SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE INTEGRATED WIRELESS NETWORK FOR THE DOJ, DHS, AND TREASURY
DEPARTMENT IS IN JEOPARDY

We found that the proposed $5 billion IWN program is at high risk of failing to develop an integrated wireless communications network for use by the DOJ, the DHS, and Treasury. The causes for this high risk include: (1) uncertain funding for the project; (2) disparate departmental funding mechanisms that allow departments to pursue separate wireless communications solutions apart from IWN; (3) the fractured nature of the IWN partnership; and (4) the lack of an effective governing structure. As a result, there is a potential risk to effective law enforcement operations and to the safety of officers and agents who are currently relying on independent, antiquated, and obsolete communications systems. Without a coordinated approach to accomplish the shared goals of the IWN project, the resulting separate agency communications systems may not be adequate in the event of another terrorist attack or natural disaster that requires a coordinated emergency response.

The IWN program, a multi-agency wireless network intended to provide secure, interoperable communications to over 81,000 federal agents nationwide, is in significant jeopardy of failing. Implementation of the project by the DOJ, DHS, and Treasury has been extremely slow, and agreement among the departments regarding the design and implementation of IWN must occur if the project is to continue.

We found that, even though IWN is intended to be a joint project, the DOJ and DHS are pursuing different approaches for implementing IWN. DOJ’s preferred approach is to continue efforts to replace its legacy communications systems for its law enforcement components with a single, integrated wireless network. DHS’s preferred approach is to consolidate existing wireless communications systems onto its planned departmental communications system and achieve necessary interoperability through gateways rather than building a single wireless network.⁴¹ The communication systems that result from these different approaches will not result in the seamless interoperable system that was originally envisioned.

We also found that the lengthy IWN development and implementation process that began in 2001 has left DOJ components waiting for upgraded communications equipment. DOJ components still conduct their law enforcement and counterterrorism operations with aging equipment that does not meet current encryption standards. As a result of the amount of time it has taken to move forward with IWN, the DOJ has also spent increasingly significant amounts of money to maintain its legacy communications systems, thereby depleting available funding for IWN.

In addition, the lengthy IWN development and implementation presents security-related concerns. During our audit, we were told that some law enforcement officers and agents occasionally resort to nonsecure forms of wireless communications, such as cellular telephones and walkie-talkie devices, when their DOJ radio equipment or communications system are inadequate to accomplish their mission. We were also told that some agents have had to interrupt surveillance operations in order to manually reprogram their radios with updated encryption keys.

The following sections of the report discuss the causes for IWN’s high risk status, identifies the potential consequences if IWN is not implemented, and provides recommendations to help redirect the effort toward successful completion.

Wireless Communication Funding Concerns

Two funding issues increase the IWN program’s risk of failure. First, there is substantial uncertainty that the program will be adequately funded. Second, disparate funding mechanisms within the participating departments allow the DHS to upgrade, repair, or replace its components’ legacy communication systems individually, while the DOJ operates under a mandate from Congress to develop a department-wide solution. In our judgment, this fundamental disparity in commitment of funds by the sponsoring departments has facilitated the breakdown of the IWN partnership. Adequate funding and departmental coordination and concentration of resources on IWN are necessary to ensure the program’s success.

Uncertain Funding

IWN is currently one of the most expensive items in the Department’s Information Technology Investment Portfolio. The DOJ life cycle costs for IWN through 2021 are projected to exceed $2.5 billion. ⁴² During our audit, the DOJ CIO told us that without a major increase in funding the IWN program will not be completed. The DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing told us that if IWN is not implemented, DOJ will still need to invest about $900 million to replace legacy communications equipment, such as mobile and hand‑held radios, repeaters, and base stations that IWN was intended to upgrade. The DOJ CIO also noted that while replacing legacy equipment with new equipment would solve encryption problems and resolve the narrowband issue, it would not fully address the problem of “stove‑pipe” communications among DOJ components and would only marginally address interoperability. In our judgment, if IWN is not implemented DOJ will miss a critical opportunity to provide more effective communications support to its law enforcement agents in the field.

The following chart shows DOJ funding for the Narrowband Communications Account from FY 2000 to the present.

