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Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2002–September 30, 2002
Office of the Inspector General


The Audit Division (Audit) audits Department organizations, programs, functions, computer technology and security systems, and financial statements. Audit also conducts or oversees external audits of expenditures made under Department contracts, grants, and other agreements. Audits are conducted in accordance with the Comptroller General's Government Auditing Standards and related professional auditing standards. Audit produces a wide variety of audit products designed to provide timely notification to Department management of issues needing attention.

Audit develops recommendations for corrective actions that will resolve identified weaknesses. During the course of regularly scheduled work, Audit also lends fiscal and programmatic expertise to Department components.

Audit has field offices in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. The Financial Statement Audit Office and Computer Security and Information Technology Audit Office are located in Washington, D.C. Audit Headquarters consists of the immediate office of the Assistant Inspector General (AIG) for Audit, the Office of Operations, the Office of Policy and Planning, and an Advanced Audit Techniques Group.

The field offices' geographic coverage is indicated on the map below. The San Francisco office also covers Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa, and the Atlanta office also covers Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

United States map indicating field offices’ geographic coverage. Cities include Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.

During this reporting period, Audit issued 227 audit reports containing more than $8 million in questioned costs and $4 million in funds to better use and made 454 recommendations for management improvement. Specifically, Audit issued 27 internal reports of programs funded at more than $468 million; 12 external reports of contracts, grants, and other agreements funded at more than $87 million; 90 audits of bankruptcy trustees with responsibility for funds of more than $193 million; and 98 Single Audit Act audits. In addition, Audit issued 3 Management Improvement Memoranda, 2 Notifications of Irregularities, and 11 Management Letter Transmittals.


The OIG audited the FBI's management of aspects of its counterterrorism program from 1995 through April 2002, focusing specifically on (1) the FBI's progress toward developing a national-level risk assessment of the terrorist threat to the United States, (2) whether the FBI's strategic planning process provides a sound basis to identify counterterrorism requirements, and (3) the amount of resources dedicated to the FBI's counterterrorism program over the last seven years. We provided the full 131-page audit report, which is classified at the "Secret" level, to the Department, FBI, and congressional oversight committees. The OIG publicly released an unclassified executive summary that highlighted our major findings and recommendations.

We found that the FBI has never performed a formal comprehensive assessment of the risk of the terrorist threat facing the United States. Such an assessment would have been useful not only to define the nature, likelihood, and severity of the threat but also to identify intelligence gaps and determine appropriate levels of resources to effectively combat terrorism. Further, although the FBI has developed an elaborate, multilayered strategic planning system, the system has not adequately established priorities or effectively allocated resources to the counterterrorism program. Specifically, the planning system acknowledged a general terrorist threat to the nation, but the FBI did not perform, and incorporate into its planning system, a comprehensive assessment of the threat of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. Similarly, the planning system identified numerous vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the FBI's capabilities to deal with the general terrorist threat, but the FBI did not make the fundamental changes necessary to correct the deficiencies. We made 14 recommendations to the FBI, including:

In response to concerns about the Department's accountability for sensitive property, the Attorney General asked the OIG to conduct an audit of the controls over weapons and laptop computers within the Department. The OIG individually audited the controls over weapons and laptop computers at the BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS. Previously, the OIG had examined the INS's property management practices, including the INS's controls over weapons issued to its employees. Our results for Department components reflect somewhat different time periods. The BOP, DEA, and USMS audits cover weapons and laptop computers that were reported lost, missing, or stolen between October 1999 and August 2001. The FBI audit covers weapons and laptop computers that were reported lost, missing, or stolen between October 1999 and January 2002. Finally, the losses shown for the INS cover weapons lost over an extended period. Our audits revealed substantial losses of weapons and laptop computers as shown in the chart below.

