFO and NCSO Sergeant, Hickox stole narcotics, including marijuana, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl seized in DEA investigations, then falsely represented to the DEA and NCSO that the narcotics had been destroyed by preparing and submitting forged certificates of destruction to the agencies. The stolen narcotics were provided to other individuals to sell on Hickox's behalf for his personal gain.

[DEA Accounting Technician Sentenced for Embezzlement](#)

On January 6, 2025, a former DEA Accounting Technician was sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay \$75,546 in restitution for one count of embezzlement. Scott Knox was sentenced in the District of Arizona. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about September 2023 through in or about March 2024, Knox willfully and knowingly embezzled \$75,546 from a DEA Imprest Fund by unlawfully removing cash deposits from the vault.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the DEA's Contract Awarded to Ocean Bay Information and Systems Management, LLC

Audit of the DEA's Registration Process for Medical Practitioners

BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 211 complaints involving ATF. The most common allegations made against ATF employees were Waste, Mismanagement and Official Misconduct. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to ATF for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG did not open any investigations and referred 10 allegations to ATF's Office of Professional Responsibility for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 10 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to ATF employees. The investigations included Fraud and Off-Duty Violations.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of ATF's Controls Over Personnel-Related Risks Associated with Operating Internationally

Audit of ATF's Management of Gun Trace Requests at its National Tracing Center

Review of the Use of Government-Owned Vehicles for Home to Work Transportation by ATF Headquarters Officials

OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 22 complaints involving OJP. The most common allegation made against OJP employees, contractors, or grantees was Fraud.

The OIG opened three investigations and did not refer any allegations. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 18 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to OJP employees, contractors, or grantees. The most common allegation was Fraud.

The following is an example of an investigation involving OJP that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Former Chief Financial Officer Sentenced for Larceny](#)

On January 24, 2025, a former executive of the Wild Horse Butte Community Development Corporation and Sacred Shawl Society, a domestic violence shelter in Martin, South Dakota, on the Pine Ridge Reservation, was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day of imprisonment and ordered to pay \$150,000 in restitution for one count of larceny. The shelter is a recipient of grant funds from DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women. The former executive was sentenced in the District of South Dakota. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, between January 2017 and July 2021, the former executive wrote herself 59 additional paychecks totaling \$70,000 that she was not entitled to receive, submitted fraudulent reimbursement requests to the Wild Horse Butte Community Development Corporation and Sacred Shawl Society, and wrote checks to cash from the organization's account for her own enrichment.

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of OJP's Administration and Oversight of the 2024 Presidential Nominating Convention Security Grants

Audit of DOJ's Processes for Identifying and Directing Deposits to the Crime Victims Fund (CVF)

CRIME VICTIMS FUND

The CVF was established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA) and serves as a major funding source for victim services throughout the country. The fund includes deposits from criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds, penalty fees, and special assessments collected by United States Attorneys' Offices, U.S. Courts, and the BOP. OJP's Office for Victims of Crime administers the CVF by sending states and territories funding directly through the VOCA victim assistance and compensation formula grants and awarding discretionary grants to state and local public and private entities to support national-scope projects, training, and technical assistance that enhances the professional expertise of victim service providers. From FY 2015 through 2024, DOJ distributed more than \$26,274 million in funding for CVF programs.

The OIG's audits of victims of crime programs have resulted in hundreds of recommendations to improve recipients' administration of CVF-funded grants, enhance program performance, improve monitoring of thousands of subrecipients, and help ensure accountability for billions of CVF dollars. During this semiannual reporting period, the Audit Division issued 9 audits of state VOCA and subaward CVF grant recipients, 1 MAM, and at the end of the period had 14 ongoing audits of state VOCA and subaward CVF grant recipients. The OIG's subaward CVF grant audits issued this period are described below.

