The FBI seeks to protect the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, enforces the criminal laws of the United States, and provides criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., coordinates activities of more than 33,900 employees in 56 field offices located in major cities throughout the United States, more than 400 resident agencies in smaller cities and towns across the nation, and more than 60 international offices, called “Legal Attaches,” in U.S. embassies worldwide.
In September 2010, the OIG issued a report examining the FBI’s investigative activity relating to five advocacy groups and one individual. The OIG initiated this review in response to congressional inquiries that raised concerns over whether the FBI had improperly targeted domestic advocacy groups for investigation based upon their exercise of First Amendment rights. The OIG review examined FBI investigative activity between 2001 and 2006 related to: (1) the Thomas Merton Center (a “peace and social justice center” in Pittsburgh); (2) PETA (3) Greenpeace USA; (4) The Catholic Worker (a pacifist organization with numerous local chapters); and (5) Glen Milner, an individual described as a Quaker peace activist.
The OIG review did not find that the FBI had targeted any of the groups for investigation on the basis of their First Amendment activities. However, the OIG concluded that the factual basis for opening some of the investigations of individuals affiliated with the groups was factually weak, and in several cases there was little indication of any possible federal crimes as opposed to state crimes. In some cases, the FBI extended the duration of investigations involving advocacy groups or their members without adequate basis, and in a few instances the FBI improperly retained information about the groups in its files. The FBI also classified some investigations relating to nonviolent civil disobedience under its “Acts of Terrorism” classification, which resulted in the watchlisting of subjects during the investigation.
In addition, in the course of our investigation, the OIG found that, because of inaccurate information provided to FBI Director Robert Mueller regarding the circumstances of the FBI’s surveillance of an anti-war rally in Pittsburgh in 2002, the Director unintentionally provided inaccurate testimony to Congress in May 2006. The Director, in reliance on the information provided to him by FBI personnel, testified that certain persons of interest in international terrorism matters were expected to be present at the rally, when in fact this was not the case.
The OIG’s specific findings relating to the individual advocacy groups are summarized below.
- The OIG found numerous references to the Thomas Merton Center in documents describing investigative activities conducted by the FBI’s Pittsburgh Field Division. For example, in late November 2002, a probationary FBI agent in the Pittsburgh Field Division attended a public anti-war leafleting event sponsored by the Thomas Merton Center. The agent’s supervisor sent him to the rally on a slow work day (the day after Thanksgiving) and instructed him to look for Pittsburgh Field Division international terrorism subjects. The OIG found that the agent’s surveillance did not violate the Attorney General’s Guidelines.
- The OIG reviewed several cases related to PETA that were conducted by the FBI’s Norfolk Field Division. The OIG’s review did not find that the FBI targeted PETA or its members for investigation based solely on their exercise of First Amendment rights. Rather, the FBI opened investigations of several individuals and of PETA as an organization to determine whether PETA or any of its leadership was funding or directing the criminal activities of the Animal Liberation Front and other animal rights extremists. Although the OIG concluded that the FBI did not violate the Attorney General’s Guidelines when it opened most of these investigations, the OIG questioned whether the FBI had a sufficient factual basis to open several of the cases as full investigations rather than as preliminary inquiries, and concluded with respect to one individual that the facts contained in the FBI communication initiating the case did not support opening any investigation at all. In addition, the FBI kept one of the cases open for 6 years, which the OIG concluded was unreasonable and was inconsistent with FBI policy.
- The OIG did not find that the FBI targeted Greenpeace or its members for investigation based solely on their exercise of First Amendment rights. Rather, the FBI opened investigations of individuals associated with Greenpeace based on concerns about potential illegal conduct, such as trespass, vandalism, and other crimes. In one case involving Greenpeace protest activities in Alaska, the FBI’s investigation was based on evidence of potential conduct that could violate federal laws such as 18 U.S.C. § 1366 (Destruction of an Energy Facility). The OIG found that the FBI had sufficient factual predication to open a preliminary inquiry and later a full investigation on members of Greenpeace and to collect information about the future travel and protest plans of the subjects.
