Coordination of Investigations by Department of Justice Violent Crime Task Forces
Evaluation and Inspections Report I-2007-004
May 2007
Office of the Inspector General
| U. S. Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration |
|
www.dea.gov |
Washington, D.C. 20537 March 28, 2007 |
MEMORANDUM
| TO: | Paul Price Assistant Inspector General Evaluation and Inspections Division |
| FROM: | Gary W. Oetjen (signature) Deputy Chief Inspector Office of Inspections |
| SUBJECT: | DEA’s Response to the OIG Draft Report: Coordination of Investigations by Department of Justice Violent Crime Task Forces |
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has reviewed the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) Draft Report titled, Coordination of Investigations by Department of Justice Violent Crime Task Forces. Although the recommendations in this report are directed to DOJ, DEA provides the following formal responses to address three areas of the report that DEA believes were inaccurately represented.
Task Force Management, pages 30, 31, and 32.
DEA Response: The initial draft report score given to DEA for Task Force Management was 27 out of a possible 72 points, the lowest among the four agencies evaluated. After OIG received DEA's response to the initial draft report, the score was adjusted to 35, raising DEA's score to third out of the four agencies evaluated. DEA appreciates revision of DEA's initial score in this category, but believes that not all nine criteria utilized to formulate an index score fairly reflects the mission of DEA's Mobile Enforcement Teams (MET).
OIG utilized the following criteria:
OIG based the maximum score for each component on the number of criteria addressed by the respective task forces and the number of cities reviewed. For each task force management score, there were nine criteria for each component in each of the eight cites. The maximum score for each criterion was eight points. OIG’s calculations were based on adding up the scores of each criterion for an overall score.
OIG’s methodology assumes MET’s mission encompasses all of the above-mentioned criteria. The MET is not a violent crime task force. MET does not target groups specifically for violence committed by members; however, violence within a drug trafficking organization is a required element for a MET deployment. Also, MET is not a fugitive task force. DEA's policy is to delegate apprehension responsibility to the United States Marshals Service (USMS) if a DEA fugitive is not arrested within 48 hours of the issuance of an arrest warrant. When the option exists, MET will invite other federal agencies to participate in its investigations, but MET normally deploys to areas void of other federal law enforcement presence. As noted in the OIG report, MET conducted approximately 125 operations during the audit period and approximately 92 percent of the deployments were in areas with either no federal law enforcement presence or with only one other federal task force. Since MET usually deploys to areas with little or no other federal law enforcement presence, MET does not have the option to routinely participate on other federal task forces. Formal training for local law enforcement agencies is generally not available since the mission of MET deployments are to make an immediate impact in specific locations. However, this does not preclude MET members from conducting on-the-job training for the requesting agency, which is commonplace.
DEA did not have access to the calculations utilized by OIG to determine DEA's Task Force Management score, but maintains MET’s score is low since OIG utilized a formula based on the sum of the collective criterion and did not adjust the formula when criteria was not applicable to MET.
Initial Scope of the Audit, pages 10, 59, 60 and 64 thru 66.
DEA Response: The scope of the OIG audit in the initial draft report stated:
"We reviewed the Department's and the components' policies on task force coordination, compliance with these policies, and local task force efforts to coordinate investigations. We also analyzed nationwide arrests reported in FY 2003-2005 by the ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams, the DEA Mobile Enforcement Teams, the FBI Safe Street Task Forces, and the USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces and assessed task force operations in eight cities".
