Review of Shooting Incidents in the Department of Justice
E & I Report I-2004-010
September 2004
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) evaluated how the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) (collectively referred to in this report as "the components") reported, investigated, and reviewed shooting incidents involving their Special Agents or Deputy Marshals. We assessed whether the components adhered to the Department's Policy Statement on Reporting and Review of Shooting Incidents, September 21, 1995 (Resolution 13), which was established to ensure objective, thorough, and timely reviews of shooting incidents involving federal law enforcement officers (LEOs). We also assessed whether the components complied with their own internal shooting incident policies and whether they complied with requirements to report specific types of shooting incidents to the Department of Justice's (Department) Civil Rights Division (CRD) and to the OIG.1
RESULTS IN BRIEF
In performing the Department's law enforcement mission, the Department's components conduct operations such as executing search warrants and arresting fugitives and other suspects. When performing their duties, federal LEOs carry firearms and are authorized to use deadly force if necessary to protect themselves and the public. Although firearm discharges (other than for training) are infrequent, Resolution 13 requires that every shooting incident be reported, investigated, and reviewed "to determine the reasonableness of the application of deadly force in accordance with DOJ policy and the law and to provide component senior management with appropriate analyses, observations, and recommendations concerning operational training, and other relevant issues, including the need for referral for further administrative or disciplinary review." To carry out Resolution 13, the Department's components have established different procedures to ensure timely reporting and to attempt to conduct objective, thorough, and timely investigations and reviews of shooting incidents.
Our review of 103 of the 267 shooting incidents that occurred in fiscal years (FYs) 2000 through 2003 found that the components did not consistently report, investigate, and review shooting incidents according to their own procedures.
We also found significant differences in the way the components conducted the criminal and administrative investigations of shooting incidents. For criminal investigations, the ATF, the DEA, and the USMS relied on state and local law enforcement agencies to conduct the investigations. In contrast, the FBI conducted its own criminal investigation in every case, sometimes by delegating the criminal investigation to the field office to which the LEO involved was assigned. For administrative investigations, the ATF and the USMS assigned headquarters teams to conduct the investigation in every case. In contrast, the FBI and the DEA delegated the administrative investigation of some shooting incidents to the field office to which the LEO involved was assigned.
While we found that the rights of LEOs involved in shooting incidents were generally well protected, we noted that the issue of criminal responsibility was not always clearly resolved. In some cases, declinations of criminal prosecution were not obtained from state or federal authorities as required by the components' policies, and some LEOs were compelled to provide administrative statements before the issue of criminal responsibility had been fully resolved.
The components' shooting incident review processes differed as well. The components' Review Boards applied the standard for the reasonable use of deadly force differently.2 The ATF, the DEA, and the FBI focused on the moment that the LEOs decided to discharge their firearms. In contrast, the USMS took into account the circumstances leading to the incident. These different applications of the standard for the reasonable use of deadly force can lead to different conclusions about similar shooting incidents. We also found that some shooting incidents that should have been reported to the CRD or the OIG under Department and component polices were not. In addition, we found that the components' Review Boards did not refer cases for discipline in the same way, which affected the discipline imposed. Finally, the components did not systematically share the lessons learned from shooting incident reports, and the Department did not aggregate shooting incident data to identify improvements to enforcement operations.
Reporting of Shooting Incidents by LEOs. Each component requires LEOs to immediately notify their supervisors when they discharge a firearm.3 Supervisors are required to prepare a written report containing specific information on the incident and submit it to headquarters within one day. These initial reports provide managers the information necessary to ensure that an appropriate investigation is initiated. In the 103 incidents we reviewed, the LEOs immediately reported 100 of the shooting incidents. In three instances, the LEOs either made a late report or admitted to discharging their weapons only after the discharge had been under investigation for a month or while testifying at the suspect's trial.4
We also found that some supervisors did not report shooting incidents to headquarters as required by their component's regulations. The ATF requires a written report within 12 hours of an incident. The DEA and the USMS require a report within 24 hours. The FBI requires an "immediate" report by electronic communication. We used a standard of one day for our review. We reviewed the files on 97 shooting incidents for copies of the written report to headquarters; 11 did not contain the required written report and in 1 file the report was undated.5 For the 85 incident files that contained dated initial written reports, we found that 54 (64 percent) of the reports were submitted within one day but that 31 (36 percent) were submitted late. On average, ATF and FBI supervisors submitted the written reports in one day, while DEA supervisors averaged two days and USMS supervisors averaged three days.
