Progress Report on Development of the Integrated Wireless Network in the Department of Justice

Audit Report 07-25
March 2007
Office of the Inspector General


Introduction

To enhance the ability of federal law enforcement agencies to communicate with each other, the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and Treasury agreed in 2004 to jointly develop the Integrated Wireless Network (IWN), a secure wireless, nationwide communications network. As initially envisioned, IWN would support over 81,000 federal agents in 50 states and the U.S. territories when fully implemented. Estimated to cost over $5 billion through 2021, IWN would address federal agency requirements to communicate across agencies, allow interoperability with state and local law enforcement partners, and meet mandates to use federal radio frequency spectrum more efficiently.

DOJ law enforcement components expect IWN to replace or upgrade current legacy land mobile radio systems. IWN will likely be a combination of land mobile radio, cellular telephones, and walkie-talkie devices. IWN is planned to provide reliable, secure, nationwide wireless communications capabilities and land mobile radio functionality. IWN is also intended to enhance and simplify communications interoperability with other federal and non-federal wireless users through increased coverage and capabilities. Additionally, IWN is also expected to reduce capital and operational costs of nationwide wireless communications in support of federal law enforcement officers through economies of scale.

The following table details the number of potential IWN users in the DOJ, Treasury, and DHS. DHS currently is the largest potential federal user of IWN, with 64 percent of the users.

POTENTIAL IWN USERS

Agency/Component Number of
Total Users by
Agency/Component
Percentage
of Total Users
Homeland Security

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

66

0.08

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

16,250

19.94

Federal Emergency Management Administration

2,954

3.62

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

600

0.74

Federal Protective Service

1,244

1.53

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

17,636

21.64

Transportation Security Administration

7,317

8.98

U.S. Secret Service

6,124

7.51

Homeland Security Total

52,191

64.04

Justice

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

3,426

4.20

Federal Bureau of Investigation

12,751

15.64

Federal Bureau of Prisons

203

0.25

Drug Enforcement Administration

5,147

6.31

Office of the Inspector General

157

0.19

U.S. Marshals Service

3,089

3.79

Justice Total

24,773

30.38

Treasury

Bureau of Engraving and Printing

279

0.34

Internal Revenue Service

2,868

3.52

Internal Revenue Service Facilities

601

0.74

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

400

0.49

U.S. Mint

400

0.49

Treasury Total

4,548

5.58

Total Users

81,512

100.00

Source:  Justice Management Division, Wireless Management Office, IWN Cost Model

In July 2004, the sponsoring departments initiated a procurement process to develop IWN. Currently, the sponsoring departments are in the final phase of the acquisition of a communications system and are awaiting detailed system design and implementation plans and cost proposals from two vendors for a wireless communications system to meet the needs of the sponsoring departments in the Southwest Border area. Once these submissions are received and evaluated, a selection will be made for one or both vendors to implement IWN nationwide.

Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Audit

The OIG performed this audit to assess the status of the development and implementation of the IWN project. The specific objectives of the audit were to:

To asses the implementation of IWN, we examined documents provided to us by DOJ officials, including the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between DOJ, DHS, and Treasury; the fiscal year (FY) 2005 Program Plan; the IWN Strategic Plan for 2003 through 2008; the Program Weekly Status Reviews; and the IWN Executive Status Reports and other pertinent documents.

We conducted fieldwork at the DOJ Wireless Management Office in Fairfax, Virginia, at various DOJ offices, including the Justice Management Division (JMD), Procurement Services Staff in Washington, D.C. and at the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project site in the Seattle, Washington area. We interviewed the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) of DOJ, DHS, and Treasury and the Directors of the DOJ and DHS Wireless Management Offices. We also interviewed the DOJ Deputy CIO, Information Sharing; Deputy Directors of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS); and an Assistant Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In addition, we interviewed the DOJ Spectrum Manager, the DOJ IWN Program Manager, and the DOJ Wireless Management Office Administration Officer.

We assessed the progress of the 3-phase acquisition plan to contract with one or more non-government vendors to build IWN across the country. We reviewed the proposals of the four vendors selected to compete in Phase 2 of the acquisition plan and interviewed DOJ staff who served on the management and technical evaluation teams. We also interviewed the Assistant Director of DOJ’s Procurement Services Staff.