This same scope was reaffirmed during the exit conference held by OIG on January 24, 2007, when the attendees from all reviewed components were informed that the review was limited to assessing DEA MET, ATF Violent Crime Impact Team, FBI Safe Street Task Force, and USMS Regional Fugitive Task Force. After reviewing the initial draft report, DEA identified two instances where OJG assessed MET state and local task forces in two cities: Las Vegas, Nevada; and Birmingham, Alabama. Since the scope of the audit focused on MET deployments and not DEA state and local task forces, DEA requested that the mention of the two state and local task forces be omitted from the report. Instead of omitting the references to the state and local task forces, OIG expanded the scope in their subsequent draft report to read:
"We reviewed the Department's and the components' policies on task force coordination, compliance with these policies, and local task force and field office efforts to coordinate investigations through 2006. We also analyzed nationwide arrests reported in 2003-2005 by the ATF Violent Crime Impact Teams, the DEA Mobile Enforcement Teams, the FBI Safe Street Task Forces, and the USMS Regional Fugitive Task Forces and assessed local task force operations in eight cities through the time of our site visits to each city. This report also includes some of the information provided by the components in response to our request for comments on the draft report".
DEA is troubled with the OIG’s revision of the scope of the audit, after issuance of the initial report. In its present state, the report does not fairly represent DEA's state and local task forces in the eight cities visited by OIG. After expanding the scope, OIG failed to report additional information on the management, coordination, cooperation, or deconfliction of not only the state and local task forces in Las Vegas and Birmingham, but any other state and local task force in the remaining six cities visited by OIG. DEA maintains the original scope of the audit should have been adhered to and the report should have omitted the mention of the state and local task forces in Las Vegas and Birmingham to remain within its scope and to provide a more objective report.
DEA's coordination of a MET deployment to Reading, Pennsylvania, pages viii, 50, and 51.
DEA's Response: OIG states in its initial draft report, executive digest section, that "DEA is the only component that has instituted nation-wide policies on coordinating new task force operations." The report went on to state, "Task force managers generally complied with the policy, with one exception. In FY 2005, the DEA failed to coordinate the operations of a Mobile Enforcement Team in one city with the other components, which created tensions among the law enforcement components there and delayed the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team's operations." The body of the original draft report discussed this incident in greater detail and stated that the DEA Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Philadelphia office violated DEA policy when DEA did not notify all federal agencies of a planned deployment and did not complete an assessment of other task forces within the deployment area. OIG reported that they interviewed an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) who explained that ATF and FBI were already coordinating task force operations in the area and were concerned that their confidential informants would be arrested by MET. The AUSA stated MET just showed up and the U.S. Attorney's Office was not sure why the DEA deployed MET in the area. OIG stated that resolution of DEA's failure to coordinate the deployment required a series of meetings that delayed task force operations.
After reviewing the initial draft report, DEA provided OIG with documentation that exposed the above-mentioned AUSA statements as inaccurate and misleading. This documentation revealed that DEA task force managers followed policy prior to deploying MET in Reading, Pennsylvania. The documentation included the MET deployment request, the date of the pre-deployment meeting, and the date of the MET deployment. The pre-deployment meeting included representatives from DEA, ATF, the U.S Attorney's Office, the Berks County District Attorney's Office, Reading Police Department, and the Pennsylvania State Police. In addition, prior to the MET deployment, the Philadelphia DEA SAC telephonically contacted the District Attorney (DA) from Berks County to coordinate the proposed deployment in Reading, PA. Shortly after the DEA SAC discussed the deployment with the Berks County DA, the DEA SAC received a telephone call from the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The U.S. Attorney advised that the Berks County DA wanted to know why MET was deploying to Reading, stating the FBI Safe Streets Task Force had the situation under control and needed no additional assistance. The DEA SAC made several attempts to contact the Berks County DA to further discuss this matter, however none of his telephone calls were returned. Prior to the deployment, the DEA SAC conducted a coordination meeting with the U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of PA, and the AUSA that served as the FBI Safe Streets Coordinator. Subsequent to supplying OIG with this information, DEA requested that the above-mentioned MET deployment be removed from the OIG report. OIG denied this request, but agreed to alter language in the report.