- The OIG concluded that the FBI did not target the Catholic Worker or its members for investigation based on their exercise of First Amendment rights. Investigative activities and documents relating to the Catholic Worker or its members were generated by several different FBI field divisions responding to discrete circumstances. However, the OIG found two FBI documents in a domestic terrorism file that contained information about nonviolent civil disobedience by Catholic Worker members (peaceful trespass on a military facility). Retaining this information – which pertained to a federal crime – was not prohibited by the Privacy Act, Attorney General’s Guidelines, or FBI policy. However, the acts in question were nonviolent civil disobedience, and the FBI has at various times disavowed interest in such activity.
- The OIG also examined the FBI’s investigative activity relating to Glen Milner, who was described in a Seattle Post-Intelligencer article as a “Quaker peace activist” who was “under watch” for protest activities carried out at the 2003 Seafair festival in Seattle, Washington. The OIG concluded that the FBI did not improperly investigate Milner because of his exercise of First Amendment rights or otherwise act in violation of FBI policies. The OIG also found no evidence that the FBI investigated Quakers as a group, or any individuals identified in FBI documents as Quakers, for their protest activities.
However, in 2006, the FBI provided inaccurate information about the incident to the public and to Congress by claiming that the surveillance related to a particular person of interest in a terrorism investigation. This included inaccurate testimony that FBI Director Robert Mueller provided to Congress in May 2006 in reliance on the information provided to him by FBI personnel. Contrary to the FBI’s statements, the OIG found no evidence that the FBI had any information at the time of the event that any terrorism subject would be present at the event. The OIG concluded that the erroneous statements to the public and Congress could have been the result of extraordinary carelessness but were more likely the result of efforts by FBI personnel to justify the surveillance.
In another instance, the FBI opened preliminary inquiries regarding three individuals associated with the Pittsburgh Organizing Group, which was affiliated with the Thomas Merton Center. We found that the factual predication for opening these investigations for a federal crime was thin and in one case insufficient under the Attorney General’s Guidelines. We also found that the FBI inappropriately used a confidential informant to collect and retain information about the First Amendment expressions of persons associated with the Pittsburgh Organizing Group.
In another case, the FBI conducted a full investigation of Greenpeace members relating to their planned protest activities with respect to two corporations in Texas (Exxon and Kimberly-Clark). The FBI used a wide variety of investigative techniques in this investigation, including surveillance. The OIG did not conclude that the FBI was investigating the subjects solely as a result of their First Amendment activities. However, the FBI articulated little or no basis for suspecting a violation of any federal criminal statute, as opposed to a state or local crime. The OIG also concluded that the investigation was kept open for 3 years, which was past the point at which its underlying justification existed and was therefore inconsistent with FBI guidelines.
The OIG report contains six recommendations, including that the FBI should specify the potential violation of a specific federal criminal statute as part of documenting the basis for opening a preliminary or full investigation in cases involving investigation of advocacy groups or their members for activities connected to the exercise of their First Amendment rights, and that the Department and the FBI should provide further guidance on when cases involving First Amendment issues should be classified as Acts of Terrorism matters and when they should not. The FBI concurred with these recommendations.
The OIG examined allegations that FBI employees cheated when taking a mandatory exam designed to test their knowledge of the FBI’s DIOG. The DIOG, which took effect in December 2008 and describes the procedures FBI employees must follow when conducting domestic investigations, replaced several older sets of guidelines that separately addressed criminal investigations, national security investigations, and foreign intelligence collection. The new DIOG was designed to standardize policy so that all investigations would be conducted legally and consistently.
In order to ensure that FBI employees understood and observed the requirements of the DIOG, the FBI ordered almost all of its employees to take 16.5 hours of training, followed by a 50-question computerized exam that had to be passed with a score of 80 percent or higher. The exam was open book and employees could use their notes to help answer questions, but employees were explicitly forbidden to consult with others while taking the exam. Over 20,000 employees took the training and the subsequent exam.
During our review, we interviewed employees in four field offices and investigated three complaints of alleged cheating. In our limited investigation, we found that a significant number of FBI employees had engaged in some form of cheating or improper conduct on the DIOG exam. We found that employees in some FBI offices used and distributed answer sheets for the DOIG exam. Employees in another office used so-called “study guides” that served a similar purpose as answer sheets. In addition, we determined that most of the employees who told us they used the answer sheets and study guides falsely certified at the end of the exam that they had not “consulted” with others during the exam. A few exploited a programming flaw to reveal the answers to the exam on their computers. In addition, we found that several employees had spoken to others while taking the exam, despite specific instructions that employees were not allowed to “consult” with others during the exam.