Reports Issued

Audits of CVF Grants

During this reporting period, the OIG released nine audits of state VOCA and subawards for CVF-funded grant programs, as described below:

[*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Arizona Department of Public Safety \(Arizona DPS\) to the Jewish Family and Children's Services of Southern Arizona Inc. \(JFCS\), Tucson, Arizona*](#)

The OIG released a report on a grant totaling \$2,892,142 subawarded by the Arizona DPS to the JFCS to fund Project Safe Place, which provides information on victim rights, individual counseling, therapy, and referrals to other services and resources. As of October 2023, the Arizona DPS had reimbursed JFCS a cumulative amount of \$2,048,745. The OIG found that JFCS could improve certain areas of its subaward management, including financial policies and procedures, internal controls related to the calculation of fringe benefit costs, and review of other costs charged to the subaward. Additionally, the OIG found that the Arizona DPS has not fully complied with single audit report requirements. The OIG made three recommendations to OJP and the Arizona DPS and two recommendations to OJP to assist JFCS in improving their subaward management and administration. OJP, the Arizona DPS, and JFCS agreed with all of them.

[*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Grants Awarded to the Wyoming Office of the Attorney General \(Wyoming DVS\), Cheyenne, Wyoming*](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$5,201,252 awarded to the Wyoming DVS. OJP provided this funding to the Wyoming DVS as the State Administering Agency to make subawards to direct victim service providers across the state. As of January 2024, OJP had reimbursed the Wyoming DVS \$3,026,002.

The OIG identified deficiencies related to Wyoming DVS's recordkeeping for priority area funding requirements and its subrecipient monitoring. The OIG also questioned \$93,696 in unsupported pass-through entity expenditures. The OIG made three recommendations to OJP to improve the Wyoming DVS's management of grant performance. OJP agreed with all three recommendations, and the Wyoming DVS concurred with two of the recommendations and did not concur with the remaining recommendation.

[*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Grants Awarded to the West Virginia Department of Homeland Security, Division of Administrative Services, Justice and Community Services \(West Virginia JCS\), Charleston, West Virginia*](#)

The OIG released a report on three grants totaling \$40,708,679 awarded to the West Virginia JCS. The OIG identified several areas needing improvement, including the internal control environment. The West Virginia JCS needs to improve its recordkeeping of its required programmatic priority areas, update controls over its subrecipient monitoring and data reporting, and enhance its written programmatic and financial policies and procedures. The OIG also determined that drawdown activity did not reconcile to the cumulative expenditures as recorded in the West Virginia JCS' accounting records. As a result of these deficiencies, the OIG questioned \$435,507, which consists of \$214,267 in unsupported costs and \$221,240 in unallowable costs. The OIG made 17 recommendations to OJP to improve the West Virginia JCS' management of award performance. OJP concurred with all 17 recommendations. The West Virginia JCS concurred with 14 recommendations and did not concur with 3.

[*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Oklahoma District Attorneys Council to Northwest Domestic Crisis Services, Inc. \(NWDCS\), Woodward, Oklahoma*](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$504,560 subawarded by the Oklahoma District Attorneys Council to NWDCS. The OIG concluded that NWDCS provided advocacy and other support services to victims of crime, including intervention, shelter, transportation, advocacy, transitional housing, and counseling services. However, the OIG found that NWDCS should improve its written policies and procedures related to performance reporting and financial management to ensure compliance with federal award requirements, as well as the continuity of processes in the event of staff turnover. Further, NWDCS should develop and implement an incentive compensation policy that adheres to the requirements of the Uniform Guidance. The OIG made three recommendations to OJP and the Oklahoma DAC to improve NWDCS's management of award performance. OJP agreed with and the Oklahoma DAC concurred with all three recommendations. NWDCS disputed one of the recommendations.

[*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the West Virginia JCS to Legal Aid of West Virginia \(LAWV\), Charleston, West Virginia*](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$789,858 subawarded by the West Virginia JCS to LAWV. The OIG found that LAWV provided services and support to underserved victim populations, victims of domestic violence and sexual assault, and elderly and disabled victims of financial exploitation. However, the OIG found that LAWV could improve its subaward management by developing and implementing policies and procedures to closeout awards. The OIG made one recommendation to OJP to assist West Virginia JCS improve LAWV's management of subaward performance. OJP, the West Virginia JCS, and LAWV agreed with the recommendation.