To assess DOJ compliance with NTIA requirements, we interviewed the Chief of the Spectrum Support Division of the Office of Spectrum Management at NTIA. We also examined the Telecommunications Authorization Act of 1992 and the NTIA Narrowband Mandate of 1993. In addition, we obtained documents from NTIA that discussed the process for requesting waivers and the proposed rule of the Frequency Assignment Subcommittee to prohibit waivers for wideband operations that interfere with narrowband operations. We also reviewed NTIA reports of frequency assignments and waivers for noncompliant frequencies.

In the following sections we provide background to the IWN project before describing our audit findings on the status of IWN.

Background

Federal law enforcement agents at the DOJ primarily use land mobile radio technology that relies on radio frequency for tactical communications. A radio frequency signal is an electromagnetic wave, oscillating at a specific frequency of cycles per second. The combined spectrum of these radio frequency signals is the medium that allows wireless communications of all kinds.

Spectrum Management

Government, commercial, and public entities use federal frequency assignments and licenses for specific radio frequencies to provide mobile telephone, paging, satellite services, radio, and television broadcasts. The Federal Communications Commission regulates interstate and international radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable communications. The NTIA manages the complex allocation of radio frequency spectrum for federal users through an application and frequency assignment process.

Demand for radio frequency spectrum, which is a finite resource, is increasing due to the expansion of technology and the development of more radio frequency-based applications, such as personal communications services, multimedia messaging services, mobile intranet/extranet access, and mobile internet access. In addition, the use of wireless services is increasing in national defense, emergency rescue, air traffic safety, law enforcement, and disaster relief efforts. Because there is little additional spectrum to allocate, more efficient use must be made of the spectrum already allocated in order to meet the increasing requests for radio spectrum assignments.

In an effort to advance the efficient and effective use of the available radio frequency spectrum, in 1993 the NTIA mandated that all federal spectrum users cut their frequency usage by one-half. This process, known as narrowbanding, requires replacing all wideband land mobile radio network infrastructure and radios with narrowband-compliant technology . Specifically, the NTIA required that the channel bandwidth used by federal agencies be reduced from 25 to 12.5 kilohertz for very high frequency operations by 2005 and by 2008 for ultra high frequency operations.23

DOJ Legacy Wireless Communications Systems

Law enforcement officers from DOJ, DHS, and Treasury require a secure and reliable means of communication to perform their law enforcement operations effectively and to ensure their safety and that of the public. Federal law enforcement requires a range of communication tools, from hand-held portable radios for internal communications to nationwide and world-wide airborne communications.

DOJ law enforcement officers require many different types of wireless communications devices, including portable radios and body transmitters to support criminal, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence investigations and other law enforcement operations.24 Typically, DOJ law enforcement operations cannot rely on traditional communications equipment such as landline telephones. Therefore, wireless communications systems are critical to most DOJ law enforcement operations. These wireless systems usually provide the law enforcement officers’ sole means of connectivity to other agents and supervisors. DOJ law enforcement officers primarily use land mobile radio technology that relies on radio frequency signals for tactical radio communications.25

As part of this review, DOJ components identified a total of 4,163 different land mobile radio communications system sites currently in use within their components. The vast majority of these systems use technology that is over 10 years old. Most of DOJ’s current communications devices function in an analog rather than a digital mode, which means they have limited functionality and diminished voice communications quality. The following table describes the DOJ law enforcement components’ legacy wireless communications systems, their age, and the functional limitations of the systems.

DOJ COMPONENT LEGACY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Component Number of System Sites26 Average Age of Systems (Years) Percent of Systems Not Narrowband Compliant Systems Frequency Type Percent of Systems Lacking OTAR Capability27 Percent of Systems Lacking AES28 Percent of Systems Obsolete29

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives30

466

10

0%

Very High Frequency

100%

100%

0%

Drug Enforcement Administration

640

13

76%

Ultra High Frequency

24%

100%

71%

Federal Bureau of Investigation

3,057

12

91%

Very High Frequency

95%

93%

84%

U.S. Marshals Service31

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

TOTAL

4,163

 

79%

 

85%

95%

73%

Source: Information derived from DOJ components

As shown in the table, 73 percent of the Department’s communications system sites are no longer supported by the manufacturer and therefore are “obsolete,” which means spare parts are difficult to find and maintenance is essentially a customized service. According to the DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing, the failure rate for this older equipment is becoming a reliability issue. In addition, 95 percent of the system sites do not meet 2002 federal Advanced Encryption Standards, and 85 percent of the system sites cannot support over-the-air re-keying (OTAR) of encryption codes, which means re‑keying must be done manually.

