Coordination of Investigations by Department of Justice Violent Crime Task Forces

Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2007-004
May 2007
Office of the Inspector General


Background

The Department of Justice (Department) has been making increasing use of different types of task forces - teams of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers - to help tribal, state, and local governments combat violent crime. In this review of the coordination of investigations conducted by four types of Department violent crime task forces, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) assesses whether the task force operations are well coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and protect officer safety.

This Background Section provides an overview of the Department’s creation of task forces, the Department’s efforts to coordinate task force operations, the task forces we reviewed, and the use of information-sharing systems to coordinate investigations and deconflict law enforcement events, such as undercover operations, surveillance, or execution of arrest warrants.

Table 2 lists various task force initiatives by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices (USAO).

Table 2: Department of Justice (DOJ) Task Force Initiatives

PROGRAM CREATED AGENCY PURPOSE

State and Local Task Forces

1978

DEA

Target mid- to upper-level drug trafficking using a high degree of local law enforcement participation and leadership

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces

1982

DOJ

Target high-level drug traffickers and money laundering organizations through individual case collaboration and funding

District Fugitive Task Forces

1983

USMS

Target fugitives by combining the resources of USMS district offices with other federal, state, and local agencies

Project Achilles

1986

ATF

Target armed violent offenders through case selection and strict federal firearms penalties

Weed and Seed

1991

DOJ

Target violent crime by combining neighborhood-targeted law enforcement with human services and economic development programs

Safe Streets Task Forces

1992

FBI

Target gangs, violent crime, and violent fugitives using teams of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers

Anti-Violent Crime Initiative

1994

USAO

Develop locally tailored anti-violent crime strategies that are implemented by federal, state, and local task forces

Mobile Enforcement Teams

1995

DEA

Provide short-term, collaborative assistance to communities that request DEA help to address drug-oriented violent crime

Regional Fugitive Task Forces

2000

USMS

Apprehend the most dangerous state and federal fugitives

Project Safe Neighborhoods

2001

USAO

Develop locally tailored gun crime reduction strategies that are implemented by local task forces composed of federal, state, and local prosecutors and law enforcement; the media; and community leaders

Violent Crime Impact Teams

2004

ATF

Target homicides and other firearms-related violent crime with locally tailored strategies

Department Efforts to Coordinate Task Forces

In 1995, the Department created the Task Force Working Group of the Department’s Office of Investigative Agency Policies (Task Force Working Group) in recognition that “ the proliferation of task forces carries with it the risks of duplication of effort, inefficiency, and lack of coordination at the operational level.”13 The Task Force Working Group was responsible for establishing a coordination mechanism and developing guidelines to ensure that existing or proposed task forces within a U.S. Attorney’s district did not duplicate one another.

In 1996, the Task Force Working Group issued the final draft of the General Guidelines on the Operation of Multi-Agency Task Forces among Federal, State and Local Entities (Draft Guidelines). The Draft Guidelines would have required that the component proposing a task force submit a completed Task Force Information Form to the U.S. Attorney in the federal judicial district where the task force would be located. The Task Force Information Form would have listed the name of the task force, the task force’s purpose, the component that would lead the task force, and other components that would participate. Under the proposed guidelines, a new task force would have needed written concurrence from the U.S. Attorney before it could begin operations.

In April 1998, the Director of the Office of Investigative Agency Policies advised the Attorney General that the Executive Advisory Board and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys believed that a detailed, uniform process to coordinate task force operations was not necessary and recommended that the Draft Guidelines not be issued. As a result, the Draft Guidelines were not implemented.

However, concerns regarding the coordination of task force investigations have continued to the present. In May 2005, the Attorney General created the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee to ensure the coordination of anti-gang efforts by the Department. This committee includes members from all Department components with anti-gang responsibilities, including ATF, the DEA, the FBI, and the USMS.

In an effort to ensure coordination, intelligence sharing, and event deconfliction among anti-gang task forces, in June 2005 the Deputy Attorney General directed components in federal judicial districts and cities with multiple anti-gang task forces to co-locate these task forces in a common facility. If co-location was not feasible, the district’s Anti-Gang Coordinator (an Assistant U.S. Attorney designated by the U.S. Attorney) was to establish a formal mechanism for coordinating anti-gang activities.

In August 2005, the Deputy Attorney General expanded Department policy to include the creation of new anti-gang task forces and the conduct of new anti-gang activities. The policy requires that new anti-gang activities and programs, such as new ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams and FBI Safe Streets Task Forces, be established only after review by the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee and approval by the Deputy Attorney General. In June 2006, the Office of the Deputy Attorney General established a detailed process, provided application materials, and directed the components to follow the application process when proposing new anti-gang task forces. This process requires the components to first submit plans for new anti-gang task forces to ATF, DEA, and FBI Special Agents in Charge; the U.S. Marshals; and the U.S. Attorneys in the proposed geographic areas of responsibility. Only then can plans for a new anti-gang task force be submitted for review by the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee.