During our investigation, we interviewed a total of 76 employees about their conduct in taking the exam. Of those, we found that 22 had cheated in one way or another on the DIOG exam. We believe the extent of the cheating related to this test was significantly greater than the cases we detailed in our report.
In addition to cheating by rank-and-file employees, the OIG also found cheating and inappropriate behavior among supervisors, including a legal advisor, two assistant special agents in charge, two supervisory special agents, and a supervisory senior resident agent.
Our report recommended that the FBI take appropriate disciplinary action against those employees identified by the OIG who cheated or engaged in inappropriate conduct related to the DIOG exam. In addition, we recommended that the FBI take appropriate steps to determine if other employees cheated or engaged in inappropriate conduct and, if so, take appropriate action. Finally, our report recommended that the FBI should conduct a new exam on the DIOG. The FBI has not yet responded to these recommendations.
The OIG’s Audit Division examined the FBI Laboratory’s examination of forensic DNA cases, which involves DNA analysis of forensic samples from crime scenes or evidentiary items such as envelopes, clothing, and drinking glasses. Our review focused on the Laboratory’s efforts to reduce its forensic DNA case backlog. We examined the size of the FBI’s forensic case analysis backlog and the amount of time contributors waited to receive DNA test results for forensic DNA cases.
Our review found that the FBI Laboratory had a large and growing backlog of forensic DNA cases. As of March 2010, the FBI Laboratory had a backlog of over 3,200 forensic DNA cases. Of these backlogged cases, over 2,700 cases were in the FBI Laboratory’s Nuclear DNA Unit, which primarily examines biological fluid stains, such as blood and semen. Almost 500 backlogged cases were in the Mitochondrial DNA unit, which analyzes evidence that is not suitable for nuclear DNA testing, such as naturally shed hairs, hair fragments, bones, and teeth. The following graphic depicts the quarterly increase in the backlog for nuclear DNA (nDNA) and mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from FY 2009 through the second quarter in FY 2010.
We found that from FY 2009 through the second quarter of FY 2010, the backlog of cases in the nDNA Unit increased by almost 40 percent (757 cases), and in the mtDNA Unit the backlog of cases grew by almost 130 percent (276 cases).
This backlog can have significant effects, such as delaying legal proceedings that are waiting on the results of DNA analysis, preventing the timely capture of criminals, prolonging the incarceration of innocent people who could be exonerated by DNA evidence, and adversely affecting families of missing persons waiting for positive identification of remains.
As a result of the backlog, the amount of time that contributors wait for FBI DNA analysis was lengthy. For example, the FBI Laboratory’s strategic initiative seeks to reduce the turnaround time for DNA analysis to 60 days in each unit. We determined that the length of time for contributors to receive results from the FBI Laboratory after submission of evidence varied from an average of approximately 150 days to over 600 days depending on the type of submission.
The FBI Laboratory’s forensic DNA backlog included 391 cases from the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), which examines improvised explosive devices sent from warzones worldwide. Our review determined that for TEDAC cases the FBI Laboratory on average took 268 days to complete in the nDNA Unit and 167 days in the mtDNA Unit. The untimely analysis of TEDAC submissions could affect the prevention of future terrorist attacks by delaying efforts to identify the maker of the improvised explosive device or the source of its components.
We also determined that the FBI Laboratory did not have a modern laboratory information management system, thereby making the determination of backlog statistics and tracking of cases difficult. Since September 2003, the FBI has spent over $10 million on developing a laboratory information management system. Yet, over 6 years later, this system is still under development, and the FBI Laboratory is not able to generate an electronic chain-of-custody document, track laboratory-wide evidence workflows, and produce laboratory-wide statistical reports to identify problems and delays.
As part of the FBI’s efforts to reduce the forensic DNA case backlog and minimize workflow bottlenecks, the FBI Laboratory is pursuing various strategies, such as laboratory information management system implementation, strategic management, human resources, and outsourcing. These strategies were ongoing at the time of our review, but they had not yet reduced the forensic DNA case backlog at the FBI Laboratory. For example, according to the FBI, it was seeking additional resources for DNA analysis and was in the process of bringing on board 17 additional forensic examiners. However, hiring and training the new personnel could take significant time (12 to 18 months for training personnel new to DNA examination) and, therefore, would not have a significant impact on the current backlog for almost 2 years.