We asked USMS and DEA shooting incident investigators about the delays. The USMS investigators stated that the USMS's organizational structure - 94 decentralized district offices - delayed its reporting process. The DEA policies, provided by the DEA shooting incident investigators, require at least three reports following a shooting incident. Overall we could not validate that timely initial written reports were made in 43 of the 97 shooting incidents.
Reporting to the CRD and the OIG. In addition to internal reports, the components must report shooting incidents involving potential violations of federal civil rights statutes to the CRD and incidents involving potential misconduct to the OIG. In 2000, the CRD established written agreements with the DEA and the FBI that require them to report incidents that result in injury or death.6 We examined the DEA's and the FBI's reporting of shooting incidents to the CRD under those agreements, and we found that the DEA reported 8 of 11 reportable shooting incidents and the FBI reported 14 of 15 reportable shooting incidents. The DEA did not report three incidents to the CRD because under the DEA's procedures, its Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is responsible for reporting potential civil rights violations to the CRD, but the DEA's shooting incident investigators only forward to the OPR those cases that they determine might involve misconduct. The investigators did not forward three incidents to the OPR because, although they involved injury or death, the investigators did not identify any potential misconduct. Consequently, the DEA did not report the three shooting incidents to the CRD. The FBI could not explain why one of its cases was not reported.
The ATF and the USMS had no written agreements with the CRD to report shooting incidents. However, the USMS Chief Inspector told us that the USMS would report any shooting incidents involving a potential violation of civil rights. Also, the ATF Special Agent in Charge, Investigations Division, Office of Inspections, told us that the ATF would report any shooting incident involving the allegation or suggestion of a civil rights violation to the appropriate United States Attorney's Office. In the 23 ATF and 22 USMS incident files we reviewed, we found no evidence (e.g., declinations of prosecution, memoranda, e-mails) of any reports to the CRD. We found that the CRD did consider two USMS cases we reviewed, but not because they were reported by the USMS. In one USMS shooting incident, the CRD received an allegation of a civil rights violation from the suspect's family, and in another case, a United States Attorney consulted with the CRD before deciding not to prosecute a Deputy Marshal. The ATF case files contained no evidence that any of the 23 ATF cases resulted in a civil rights complaint against an ATF Special Agent.
We also found that the DEA and the FBI did not report many reportable shooting incidents to the OIG. Of the 57 incidents from all components that were reportable to the OIG, we documented that the components submitted formal reports on 35 of the incidents.7 The ATF and the USMS informed the OIG of all of their reportable incidents (4 for the ATF and 20 for the USMS), but the DEA reported only 4 of its 16 reportable incidents and the FBI reported only 7 of 17 reportable incidents. The FBI and the DEA did not report incidents that they initially determined were unintentional discharges. However, excluding discharges initially reported as unintentional from the reporting requirement can lead to a failure to report a significant incident if the evidence developed in the investigation shows that the discharge may have been intentional.
To ensure that shooting incidents are properly reported to the OIG, on July 27, 2004, the Assistant Inspector General of the Investigations Division sent a memorandum to the ATF, the DEA, and the FBI describing requirements for the reporting of firearms discharges. The reporting requirements for the ATF, the DEA, and the FBI are now the same as those established for the USMS in 1998.