NARROWBAND COMMUNICATIONS ACCOUNT BUDGET SUMMARY
FY 2000 – 2008

Source: OIG analysis of Justice Management Division, Wireless Management Office and Budget Staff budget data

Through FY 2006, approximately $772 million has been appropriated to fund the DOJ Narrowband Communications Account. However, since FY 2000, the enacted appropriation for IWN has been consistently less than the DOJ Wireless Management Office budget request. For FY 2007 and FY 2008, the DOJ Wireless Management Office request has increased in anticipation of the IWN contract awards. DOJ officials told us, however, that they expect to receive approximately 50 percent of their requested funding. The DOJ CIO told us that the current level of IWN funding is not sufficient to implement IWN nationwide.

Moreover, the DHS Wireless Management Office Director told us in March 2006 that DHS officials do not believe funding will be available for DHS and DOJ to implement the new nationwide replacement system using the same design demonstrated by the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project.

We asked for an estimate of the total amount of IWN project costs from the DOJ Wireless Management Office Administrative Officer. Although the DOJ Wireless Management Office has assumed the responsibility for managing the Joint Program Office, we were advised by the DOJ Wireless Management Office Administrative Officer that an estimate of total IWN project costs is not available because DHS costs are not reported to the Joint Program Office. We also requested this information from DHS in April 2006 and again in October 2006, but DHS did not provide this data. As a result, the following chart illustrates only the costs incurred by DOJ, through September 30, 2005, for IWN-related projects and equipment, and for operation and maintenance of existing DOJ legacy communication systems.

DOJ NARROWBAND COMMUNICATIONS ACCOUNT
BY PROJECT⁴³
FY 2000 - FY 2006

[Image Not Available Electronically]

Source: OIG analysis of Justice Management Division, Wireless Management
            Office cost data

As the graph demonstrates, over the past 7 years almost two-thirds of the money in the DOJ’s Narrowband Communications Account has funded the maintenance of existing legacy systems instead of new wireless solutions. Since the inception of the Narrowband Communications Account in FY 2000, the cost of operating and maintaining legacy communications has been between 38 percent and 80 percent of the total program costs for a single fiscal year. In FY 2004, legacy costs accounted for $52.5 million of the total program cost of $ 137.6 million, while in FY 2001 legacy costs accounted for $ 89.2 million of the total program cost of $ 111.5 million. According to estimates from the Wireless Management Office, operating and maintenance costs for legacy systems are expected to increase by 5 percent annually. At that rate, by FY 2008 legacy systems operations and maintenance costs will consume 72 percent of the Narrowband Communication s Account at the current funding level .

Disparate Departmental Funding Mechanisms

Funding for all DOJ legacy land mobile radio systems, including IWN, is consolidated within the Narrowband Communications Account managed by the DOJ’s Wireless Management Office. Because DOJ’s wireless communications budget is consolidated, the Wireless Management Office is responsible for funding the components’ legacy radio systems operations and maintenance needs. The Narrowband Communications Account’s appropriation language directs that no DOJ component can develop or procure additional radio equipment or infrastructure without prior approval from JMD. Consequently, DOJ components receive funding to operate and maintain their legacy communications systems through reimbursable agreements with the Wireless Management Office.

The DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing told us that if a DOJ component needs to replace legacy equipment, it must request funding approval from the Wireless Management Office. This official said that components are required to demonstrate the imminent failure of a particular system to receive funding to upgrade or replace existing legacy equipment and infrastructure. He said that any remaining funding after individual component legacy communications operations and maintenance needs are met is allocated to IWN-related investments.

An example of this approval process occurred in 2004 when the FBI requested replacement of its Las Vegas, Nevada, field office radio system. Because the FBI demonstrated that the system was failing, the Wireless Management Office approved and funded replacement of the old legacy system. The new system is a very high frequency, narrowband compliant system that meets the Advanced Encryption Standard.