Our report made five recommendations to the FBI to help improve Laboratory DNA operations, such as standardizing FBI Laboratory-wide definitions for calculating backlog, ensuring FBI Laboratory users have access to a laboratory information management system, and examining the effect of outsourcing agreements on the overall backlog and the time contributors wait for test results. The FBI concurred with these recommendations, and stated that it is in the process of standardizing FBI Laboratory-wide definitions for calculating backlog, reviewing its laboratory information management system needs, and developing plans for monitoring the effects of outsourcing agreements.
This OIG audit examined the FBI’s allocation and utilization of personnel resources and the numbers and types of cases investigated over the past 5 years. This report was the fourth in a series of OIG reviews analyzing the changes in the FBI’s allocation and utilization of personnel resources and casework by specific investigative areas.
Our review assessed in detail the allocation and actual use of FBI personnel resources by priority area. In our previous reviews, we determined that the FBI used significantly more field agent resources than it had allocated for counterterrorism matters, and used significantly fewer field agent resources than it had allocated for non-terrorism matters. In this review, we determined that the FBI used field agents in line with the number it had allocated to its highest national priorities, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime, and civil rights. However, the FBI used fewer field agents than it had allocated to its lowest national priorities, including gangs and criminal enterprises, white collar crime, and violent crime. The following chart portrays the breakdown of the FBI’s “burn rates” among its national priority areas between FYs 2005 through 2009.1
Specifically, we found that in FY 2009 the FBI used 26 percent of its field agents to address counterterrorism matters, while using 51 percent to address criminal matters. This is a significant change from FY 2001 when the FBI used 13 percent of its field agents on counterterrorism matters and 72 percent on criminal matters.
We also examined the number of active FBI cases related to various investigative priorities. Overall, between FY 2005 and FY 2009 the number of FBI active cases related to violent crime, counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and white collar crime decreased. During that same time period, the number of active cases relating to cyber crime, pubic corruption, civil rights, gangs, and criminal enterprises increased.
We determined that the FBI continued to experience substantial gaps between the number of intelligence analyst positions allocated and utilized between FYs 2005 and 2009. FBI officials stated the rate of attrition and time it takes to hire applicants affected the FBI’s ability to fill vacant intelligence analyst positions.
Our audit also determined that the FBI has improved its ability to monitor and evaluate its allocation and utilization of personnel resources by establishing a Resource Planning Office and by developing an extensive management information system. In addition, the FBI has established various resource management initiatives to oversee the allocation and utilization of personnel resources.
However, the FBI has not formalized all of the policies and procedures related to its resource management initiatives and did not fully integrate them into FBI operational practices. This contributed to inconsistent execution of some initiatives by FBI operational divisions and field offices.
The OIG report provided 10 recommendations to assist the FBI in its resource planning and allocation decisions, including a recommendation that the FBI require operational divisions to regularly examine resource utilization associated with division-specific priorities for all investigative programs and a recommendation that the FBI establish policies and procedures to formalize its new resource management initiatives. The FBI agreed with the OIG recommendations, and stated it is taking action in response. For example, the FBI stated that it is in the process of developing resource-utilization and casework reports associated with division-specific priorities within its management information system, and that it drafted a policy on its risk-based resource allocation and assessment model, which is undergoing management review.
The FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) is a national information repository that stores DNA specimen information to facilitate its exchange by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. During this reporting period, the OIG audited state and local laboratories that participate in CODIS to determine the laboratories’ compliance with the FBI’s Quality Assurance Standards (QAS) and National DNA Index System (NDIS) participation requirements. Additionally, we evaluated whether the laboratories’ DNA profiles in CODIS databases were complete, accurate, and allowable for inclusion in NDIS. Below are examples of our audit findings.
- Our audit found that the Montana Department of Justice Forensic Science Division Laboratory was generally in compliance with the standards governing CODIS activities, including compliance with the NDIS requirements and Quality Assurance Standards we tested. The audit found that, of the sample of 80 forensic DNA profiles reviewed, only 1 profile contained an inaccurate specimen identification number, which was corrected when we brought the discrepancy to the attention of laboratory management. To address future concerns, the Laboratory added written policy that requires a profile to undergo a subsequent review if changes are made to it.
