October 1, 2003–March 31, 2004
Office of the Inspector General

The DEA enforces federal laws and regulations related to the growing, production, or distribution of controlled substances. In addition, the DEA seeks to reduce the supply of and demand for illicit drugs, both domestically and internationally. The DEA has approximately 9,000 employees staffing its 21 division offices in the United States and the Caribbean and 80 offices in 58 other countries.

Reports Issued

The DEA's Disciplinary System

We assessed the effectiveness of the DEA's system for investigating employee misconduct and disciplining employees when misconduct is confirmed. Specifically, we reviewed whether allegations of misconduct were properly reported to and investigated by the DEA's OPR, disciplinary penalties were fair and reasonable, the overall process was conducted in a timely manner, and the system was fairly administered.

We concluded that the DEA's system generally functioned well. The investigations of alleged misconduct appeared to be thorough and well-documented and provided a sound basis for making disciplinary decisions. We also concluded that the DEA usually imposed reasonable and consistent discipline for confirmed misconduct.

However, we found problems in various cases that revealed weaknesses in the DEA's three-tiered disciplinary system. On the first tier of the system, the OPR investigates allegations of misconduct; on the second, the Board of Professional Conduct determines whether misconduct occurred and proposes disciplinary actions; on the third, the deciding officials make the final disciplinary decision. The weaknesses we found included the following:

• Inadequate guidance and the possible failure of the deciding officials to properly consider the Board's mitigation before applying additional mitigating factors, resulting in penalties that appeared to be too lenient;

• Improper consideration of personal experience and opinion and of external factors by Board members and a deciding official when making disciplinary decisions;

• Failure to adequately document disciplinary decisions by the Board and deciding officials;

• Failure of DEA management to monitor the timeliness of the disciplinary process; and

• Lack of management oversight over the deciding officials.

We made eight recommendations to help the DEA ensure its disciplinary decisions are reasonable, free of inappropriate external influences, well-documented, and timely.

Forensic Laboratory Operations

The DEA's forensic laboratories analyze evidence to aid the investigation and prosecution of drug-related crimes and the development of intelligence related to drug trafficking. The DEA's Office of Forensic Sciences operates seven regional and two specialized laboratories. The regional laboratories analyze domestic law enforcement exhibits to identify controlled substances and latent prints. Laboratory personnel provide expert testimony in court and technical advice and support to law enforcement at crime scenes. The DEA's specialized laboratories focus on research, the development of information for intelligence purposes, and computer and other digital exhibits.

This audit followed up on our 1995 report, which identified weaknesses in the DEA's laboratory facilities but found laboratory operations and management controls to be satisfactory, with customer satisfaction ranging from favorable to excellent. In the earlier report, we recommended the DEA enhance certain management controls and consider consolidating its regional laboratories if adequate funding for replacing the facilities was not provided. During the follow-up audit, we evaluated how effectively the DEA's forensic services support the investigation and prosecution of drug cases and the gathering of drug information for intelligence purposes. We also assessed how effectively the laboratories manage evidence and other controlled substances to prevent loss or compromise, and we followed up on the status of facility replacements.

We found DEA laboratory services were effective and the quality of work was well managed. Laboratory services were generally performed in time to be useful to customers. However, turnaround times were significantly longer for latent print and digital evidence services than for drug analyses because of limited resources. In addition, procedures for handling latent print exhibits could be improved to help identify more suspects. DEA procedures allowed many people to handle exhibits prior to examination, increasing the possibility that print residues may be obliterated. DEA procedures also did not provide analysts direct access to all possible databases that could be useful for matching prints. The DEA had established procedures for laboratories to control and account for the receipt, storage, transfer, and disposition of evidence exhibits, and laboratories complied substantially with the requirements. With respect to outdated facilities, we found most had been replaced, with one significant exception. The Southeast Laboratory in Miami has not yet been replaced or relocated and has serious ventilation problems. Additionally, we found security weaknesses at two laboratories.