BOP 33,859 32,790 2,690 27 20,594 2
DEA 9,209 4,529 6,134 Unknown 14,921 16
FBI 26,748 11,193 15,077 317 49,696 212
INS 34,844 19,600 Unknown Unknown 50,306 539
USMS 7,561 6,261 1,450 56 14,361 6
TOTAL 112,221 74,373 25,351 400 149,878 775

Apart from the INS and the FBI - which reported losses of 539 and 212 weapons, respectively - none of the audited components reported more than 16 missing weapons. The FBI's loss of 212 weapons represents all functional weapons reported as lost, missing, or stolen between October 1, 1999, and January 31, 2002, but does not include an additional 211 weapons that were reported lost, missing, or stolen outside this audit period.

At a minimum, local law enforcement officials recovered 18 Department weapons during their investigations of illegal activity. For example:

At the time of our audit, the DEA could not provide us with the number of losses of laptop computers. The FBI reported 317 of its more than 15,000 laptop computers as missing while the USMS reported 56 of its 1,450 laptops as missing. Our prior audit of INS property management did not include specific tests of laptop computers.

Regulations established by the Justice Management Division, the Department's administrative arm, delegate property management responsibilities to the individual components. While these regulations establish minimum standards for component property management systems, they do not require Department oversight of component activities. In our judgment, the loss of 775 weapons and 400 laptop computers indicates a lack of accountability for sensitive Department property. Consequently, it is critically important for the Department to increase its oversight role in the management of sensitive property such as weapons and laptop computers within the components. Further, the Department must take action to tighten controls that are currently weak, inadequate, or not fully implemented. At the conclusion of our audits at each component, we made specific recommendations to improve accountability for weapons and laptop computers. In a summary report that pulled together findings from the individual audits, the OIG made 13 recommendations to improve the management of sensitive property throughout the Department. These recommendations generally have been well received, and in many cases corrective actions are already under way.

The IRP, a cooperative effort of the INS, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and participating federal, state, and local correctional agencies, seeks to (1) identify removable criminal aliens in federal, state, and local correctional facilities, (2) ensure that they are not released into the community, and (3) remove them from the United States upon completion of their sentences. Aliens convicted of certain offenses or unlawfully present in the United States are subject to deportation. The IRP process ideally begins with the identification of potentially deportable foreign-born inmates as they enter the correctional system and culminates in a hearing before an immigration judge at a designated hearing site within the federal, state, or local prison system. Upon completion of their sentences, deportable aliens are then released into INS custody for immediate removal.

Our audit, which focused primarily on IRP operations at the state and local level, found that the INS has not effectively managed the IRP. The INS has not kept pace with increases in the IRP workload brought on by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, both of which dramatically increased the number of criminal aliens eligible for removal. Despite the foreseeable impact of the legislation, we found little evidence that management had taken steps to address the increased workload, particularly at the county level. Staffing levels for the IRP had not increased. In fact, staffing levels decreased because of INS-wide chronic vacancies in the immigration agent position, which is the backbone of the program. Not coincidentally, the number of criminal aliens deported decreased slightly in FY 2001 from FY 2000 totals, even as the total prison population grew by 1.6 percent during the same period. Consequently, the INS failed to identify large numbers of potentially deportable foreign-born inmates in county jails in California and Florida. For example, we found that IRP interviews of foreign-born inmates to determine their deportability were minimal to nonexistent at the county level. As a result, we found that many potentially deportable foreign-born inmates passed through county jails virtually undetected. The audit found that some of these inmates not identified by the INS as potentially deportable went on to commit additional crimes after being released into the community.

In addition, we found that the INS did not always process IRP cases in a timely manner. As a result, the INS had been forced to detain criminal aliens released from incarceration whose deportation proceedings had not been completed. To determine the causes for IRP-related detention costs, we reviewed a sample of 151 A-files of criminal aliens in INS custody, representing a cross-section of criminal aliens released from federal, state, and local correctional facilities throughout the country. For that sample, we identified $2.3 million in IRP-related detention costs, of which $1.1 million was attributable to failures in the IRP process within the INS's control, and $1.2 million was related to factors beyond the INS's immediate control. INS-wide, the detention costs associated with failures in the process may be significant. According to INS statistics, the average daily population in FY 2001 for criminal aliens held in INS custody was over 10,000, most of which were federal, state, or local inmates released into INS custody for removal. Based on this unaudited data, total IRP-related detention costs could run as high as $200 million annually. A significant portion of these costs could have been avoided with better management of the IRP.

The Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA) directs the OIG to perform an annual independent evaluation of the Department's information security program and practices. Our FY 2001 GISRA audits examined four classified and five sensitive but unclassified (SBU) mission-critical Department computer systems. During this reporting period, we issued the remaining three FY 2001 individual audit reports on the FBI's administrative and investigative mainframes, the DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center Information System (classified section), and the BOP Network. We also issued reports summarizing our GISRA results for both classified and SBU systems.

Our audits of both the classified and SBU systems revealed vulnerabilities with management, operational, and technical controls that protect each system and the data stored on it from unauthorized use, loss, or modification. Because technical controls prevent unauthorized access to system resources by restricting, controlling, and monitoring system access, we concluded that the vulnerabilities noted in those areas were the most significant. Overall, these GISRA audits found common vulnerabilities with security policies and procedures, password management, and logon management. We also found issues with account integrity and systems auditing management. To varying degrees, each audit found insufficient or unenforced Department-level and component security policies and procedures. In several areas of identified vulnerabilities, broadly stated or minimally imposed standards allowed system security managers too much latitude in establishing system settings and, consequently, systems were not fully secured. The vulnerabilities identified were more voluminous and material for the Department's classified systems than for its SBU systems. We attributed this to Department management performing penetration testing on its SBU systems but not its classified systems.

To address the deficiencies noted, our recommendations to components included increased oversight, development of documented procedures, and establishment of proper system settings to help improve computer security. Additionally, at the Department level, we recommended the establishment of an Information Technology Central Security Compliance Office with the responsibility to oversee, standardize, implement, and maintain strict departmentwide security controls over both classified and SBU systems. To ensure uniform system security, we recommended more specific guidance through revisions to the Department's security policy and the development of additional procedures. The components and the Department generally concurred with our findings and agreed to implement corrective action.

For FY 2002, we again evaluated the effectiveness of the Department's plans, programs, and practices in conformity with the GISRA and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance. As part of our evaluation, we tested the effectiveness of information security controls for five SBU systems and three classified systems as an appropriate subset of Department systems. These included systems at the INS, Office of Justice Programs (OJP), USMS, FBI, and BOP.

We found that the Department had undertaken some action to improve information technology (IT) security policies and procedures. However, many deficiencies found in the FY 2001 GISRA reviews were found again in this year's review. Overall, our evaluation disclosed that the Department's IT security program requires improvement at both the Department and component levels. We assessed the Department's IT security program as "fair," using a scale of excellent, good, fair, and poor. As required by GISRA, we submitted a summary of our results to OMB. Individual audit reports will be issued in the next reporting period.

OJP developed the Convicted Offender DNA Sample Backlog Reduction Grant Program (Program) to reduce the national convicted offender DNA sample backlog, estimated at over 745,000 at the end of 2000. The goal of the Program is to rapidly accelerate the analysis of convicted offender samples collected by states, thereby reducing and ultimately eliminating the backlog. OJP awarded approximately $14.5 million in backlog reduction grants in FY 2000, the first year of the Program. That year 21 states applied for grants, and each state received the entire amount requested. States used the funds to hire contractor laboratories to analyze their backlogged convicted offender samples so that the resultant DNA profiles could be entered into the National DNA Index System (NDIS) to assist in solving crimes.