The Components' Shooting Investigations. Resolution 13 requires that shooting incident investigations avoid any appearance of a conflict of interest or impropriety, present all the relevant information necessary for an accurate and objective analysis, and be conducted expeditiously. Components' senior management is permitted to decide "[w]hether a shooting inquiry will be conducted by investigators assigned to the field office where the incident occurred or by investigators assigned to a component headquarters Office of Inspection or other headquarters element…." We found that the ATF and the USMS delegate the fewest investigations. All 23 intentional and unintentional firearms discharges by ATF Special Agents were investigated by an Office of Inspection team, and all 22 shooting incidents involving Deputy Marshals were investigated by the USMS Office of Internal Affairs (OIA). In contrast, the DEA and the FBI delegated many shooting incident investigations. The DEA allowed 22 of its 37 shooting incidents that did not result in significant or life threatening injuries, deaths, or other significant liabilities to be investigated by the DEA field office to which the Special Agent was assigned. The FBI's delegation decisions were not based on the seriousness of the incident, but rather on the extent of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) or Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) participation in the planning and operational events of the incident. Of the 39 FBI cases we reviewed, 2 were investigated by headquarters, 21 were investigated by Inspectors in Place (IIP), and 16 were assigned to the SAC.8
During the criminal investigation of shooting incidents, Resolution 13 also requires "the recognition and accommodation, as appropriate under the circumstances, of multiple interests and jurisdictions following a shooting incident." We reviewed 124 individual cases arising from 103 shooting incidents (some incidents involved more than one LEO). The ATF, the DEA, and the USMS told us that they always request state or local law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction to conduct the criminal investigations and only conducted a criminal investigation themselves if the state and local agencies declined the request. We found that local law enforcement agencies conducted the criminal investigations in 62 of the 85 cases involving LEOs of the ATF, the DEA, and the USMS.9 However, the FBI conducted a criminal investigation into all 39 cases involving its Special Agents, and state or local agencies conducted a parallel investigation in 12 of the 39 cases we reviewed. FBI investigators told us that they would not discourage a local investigation and would cooperate with state or local investigators, but that they do not request local criminal investigations and that they conduct an FBI criminal investigation in every case.
The ATF, DEA, and USMS shooting investigators said that they rely on local investigations because the states have the primary authority and responsibility to investigate and prosecute assaults, homicides, or other felonies occurring in their jurisdictions, and allowing local authorities to carry out their duties may preclude the need for an extensive federal investigation. We asked the FBI shooting investigators why the FBI conducts its own criminal investigations. They stated that, for cases involving injury or death, the FBI's agreement with the CRD requires it to investigate any potential violation of civil rights and that policy has been extended, by practice, to every shooting incident. Further, the FBI investigators stated that the FBI had the resources to conduct investigations in all cases. We found that the DEA has a similar agreement with the CRD, however, and meets the requirement by submitting the local criminal investigations to the CRD.
After the criminal investigation is complete, each component requires investigators to obtain a declination of prosecution from state or federal prosecutors or otherwise to ensure that there is no criminal action pending before completing the administrative investigation of a shooting incident. Because declinations of prosecution are recorded in the case files, we were able to evaluate the components' compliance with their policies. We found that the ATF did not obtain the required declination of prosecution in 4 cases, the DEA and the FBI did not obtain the required declination of prosecution in 1 case each, and the USMS did not obtain the required declination of prosecution in 17 cases.
The ATF investigators acknowledged that they had not obtained the required declinations in four cases due to an administrative oversight; these four ATF cases involved shooting incidents where the suspect was not injured or killed. The DEA investigators said that a declination of prosecution was not obtained in one case because it involved a suspect who eluded arrest until he was apprehended by local law enforcement one week after the shooting incident. The suspect reported that he received a minor wound during the shooting incident, but local law enforcement did not take further action. The FBI could not explain why one of its cases was not reported to the CRD for the required declination of prosecution. The USMS told us that its policy of obtaining declinations of prosecution in every case "needed to be more actively enforced."
During criminal investigations, LEOs have a constitutional right to remain silent. But once the criminal investigation is complete, the components can compel LEOs to provide statements for the administrative investigation and can discipline the LEOs if they refuse to comply. If a government agency compels an employee to provide a statement, it may use the information from that statement to take administrative action against the employee, but it may not use the information against the individual in a criminal prosecution.10 In the 124 cases we reviewed, the components compelled 30 administrative statements. The ATF and the DEA compelled statements only when they needed information to complete the administrative investigation, but the FBI and the USMS compelled an administrative statement in every case in which the LEO declined to give a voluntary statement, and, in some cases, compelled statements even though voluntary statements had already been made.
Our review of the case files also found that the components followed substantially different practices for compelling administrative statements in similar situations. In four FBI shooting cases, investigators compelled administrative statements (without declinations of prosecution) from Special Agents involved in the shooting incidents for use in the criminal cases against the suspects involved in the shooting incidents. In similar DEA shooting incidents, the DEA did not compel the Special Agents involved to provide administrative statements to support the prosecution of the suspects. Instead, the DEA consulted with the Assistant United States Attorney, and the Special Agents testified before the federal grand jury considering the charges against the suspects. In the DEA and FBI cases, the suspects were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 115 with assaulting the Special Agents. Although these assaults may be related to shooting incidents, both FBI and DEA policies require that the charges of assaulting the LEOs be investigated separately, not as a part of the shooting incident administrative investigation. The FBI case files included no explanation for the FBI's decision not to conduct a separate criminal investigation and to rely instead on compelled administrative statements.