As shown in the table above, the DEA and FBI use the most radio system sites and also have DOJ’s oldest systems. Further, because the USMS relies on the FBI radio systems, all DOJ law enforcement operations except ATF rely on radio communications technology that is over 10 years old. This dated technology includes devices that function only on wideband land mobile radio channels and do not provide adequate encryption security. Due to the age and outdated technology of these systems, many DOJ law enforcement officers are experiencing degraded coverage, reliability, and usability in their tactical radio communications.32 In addition, these antiquated radio systems are “stove-piped” and provide limited federal-to-federal and federal-to-state and local interoperability.

Because the DEA’s radio systems operate on the ultra high frequency band, which is not compatible with the very high frequency band, interoperability between DEA radio systems and those of the ATF, FBI, and USMS is more difficult, although not impossible to achieve.33 As part of implementation of the IWN program, the DEA is expected to transition to very high frequency operations. However, until IWN is completed, the DEA must purchase, operate, and maintain costly dual-band radios to allow interoperability with other law enforcement organizations, including those in the DOJ.

Moreover, the older radios are large and obtrusive. We found that, when combined with their limited functionality and decreasing reliability, the size of current hand-held radios is such that agents are much less inclined to use them. Several DOJ officials told us during the audit that because of these factors, agents are sometimes using commercial communications devices such as cellular telephones and walkie-talkies, which are vulnerable to interception, for communicating with each other, instead of using agency hand-held radios.

Origins of IWN

In response to the 1993 NTIA mandate that all federal spectrum users cut their frequency usage by one-half, DOJ law enforcement components separately developed plans for replacing their land mobile radio systems. In 1998, however, in response to DOJ’s budget submission addressing the components plans to comply with NTIA’s mandate, Congress directed that any DOJ narrowband conversion initiative must be based on a comprehensive strategy to increase spectrum efficiency, to achieve communications interoperability among all DOJ components and other federal law enforcement agencies, and to maximize efficiencies and savings through shared infrastructure and common procurement strategies.

As a result, in July 1998 Congress created the DOJ’s Narrowband Communications Account to centrally fund the conversion of DOJ’s legacy radio communications systems to narrowband systems. DOJ’s JMD was directed to serve as the central purchasing agent for all DOJ communications equipment and to develop an integrated, department-wide strategic plan to meet the DOJ narrowband conversion and interoperability requirements. In October 1998, the Attorney General created the Wireless Management Office within JMD to oversee and direct DOJ’s consolidated approach to wireless communications and to centrally manage the consolidated wireless account.

The Wireless Management Office was directed to provide day-to-day management of wireless communications’ architecture development and planning, management, acquisition, financial planning, and technical services for DOJ components. To ensure that components could influence the design and capabilities of DOJ’s wireless systems, the Wireless Management Office received guidance from the Wireless Communications Board, which was chaired by the DOJ’s CIO and composed of senior managers from DOJ components.

Prior to FY 2002, DOJ and Treasury were independently pursuing solutions to meet the NTIA narrowband mandate. Due to the similar and complementary nature of the law enforcement missions and the co-location and overlapping geographic jurisdictions of the two departments, DOJ and Treasury officials began discussing a joint project in August 2001.34

In November 2001, the DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration and Treasury’s Acting Assistant Secretary for Management signed an MOU agreeing to improve communications operability between and among their law enforcement agencies; improve communications operability between DOJ and Treasury and state, local, and other federal law enforcement agencies; achieve cost efficiencies; and meet the narrowband mandate.

The MOU established the IWN Joint Program Office to provide day‑to‑day management of the IWN program. The Joint Program Office was composed of staff from both DOJ and Treasury and received high-level program guidance from the Integrated Wireless Network Executive Board (IWN Executive Board), which was composed of executives from DOJ’s Wireless Communications Board and Treasury’s Wireless Executive Committee. The IWN Executive Board’s role was to ensure a coordinated approach to IWN by DOJ and Treasury that would meet each department’s requirements and provide a forum for resolving programmatic issues, such as acquisition strategy, overall concept of operations, and security policies.

Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project

In September 2001, prior to the DOJ and Treasury combining efforts, the DOJ awarded a contract to CTA Communications, Inc., to identify and define the wireless communications requirements for DOJ components, convert the requirements to a recommended plan, and develop a design concept for a consolidated approach to meet the wireless communications needs of the DOJ. In November 2001, the scope of the contract was expanded to include the requirements of Treasury’s law enforcement bureaus. The contractor’s final report, the 2002 IWN design, recommended a very high frequency, land mobile radio design that used “trunking,” a computer-controlled system that automatically allocates an open frequency from a pool of frequencies when a user initiates a radio call. The report also recommended an aggressive implementation schedule beginning in January 2003 and ending in 2010.