According to the DOJ CIO, while the DHS supports IWN, the DHS has not always lived up to its commitments to the IWN project, in part because DHS components receive independent funding for their wireless communications needs. The DOJ CIO stated that this makes it more difficult for the DOJ to obtain cooperation and compliance because narrowband conversion funds are not centrally managed and distributed by DHS, as is the case in the DOJ. At a May 2006 Department Investment Technology Review Board meeting, the Deputy Attorney General expressed concern that this disparate funding structure is encouraging inefficiencies and resulting in a lost opportunity to create a truly integrated network.⁴⁴

The DHS CIO told us that DHS appropriations are not structured the same as DOJ’s and that DHS has separate funding for IWN and for its legacy communications systems. In the joint FY 2006 Office of Management and Budget Capital Asset Plan and Business Case (Exhibit 300), DHS reported its intent to consolidate narrowband conversion funding within DHS in a manner similar to the funding approach used by DOJ. ⁴⁵ However, in contrast to this document, in October 2006 the DHS CIO told us that DHS does not intend to consolidate narrowband funding of DHS components into a central account. Consequently, the DHS CIO can continue to allocate narrowband conversion resources to individual components, programs, or geographic locations that he believes are in the best interest of the DHS. This allows the DHS CIO to meet the immediate needs of DHS components’ by replacing and upgrading their legacy communications systems while still participating in IWN. DOJ, in contrast, is required to develop an integrated department-wide solution because of the congressional requirement that all wireless communications spending be consolidated and managed by a central office.

Fracture in the IWN Partnership

Our audit also found strong indications that the IWN partnership is fractured. It appears that the DOJ and DHS are pursuing separate wireless communications solutions instead of a single joint solution. The current MOU between DOJ, DHS and Treasury requires the departments to collaborate annually on a joint budget submission to request funding for the IWN program. For FYs 2005 through 2007, the departments collaborated on and submitted joint Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300s. However, for FY 2008, DOJ and DHS submitted separate Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300s for IWN. In our judgment, such a significant departure from the current MOU calls into question the nature of the IWN partnership.

We were advised by the DOJ and DHS CIOs that the current partnership MOU needs to be revised and that the departments are currently in the process of re-negotiating this critical document. Senior DOJ officials have told us that DOJ is looking for a master agreement with annual program plans that detail the specifics of IWN implementation for the immediate year and the responsibilities and contributions expected from each department. The DHS CIO told us that DHS will insist on contracting authority on IWN contracts, which would allow DHS to independently write task and delivery orders against IWN contracts once they are awarded. According to the DHS CIO, without contracting authority for DHS the MOU is a “no go.”

In March 2006, the DHS Wireless Management Office Director stated that DOJ appears focused on using trunking technology in a single, nationwide solution.⁴⁶ However, he said that DHS wants to use the IWN contract or contracts to acquire the necessary supplies and services to implement individual solutions for its priority geographic locations rather than a single, integrated wireless communications solution. In our opinion, this shows DHS’s pursuit of individual solutions rather than a single integrated wireless communications solution.

In October 2006, the DHS CIO told us that DHS is fully committed to the IWN program and has demonstrated its commitment by contributing staffing and funding resources.⁴⁷ The DHS CIO also told us that DHS is consolidating its existing networks into a primary communications infrastructure called OneNet, similar to the DOJ’s JUTNet, and expects all DHS networks to be operating on OneNet within a year.⁴⁸

However, in addition to the separate Office of Management and Budget Exhibit 300 submissions and the ongoing MOU negotiations, recent decisions made by the DHS provide further indications that the partnership is fractured. For example, in March 2006 the DHS CIO decided to relocate most of the DHS staff assigned to the Joint Program Office to DHS Headquarters. The DHS CIO told us that the decision was an internal business decision and was reached for economic and organizational efficiency reasons. This official stated that the relocated staff were still assigned to the Joint Program Office, but just were working from a different location. The DHS Wireless Management Office Director expressed the opinion that a joint program office, as it currently exists, probably will not be needed. Instead, he suggested that the relevant agencies create joint teams at the project level, either physically or virtually. In our view, these actions are consistent with DHS’s preferred approach of implementing unique solutions in specific locations rather than furthering the development of a joint, nationwide project with DOJ and Treasury.

We also discussed the DHS’s participation in the IWN project with the DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing, who told us that the DOJ had been the only major player actively participating in the project for a considerable period of time. He stated that prior to the creation of DHS, Treasury had been a major participant, but its involvement in the project has since been minimized as a result of the reorganization that resulted in its loss of most of its law enforcement components. The DOJ Deputy CIO stated that after allowing the DHS time to organize itself after its creation, DOJ was hoping that the DHS would assume its responsibilities outlined in the current MOU and fully share responsibility for the project with DOJ. However, the DOJ CIO stated that DHS has never participated at the level DOJ expected.

The DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing told us that, nevertheless, DOJ is pursuing a single, integrated solution for IWN. He stated that if DOJ cannot build IWN with the DHS, at least it can develop an integrated network for DOJ. The Deputy CIO also told us that if the DHS uses the IWN contracts only as procurement vehicles, at least there would be some commonality in equipment, services, and vendors between the departments’ individual solutions.

The IWN partnership currently appears to be fractured in its approach and disjointed in its goals to develop a secure, wireless, nationwide communication network. We believe that, as result, the system that results from this partnership likely will not be the seamless, interoperable system that was originally envisioned and therefore the communication systems may not be adequate in the event of another terrorist attack or national disaster.

Lack of Effective Governing Structure

We also found that the IWN Executive Board does not have an effective governing structure.

Decision by Consensus

The June 2004 MOU assigns the governance of the IWN project to the IWN Executive Board. The IWN Executive Board is composed of the CIOs from DOJ, DHS, and Treasury. The IWN Executive Board has the authority to review and approve all key business and policy issues related to the implementation and management of the IWN program, including budgets, system deployment priorities, and program management issues such as acquisition strategy, overall concepts of operation, and security policies. The IWN Executive Board is also responsible for overseeing and evaluating the program management activities of the Joint Program Office. The MOU requires that decisions by the IWN Executive Board be made by consensus.

However, the MOU does not provide a process to move forward in the absence of consensus. As the DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing told us, “if DOJ and DHS do not agree, IWN does not go forward.” This is of particular concern because, according to the DOJ Deputy CIO, repeated turnover of key DHS personnel has resulted in time consuming efforts on DOJ’s part to re-examine previous decisions with new DHS officials to again reach consensus.

Since the formation of the current IWN partnership in June 2004, DHS has had three Wireless Management Office Directors, and as of October 3, 2006, the position was vacant. We were told that during this same period DHS has had two CIOs and one acting CIO. Furthermore, language in the DHS’s FY 2007 appropriations law established the Office of Emergency Communications and transferred IWN responsibilities to that office. Up to this point, IWN administration has been the DHS CIO’s responsibility, and we are concerned that DOJ will again be faced with the need to revisit previous decisions with new DHS personnel.

Lack of DOJ Component Representation

DOJ radio program managers and senior managers from four DOJ components – the ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS – expressed concern that although their IWN‑related issues are considered by the DOJ CIO, the components are not able to influence IWN Executive Board decisions.

Two of the senior managers told us that their questions and concerns about the IWN project have gone unanswered by the IWN Executive Board. DOJ radio program managers from all four components expressed concern regarding the lack of incorporation of component concerns in decisions related to IWN. For example, all four radio program managers told us that the components’ preferred plan was to implement IWN in the Southeastern United States after the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project was completed. However, in November 2004 the Joint Program Office began requirements analysis for the Southwest Border area and subsequently issued a request for design proposals for the Southwest Border area instead of the Southeastern area. Three of the four DOJ radio program managers attributed this change in the implementation plan to “an attempt to meet” DHS requirements.

In our interviews, the radio program managers and senior managers from DOJ components expressed many concerns with the current IWN project, which we summarize in the following tables.

DOJ RADIO PROGRAM MANAGERS’ IWN-RELATED CONCERNS

DOJ SENIOR MANAGERS’ IWN-RELATED CONCERNS

Senior managers from the ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS all expressed concern about IWN program delays. Three of the four senior managers shared the same concerns that were expressed by the radio program managers regarding the nature of the IWN partnership, the loss of focus on tactical communications, and the adequacy of legacy communications systems. Senior managers from the ATF, DEA, and FBI also expressed concern regarding the availability of sufficient funding to complete the IWN project.

The DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing told us that the component representatives regularly telephone, e-mail, or meet with the DOJ CIO to discuss their IWN-related concerns. DOJ component representatives also described this process as their method for raising IWN‑related concerns to the IWN Executive Board. However, as demonstrated by the consistency and critical nature of the concerns summarized in the preceding tables, the concerns of the components have not been addressed by the IWN Executive Board.

In our judgment, the ultimate beneficiaries of IWN do not have an effective method to contribute to the design and execution of the program. Further, due to their inability to participate in the development and implementation of the IWN, DOJ components are losing confidence in the program.