The Components' Review Board Process. Components established Review Boards to examine the facts and quality of the shooting investigation, determine the need for training improvements, and refer cases for discipline. Resolution 13 requires that Review Boards be independent and objective; that their decisions and recommendations be free of the control or direction of component management; and that their members be able to assess the facts without distortion. We found that the composition of some Review Boards was less consistent with independent and objective reviews and that the Review Boards applied the standard for the reasonable use of deadly force differently.
Two of the components' Review Boards included members from outside the component. The ATF Board included outside members from two other law enforcement agencies. Board members told us that including representatives from peer organizations helped ensure the independence and objectivity of the ATF Boards in which they participated. The FBI's Review Board also includes an outside member from the CRD and a Department attorney. We found that the ATF, FBI, and USMS Review Boards included representatives from several levels of their organization. We found, however, that the DEA's Review Board is composed of three high-ranking individuals who report directly to the DEA Deputy Administrator and who are responsible for the operations being reviewed. Because the DEA Review Board represents only the senior level of the DEA, we believe the composition of the DEA's Review Board might not be consistent with the Resolution 13 requirement for an independent review.
We also found that the components' Review Boards applied the standard for the reasonable use of deadly force differently. Of the 124 cases we reviewed, Review Boards considered 121 cases and, in 14 cases, determined that the use of force was unreasonable. In 11 of the 14 cases (7 DEA cases and 4 FBI cases), the discharge of the firearm was unintentional. In three cases, all involving USMS Deputy Marshals, the Review Board found that an intentional discharge was unreasonable. The ATF, the DEA, and the FBI Review Boards focused on the moment the LEOs decided to discharge their firearms. In contrast, the USMS Review Board took into account the circumstances that led to the incident. These different approaches can lead to different conclusions about similar sets of facts. For example, the ATF, DEA, and FBI approach would find reasonable the actions of an LEO who failed to properly identify a suspect and consequently shot an innocent civilian if, at the moment the LEO fired, he or she believed that the civilian was the suspect and was acting in a threatening manner. The USMS's approach would find the same actions to be unreasonable because the LEO had not taken steps to properly identify the individual.
The Review Boards documented their findings and recommendations in different ways. Resolution 13 requires Review Boards to make "appropriate, timely recommendations to senior management … including, if necessary, referral to appropriate entities for disciplinary review." All of the Review Boards prepared memoranda for senior management presenting their findings on each case. Our review of 124 case files found that, for almost all of the cases we reviewed, the memoranda prepared by the FBI and USMS Review Boards effectively documented their findings and were thorough. However, we found that the memoranda prepared by the ATF and DEA Review Boards did not always provide senior management with detailed analyses, observations, and recommendations concerning operational training and discipline as required by Resolution 13 or the ATF Orders in effect at the time.11
Further, we found that the Review Boards referred cases for discipline differently.12 The USMS Review Board forwarded its cases to the USMS Human Resources Office and allowed the Human Resources Office to make any discipline referrals; the DEA Board referred cases for discipline without making specific discipline recommendations; and the FBI Review Board referred cases for discipline with specific recommendations for discipline. The way in which cases were referred affected the actual discipline imposed by the components. For example, the FBI Review Board made specific recommendations for discipline in each case it referred to the FBI OPR and followed a policy of recommending a 3-day suspension for all unintentional discharges. Consistent with those policies, the FBI Review Board recommended a 3-day suspension (later increased to a 5-day suspension by the deciding official) for a Special Agent who unintentionally discharged one round into a dying suspect. In a similar case, a DEA Special Agent unintentionally discharged her firearm, wounding a suspect and her partner. The Review Board referred the case to the DEA Board of Professional Conduct and the Special Agent received a Letter of Caution.