We audited the Program to assess its impact on the national offender backlog, evaluate OJP's administration of the Program, and assess compliance by grantee states and contractor laboratories with legislative and Program requirements and with FBI-issued quality assurance standards (QAS). Our audit disclosed that, while the Program funded the analysis of over 288,000 convicted offender samples that were previously backlogged, it was difficult to determine whether the national offender backlog was actually reduced. That determination was complicated by factors that included changes to state statutes requiring greater numbers of people to provide DNA samples and the subsequent need for the states to handle the increased volume. In addition, while Program grants increased the number of complete offender profiles uploaded to NDIS, two of the eight grantee states we audited showed no increase in productivity in the 1-year period we reviewed because of delays in uploading contractor data to NDIS.

We noted that the eight selected grantee states adequately monitored their contractors and generally administered their grants in accordance with Program requirements. However, we found that OJP needed to improve its monitoring of the Program's progress toward achieving its stated performance goals. Although OJP was tracking the Program's progress, it was not gathering the correct data and statistics to accurately monitor and report that progress. We also found that OJP needed to develop and implement written procedures to ensure follow-up when grantees fail to comply with grant requirements or fail to file timely grant reports. We noted that 14 of the 21 Program grantees either did not submit required reports or submitted reports late. Further, we noted that 15 of the 21 Program grantees did not submit required quality assurance test results to OJP.

Our audit also found that the three contractor laboratories we examined materially complied with the Program requirements and the QAS, with a few exceptions related to equipment calibrations and continuing education documentation. In reports specific to each contractor laboratory, we recommended that procedures be enhanced to ensure that required equipment calibrations were made and documented and that all required continuing education was properly documented.

The DEA awarded six contracts totaling about $132 million to obtain linguistic services to perform monitoring, transcription, and translation services at its field divisions in Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Miami, New York, and San Diego. The DEA also had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Utah National Guard (UTNG) to obtain linguistic services. The total amount of the reimbursable agreements executed under this MOU since FY 1997 was approximately $5.3 million. We performed individual contract audits for the DEA's linguistic services contracts in Dallas, Houston, Miami, and San Diego.

While the assistant U.S. attorneys and DEA case agents indicated the quality of the linguistic services were adequate, we found weaknesses in the DEA's monitoring of payments to the contractors and in the contractors' claims for reimbursement. As a result, we questioned $2.8 million of the $9.4 million that had been paid to the contractors in our individual contract audits. Specifically, we found that the DEA's contracting officer's technical representatives did not provide adequate oversight of the contracts, and the DEA paid the contractors for such things as services not authorized by delivery orders, services performed outside the allowable performance period, hours not supported by timesheets or logs, overtime that was not properly approved, and unauthorized or unsupported travel costs.

We also reviewed the MOU and reimbursable agreements with the UTNG and determined that, while the users of the UTNG services were generally satisfied with the quality of the services, significant weaknesses existed in the UTNG's claims for reimbursement and in the DEA's monitoring of payments. As a result, we questioned $518,912 of the funds paid to the UTNG for performance from July 1, 1997, through July 30, 2001. This amount represents about 13 percent of the $4.1 million reimbursed to the UTNG. Specifically, we found that the DEA did not effectively monitor the costs billed by the UTNG, and the DEA paid the UTNG for:

The BOP has an ongoing prison construction program to meet its need for new inmate bed space and replace obsolete facilities. When the OIG started its audit in July 2001, the BOP was building 13 new prisons at a cost of approximately $1.6 billion for completion between FYs 2002 and 2004. Our audit examined whether the BOP was adequately managing new construction-related contracts, was making accurate and timely payments to contractors, and had improved its management practices since the OIG audited this issue in 1998.

Overall, we found that the BOP has strengthened management controls and has improved its overall monitoring of contractors' performance since 1998. We further found that the BOP has a quality assurance program in place that adequately monitors the work of contractors. However, our audit identified a pending contract modification for $1.6 million that we considered unnecessary, three contract modifications for $306,679 that exceeded the independent government estimate (IGE) without adequate written justification, and a small number of contractor payments that did not comply with the prompt payment requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR).