Based on the results of the 2002 IWN design, in November 2002 the Joint Program Office awarded a contract to acquire the necessary hardware, software, and services for a pilot project to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed technology. The pilot project, called the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project, was initiated in the metropolitan Seattle, Washington, area and became fully operational in December 2004. Since the pilot project became operational, the Joint Program Office has initiated Seattle/Blaine Phase II and the Northwest Expansion of the project.35

The pilot project created a trunked, interoperable network that provides tactical wireless radio communications for over 600 federal users from 5 federal agencies. The system is also interoperable with state and local law enforcement organizations in the Seattle/Blaine area. The FBI Telecommunications Manager in Seattle described the project as a series of networked communications sites. He told us that as part of the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project, 17 radio sites were either built, purchased, upgraded, or borrowed from state and local organizations. These sites communicate with the individual users’ radios and with the prime site. The prime site houses the computer hardware and software and circuit connections that comprise the “brains” of the network.

The communication system tracks users in the coverage area and assigns the frequency most readily available to receive and transmit their radio communications to the prime site. As a result, users do not have to manually change radio channels as they move from one channel’s coverage area to another. Users are organized into talk groups based on their organization and functional requirements. Users in each talk group can communicate with other members in the same group, and these users can communicate with other talk groups by requesting and receiving permission from other talk groups. The Joint Program Office funded the procurement of IWN compatible hand‑held and mobile radios for the agencies participating in the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project. Because this was a new communications system, users were given training in the operation of the radios and the protocols for interoperable communications.

From its inception in November 2002 through September 2004, the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project cost approximately $32 million. According to the Seattle/Blaine Beta Benchmark Assessment, the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project reduced the number of required radio frequency sites from 43 to 15 in the Seattle/Blaine area, which resulted in estimated annual savings of $126,000 in site lease costs. 36 According to the assessment, the pilot project also successfully demonstrated 66 percent more efficient use of spectrum resources through the use of trunking technology, which in addition to meeting federal narrowbanding requirements reduced the number of radio frequency assignments from 331 to 114. Importantly, the pilot project demonstrated the feasibility of a government owned, managed, and operated integrated wireless network among five federal agencies and proved the viability of the technology identified by the 2002 IWN design.

The following table shows the federal components, number of users, and level of system usage for the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project from January through September 2006.

SEATTLE/BLAINE PILOT PROJECT SYSTEM USAGE
January through September 2006

Component

Average Number
of Radios

Total
Radio Calls
Initiated

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives

33.33

7,360

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

19.44

3,952

Drug Enforcement Administration

88.56

53,953

Federal Bureau of Investigation

147.56

30,849

Federal Communications Commission

0.11

9

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

255.67

88,763

Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations

15.33

707

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

4.56

1,607

Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General

3.78

5,741

Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

6.44

700

U.S. Marshals Service

50.44

24,190

U.S. Secret Service

0.33

22

Total

625.55

217,853

Source: OIG Analysis of DOJ Wireless Management Office system usage data

To assess the level of interoperability achieved by the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project, we asked the FBI Telecommunications Manager for the results of interoperability tests of the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project. This official told us that FBI and DEA agents and USMS deputy marshals use interoperable IWN talk groups on a regular basis for activities such as investigations, surveillance, and intelligence gathering.37 The pilot project also provides interoperability between federal, state, and locals users. This functionality, which is tested quarterly, was used in a full scale communications exercise in September 2006 involving DOJ and DHS, Washington State Patrol, eight local police departments, six local fire departments, three sheriffs’ offices, three emergency management operations centers, two communications centers, two public and one private emergency medical response organizations, and one county public health department.

In addition, the FBI telecommunications official cited four arrests between August and October 2006 in which federal and local agencies used the interoperable talk groups to communicate in their investigations. One of the joint arrests involved the FBI, DEA, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Seattle Police Department, and King County Sheriff’s Office. In addition, the FBI official cited joint operations between the USMS and King County Sheriff’s office and between ATF and the Seattle Police Department that used IWN.

Representatives from ATF, FBI, and USMS that we interviewed cited the following benefits of the Seattle/Blaine IWN network compared to their previous radio systems:

DEA representatives expressed the opinion that the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project was designed primarily for border, port, or major urban areas and therefore does not provide adequate coverage for DEA operations.