[*Audit of OJP State of Washington Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded to the Young Women's Christian Association of Seattle, King County, and Snohomish County \(YWCA of Seattle\), Seattle, Washington*](#)

The OIG released a report on four grants totaling \$603,666 subawarded to the YWCA of Seattle to provide outreach and prevention services to youth and direct services to victims of crime. The OIG found that it can improve certain areas of its grant management. Specifically, the OIG found that the YWCA of

Seattle over-reported the number of victims it served and that its performance data included activities funded by other sources. The OIG also found that the YWCA of Seattle charged to the grants unapproved salaries and unallowable gift cards. As a result, the OIG identified \$43,614 in questioned costs, \$24,810 of which were unsupported costs. The OIG made six recommendations to OJP to improve the YWCA of Seattle's grant management. The OIG also made one recommendation to OJP to assist the Washington State Department of Commerce improve its subrecipient performance monitoring. OJP agreed with all seven recommendations.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Wisconsin Department of Justice \(Wisconsin DOJ\) to Pathfinders Milwaukee, Inc. \(Pathfinders\), Milwaukee, Wisconsin](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$1,321,056 subawarded to Pathfinders. The OIG found that Pathfinders used the grant funds to provide advocacy, therapy, case management, and outreach services to youth victims of sexual violence and exploitation in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. However, the OIG identified that Pathfinders could improve certain areas of its grant management, particularly its performance reporting procedures and financial procedures. Additionally, the OIG identified \$1,800 in unsupported costs. The OIG made three recommendations to OJP and the Wisconsin DOJ to improve Pathfinders' grant management and administration and to remedy unsupported costs. OJP agreed with all three recommendations. The Wisconsin DOJ concurred with, and Pathfinders accepted the three recommendations.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration \(Tennessee DFA\) to the Tennessee Voices for Children \(Tennessee Voices\), Goodlettsville, Tennessee](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$800,000 subawarded to Tennessee Voices to provide advocacy services that are culturally sensitive to individuals suffering trauma as a result of crime victimization. The OIG found that Tennessee Voices' compliance with VOCA budget and expenditure procedures could be improved. Specifically, the OIG found that Tennessee Voices did not submit a budget modification request for additional staff to work on its grant-funded program. Consequently, the OIG questioned the related personnel cost totaling \$11,012. The OIG made two recommendations for OJP to work with the Tennessee DFA to improve Tennessee Voices' grant management. OJP agreed with and the Tennessee DFA concurred with the recommendations. Tennessee Voices did not state whether it agreed or disagreed with both recommendations but outlined actions it will take to ensure compliance with relevant guidance.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the New York Office of Victim Services \(New York OVS\) to Safe Horizon, Inc. \(Safe Horizon\), New York, New York](#)

The OIG released a report on one grant totaling \$10,551,267 subawarded to Safe Horizon to support and assist children victims of crime and their families who have experienced physical abuse, sexual abuse, or traumatic exposure to violence. The OIG found that Safe Horizon should enhance its programmatic and financial policies and procedures to help ensure continuity of program operations and compliance with VOCA Guidelines and DOJ Grants Financial Guide requirements. Additionally, the OIG found that New York OVS utilized a noncompliant methodology for awarding Victims of Crime Act funds to certain subrecipients, which resulted in Safe Horizon commingling federal and state funded expenditures in a single account. The OIG made five recommendations to OJP. OJP and New York OVS agreed with all of them. Safe Horizon neither agreed nor disagreed with all of them.

Management Advisory Memorandum

[Notification of Concerns Identified in State Administering Agencies' \(SAA\) Administration of VOCA Victim Assistance Formula Grant Funds](#)

The OIG released a MAM identifying concerns that may affect the ability of SAAs and subrecipients to administer VOCA victim assistance formula grants. The OIG made two recommendations to OJP to help ensure appropriate management of VOCA funds by SAAs when CVF subawards consist of funds from multiple sources. The OIG believes that OJP should provide formal guidance to SAAs to ensure that VOCA subrecipients can completely and accurately account for the VOCA funds received. The OIG made two recommendations to OJP, and OJP agreed with both of them.