The OIG recommended that the BOP not approve the $1.6 million contract modification, remedy the costs found above the IGE and adequately document future modifications that exceed the IGE, and ensure future contractor payments are calculated in accordance with the FAR prompt payment requirements. The BOP agreed with our recommendations and initiated corrective actions.

INS employees at air ports of entry (POEs) collect user fees for processing various types of applications and petitions for immigration benefits. The fees are usually collected in cash. Because the INS was unable to determine the amount of money in fees it collected at airports, we sampled eight air POEs where we believed the INS collected large amounts of fees. Those eight POEs deposited a total of approximately $2.5 million during the first nine months of FY 2001.

At all eight POEs, we found major failures to comply with the INS's Fee Collection Procedures manual issued in July 2000. The record keeping at air POEs was so poor, and non-compliance with the new procedures was so high, that we concluded that air POEs do not have adequate controls in place to reduce the risks of theft or error. We found that cash and accounting records were not adequately safeguarded and preserved; management oversight throughout the collection and deposit process was inadequate; segregation of duties was inadequate; reconciliations between the cash collected, the individual receipts, and the applications processed were inadequate; and the workload statistics were inaccurate. These findings left little or no audit trail and created an environment highly vulnerable to loss or theft without detection. Our report contained eight recommendations for improving the safeguards over the collection of fees.

The Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 and the Government Management Reform Act of 1994 require annual financial statement audits of the Department. The OIG oversees and issues the reports based on the work performed by independent public accountants. During this reporting period, we issued six FY 2001 Department component financial statement reports.

Each of these audits was performed in support of the FY 2001 consolidated Department audit, which was issued in the prior semiannual reporting period. For the first time, the Department received an unqualified opinion on all of its FY 2001 consolidated financial statements as well as unqualified opinions on all of the component financial statements. This was an improvement over FY 2000, when the Department received an unqualified opinion on its balance sheet and statement of custodial activity and a qualified opinion on its remaining statements. A qualified opinion means that the financial statements are presented fairly in all material respects, except for matters identified in the audit report.

The Department's unqualified opinion also included unqualified opinions for the first time on all ten of the reporting components' financial statements that make up the consolidated report. Importantly, the components were able to reduce the number of material weaknesses and reportable conditions, which signifies improvements in the components' internal controls.

However, as in FY 2000, the Department had to expend tremendous manual efforts and costs in preparing its financial statement for FY 2001. Many tasks had to be performed manually because the Department lacks automated systems to readily support ongoing accounting operations, financial statement preparation, and the audit process. The OIG's concern about these conditions is increased because OMB is requiring that FY 2002 annual financial statements be submitted one month earlier than in FY 2001.

The table below compares the FY 2001 and the FY 2000 audit results for the Department consolidated audit as well as for the ten individual component audits.

Comparison of FY 2001 and FY 2000 Audit Results
Reporting Entity Auditors' Opinion on Financial Statements Number of Material Weaknesses Number of
Reportable Conditions
2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000
Consolidated Department of Justice U Q1 3 3 0 1
Assets Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund U U 0 0 0 2
Federal Bureau of Prisons U U 0 0 0 3
Drug Enforcement Administration U U 4 4 1 2
Federal Bureau of Investigation U U 3 2 1 1
Federal Prison Industries, Inc. U U2 2 5 2 1
Immigration and Naturalization Service U Q1 3 3 1 3
Offices, Boards, and Divisions U U 0 0 2 2
Office of Justice Programs U U 0 0 3 3
U.S. Marshals Service U U 1 1 2 3
Working Capital Fund U U 0 0 0 3
Component Totals 13 15 12 23

Q - Qualified Opinion
U - Unqualified Opinion

  1. Qualified on Statement of Net Cost, Statement of Changes in Net Position, Statement of Budgetary Resources, and Statement of Financing. Unqualified on other financial statements.
  2. Originally reported as qualified, but qualification subsequently removed during FY 2001 audit after auditors were able to sufficiently extend audit procedures to FY 2001 beginning balances.