Timeliness of Shooting Incident Reviews. Resolution 13 states that prompt reporting, investigation, and review of shooting incidents are important, although it does not establish specific standards for completing shooting reviews. We reviewed the case files on 100 incidents to determine how long the shooting review process took from the date of the shooting incident to the date that a letter was sent to inform the LEO of the Review Board's decision. We found that the ATF and FBI averaged 176 and 184 days, respectively, and the USMS averaged 262 days to complete its shooting reviews. The DEA took 442 days (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Average Number of Days to Close Shooting Review Process
| Source: OIG analysis of components' shooting incidents. |
We recognize that the amount of time taken to complete an investigation depends on the complexity of the incident and factors beyond the control of the component. However, the files we reviewed did not generally contain sufficient information to enable us to conduct a detailed analysis of the reasons for the time taken. All of the components allow for extensions of the time required for the report of the administrative investigation, but the case files we reviewed did not contain documentation to indicate that extensions were granted. Nonetheless, much of the difference in the time required to complete shooting reviews appeared to be due to the time it took for each component's Review Board to meet after the completion of the investigations. The average times ranged from 39 days at the ATF to 226 days at the DEA. Only the ATF required its Review Board to meet within a specified time period (60 days after the completion of a shooting incident investigation). The other components did not require their Boards to meet within a specified time period.13 According to DEA Office of Inspection staff, the lengthy delays in convening the DEA Review Board were due to difficulties in coordinating the busy schedules of the three high-ranking officials on the Board.
The lengthy review delays had at least two potential negative effects. First, recommendations to senior management regarding operational, training, and safety issues were delayed, which hindered management's ability to make prompt corrections. Second, lengthy delays increased the time that LEOs remained under investigation, which could affect the LEOs' careers because their promotions and transfers could be delayed until the review was complete. The DEA recognized the potential adverse impact on employees and established procedures to reduce the impact of the investigation on promotions and transfers.
Sharing Lessons Learned Among Components. Resolution 13 states that "operational, safety, training or other relevant issues disclosed during the investigative or review process should be promptly communicated to component employees, and must be incorporated in policy manuals and training curriculae, as appropriate." Resolution 13 also requires that components conduct meaningful shooting incident data and trend analyses.
To communicate operational, safety, and training issues to LEOs, the ATF prepared semiannual summaries of its shooting incidents that are available to all employees on the ATF intranet. The DEA prepared annual summaries of its shooting incidents that are available to employees on the DEA intranet. The FBI began to prepare summaries of its shooting incidents during the course of our review, and the effort was ongoing when we completed our fieldwork. In March 2004, the USMS Review Board suggested to the Director that the USMS begin preparing shooting incident summaries, and the USMS is implementing the Review Board's recommendations.
Only the DEA could demonstrate that it incorporated lessons learned from shooting incidents directly into its training curriculum. The components' training directors and supervisory firearms instructors we interviewed said that their headquarters would notify them of any safety issues disclosed during the investigative or review process and that they would promptly incorporate safety issues in policy manuals and training curricula. We found that only the DEA sends shooting incident files from its Review Board directly to its training academy for operational and training analysis and incorporation into the training curriculum. In contrast, the ATF training staff did not receive the shooting incident files for review and during our interview were unaware that shooting incident summaries were available on the ATF's intranet. The FBI training academy only retained the preliminary reports of shooting incidents. The USMS supervisory firearms instructor, who is a member of the Review Board, was prohibited from discussing shooting incident reviews with anyone outside the Review Board, including students. Consequently, the ATF, the FBI, and the USMS did not ensure that lessons learned from shooting incidents were incorporated into their training curricula. According to one USMS trainer, the lack of a mechanism to incorporate lessons learned from shooting incidents into the training provided at the training academy means that Deputy Marshals must rely on "word of mouth" for lessons learned from shooting incidents, and important details may be lost or inaccurately conveyed.
We also found that the components did not share with each other shooting incident information and that there is no formal process for ensuring that shooting incidents are promptly reported across the Department. Resolution 13 requires components to use statistical techniques to describe, summarize, and compare shooting incident data and to identify long-term patterns and changes that have occurred over time in order to minimize risks to LEOs and public safety. However, during the period we reviewed, the annual number of shooting cases involving the use of deadly force never exceeded 16 in any component. Because the components engaged in similar types of enforcement operations and had similar types of shooting incidents, they could have benefited by sharing with each other shooting incident information.