As a result, Department components’ field offices that are seeking to establish a new anti-gang task force must notify the U.S. Attorney for that district before filling out the task force application. The field office then completes a Gang Threat Assessment and presents the results to the U.S. Attorney for consideration. If the U.S. Attorney agrees that a new task force is needed, the field office completes the application by providing a more detailed description of the proposed task force, including mission, target area, and participating agencies. The field office must also obtain the concurrence of other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the area. If a federal agency does not concur with the proposal, the U.S. Attorney can proceed without the concurrence of the dissenting agency or cease efforts to establish the new task force. The U.S. Attorney must concur with the final application and then forward the application to the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee for consideration.

Applications submitted to the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee are first reviewed by its Task Force Recommendation Subcommittee, which relies on violent crime statistics, input from local law enforcement agencies, and other information when recommending to the full Committee whether to grant or deny the application. Based on the Subcommittee’s conclusions, the full Committee makes a formal recommendation to the Deputy Attorney General, who makes the final decision to grant or deny the application. Since the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee’s inception, the Deputy Attorney General has approved three ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams, one ATF-led anti-gang task force, and eight FBI Safe Streets Task Forces. The Committee has denied one application by ATF for a Violent Crime Impact Team in Denver, Colorado.

Four Types of Violent Crime Task Forces

The Department has been making increasing use of four types of task forces. At the end of fiscal year (FY) 2005, 84 cities had more than 1 violent crime task force operated by the Department and its components, up from 20 cities at the beginning of FY 2003. At the beginning of FY 2006, Department components operated 210 of these 4 types of task forces:

Appendix I lists the locations of these task forces.

ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams

The Deputy Attorney General created ATF’s Violent Crime Impact Teams in June 2004 as a pilot program designed to reduce homicides and other firearms-related violent crime in 15 cities.16 In December 2004, ATF extended the initiative indefinitely. At the beginning of FY 2006, there were ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams in 22 cities. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General and ATF selected the initial cities based on an examination of crime statistics, particularly homicide and other violent crime. Since August 2005, the Deputy Attorney General has required that the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee review plans for new ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams.

Several elements are meant to differentiate the ATF Violent Crime Impact Team initiative from standard ATF law enforcement operations. These elements include: (1) targeting specific geographic areas, such as neighborhoods or communities, with a high rate of firearms violence; (2) targeting the worst violent offenders in those areas; (3) building effective working relationships with community leaders; and (4) working in partnership with other Department components. The DEA, the FBI, the USMS, and the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys agreed to provide assistance to ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams in each city, as resources allowed.

DEA Mobile Enforcement Teams

The DEA established the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team program in 1995 to help local law enforcement agencies, particularly in rural areas, confront drug trafficking problems that were beyond their immediate capabilities.17 Each of the DEA’s 21 field divisions has a DEA Mobile Enforcement Team, consisting of approximately 10 DEA Special Agents and a supervisor.18 The DEA Mobile Enforcement Team can be deployed to any location within the field division’s jurisdiction. Local law enforcement officials, including chiefs of police, sheriffs, district attorneys, and state attorneys, can submit a written request to the DEA for a DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment. DEA supervisors can also recommend deployments. DEA Mobile Enforcement Teams can be requested for many reasons, including budget limitations that make it difficult for local jurisdictions to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the targeted drug trafficking organization or the inability to conduct undercover operations because local drug dealers recognize the local jurisdiction’s narcotics officers.

Prior to a deployment, DEA Mobile Enforcement Team Special Agents visit the proposed city to meet with local law enforcement officials, the nearest DEA field office, local prosecutors, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. This pre-deployment review determines the extent of violence in the community, ensures that there are clear ties between the violence and the targeted drug trafficking organization, and confirms that the problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of both the local law enforcement agencies and the nearest DEA field office. If the DEA Special Agents agree that a deployment is warranted, they submit a formal, intelligence-based assessment to DEA headquarters for approval and funding. During FYs 2003 through 2005, the DEA completed 110 DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployments. The average deployment lasted 6.2 months.

FBI Safe Streets Task Forces

The FBI created the FBI Safe Streets Task Force program in 1992 to reduce violent crime associated with: (1) gangs whose activities constitute criminal enterprises; (2) fugitives; and (3) individuals who commit federal crimes such as bank robbery, kidnapping, or assaults on federal officers.19 There are three types of FBI Safe Streets Task Forces: Violent Gang, Violent Crime, and Major Theft. The mission of the FBI Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Forces is to reduce gang-related violence by targeting the most violent gangs whose activities constitute criminal enterprises. The FBI Violent Crime Safe Streets Task Forces focus on reducing violent crime associated with violent fugitives, bank robberies, and interstate commerce. The mission of the FBI Major Theft Safe Streets Task Forces is to reduce major thefts conducted by criminal enterprises whose targets include cargo, jewelry, and art that cross state or national boundaries. At the beginning of FY 2006, there were 160 FBI Safe Streets Task Forces. FBI Safe Streets Task Forces are primarily made up of FBI Special Agents and local law enforcement officers.