OTHER DOJ COMPONENTS

Criminal Division

Investigations

The following are examples of investigations that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

[Findings of Misconduct by a then DOJ Attorney Advisor for Conduct Prejudicial to the Government in Connection with the Attorney Advisor Engaging in Inappropriate Sexual Contact with an Intern in the Attorney Advisor's Office](#)

On February 4, 2025, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by a DOJ Attorney Advisor for conduct prejudicial to the government in connection with the Attorney Advisor engaging in inappropriate sexual contact with an intern in the Attorney Advisor's office. The OIG initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information alleging that a then Attorney Advisor had engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with an intern while in the Attorney Advisor's office. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation and determined that this behavior constituted conduct prejudicial to the government in violation of federal ethics regulations.*

[Findings of Misconduct by Assistant United States Attorney \(AUSA\) for Misuse of Position, Misuse of Government Property, Improper Acceptance of Gifts, and Misuse of Government Travel Card, While on Detail Overseas](#)

On December 11, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by an AUSA for misuse of position, misuse of government property, improper acceptance of gifts, and misuse of a government travel card, while on detail overseas. The OIG initiated an investigation upon receipt of information from DOJ's Criminal Division, alleging that an AUSA, while on detail overseas, misused the AUSA's position and government property, and improperly accepted gifts, by planning and hosting an awards ceremony that was neither sponsored nor authorized by the United States government. During the investigation, the OIG received information that the AUSA had misused the AUSA's government travel card for disallowed charges, including parking, meals, baggage, and hotel stays, resulting in revocation of travel card privileges. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations that the AUSA misused the AUSA's position and government property, and improperly accepted gifts, in violation of federal ethics regulations.*

[Findings of Misconduct by an AUSA for Conduct Prejudicial to the Government and Misuse of Government Property](#)

On October 24, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by an AUSA for conduct prejudicial to the government and misuse of government property. The OIG initiated an investigation after receiving information from a local police department that an AUSA had used his government issued mobile device to engage in extensive sexually explicit and sexually oriented communications with an individual, who later became the target of a police investigation. The OIG

investigation substantiated the allegation that the AUSA exchanged numerous inappropriate, sexually explicit and sexually oriented text messages with the individual using the AUSA's government-issued mobile device, in violation of DOJ policy and federal ethics regulations. The OIG also found that the AUSA left the AUSA's office during work hours for a sexual encounter with the individual, in violation of federal ethics regulations.*

Environment and Natural Resources Division

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the Superfund Activities in the Environment and Natural Resources Division for FYs 2023 and 2024

Executive Office for United States Attorneys

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the United States Attorneys' Offices Compliance with Savanna's Act of 2020 and its Efforts to Address Missing and Murdered Indigenous Persons

Justice Management Division

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the Justice Management Division's Fleet Management Program

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

Audit of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services COPS Hiring Program

TOP MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES

Since 1998, the OIG has published an annual report on the top management and performance challenges facing DOJ. The report is based on the OIG's oversight work, research, and judgment. By statute, this report is required to be included in DOJ's annual Agency Financial Report.

This year's report identifies seven challenges that the OIG believes represent the most pressing concerns for DOJ:

1. The Ongoing Crisis Facing the Federal Corrections System,
2. Strengthening Public Trust in DOJ,
3. Promoting and Safeguarding National Security,
4. Cybersecurity and Emerging Technology,
5. Pursuing DOJ's Law Enforcement Mission While Protecting Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
6. Strengthening the Administration and Oversight of Contracts and Grants, and
7. Managing Human Capital.