Consequences of IWN Project Failure

Failure to upgrade DOJ components’ antiquated communications systems with or without IWN would represent an unnecessary risk to the safety of DOJ law enforcement officers and agents. Further, failure of the IWN project will represent a significant missed opportunity to achieve needed communications interoperability between federal law enforcement agencies, and cost and spectrum efficiencies. In addition, because the DOJ plans to address its narrowband requirements with IWN, failure of the joint program will require the DOJ to seek alternative solutions such as a department-wide communications network or a network developed by DOJ and Treasury.

Unacceptable Risk to Safety of Department of Justice Law Enforcement Officers and Agents

It is critically important that law enforcement officers and agents have a reliable, safe, and efficient way to communicate. Law enforcement agents must be able to maintain flexibility and mobility, and at times operate covertly, yet still remain in contact with other personnel essential to the operation. Wireless communications systems are a critical part of most law enforcement operations, and usually provide the sole means of communications connectivity for the overall operation.

DOJ has been relying on IWN to address a myriad of problems with its current wireless communications systems. As discussed above, at present the DOJ has multiple stove‑piped land mobile radio systems with infrastructure dating back 15 to 20 years. The performance of the systems has degraded in terms of coverage, reliability, and usability. The systems provide limited federal-to-federal and federal-to-state/local interoperability, do not use radio spectrum efficiently, and require extensive operations and maintenance funds.

The vast majority of DOJ legacy systems are comprised of technology that is over 10 years old and, as shown in the table below, 31 percent of DOJ’s legacy systems are over 15 years old. As a result, devices function only on wideband land mobile radio channels that are no longer compliant with NTIA policy, or only with a Digital Encryption Standard algorithm that is no longer supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and is recognized as “weak” security. We were also told that the current encryption standard used by the majority of DOJ’s legacy systems is vulnerable to amateur hacking attempts and that communications may be intercepted by unauthorized parties, thereby jeopardizing operations. Further, most of DOJ’s current devices function in an analog versus digital mode, which means they have limited functionality and diminished voice communications quality. The following table lists the DOJ components’ legacy communications systems by age.

AGE OF DOJ COMPONENT LEGACY LAND MOBILE RADIOS SYSTEMS
As of September 2006

Another effect of DOJ’s current outdated land mobile radio systems is that most DOJ systems cannot support over-the-air re-keying of encryption codes, which means re-keying must be done manually. Also, most systems and devices are not compatible with the interoperability standard for over-the-air interface, which means that the units can function only with similar equipment. This limits (but does not eliminate) the options for interoperability among DOJ systems, as well as between DOJ systems and other law enforcement and homeland security personnel.

For example, the Department’s components have been able to establish some measure of interoperability among themselves and with state and local law enforcement organizations in specific law enforcement operations by using the current antiquated systems. But the process is not seamless and requires significant planning. During the Washington, D.C., area sniper shootings in 2002, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies needed to communicate in order to respond and relocate quickly. This required interoperability between communications systems operating in several different frequency bands, and adherence to the federal requirement that radios be programmed with encryption keys.

In order to achieve interoperability for this operation, special equipment was added to the participating law enforcement agencies’ systems to receive broadcasts from the originating systems and rebroadcast the message to the other law enforcement systems. Because these broadcasts were not encrypted, all law enforcement agencies could receive the communication. The drawbacks to this method were that non-law enforcement personnel were also able to receive the broadcast and the time required to plan and install the equipment.

In some cases, existing communications equipment used by DOJ components is no longer supported by the manufacturer, which means spare parts are difficult to find and maintenance is essentially a “custom service.” This is an important issue because according to the DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing, the decreasing reliability of this older equipment is a contributing factor to agents’ use of commercial devices instead of radios.

As shown in the table below, 73 percent of the Department’s 4,163 radio system sites are no longer supported by the manufacturer.

OBSOLETE DOJ COMPONENT LEGACY
LAND MOBILE RADIO SYSTEM SITES⁵⁰
As of September 2006

Another drawback to the current radio equipment is its size – older radios are large and obtrusive. When combined with the limited functionality and decreasing reliability, the size of current hand-held radios is such that agents are much less inclined to use them. Several DOJ officials told us that agents are sometimes using commercial cellular telephones and walkie‑talkies that are vulnerable to interception in lieu of hand‑held radios. In our judgment, this represents a serious risk to agents and Department law enforcement operations.