This same draft report was reviewed by the U.S. Attorney's Office, who issued e-mail correspondence to OIG. The comments were prepared by the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorney's Office and the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which reported that “…...comments in the report also overstate the issues." The Executive Office of the U.S. Attorney's Office recommended to the OIG that "the report discussing the deployment of a DEA MET team "outside Philadelphia" should be removed from the report altogether. As our earlier comments indicated, on that occasion (deployment of MET team to Reading, PA) there was discussion, deconfliction, and cooperation prior to deployment, so it is simply not, as the topic sentence in the paragraph states, an example of a failure to coordinate task force locations. It is an example of cooperation." Also, the Deputy Chief of the Criminal Division in the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, wrote, "There is a criticism of the DEA’s handling of their placement of their MET Team deployment in Reading. First, it is probably not at all relevant to what is going on in Philadelphia, where agencies effectively coordinate the location of their task forces with each other. Nevertheless, the comments in the report also overstated the issues. DEA did meet with the USAO, ATF, and the FBI to work out the logistics and deconfliction for the MET Team before the MET Team deployment commenced in Reading. Ultimately, deconfliction worked well because all targets were discussed with the FBI agent running the FBI Task Force in Reading."
OIG issued a revised draft report. The body of the report contained additional language to include:
The Assistant U.S. Attorney said the biggest problem with the Reading operation was that the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team just showed up and the U.S. Attorney's Office and the FBI were not sure why the DEA was deploying a DEA Mobile Enforcement Team in that area. Resolution of DEA’s failure to coordinate the deployment required a series of meetings that delayed task force operations.
Based on documents provided by the DEA, the Reading Chief of Police requested a Mobile Enforcement Team deployment on March 1, 2005, and a meeting to discuss the deployment was held on March 16, 2005. Representatives of the U.S. Attorney's Office, the DEA, the Pennsylvania State Police, the Berks County Pennsylvania District Attorney's Office, the Reading Police Department and the ATF attended. Representatives of the FBI did not attend the March 16, 2005 meeting. Documents provided by the DEA also showed that DEA opened the case file to support the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment to Reading on March 17, 2005. The DEA Philadelphia Field Division completed the pre-deployment assessment on April 5, 2005, DEA task force managers approved funding for the deployment on April 6, 2005, and the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team began operations in Reading on April 18, 2005.
An FBI manager stated that the FBI was not notified of the DEA’s actions in Reading and that there was no cooperation between the FBI and the DEA during the deployment of the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team to Reading. The supervisor of the FBI Safe Streets Task Force during the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment stated that the FBI was not invited to the March 16, 2005 pre-deployment coordination meeting. The supervisor also stated that there was no cooperation between the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force prior to, during, or after the deployment and that individual DEA and FBI task force investigations were deconflicted by the Berks County District's Attorney's Office during the deployment.
Although we found that the DEA failed to notify FBI Safe Streets Task Force managers of the deployment, the Assistant U.S. Attorney, an ATF Supervisory Special Agent, and a Reading Police Department Sergeant stated that there was cooperation and deconfliction between DEA, ATF, and state and local law enforcement before and during the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team operations in Reading.
After reviewing the revised draft report, DEA advised OIG that the DEA Philadelphia Special Agent in Charge (SAC) met with the Philadelphia FBI and ATF SACs to coordinate the MET deployment prior to the pre-deployment meeting. DEA subsequently learned that OIG had been in possession of information that the DEA SAC had deconflicted with all relevant federal agencies prior to the MET deployment, but neglected to include this information in the report. This information was provided to OIG during the initial interview of the Philadelphia DEA SAC. OIG then requested that DEA provide the name of the FBI supervisor with whom deconfliction and coordination occurred. DEA provided the name of the FBI SAC and the time frame during which the meeting took place in the office of the Philadelphia DEA SAC. Also in attendance during the same meeting was the Philadelphia ATF SAC. DEA also supplied OIG with information that a FBI representative did attend the pre-deployment meeting. The FBI representative was a full-time Task Force Office (TFO) assigned to the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. The TFO participated in the meeting to include deconflicting investigations and confidential informants. After the pre-deployment meeting, the TFO returned to the Safe Streets Task Force and shared information obtained from the deployment meeting with members of the Task Force. DEA again requested that any mention of the Reading MET deployment be deleted from the report due to overwhelming documentation provided to OIG supporting deconfliction and coordination of the Reading MET deployment.