- The OIG examined CODIS activities at the Houston, Texas, Police Department’s Crime Laboratory. Our audit found that the Laboratory’s personnel record retention policy did not require the retention of personnel records for 10 years as mandated by NDIS participation requirements – it was the Laboratory’s policy to maintain these records only until its reaccreditation, which is usually a 5-year timeframe. The Laboratory corrected this policy when we brought the record retention discrepancy to its attention. We also found that out of the 100 DNA profiles we reviewed, 1 profile was unallowable and 2 were inaccurate. The Laboratory corrected these DNA profile discrepancies during our audit and revised its procedures to require three different levels of review to prevent future errors from occurring. NDIS-participating laboratories are required to have annual QAS reviews performed by review teams that have at least one reviewer that underwent the FBI’s QAS review training. However, we found that the Laboratory’s last QAS review team did not adhere to this requirement. We recommended that the Laboratory implement procedures to ensure that it adhere to the QAS reviewer training requirement, and the Laboratory agreed with this recommendation.
During this reporting period, the OIG received 1,484 complaints involving the FBI. The most common allegations made against FBI employees were violations of intelligence-gathering standards; job performance failure; waste; and misuse of government property. The majority of the complaints received this period were considered management issues and were provided to FBI management for its review and appropriate action.
At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 42 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to FBI employees. The criminal investigations covered a wide range of offenses, including job performance failure and waste, misuse of government property. The administrative investigations involved serious allegations of misconduct. The following are examples of cases involving the FBI that the OIG’s Investigations Division handled during this reporting period:
- A joint investigation by the OIG’s Washington Field Office, the Office of Personnel Management’s OIG, and the FBI resulted in the arrest of three FBI special agents and one intelligence analyst on charges of making false statements on U.S. government documents in an effort to conceal their use of anabolic steroids and HGH. The arrests stem from statements made on medical forms used to assess the employees’ continuing fitness for duty. According to the arrest affidavits, the four FBI employees received numerous prescriptions for anabolic steroids and HGH after meeting with doctors and receiving false diagnoses for medical conditions such as pituitary dwarfism. The four are accused of failing to disclose the treatment or prescriptions on medical history forms they must file with the FBI, which are used to assess their fitness for duty. All have been placed on suspension without pay. Judicial proceedings continue.
- An investigation by the OIG’s Washington Field Office led to the arrest and guilty plea of an FBI management support specialist in the Eastern District of Virginia for possession of child pornography. The investigation found that the management support specialist used the FBI’s computer network to facilitate sexually explicit e-mail communications with parties identifying themselves as minors. In addition, the investigation determined that the management support specialist possessed on his home computer between 10 and 20 images depicting minor victims engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The management support specialist was sentenced to 46 months of incarceration, followed by 15 years of supervised release, with sex offender monitoring and conditions.
- An investigation by the OIG’s Miami Field Office resulted in the arrest of an FBI special agent on charges of wire fraud, bank fraud, and bankruptcy fraud charges. The investigation developed evidence that from May to July 2006 the special agent provided false information to obtain 15 mortgage loans from SunTrust Mortgage. In his mortgage applications, the special agent falsely claimed that he was employed by DOJ Productions, an alleged music company, and earned $42,350 a month from that company. Additionally, the special agent secured a home equity line of credit based on a claim that he was the President of Judah Music and earned $500,000 a year. The FBI special agent filed for bankruptcy in July 2009, and he failed to include properties he owned or transferred on the bankruptcy application. Judicial proceedings continue.
- An investigation by the OIG’s Dallas Field Office, along with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, resulted in the arrest and guilty plea of an FBI special agent in the Northern District of Texas to charges of unlawful employment of aliens. The investigation revealed that the special agent had owned and operated a Schlotzsky’s Deli sandwich franchise for 12 years and employed a family of illegal aliens. The FBI special agent admitted to changing several employees’ social security numbers in an effort to avoid detection that they were in the country illegally. The FBI employee was terminated and forfeited her retirement. Sentencing is pending.
- An investigation by the OIG’s Los Angeles Field Office led to the arrest and guilty plea of an FBI special agent for illegally accessing information from a government computer system. The investigation determined that the special agent obtained information from the FBI’s databases to assist a friend in the collection of an unpaid debt. The special agent was sentenced in the Central District of California to serve 3 months in home confinement, complete 100 hours of community service, and pay a fine of $3,000. The special agent resigned from the FBI as a condition of his guilty plea.