We continue to audit grants disbursed by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). During this reporting period, we performed eight audits of COPS hiring and redeployment grants. Our audits identified more than $2 million in questioned costs and more than $800,000 in funds to better use. Examples of findings reported in our audits of COPS grants follow.

The OIG contributes to the integrity of the bankruptcy program by conducting performance audits of trustees under a reimbursable agreement with the Executive Office for U.S. Trustees. During this reporting period, we issued 90 reports on the Chapter 7 bankruptcy practices of private trustees under Title 11, United States Code (Bankruptcy Code).

The Chapter 7 trustees are appointed to collect, liquidate, and distribute personal and business cases under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. As a representative of the bankruptcy estate, the Chapter 7 trustee serves as a fiduciary protecting the interests of all estate beneficiaries, including creditors and debtors.

We conduct performance audits on Chapter 7 trustees to provide U.S. Trustees with an assessment of the trustees' compliance with bankruptcy laws, regulations, rules, and the requirements of the Handbook for Chapter 7 Trustees. Additionally, the audits assess the quality of the private trustees' accounting for bankruptcy estate assets, cash management practices, bonding, internal controls, file maintenance, and other administrative practices.

The Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, requires recipients of more than $300,000 in federal funds to arrange for audits of their activities. Federal agencies that award federal funds must review these audits to determine whether prompt and appropriate corrective action has been taken in response to audit findings. During this reporting period, the OIG reviewed and transmitted to OJP 98 reports encompassing 714 Department contracts, grants, and other agreements totaling more than $316 million. These audits report on financial activities, compliance with applicable laws, and the adequacy of recipients' management controls over federal expenditures.


This audit is assessing whether the FBI is effectively managing its IT projects. We are examining the FBI's efforts in developing enterprise architecture and project management functions and assessing Trilogy, the FBI's largest project designed to improve IT infrastructure and office automation, to determine how the FBI's IT management practices affected the project's progress. This audit also is assessing the FBI's IT-related strategic planning and performance measurement activities.

This audit is examining the types and number of cases the FBI investigates, assessing how it allocates its investigative resources, and evaluating the performance measures it uses for its cases.

The Legal Attaché program was created to gain greater cooperation with international police partners in support of the FBI's mission. The program has grown substantially over the past few years, from offices in 23 countries in 1993 to 44 offices in 2001. This audit is assessing the effectiveness, efficiency, and cost of the program; determining the types of activities performed by attachés to identify potential overlap and duplication of efforts with other law enforcement agencies; and examining the performance measures used to evaluate the program.

This audit is reviewing primary inspection operations at airports, especially with regard to the INS's procedures for referring persons to secondary inspection. We also are evaluating management controls over the primary inspection process, the availability and analysis of traveler information prior to flight arrival, and the training of inspectors.

Premium processing permits nonimmigrant employment-based visa applicants to request an expedited adjudication process. This audit is assessing whether the INS has achieved its goals for the premium processing program and whether the processing time for similar petitions and applications has changed significantly since the implementation of the premium processing program.

This audit is following up on our December 2000 report on the quality of INS inspection facilities at international airports. We are assessing whether the INS is taking timely action to implement the recommendations from our report and whether actions taken have resulted in improvements at the airports we identified as having the most serious deficiencies.

We are reviewing the DEA's implementation of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to evaluate whether the DEA has (1) developed strategic goals and objectives that are consistent with the Department's strategic goals and objectives, (2) established performance measures that are adequate to evaluate achievement of its goals and objectives, and (3) established an effective system to collect, analyze, and report data related to its performance measures.

Several Department components - particularly the DEA, BOP, OJP, and COPS - spend considerable money and effort on activities designed to reduce the demand for drugs in the United States. This audit is assessing (1) how the Department allocates resources to demand reduction, (2) whether Department efforts are coordinated effectively, and (3) whether components measure the effectiveness of demand reduction activities.