OIG amended portions the Reading section of the report once again. The body of the report contained revised language to include:
The request for a deployment in Reading and DEA’s response gave rise to ATF's and FBI's concerns that the decision to deploy a DEA Mobile Enforcement Team in Reading had not been coordinated. In response to these concerns, the Philadelphia DEA Special Agent in Charge met with the Philadelphia FBI and ATF Special Agents in Charge, to better coordinate the requested deployment.
Although the task forces' operations were deconflicted without incident, the lack of coordination created tensions among the task forces operating in Reading and resulted in a series of meetings that delayed task force operations.
The DEA Assistant Special Agent in Charge understood that the Reading Police Sergeant was representing the interest of the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. However, the Reading Police Department Sergeant, who the DEA believed was representing the FBI at the March 16th meeting, stated to the OIG that he did not represent the FBI at the meeting and that he stated this to the DEA Special Agents at the meeting.
An FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge in Philadelphia stated that as result of the lack of pre-deployment coordination in Reading there was no cooperation between the FBI and the DEA before or during the deployment of the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team to Reading. The FBI Special Agent who supervised the FBI Safe Streets Task Force during the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment stated that the FBI was not invited to the March 16, 2005, pre-deployment coordination meeting. The supervisor also stated that there was no cooperation between the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force prior to, during, or after the deployment.
Despite ATF’s and the FBI's concerns regarding a DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment in Reading DEA documents showed that the DEA opened the case file to support the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment to Reading on March 17,2005.
We found that the coordination for the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment in Reading was not effective in ensuring cooperation among the violent crime task forces in the same geographic area. An Assistant U.S. Attorney stated that the U.S. Attorney's Office had to mediate several meetings involving the DEA, the FBI, and ATF to determine how federal targets of the Reading DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment would be deconflicted, and individual DEA and FBI task force operations were deconflicted by the Berks County District's Attorney's Office.
Despite the lack of cooperation, an Assistant U.S. Attorney and an ATF Supervisory Special Agent stated that the DEA, ATF, FBI, and state and local law enforcement operations were deconflicted during the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment in Reading.
After reviewing the modified section of the report, DEA identified misleading and contradictory statements. As noted in the first above-mentioned bullet, the OIG report states the ATF and FBI were concerned with the MET deployment and lack of coordination. The report then states the DEA Philadelphia SAC met with the Philadelphia FBI and ATF SACs to coordinate the deployment. OIG did not provide any documentation or cite any members of ATF who stated they were concerned with the alleged lack of coordination. In fact, ATF was at the pre-deployment meeting and coordinated operations throughout the deployment. The report then contradicts itself when it states the SACs met to coordinate the deployment, but then fails to mention this coordination meeting occurred prior to the pre-deployment meeting or any actual MET deployment. According to the Philadelphia ATF SAC, there were never any problems or issues with the DEA MET deployment in Reading and all matters were properly coordinated and deconflicted.