Cost Efficiency

When the Narrowband Communications Account was created in 1998, one of the primary concerns expressed in the appropriations language was the need to increase efficiency and savings through shared infrastructure and common procurement strategies. The 2002 IWN cost model estimated approximately $1.19 billion in additional investment costs if the departments do not collaborate and instead developed their own tactical communications solutions.

The DOJ CIO stated that from a cost perspective, he believes the 2002 IWN cost model estimate of increased costs to build separate systems is not unreasonable. However, in May 2006 the DOJ CIO identified a risk of funding falling substantially short of what is necessary to implement IWN. The mitigation strategies subsequently identified by the DOJ include looking for lower cost alternatives, reducing reliability and security features of the proposed solutions, and providing IWN coverage to only high‑priority areas.

If DOJ, DHS, and Treasury do not collaborate on a joint IWN solution, the government could miss the opportunity to save over $1 billion through shared infrastructure, common procurement strategies, and consolidation of redundant information technology investments.

Narrowband Requirement

As noted earlier, as new wireless technologies and applications have developed, the demand for spectrum-based services has increased and efficient use of the radio frequency spectrum has become critical. Therefore, under instruction from Congress in October 1993 to manage the radio frequency spectrum more efficiently, the NTIA mandated that land mobile radio systems operating at very high frequencies and ultra high frequencies convert to narrowband channel bandwidth communications systems by January 1, 2005, and January 1, 2008, respectively.

By 2004, several federal agencies were advising the NTIA that they would not be able to meet the January 1, 2005, deadline for converting their very high frequencies to narrowband operations. DOJ was one of the departments that reported it would not meet the deadline, citing the lack of suitable equipment and encryption capability as part of the reason for its non-compliance.

As shown in the following table, DOJ is one of the largest users of the very high frequency radio spectrum, with more than 14,000 frequency assignments. As of November 2005, approximately 70 percent of the radio frequencies assigned to DOJ were used for tactical communications support, which is critical to agent safety and operational effectiveness. The following table shows federal agency rate of compliance with the narrowband mandate.

NARROWBAND COMPLIANCE FOR AGENCIES WITH GREATER THAN 1,000
VERY HIGH FREQUENCY LICENSES⁵¹
As of April 18, 2006

As the table shows, the DOJ had the lowest narrowband compliance rate, at 22 percent, among the dozen agencies with at least 1,000 very high frequency licenses. According to the DOJ CIO and Deputy CIO for Information Sharing, because the DOJ is relying on IWN to replace the components’ noncompliant legacy radio systems, DOJ’s narrowband compliance rate will not improve unless the DOJ receives additional funding for the IWN conversion.

The Chief of the Spectrum Support Division of the Office of the Spectrum Management at NTIA told us that for calendar years 2005 and 2006, agencies that had not met the narrowband requirement were allowed to request waivers to continue protected wideband operations on the frequencies subject to the NTIA mandate. The Chief of the Spectrum Support Division said that during the past 2 years NTIA had received and granted tens of thousands of waiver requests.⁵²

WAIVERS GRANTED BY NTIA TO IWN PARTNERS
DURING CALENDAR YEARS 2005 AND 2006

Source:

OIG analysis of National Telecommunications and Information Administration data

However, in September 2006, NTIA’s Frequency Assignment Subcommittee approved a change to the NTIA Manual that eliminates the waiver provision and directs the Subcommittee to adjudicate only unresolved conflicts between agencies involving overlapping narrowband and wideband operations.

On October 11, 2006, DOJ submitted a waiver request for the 69 percent of its frequency assignments that have not been converted to narrowband. The NTIA Subcommittee rejected DOJ’s waiver request. As a result, beginning January 1, 2007, DOJ will be operating on a non-interference basis on 10,129 frequency assignments. This means that DOJ law enforcement communications on those frequency assignments may be subject to interference from narrowband communications of other agencies and that DOJ will have no basis to request the interfering operation to stop. Further, if DOJ wideband operations interfere with other users’ narrowband operations, DOJ could be required to cease operating on the frequency.

We discussed DOJ’s ability to change frequencies in such an event with the DOJ Spectrum Manager. She said that the DOJ could not change frequencies without buying new equipment. The DOJ Spectrum Manager told us that the DOJ would continue to ask for waivers until the IWN acquisition process is completed and adequate funding and technological advances in equipment allow IWN to be implemented across the country. The DOJ Spectrum Manager also stated that as a result of the NTIA Subcommittee’s action, DOJ is elevating its request for waivers to the Department of Commerce’s Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information.