- An investigation by the OIG’s Detroit Area Office resulted in the arrest of an FBI evidence control technician, assigned to the FBI Indianapolis Division, pursuant to an indictment returned in the Northern District of Indiana charging her with embezzlement, false statements, and witness tampering. The investigation determined that over a 3-year period, the evidence control technician embezzled more than $30,000 in cash that the FBI had stored in evidence, and that she created false documents to cover up her theft. In addition, she attempted to persuade a witness via telephone to provide false information to the OIG regarding more than $80,000 in cash deposits to her bank account. The evidence control technician was terminated from her position during the OIG investigation. Judicial proceedings continue.
- In April 2010, Space Age Engineering, Inc., (Space Age Engineering), a contractor for the FBI located in Westlake Village, California, agreed to pay $25,000 to settle allegations that it violated the Civil False Claims Act. This case was initiated as the result of a qui tam lawsuit filed by a competitor of Space Age Engineering. The FBI awarded Space Age Engineering a contract to provide 52 trucks for use at FBI legal attaché offices around the world, including eight “non-standard” trucks with right-hand drive or leaded fuel configurations. Based on Space Age Engineering’s assurance that it could provide both types of vehicles, the FBI agreed to pay Space Age Engineering approximately $5,088 more per standard truck than the lowest bidder. An investigation by the OIG’s Fraud Detection Office, with assistance from the OIG’s Los Angeles Field Office, determined that Space Age Engineering failed to provide the eight “non-standard” vehicles as required by the contract.
- In our September 2009 Semiannual Report to Congress, we reported on an investigation by the OIG’s El Paso Area Office and ATF’s El Paso Field Office that resulted in the arrest of an FBI special agent in the Western District of Texas on charges of dealing firearms without a license, maintaining false firearms records, and making a false statement. The investigation revealed that the FBI special agent, who was not a licensed firearms dealer, bought and sold firearms from January 2005 until May 2008. During this reporting period, the FBI special agent was convicted by a jury of one count of dealing firearms without a license, four counts of causing a firearms dealer to maintain false records, and one count of making a false statement to federal authorities. He was sentenced to two years’ incarceration, followed by three years of supervised release, and was ordered to perform 250 hours of community service.
The FBI’s Implementation of the Sentinel Project
The OIG is continuing to evaluate the FBI’s ongoing development and implementation of the Sentinel information technology project, which is intended to upgrade the FBI’s electronic case management system and provide the FBI with an automated workflow process.
The OIG is examining changes to the FBI’s watchlist nominations process to ensure the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the FBI’s watchlisting practices.
The FBI’s Efforts to Combat National Security Cyber Threats
The OIG is examining the FBI’s efforts to combat cyber intrusions that threaten national security. The review assesses the development and operation of the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force, as well as the capabilities of FBI field offices to investigate national security cyber cases.
The OIG is reviewing the FBI’s Integrity and Compliance Program, which was established following a 2007 OIG report on the FBI’s use of National Security Letters (NSL). This review will evaluate how the FBI’s Program: (1) identifies risks of non-compliance with both the letter and spirit of applicable laws, regulations, rules, and policies; (2) ranks identified risks; (3) analyzes highly ranked risks; (4) mitigates risks with adequate corrective actions; (5) monitors the implementation of the corrective actions to ensure that mitigation is effective; and (6) promotes a culture of integrity and ethical compliance throughout the FBI.
Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (Act)authorizes targeting non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information. As required by the Act, the OIG is examining the number of disseminated FBI intelligence reports containing a reference to a U.S. person identity, the number of U.S. person identities subsequently disseminated in response to requests for identities not referred to by name or title in the original reporting, the number of targets later determined to be located in the United States, and whether communications of such targets were reviewed. In addition, the OIG is examining the FBI’s compliance with the targeting and minimization procedures required under the Act.
The OIG is again examining the FBI’s use of NSLs and Section 215 orders for business records. Among other issues, our review is assessing the FBI’s progress in responding to the OIG’s recommendations in prior OIG reports that examined the FBI’s use of these authorities. In addition, the review is examining the FBI’s use of its pen register and its trap and trace authority under the Act.
- The FBI uses the term “burn rate” to refer to the difference between allocated resources (Funded Staffing Level) and actual resources used (as reflected in its time utilization database). An “overburn” occurs when more resources are used than allocated. In contrast, the FBI defines “underburn” as using fewer resources used than allocated.