Sharing information and Department-level aggregation could have enabled the components to identify significant trends earlier. For instance, we compiled the shooting incident data reported for all components over the last four years and found that more than half involved vehicles. In November 2002, the USMS Review Board observed that Deputy Marshals were frequently involved in shooting incidents while trying to arrest fugitives in stopped vehicles and recommended that the USMS research "devices that could be used to immobilize vehicles." During that same time, the DEA also identified vehicles as a principal factor in shooting incidents and conducted research on vehicle containment. Had the components shared information and lessons learned with one another, the DEA could have informed the USMS that its research on vehicle containment found "that tire spike strips and an intentional puncture of the subject vehicle's tire(s) for the purpose of preventing a subject from fleeing proved ineffective and unreliable."14 The DEA also could have shared the "active vehicle containment technique" that the DEA developed in response to shooting incidents in order to make it more difficult for suspects to use their vehicles as weapons against the LEOs. Because the components did not share data or discuss shooting incident lessons together, they each addressed similar issues independently.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
We noted several areas in the components' shooting review processes that differed significantly. We believe that the results of our review should be examined carefully by the components to identify areas that could be improved and to ensure that shooting incidents are reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and reviewed by an objective and independent Review Board.
All of the components require a written report within one day so that senior management can make investigative decisions, but, on average, only the ATF and the FBI consistently met the requirement. Further, the FBI and the DEA are required to report shooting incidents involving injury and death to the CRD, and all the components are required to report shooting incidents to the OIG, but neither the CRD nor the OIG was informed of all reportable incidents.
Three of the components - the ATF, the DEA, and the USMS - rely on local law enforcement to conduct the criminal investigations of shooting incidents, but the FBI conducts all its own criminal investigations. Investigators assigned by the components' headquarters conducted the administrative investigation of every ATF and USMS shooting incident, but the DEA and the FBI delegated the administrative investigation of some shooting incidents to the field office to which the LEO involved was assigned.
While each of the components' Review Boards prepares a memorandum for every shooting incident reviewed, we found that only those prepared by the FBI and USMS boards consistently included analysis and recommendations specific to the incident being reviewed. We also found that each component has different Review Board membership requirements, ranging from only senior-level managers to outside law enforcement to non-supervisory personnel. Outside representation on Review Boards can improve objectivity and independence, and reduce inconsistencies among the components. The ATF approach of including experienced LEOs from peer law enforcement agencies appeared to enhance the independence and objectivity of its Review Board.
The most important difference in the components' review of shooting incidents was the lack of uniform application of the standard for determining the reasonableness of the use of deadly force. The ATF, the DEA, and the FBI Review Boards looked at the reasonableness of the LEO's belief that the suspect posed an imminent threat at the moment deadly force was used. The USMS Review Board considered the reasonableness of a Deputy Marshal's actions as a whole, including the actions that created the necessity for deadly force. As a result, Review Boards made different decisions regarding the reasonableness of the use of deadly force for similar shooting incidents. We believe that Review Boards should apply a uniform Departmentwide standard for determining the reasonableness of the use of deadly force.
Overall, we found that the components varied substantially in the time they took to complete the administrative investigation of shooting incidents. The ATF averaged 176 days; the DEA, 442; the FBI, 184; and the USMS, 262. Much of this difference appeared to be due to the time it took for each component's Review Board to meet after the completion of the investigations. The average times ranged from 39 days at the ATF to 226 days at the DEA. Only the ATF required its Review Board to meet within a specified time period (60 days after the completion of a shooting incident investigation). The other components did not require their Boards to meet within a specified time after the completion of investigations.
Although the areas we identified need to be addressed to ensure the effectiveness of the shooting review process, each component's system had strengths that the other components and the Department could use as benchmarks to improve the shooting review process. Moreover, better sharing and analysis of information on shooting incidents could identify improvements to operational procedures and training.
To better ensure timely, thorough, and objective reporting, investigation, and review of shooting incidents, we recommend that the Department:
With regard to specific component practices, we recommend that the components take the following actions to correct the specific weaknesses identified in this report.
We provided copies of this report to the ATF, the DEA, the FBI, the USMS, and the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) and requested responses to the recommendations. The ATF, the DEA, the FBI, and the USMS concurred with all of their respective recommendations, and the ODAG concurred with the recommendation made to the Department as well as all the recommendations made to the individual components. We analyzed each response and have appended the responses and our analyses to this report.