The DOJ’s failure to meet the NTIA narrowband mandate, coupled with NTIA’s recent denial of the DOJ’s request to keep operating on the non-narrowband frequencies means that DOJ law enforcement communications could be subject to interference from the narrowband operations of other agencies. Further, if DOJ’s wideband operations interfere on the narrowband operations of other agencies, DOJ could be required to cease operations on those frequency assignments. Under either of these circumstances, DOJ law enforcement operations could be compromised due to the inability to communicate effectively and the potential for garbled, incomprehensible, or incomplete transmissions.

Interoperability

The initial IWN design that was the basis for the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project addressed interoperability by planning for gateways that would allow IWN users to communicate with state and local public safety communication systems. According to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission):

The inability to communicate was a critical element at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash sites, where multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded. The occurrence of this problem at three very different sites is strong evidence that compatible and adequate communications among public safety organizations at the local, state, and federal levels remains an important problem.⁵³

We asked the IWN Executive Board representatives about IWN’s progress toward achieving the goal of interoperability.

According to the DHS CIO, DOJ and DHS can achieve interoperability, including wireless communications interoperability, through gateways between JUTNet and OneNet, the two primary departmental networks. The DHS CIO told us that because the DHS cannot wait for IWN, it has included the requirement for IWN interoperability in its recent Secure Border Initiative contract.⁵⁴

According to the DOJ Chief Information Officer, DHS’s following an independent approach would not rule out interoperability, but the resulting communication system may not be as well coordinated as a system developed through an integrated approach and may make interoperability more difficult and costly to achieve. The DOJ Deputy CIO for Information Sharing told us that the JUTNet and OneNet networks could connect major points such as agency field offices through traditional land lines. This official told us that once these networks are established, interoperability between the systems would be fairly simple, but not an inherent part of the networks.

The Treasury Chief Information Officer advised us that if DHS pursues an independent approach “interoperability will be fuzzy,” and that as long as one department is free to go their own way, nothing can be done to improve interoperability. He also stated that the goal of all the departments is to increase interoperability, not only for emergency situations, but for day‑to‑day operations. The Treasury Chief Information Officer told the OIG that “At the end of the day, no one wants to be the department that did not work to develop interoperability. Each of the representatives has leadership responsibilities to do what is best for the government.”

The level of interoperability described by the IWN Executive Board representatives does not reflect the seamless communications capability originally envisioned for the network and, in our judgment, may not be adequate in the event of another terrorist attack or natural disaster.

Conclusion

Our audit found that the IWN program is facing significant challenges and a high risk that the joint narrowband communications network originally envisioned for the DOJ, DHS, and Treasury will not be realized. Despite over 6 years of development and more than $195 million in funding for IWN, apart from one pilot system DOJ law enforcement agents have received little in the way of new, secure, compliant radio equipment through IWN. We found that the causes for the risk of failure include uncertain funding to complete the project, disparate departmental funding mechanisms, a fractured IWN partnership, and the lack of an effective governing structure for the project.

A failure of the IWN project would represent a significant missed opportunity to achieve needed communications interoperability among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, failure of the joint IWN project will require DOJ and other agencies to independently create communications networks, which we believe would result in substantially increased overall costs and less efficient use of the radio spectrum. Moreover, failure to upgrade DOJ components’ antiquated communications systems with or without IWN would represent an unnecessary risk to the safety of DOJ law enforcement agents and Department law enforcement operations.

DOJ has been relying on IWN to address a myriad of problems with its current wireless communications systems, which consist of multiple stove‑piped land mobile radio systems with infrastructure dating back 15 to 20 years. Over the years, the performance of these systems has degraded in terms of coverage, reliability, and usability. Of the Department’s 4,163 radio system sites 3,022 are no longer supported by the manufacturer, which means spare parts are difficult to find and maintenance is essentially a “custom service.” In addition, much of the Department’s current radio equipment is large and obtrusive. We were told that the size of current hand-held radios, combined with their limited functionality and decreasing reliability, has lead some DOJ agents to use commercial cellular telephones and walkie-talkies that are vulnerable to interception in lieu of hand‑held radios.