However, in April 2003 the DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing reported to the IWN Executive Board that while the IWN acquisition strategy used for the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project would adequately address current communications requirements of the DOJ, DHS, and Treasury, it might not be flexible enough to meet any change in requirements and to integrate new technologies over the life of the procurement. In addition, the Deputy CIO said that expanding the IWN project nationwide using the design and acquisition process from the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project would not have been a good business decision because the DOJ had identified only one vendor capable of meeting requirements of a contract to expand the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project nationwide. He said that, without competition, cost savings and technological advantages would have been minimized. Further, the 2002 IWN design did not include industry advances in wireless technology and did not incorporate commercial services into the solution. Therefore, in July 2004 the IWN Executive Board initiated the current acquisition strategy to implement IWN on a nationwide basis. The Joint Program Office is in the final phase of the acquisition and plans to award contracts to one or more vendors in the second quarter of FY 2007.

Current Partnership with Treasury and Homeland Security

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, the original impetus of meeting the federal mandate to improve spectrum efficiency was overshadowed by the need to develop a secure, wireless, interoperable communications system for federal, state, and local law enforcement and emergency personnel. However, the IWN project’s goals already included improving communications interoperability among the participating departments and state, local, and other federal law enforcement agencies.

Yet, changes in the structure of federal law enforcement agencies after the September 11 attacks required increased coordination among these agencies in the development of IWN. When DHS was formed in 2002, several law enforcement agencies from the Justice and Treasury Departments were transferred to the new agency. The following chart shows the DOJ, Treasury, and DHS components participating in IWN after establishment of the DHS.

THE IWN PARTNERSHIP AFTER CREATION OF DHS

DOJ Treasury DHS

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

Bureau of Engraving
and Printing

Customs and Border Protection

Drug Enforcement Administration

Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Federal Bureau of Prisons

The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Federal Bureau of Investigations

U.S. Mint

U.S. Secret Service

Office of the
Inspector General

Office of the Inspector General

Transportation Security Administration

U.S. Marshals Service

Emergency Preparedness and Response



PRIOR TO MARCH 2003

Office of the
Inspector General

DOJ Agency

Treasury Agency

Other than DOJ or Treasury Agencies

Comprised of DOJ and Treasury Agencies

Source: OIG Analysis of the Joint Program Office FY 2005 Program Plan and Homeland Security Act of 2002

When several DOJ and Treasury components were transferred to the DHS, the Joint Program Office continued to pursue a consolidated management approach to meet the communications requirements of those components transferring as well as the communications requirements of the components that remained with the DOJ and Treasury. This was consistent with the Office of Management and Budget’s expectation that the agencies transferring to the DHS would continue to participate in IWN on a cost‑sharing basis.

In June 2004, the DHS joined the DOJ and Treasury in the IWN partnership, and the three departments’ CIOs signed a new MOU to develop, implement, and manage a joint wireless system.38 To provide executive‑level guidance and policy direction for the Joint Program Office, the new MOU established the IWN Executive Board and designated the CIOs from each of the sponsoring departments as co-chairs. The MOU also specified that decisions by the IWN Executive Board would be reached through consensus among the three co-chairs.

The MOU describes identical responsibilities for and resource contributions from DOJ and DHS. Under the terms of the MOU, Treasury is not required to share the costs of designing and building IWN, given its few remaining law enforcement personnel after creation of the DHS, but it is required to fund its specific equipment requirements and contribute to IWN commensurate with its level of participation in the program. We were advised by the DOJ Wireless Management Office Administrative Officer that the DOJ Wireless Management Office has assumed the responsibility of staffing and managing the Joint Program Office to allow the program to move forward.

In July 2004, the IWN Executive Board initiated a 3-phase acquisition strategy to award a contract for:

The IWN Executive Board’s acquisition strategy envisioned selecting a single contractor to implement the entire IWN program after completing the following three phases.

Representatives from DOJ law enforcement components told us they were extremely concerned with the length of time it is taking to implement IWN. The IWN project began in 2001 and the current acquisition strategy is about 15 months behind schedule. As discussed in the next section of this report, we found serious concerns regarding the funding of IWN, fractures in the IWN partnership, and an ineffective governing structure for the program. As a result, we concluded that the successful completion of the integrated wireless network for the DOJ, DHS, and Treasury departments is in jeopardy.

The following table details key events of DOJ’s narrowband conversion effort and the IWN project development, beginning with the creation of the Wireless Management Office in 1998.