While these challenges are not rank ordered, the OIG believes that it is critical that the Department address the escalating strategic management and operational challenges facing the federal correction system, which is beset by deteriorating facilities, staffing challenges, and concerns over institutional safety and security and healthcare. The serious issues identified during recent OIG unannounced inspections of BOP facilities, including significant facility issues affecting the conditions of inmate confinement and operational deficiencies in core inmate management and security functions, have heightened concern about the Department's ability to fulfill basic mission requirements. Strengthening the public's trust also remains vitally important for the Department, as confidence in the Department as an institution and its employees is essential to fulfilling the Department's mission to uphold the rule of law, keep our country safe, and protect civil liberties.

Additionally, the Department must continue to promote and safeguard national security as it works to counter acts of terrorism and violent extremism, hold international criminal networks accountable for crimes, and ensure the nation's elections are secure and free from foreign influence. Increasingly sophisticated cyber criminals and the rapid advancement of emerging technologies such as AI will require the Department to enhance its cybersecurity strategy and better safeguard sensitive data and information systems. The Department will also need to continue carefully balancing its responsibility to keep the American people safe against its responsibility to protect civil rights and civil liberties. And, as the Department strives to protect communities against violent crime, opioids and other narcotics, and child exploitation, it must also ensure that adequate oversight and accountability measures over law enforcement are robust and effective.

To maximize taxpayer dollars, the Department must continue to ensure that the management of DOJ contracts and grants comply with federal law and requirements. The Department also must take steps to maintain its ability to hire and retain top talent, including implementing succession planning and quickly and appropriately addressing allegations of sexual harassment.

Detailed information about DOJ's management and performance challenges is available on the [OIG website](#).

TESTIMONY/LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

Congressional Testimony

During this reporting period, the Inspector General did not testify before Congress.

Legislation and Regulations

The IG Act directs the OIG to review proposed legislation and regulations relating to the programs and operations of DOJ. Although the DOJ's Office of Legislative Affairs reviews all proposed or enacted legislation that could affect DOJ's activities, the OIG independently reviews proposed legislation that could affect its operations and legislation that relate to waste, fraud, or abuse in DOJ's programs and operations.

WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION COORDINATOR PROGRAM

Whistleblowers perform a critical role when they bring forward evidence of wrongdoing, and they should never suffer reprisal for doing so. The OIG [Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Program](#) works to ensure that whistleblowers are fully informed of their rights and protections from reprisal.

During this reporting period, the DOJ OIG worked with staff for the PRAC to inform Congress on the need for legislation to extend the PRAC, which will sunset on September 30, 2025, absent legislation to extend its sunset date. The PRAC works with partner OIGs to identify and fight fraud in pandemic-era spending programs. The PRAC's fraud fighting efforts have benefited from tips and other information from whistleblowers, and the DOJ OIG has a shared interest in ensuring that the important fraud fighting tool does not expire. The Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Program commends the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, which advanced legislation on March 25 to extend the PRAC. The DOJ OIG looks forward to working with its partners at the PRAC and the Senate to ensure that the PRAC's fraud-fighting capabilities do not expire.

October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025

Employee complaints received ⁷	293
Employee complaints opened for investigation by the OIG	43
Employee complaints that were referred by the OIG to the components for investigation	144
Employee complaint cases closed by the OIG ⁸	49

⁷ "Employee complaints" are defined as allegations received from whistleblowers, defined broadly as complaints received from employees and applicants with the Department, or its contractors, subcontractors, or grantees, either received directly from the complainant by the OIG Hotline, the field offices, or others in the OIG, or from a DOJ component if the complaint otherwise qualifies and is opened as an investigation.

⁸ This number reflects cases closed during the reporting period regardless of when they were opened.

OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS

As part of the OIG's mission to promote accountability and transparency in DOJ, the OIG periodically publishes a list of its open recommendations to DOJ, i.e., the OIG recommendations that DOJ has not fully implemented as of the reporting date. This list is available on the [OIG website](#) and on [Oversight.gov](#).