Two of the above-mentioned bullets stated the lack of coordination/cooperation created problems among the task forces operating in Reading and resulted in a series of meetings that delayed task force operations. This is another misleading statement in that problems were not created with several task forces operating in the area. The only task force that cited problems was the FBI Safe Streets Task Force, whose supervisor opposed the MET deployment. OIG also failed to mention that DEA MET delayed its deployment at the request of the Philadelphia State Police, who was concluding a long term investigation. DEA MET clearly coordinated its operations with federal, state, and local counterparts. In addition, the DEA MET participated in weekly deconfliction meetings hosted by the Berks County DA's Office, which is the prosecuting arm of the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. During these meetings, investigative actions and targets were discussed. Agencies that participated in these meetings included DEA MET, the Reading Police Department Vice squad, and Berks County DA's Office Detectives. The FBI office responsible for Reading is based out of Allentown, Pennsylvania, which supplied one agent to the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. No FBI personnel (to include the supervisor and/or agent) attended any of the deconfliction meetings hosted by the Berks County DA's Office. These meetings were held at the direction of the Berks County DA to specifically deconflict and coordinate ongoing investigations by the DEA MET and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. OIG did not provide any documentation to support the comments that the MET Reading deployment resulted in a series of meetings that delayed task force operations.
The revised report refers to a FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) in Philadelphia and a FBI Special Agent who supervised the FBI Safe Streets Task Force during the DEA MET deployment. It is the position of DEA that any perceived tension resulted from the FBI and the Berks County DA not wanting the DEA MET to operate independently in the area of Reading, Pennsylvania. Based on discussions with Philadelphia DEA senior management, the Berks County DA wanted full control over DEA MET and wanted MET to merge into the operations being conducted by the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. This suggestion was not considered because of the difference in the focus and mission of the DEA MET and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force. The focus of MET is to conduct short term enforcement operations into violent drug trafficking organizations. The report states the FBI ASAC and the FBI supervisor complained that there was no cooperation between the FBI and the DEA before or during the MET deployment. The FBI supervisor also complained the FBI was not invited to the March 16, 2005 pre-deployment coordination meeting. Prior to the pre-deployment meeting, the Philadelphia FBI SAC was advised of the MET deployment by the Philadelphia DEA SAC. DEA cannot account for why this communication was not relayed to the FBI supervisor of the Reading Safe Streets Task Force. The report again contradicts itself when it states an Assistant U.S. Attorney and an ATF Supervisory Special Agent stated that the DEA, ATF, FBI, and state and local law enforcement operations were deconflicted during the DEA Mobile Enforcement Team deployment in Reading.
DEA again requested that any mention to the Reading MET deployment be removed from the OIG report. DEA has provided clear and convincing information and documentation that DEA task force managers complied with policy prior to deploying MET in Reading. OIG has consistently altered the Reading MET deployment section to fit their version of events. This section of the report has expanded from one paragraph in the body of the report to six paragraphs. The initial paragraph, as noted above, stated the DEA Philadelphia SAC violated DEA policy when DEA did not notify all federal agencies of a planned deployment and did not complete an assessment of other task forces within the deployment area. The OIG report now states the DEA Philadelphia SAC met with the Philadelphia FBI and ATF Special Agents in Charge, to better coordinate the requested deployment. As OIG has expanded the Reading MET section, it has inserted contradictions to its own report. DEA is troubled that OIG has decided to put more weight into a statement made by a FBI Task Force supervisor over the statements of DEA and ATF Special Agents in Charge, the Executive Office of the U.S, Attorney's Office, and the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It should be noted, that this MET deployment originated as a result of a Reading Police officer being killed in the line of duty. The Philadelphia DEA SAC offered funding, resources, and manpower to the Reading PD in an attempt to further combat their violent drug trafficking problem. The FBI Safe Streets Task Force represented to DEA that the assistance of the DEA MET was not wanted or needed and that the FBI Safe Streets Task Force had the situation fully under control. This is evidenced by the comments made to OIG by the AUSA that was the FBI Safe Streets Coordinator. It is the position of DEA that this is not an example of the DEA’s failure to deconflict, but rather the FBI Safe Street Task Force's failure to embrace DEA’s MET resources as an ally as opposed to an adversary. In addition to DEA’s request to remove this section, the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys Office also requested its removal since DEA did deconflict, coordinate, and cooperate prior to the MET deployment.
| cc: | Michele M. Leonhart Richard Theis Kevin O’Connor |
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