Just to replace DOJ’s antiquated legacy wireless communications equipment would cost DOJ approximately $900 million. However, the DOJ will require more than twice that amount to fund its share of IWN. Consequently, for the DOJ, DHS, and Treasury to complete IWN as planned, a major infusion of funding will be required over the next several years.

Our audit found that the fractured nature of the current IWN partnership and the disjointed approach of the two primary partners to achieve the IWN goals seriously threaten the success of the IWN program. In order to salvage the intended multi-agency project, we believe IWN requires a partnership among the agencies involved with a commitment to common goals and methods to achieve those goals. DOJ, DHS, and Treasury need to commit to a joint IWN solution rather than addressing individual communications issues in their respective departments. The three departments also must develop a cohesive management approach to direct IWN development and deployment.

The current ineffective governing structure of the IWN program has led to significant delays in the program. Valuable time has been spent reaching decisions between agencies that are revisited due to turnover of key personnel. Due to the complexity, expense, and critical nature of this program, a coordinated and effective governing structure is imperative for IWN to succeed.

Recommendations

We recommend that:

1. DOJ reach an agreement with the DHS and Treasury Deputy Secretaries that reflects each agency’s commitment to the IWN project. This agreement should explicitly state the shared goals, responsibilities, and resource contributions and funding requirements of the sponsoring departments.

2. If the departments are unable to reach agreement on a unified approach, we recommend that the DOJ notify Congress and the Office of Management and Budget that the IWN project is not viable as a joint project with DHS, and that the three Departments are pursuing their own IWN strategy to meet their wireless communications requirements.

3. In addition, if DOJ is unable to reach agreement on a unified approach with DHS and Treasury, the DOJ should develop and implement a departmental plan to upgrade its legacy wireless communications systems.

4. Require the Assistant Attorney General for Administration to ensure that an agreement is reached that allows DOJ to continue its wideband operations on very high and ultra high frequencies without interference.

41. A gateway is a hardware and software-driven interface that will interpret control protocol of different radio systems and allow them to be compatible with the network.

42. Life cycle costs are the estimated costs associated with program planning, project implementation, and the operation and maintenance of legacy and IWN communications systems over a 15 year period.

    Under the current IWN partnership MOU, DOJ and DHS equally share the design and implementation costs of IWN. Assuming the cost-sharing arrangement continues as the program goes forward, DOJ’s share of the estimated $5 billion in life cycle costs through 2021 is $2.5 billion.

43. The cost data contained in this chart was not audited by the OIG.

44. The Department Investment Technology Review Board is charged with overseeing the Department’s IT investment management program by monitoring the selection and performance of IT investments that are high profile, high cost, and/or high risk.

45. The Office of Management and Budget requires agencies to submit Exhibit 300s for major information technology investments as part of its budget justification and reporting process. The Exhibit 300 demonstrates compliance with capital programming and planning and investment control policies and justifies new or continued funding for major acquisitions. The Office of Management and Budget uses the Exhibit 300 to make decisions about budgetary resources and to assess agencies’ programming processes.

46. As previously defined, trunking is a computer-controlled system that uses all the available frequencies in a pool, automatically allocating an open frequency each time someone on the system initiates a radio call. Although trunking technology provides greater spectrum efficiency and functionality, this technology costs significantly more than conventional technology.

47. As we explain later, there has been significant turnover in the DHS CIO position during IWN’s development.

48. OneNet is a planned communications network intended to consolidate DHS components’ sensitive but unclassified data networks. JUTNet is a planned single, secure network that will handle classified and sensitive but unclassified material and will replace the DOJ’s current Justice Consolidated Network .

49. For the purpose of this audit, we are comparing the number of radio sites per reported system. Radio sites are typically the basic cost unit of a communications system.

50. For the purpose of this audit, we are comparing the number of radio sites per reported system. Radio sites are typically the basic cost unit of a communications system.

51. See Appendix 5 for agency licenses and rate of compliance.

52. See Appendix 6 for the waivers granted in 2005 and 2006.

53. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004)

54. The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure America’s borders. On September 18, 2006, DHS awarded a contract for information technology services, including telecommunications services, to implement SBInet along the United States northern and southern borders. SBInet is intended to detect and identify illegal entry attempts at U.S. land borders with Mexico and Canada.