As of March 31, 2025, DOJ had 587 open OIG recommendations, which the OIG associated with the following statuses at that time: (1) resolved (474 recommendations), (2) on hold/pending with OIG (106 recommendations), (3) unresolved (2 recommendations) and (4) response not yet due (5 recommendations). The recommendations in this report are associated with approximately \$47,611,287 in questioned costs and over \$191,690 in funds that the OIG recommends could be used more efficiently if repurposed by the agency.⁹

The OIG also identifies its three highest priority open recommendations on the [OIG website](#) and [Oversight.gov](#). These priority recommendations are those the OIG believes, when implemented, will have the most benefit or impact to DOJ's mission, operations, programs, or funds. Factors the OIG considers when identifying priority recommendations include monetary impact; reduction of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct; impact on program efficiency and effectiveness; impact on health, safety, national security, or the economy; current value to policy makers; and the recommendation's relationship to high-profile areas such as OIG top management challenges, agency strategic priorities, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency top challenges, and congressional interest. At the close of this reporting period, the OIG had identified on Oversight.gov the priority open recommendations outlined in the table on the following page.

⁹ This information omits recommendations that DOJ determined to be classified or sensitive, and therefore unsuitable for public release. Definitions of each status category are available in "Appendix 2, Glossary of Terms."

Report Number and Date	Report Title	Rec. No.	Recommendation
23-065 (May 2023)	Limited-Scope Review of the BOP's Strategies to Identify, Communicate, and Remedy Operational Issues	5	The OIG recommended that the BOP develop and implement a reliable method to calculate appropriate staffing levels at the enterprise and institution levels. Such a method should seek to baseline appropriate staffing levels for the current inmate population and be flexible to account for future population changes overall and among institutions, as well as other factors (e.g., institution security level and layout) that determine appropriate staffing levels. Once such a method is developed, communicate the need to align funding levels with appropriate staffing levels to executive and legislative branch stakeholders.
22-001 (October 2021)	MAM: Notification of Needed Upgraded to the BOP's Security Camera System	1	The OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system that, among other things: (a) identifies enhancements needed to address camera functionality and coverage deficiencies, (b) provides cost projections and the BOP appropriations account to fund the upgrades, and (c) includes an estimated timeline for completion of the work.
21-093 (July 2021)	Investigation and Review of the FBI's Handling of Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Former USA Gymnastics Physician Lawrence Gerard Nassar	1a	The OIG recommended that the FBI more precisely describe for FBI employees when they are required to promptly contact and coordinate with applicable state and local law enforcement and social service agencies after receiving allegations of crimes against children that potentially fall under state jurisdiction, even when the allegations also potentially fall within the FBI's jurisdiction.

STATISTICS

Evaluation and Inspections Workload and Accomplishments

The following table summarizes the workload and accomplishments of the Evaluation and Inspections Division during the 6-month reporting period ending March 31, 2025:

Workload and Accomplishments	Number of Reviews
Reviews/Inspections Active at Beginning of Period	5
Reviews/Inspections Cancelled	1
Reviews/Inspections Initiated	2
Final Reports Issued	2
Reviews/Inspections Active at End of Reporting Period	4

Investigations Statistics

The following table summarizes the workload and accomplishments of the Investigations Division during the 6-month period ending March 31, 2025:

Source of Allegations ¹⁰	
Hotline (Telephone, Mail, and Email)	3,480
Other Sources	4,269
Total Allegations Received	8,109

¹⁰ These figures represent allegations entered into the OIG’s complaint tracking system. They do not include the approximate 4,654 additional hotline, email, and phone contacts that were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and/or outside the purview of the federal government.

Investigative Caseload	
Investigations Opened This Period	95
Investigations Declined for Prosecution	67
Investigations Closed and Reports of Investigation Issued This Period ¹¹	98
Investigations in Progress as of March 31, 2025	547
Prosecutive Actions	
Criminal Indictments/Informations ¹²	30
Arrests	40
Convictions/Pleas	30
Prosecutions Referred to DOJ ¹³	99
Prosecutions Referred to State and Local Prosecutors ¹⁴	12
Administrative Actions	
Terminations	16
Resignations	42
Disciplinary Action	24
Monetary Results	
Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries/Assessments/Forfeitures	\$4,330,955.89
Civil Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries/Penalties/Damages/Forfeitures	\$5,300,696.90
Non-judicial Restitutions/Recoveries/Forfeitures/Revocations/Seizures	\$175,985.00

¹¹ At the conclusion of an investigation, one or more types of report are prepared. The prepared report may be an abbreviated report of investigation or a full report of investigation. In addition, an investigative summary for public posting on the OIG website may be prepared for an investigation involving a senior government employee. The number of reports issued represents one report for each investigation.