This audit is the third in a series of a four-phase effort by 21 OIGs. Our audit focuses on the Department's plans for protecting its critical cyber-based infrastructures. We are reviewing the Department's plans for mitigating risks, managing emergencies, coordinating resources with other agencies, meeting resource and organizational requirements, and recruiting, educating, and maintaining awareness related to protecting critical cyber-based infrastructures.

The U.S. Trustee Program manages the bankruptcy system and is largely responsible for maintaining its integrity. Because bankruptcy fraud and abuse by debtors, creditors, attorneys, and other professionals threaten the integrity of the system, the program's ability to deter and detect bankruptcy fraud and take appropriate civil or criminal action is critical. We are assessing the management controls implemented in U.S. Trustee offices to identify and eliminate fraud and misconduct by debtors, private trustees, and others and are evaluating performance measures relative to bankruptcy fraud.

Congress established the Department of Justice Counterterrorism Fund (Fund) in July 1995 to reimburse Department components for the costs incurred in reestablishing the operational capabilities of facilities damaged through terrorist acts. The Fund is to be used for the payment of expenses beyond what a component's appropriation could reasonably be expected to fund. This audit is assessing whether Fund expenditures for FYs 1998 through 2002 were authorized, supported, and used in accordance with the intent of the law and reimbursement agreements were finalized in an expeditious manner and excess funds deobligated.

From FY 1993 through FY 2001, OJP and COPS awarded more than $26 billion in grants. OJP has five bureaus and six program offices that manage grant funds. COPS awards grants under numerous programs to fund advances in community policing across the country. This audit is reviewing the administrative activities and grant functions within OJP and between COPS and OJP to determine whether there are activities and functions that could be streamlined to increase operational efficiency.


OMB Circular A-50, Audit Follow-Up, requires audit reports to be resolved within six months of the audit report issuance date. Audit monitors the status of open audit reports to track the audit resolution and closure process. As of September 30, 2002, the OIG had closed 198 audit reports and was monitoring the resolution process of 502 open audit reports.



As of September 30, 2002, the following audits had recommendations without management decisions.


Funds Recommended to be Put to Better Use
Audit Reports Number of
Audit Reports
Funds Recommended
to be Put to Better Use
No management decision made by beginning of period 5 $19,026,543
Issued during period 5 $4,766,690
Needing management decision during period 10 $23,793,233
Management decisions made during period:
  • Amounts management agreed to put to better use
  • Amounts management disagreed to put to better use

  • 7

    No management decision at end of period 3 $3,688,893

    Audits With Questioned Costs
    Audit Reports Number of
    Audit Reports
    Total Questioned
    Costs (including
    unsupported costs)
    No management decision made by beginning of period 33 $26,395,750 $2,212,447
    Issued during period 41 $8,377,755 $655,431
    Needing management decision during period 74 $34,773,505 $2,867,878
    Management decisions made during period:
  • Amount of disallowed costs1
  • Amount of costs not disallowed

  • 372


    No management decision at end of period 39 $21,162,774 $1,757,743
    1. Includes instances where management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken.
    2. Includes two audit reports that were not resolved during this reporting period because management has agreed with some, but not all, of the questioned costs in the audits.

    Audits Involving Recommendations for Management Improvements
    Audit Reports Number of
    Audit Reports
    Total Number
    of Management
    No management decision made by beginning of period 78 156
    Issued during period 120 454
    Needing management decision during period 198 610
    Management decisions made during period:
  • Number management agreed to implement1
  • Number management disagreed with

  • 1372

    No management decision at end of period 65 141
    1. Includes instances where management has taken action to resolve the issue and/or the matter is being closed because remedial action was taken.
    2. Includes four audit reports that were not resolved during this reporting period because management has agreed to implement a number of, but not all, recommended management improvements in these audits.