We recommended, among other actions, that the DEA maximize the results of latent print examinations by adding direct access to more databases, instructing chemists and special agents in the proper handling of exhibits for which fingerprint examination may be critical, and increasing the use of fingerprint specialists at crime scenes. We also recommended the DEA improve the timeliness of latent print and digital evidence services by allocating resources to support turnaround times comparable to those for drug services. We further recommended the DEA ensure exhibits are destroyed within the 90-day standard. The DEA concurred with all the recommendations.

Custodial Accountability for Evidence Held by Field Divisions

The OIG evaluated the DEA's progress in correcting problems in the custody of evidence by DEA field divisions identified in a 2001 internal DEA inspection report. The DEA report stated that evidence custodians needed clearer guidance and were uncertain about their responsibilities for maintaining evidence logbooks, the DEA had no central point-of-contact for uniform evidence guidance, and evidence custodians lacked formal training. The DEA's findings followed a General Accounting Office (GAO) review that had determined the DEA needed to strengthen accountability for drug evidence.

We found that more than two years after the DEA's report - and four years after the GAO's report - the DEA had not corrected the deficiencies by implementing program guidance, improving headquarters support, or developing training. Consequently, some DEA field division personnel continued to handle and store evidence improperly. Our review determined that the DEA had not implemented its own recommendations because its internal report had not been distributed to the appropriate offices for action.

We concluded that the original recommendations from the internal inspection report remain valid. They were as follows:

• Ensure all evidence custodians have preprinted logbooks so that they all use the same data fields to track evidence in their custody;

• Appoint an expert point-of-contact who can provide uniform guidance, track questions, and identify common trends to improve evidence-handling policies;

• Develop a handbook specifically for evidence custodians that outlines standard operating procedures and provides uniform guidance on evidence handling; and

• Provide formal, comprehensive training for evidence custodians that is uniform across all field divisions.

We recommended the DEA verify during field inspections that corrective actions have been taken. The DEA concurred with our recommendations.

Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 257 complaints involving the DEA. The most common allegations made against DEA employees included misuse of a credit card, job performance failure, and improper release of information. The OIG opened 7 investigations and referred 13 allegations to the DEA's OPR for investigation.

At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 21 open cases of alleged misconduct against DEA employees. The following are examples of cases involving the DEA that the OIG investigated during this reporting period:

• The DEA associate special agent in charge (ASAC) assigned to the New York Field Office was arrested in the Southern District of New York on charges of embezzlement, false claims, aiding and abetting, mail and wire fraud, and theft of honest services. A joint investigation by the OIG's New York Field Office and the DEA's OPR led to a 214-count indictment alleging the ASAC embezzled $138,000 from the DEA and misused DEA resources to perform work for a private investigations firm he owned and operated. The investigation revealed the ASAC had DEA special agents give him cash or money orders from the DEA imprest cashier under the pretext that the funds were required for legitimate DEA enforcement efforts. The ASAC converted the funds to his own use or deposited them in personal bank accounts. In addition, the ASAC made DEA special agents issue administrative subpoenas and conduct computer searches, criminal histories, and other law enforcement activities on individuals unrelated to DEA investigations. The ASAC received payment from private clients for these activities.

• A special agent assigned to the DEA's Phoenix Field Division was arrested on charges of witness tampering. A joint investigation by the OIG's Tucson Area Office and the DEA's OPR led to an indictment alleging the special agent interfered with an ongoing DEA drug investigation by calling the drug suspect and warning him that an undercover DEA informant was working for law enforcement. The DEA's investigation was aborted, the drug arrest could not be made, and the drug suspect later fled. Judicial proceedings continue.

Ongoing Work

Use of Informants

The OIG is assessing the DEA's payments to confidential informants used in criminal investigations and drug case prosecutions, its compliance with regulations and controls over disbursements, and the effect that the information provided by informants has had on arrests and the prosecution of cases.

Management of Information Technology

The OIG is conducting an audit of the DEA's acquisition and implementation of IT systems to determine whether the DEA is effectively managing its IT investments.