¹² The number of indictments reported include both sealed and not sealed.

¹³ This number includes all criminal and civil referrals to DOJ for a prosecutorial decision, whether they were ultimately accepted or declined with the caveat that, if an investigation was referred to more than one DOJ office for a prosecutorial decision, the referral to DOJ was counted only once. The number reported as referred represents referrals for both individuals and or other legal entities.

¹⁴ The number reported as referred represents referrals for both individuals and/or other legal entities.

Investigations Division Briefing Programs

OIG investigators conducted 173 Integrity Awareness Briefings for Department employees and other stakeholders throughout the country. These briefings are designed to educate employees and other stakeholders about the misuse of a public official's position for personal gain and to deter employees from committing such offenses. The briefings reached more than 4,438 employees.

OIG Hotline


During FY 2025, the OIG received most of its [hotline](#) complaints through its electronic complaint form.

In addition, DOJ employees and citizens can file complaints by telephone, fax, email, and postal mail. The online access, email, fax, and postal mail all provide the ability to file a complaint in writing to the OIG.

From all hotline sources during the first half of FY 2025, 3,840 new complaints related to DOJ operations or other federal agencies were entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. Of the new complaints, 3,222 were forwarded to various DOJ components for their review and appropriate action; 229 were filed for information; 121 were forwarded to other federal agencies; and 13 were opened by the OIG for investigation.

Approximately 4,654 additional hotline, email, and phone contacts were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government and therefore were not entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system.

Complaint Sources
October 1, 2024–March 31, 2025



Source: Investigations Data Management System

APPENDICES

1 | Acronyms and Abbreviations

AI	Artificial Intelligence
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
AUSA	Assistant United States Attorney
BOP	Federal Bureau of Prisons
CHS	Confidential Human Sources
CO	Correctional Officer
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CVF	Crime Victims Fund
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DOJ or Department	U.S. Department of Justice
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act
FMC	Federal Medical Center
FY	Fiscal Year
GS Foods	GS Foods Group, Inc
IG Act	Inspector General Act of 1978
MAM	Management Advisory Memorandum
NCSO	Nassau County Sheriff's Office
ODAG	Office of the Deputy Attorney General
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OJP	Office of Justice Programs
PRAC	Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
SA	Special Agent
TFO	Task Force Officer
USMS	U.S. Marshals Service
VOCA	Victims of Crime Act of 1984

2 | Glossary of Terms

The following are definitions of specific terms as they are used in this report:

Administrative Actions: Term that encompasses actions taken against an employee, contractor, or grant recipient, including disciplinary action, termination, debarment, and loss of funding, and can also include an employee's or contractor's resignation or retirement.

Cooperative Agreement: Term used to describe when the awarding agency expects to be substantially involved with the award's activities, often used interchangeably with "grant."

Contraband: 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(h) defines contraband as "material prohibited by law, regulation, or policy that can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the safety, security, or good order of the facility or protection of the public." Contraband includes weapons, explosives, drugs, intoxicants, currency, cameras, recording equipment, telephones, radios, pagers, electronic devices, and any other objects that violate criminal laws or are prohibited by federal regulations or BOP policies.

Disallowed Cost: The IG Act defines "disallowed cost" as a "questioned cost that management, in a management decision, has sustained or agreed should not be charged to the Government."

Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use: Recommendation by the OIG that funds could be used more efficiently if management of an entity took actions to start and complete the recommendation, including: (1) reductions in outlays; (2) deobligation of funds from programs or operations; (3) withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds; (4) costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the entity, a contractor, or grantee; (5) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award reviews of contract or grant agreements; or (6) any other savings that specifically are identified.