NARROWBAND CONVERSION KEY EVENTS AND
IWN DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE
(By Fiscal Year)

1998

DOJ Establishes the Wireless Management Office

Wireless Management Office Develops Justice Wireless Network For Land Mobile Radio And Commercial Wireless Services

     

1999

Wireless Management Office Assesses Availability of Standards Compliant Technology

       

2001

DOJ Issues Contract for System Design Concept

DOJ and the Treasury
Sign Memorandum of Understanding

DOJ Amends System Design Contract to Include Requirements of Treasury’s Law Enforcement Components

   

2002

Contractor Completes System Design Concept

DOJ and Treasury Initiate IWN

DOJ and Treasury Establish the Joint Program Office

Joint Program Office Awards Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project Contract

DHS Formed

2003

Joint Program Office Initiates Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project

       

2004

DOJ, DHS, and Treasury
Sign Memorandum of Understanding

IWN Executive Board Adopts New 3-Phase IWN Acquisition Strategy

IWN Acquisition Phase I Request For Proposals Released

Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project Becomes Operational

IWN Acquisition Phase I Completed

2005

IWN Acquisition Phase II Request For Proposals Released

IWN Acquisition Phase II Proposals Received From Four Vendors

     

2006

IWN Acquisition Phase II Completed With The Selection of Two Vendors

IWN Acquisition Phase III Task Orders Awarded

     
Source: OIG Analysis of Justice Management Division, Wireless Management Office IWN data.



Footnotes
  1. Very high frequency and ultra high frequency are internationally recognized subdivisions of the electromagnetic spectrum. The very high frequency band is the range of frequencies from 30 MHz to 300 MHz and the ultra high frequency band is the range of frequencies from 300 MHz to 3000 MHz.

  2. For the purpose of this report, the term “DOJ law enforcement officers” includes FBI, DEA, and ATF Special Agents, Deputy Marshals, and other DOJ law enforcement officers.

  3. Land mobile radio is a mobile radio service operating between fixed base stations, and stations (mobile and hand‑held) capable of surface movement. Radio frequency is any frequency within the electromagnetic spectrum.

  4. For the purpose of this audit, we are comparing the number of radio sites per reported system. Radio sites are typically the basic cost unit of a communications system.

  5. A key is the code programmed into radios to allow encrypted communications within a system. To ensure security, these keys must be changed periodically. Over-the-air re-keying would allow a law enforcement officer to receive an updated encryption code rather than requiring manual reprogramming by a radio technician. OTAR capability is limited to the system capability. For example, even though individual radios may be OTAR capable, without the system being OTAR capable there is no OTAR functionality within the system.

  6. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is an encryption algorithm that was approved by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in November 2001 for use by U.S. Government organizations to protect sensitive information. This algorithm replaces the Data Encryption Standard (DES) that has been in use since 1977 and is no longer approved for Federal use.

  7. For the purpose of this audit, “obsolete systems” are system sites that are no longer supported by the manufacturer.

  8. The DOJ OIG uses ATF’s systems for its radio communications.

  9. The USMS primarily uses FBI’s systems for its radio communications. The USMS is in the process of installing a new radio system in the New York/New Jersey area.

  10. Degradation is the reduction in the ability of a system to perform its intended function . Usability describes the ease of operation with a minimum of user intervention.

  11. A DEA official told us that their communications systems are ultra high frequency because that spectrum was available when the DEA was established in 1972.

  12. In 2001, DOJ law enforcement components included the DEA, FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and U.S. Marshals Service. Treasury law enforcement components included the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs Service, and ATF.

  13. Seattle/Blaine Phase II includes coverage for aircraft operations and to fill in existing coverage gaps. The Northwest Expansion is to provide coverage for Portland, Oregon, the Oregon Coast, Eastern Washington, and the northern border.

  14. The Seattle/Blaine Beta Benchmark Assessment, completed in May 2004, reported the progress of the project toward achieving the overall goals of the IWN program.

  15. A talk group is a subgroup of radio users who share a common functional responsibility. The Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project includes talk groups such as the FBI bomb squad, ATF bomb squad, and Seattle Police Department bomb squad.

  16. A copy of the MOU between the DOJ, Treasury, and DHS is included as Appendix 4.

  17. Phase 1 was an acquisition process whereby an agency publishes a pre-solicitation notice that provides a general description of the scope or purpose of the acquisition and invites potential offerors to submit information that allows the government to advise the offerors about their potential to be viable competitors.

  18. An indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract is a contract for supplies or services that does not specify a firm quantity of supplies or services other than a minimum or maximum quantity, and provides for the issuance of delivery or task orders during the contract period.



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