In 2004, FBI headquarters began requiring that FBI Special Agents in Charge of its field offices develop proposals for new FBI Violent Gang and Violent Crime Safe Streets Task Forces that FBI headquarters must approve before any new task forces are established. The proposals include an analysis of the crime problem within the FBI Safe Streets Task Force area; a list of the federal, state, and local agencies that would participate on the FBI Safe Streets Task Force; and a list of existing task forces in the area with which the new FBI Safe Streets Task Force would have to coordinate. Since August 2005, new FBI Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Force activities have also been subject to approval by the Deputy Attorney General.

USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces

Congress created the USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces through the Presidential Threat Protection Act of 2000.20 Run by the USMS, their purpose is to apprehend the most dangerous fugitives by combining the efforts of federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel in two or more federal judicial districts. USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces apprehend fugitives wanted on USMS warrants or warrants issued by any of the federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with which the USMS has established a fugitive apprehension Memorandum of Understanding.

At the end of FY 2005, there were five USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces covering the New York/New Jersey, Pacific Southwest, Great Lakes, Southeast, and Capital Area regions. In FY 2006, Congress created the Gulf Coast Regional Fugitive Task Force.

Information Sharing in High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas

Of particular note to our review is the task forces’ use of High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) information-sharing systems to coordinate investigations. In 1988, Congress authorized the Director of the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy to designate HIDTAs within the United States. HIDTAs are cooperative efforts of the law enforcement community in particular areas that exhibit serious drug trafficking problems that harmfully affect other areas of the country. Each HIDTA is controlled by an Executive Board that is made up of officials from federal agencies and state or local agencies. Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies use HIDTA funds for infrastructure and joint initiatives (including task forces) to combat drug trafficking organizations in specific geographic areas. Since 1990, 28 areas have been designated as HIDTAs.

The HIDTA Program also facilitates cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies by funding information-sharing systems. Law enforcement agencies can use these systems to coordinate their d rug-related violent crime investigations. Some HIDTAs have the capability to support information sharing on all violent crime investigations.

Some HIDTAs’ information-sharing systems include databases that allow law enforcement officers to search for a suspect by name, date of birth, or other identifiers to determine whether any other law enforcement agencies have expressed an interest in the same suspect. Generally, HIDTAs with suspect databases require law enforcement officers querying the database to record their interest in the suspect in the database in case other officers search for the same suspect later. A significant exception to the general practice is LA Clear, the Los Angeles and Las Vegas HIDTA information-sharing system. LA Clear permits law enforcement officers or Special Agents to make a suspect inquiry without submitting any information that would alert others that the inquiry was made.

Some HIDTAs’ information-sharing systems also include event deconfliction databases that track the time and location of all law enforcement events, such as surveillance, warrant sweeps, buy-busts, and reverse buys in a geographic area.21 A law enforcement officer reports an event to the HIDTA by providing the time and location of the planned event, as well as a cell phone number where the officer can be reached immediately. The database searches a specified radius to determine if there is a conflict or “hit” with any other events.22 If there is a hit, a HIDTA analyst telephones the officers that submitted the overlapping event and provides them with one another’s contact information. The officers involved are responsible for contacting each other and working out the potential conflict directly.



Footnotes
  1. See Office of Investigative Agency Policies, Resolution 15, October 30, 1995.

  2. The OIG recently evaluated the Department’s ATF Violent Crime Impact Team Initiative. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ Violent Crime Impact Team Initiative, I-2006-005, May 2006.

  3. The OIG has evaluated the performance of some USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of the United States Marshals Service’s Apprehension of Violent Fugitives, I-2005-008, July 2005.

  4. 28 U.S.C. § 599A.

  5. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.

  6. The Los Angeles Field Division has two Mobile Enforcement Teams.

  7. 28 U.S.C. § 533.

  8. Pub. L. 106–544 § 6.

  9. In a “reverse buy,” an undercover law enforcement officer acts as the seller of drugs or firearms to apprehend suspected drug or firearm traffickers.

  10. Each HIDTA sets its own radius for what constitutes a “hit.” For example, the Philadelphia/Camden HIDTA reports a hit only if the address of an event matches exactly. The Los Angeles and Nevada HIDTAs report a hit if events are occurring less than 1,000 yards apart.



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