Management Decision: The IG Act defines "management decision" as the "evaluation by the management of an establishment of the findings and recommendations included in an audit report and the issuance of a final decision by management concerning its response to such findings and recommendations, including actions concluded to be necessary."

Questioned Cost: A cost that is questioned by the OIG because of: (1) an alleged violation of a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) a finding that the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.

Supervised Release: Court-monitored supervision upon release from incarceration.

Unsupported Cost: A cost that is questioned by the OIG because the OIG found that, at the time of the audit, the cost was not supported by adequate documentation.

3 | Peer Reviews

Peer Reviews Conducted by Another OIG

Audit Division

The most recent peer review of the Audit Division was performed by the General Services Administration OIG in March 2025. There are no outstanding recommendations.

Evaluation and Inspections Division

The most recent peer review of the Evaluation and Inspections Division was performed by a team from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG in September 2024. There are no outstanding recommendations.

Investigations Division

The most recent peer review of the Investigations Division was conducted by the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration in March 2021. There are no outstanding recommendations.

Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG

Audit Division

The Audit Division conducted a peer review of the U.S. Postal Service OIG in September 2024. There are no outstanding recommendations.

Evaluation and Inspections Division

The Evaluation and Inspections Division did not conduct any peer reviews during this reporting period.

Investigations Division

The Investigations Division did not conduct any peer reviews during this reporting period.

4 | Reporting Requirements

The IG Act specifies reporting requirements for semiannual reports. The requirements are listed below and indexed to the applicable pages:

IG Act References	Reporting Requirements	Page
5 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2)	Review of Legislation and Regulations	38
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1)	Description of Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies and Recommendations for Corrective Actions	12–35
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2)	Identification of Recommendations for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed	40–41
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(3)	Significant Investigations Closed	12–35
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(4)	Total Number of Convictions Resulting From Investigations	3, 43
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(5)	Listing of Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports	12–35
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(6)	Information Regarding Management Decisions Made During the Reporting Period with Respect to Audits, Inspections, or Evaluations Issued During a Previous Reporting Period	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(7)	Information Described in Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 Section 804(b)	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(8)	Peer Reviews Conducted by Another OIG	47
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(9)	Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews of the OIG	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(10)	Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(11)	Statistical Table Pertaining to OIG Investigations	42–43
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(12)	Description of Metrics for OIG Investigative Table	42–43
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(13)	Reports Involving Substantiated Allegations Against Senior Government Employees or Senior Officials	4, 17, 20, 34–35
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(14)	Instance of Whistleblower Retaliation	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(15)	Attempts to Interfere with OIG Independence and Summary of Reports of Refusal to Provide Information or Assistance	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(16)	Inspections, Evaluations, Audits, and Investigations of Senior Government Employees Undisclosed to the Public	Nothing to Report ¹⁵

¹⁵ This information is provided pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(16)(B). The OIG does not have any information to report pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(16)(A) for this reporting period.

Report Waste, Fraud, Abuse, Misconduct, or Whistleblower Retaliation

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, misconduct, or whistleblower retaliation regarding DOJ programs, employees, contractors, or grants, please go to the [OIG Hotline](#) to submit a complaint.

The OIG website has complaint forms that allow you to report the following to the OIG:

- COVID-19 related issues, including suspected waste, fraud, abuse, misconduct, or whistleblower retaliation relating to a DOJ employee, program, contract, or grant;
- allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or misconduct in DOJ contracts, subcontracts, and grants;
- allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or misconduct in DOJ programs or by DOJ employees;
- violations of civil rights or civil liberties by DOJ employees; and
- whistleblower retaliation against DOJ employees or employees of DOJ grantees, subgrantees, contractors, or subcontractors.

To give information by mail or fax, please send to:

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General
Investigations Division
ATTN: OIG Hotline
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20530
Fax: (202) 616-9881

For further information on how to report a complaint to the OIG, please call (800) 869-4499.

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General