FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
AND CASEWORK

U.S. Department of Justice
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Audit Division

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY*

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is responsible for investigating counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal matters. Counterterrorism was the FBI's top priority before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). Following 9/11 the FBI issued a new set of priorities and realigned its investigative resources by significantly increasing the number of field agents addressing terrorism-related matters, while reducing the number of field agents handling criminal investigative matters.

Between fiscal years (FY) 2003 and 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued three audit reports examining the FBI's allocation of its personnel resources and the changes in the types of cases it was handling after 9/11. In these reviews, we determined that the FBI was not adequately assessing or utilizing performance data to allocate resources and to evaluate the effects of the reprioritization of its resources. We recommended that the FBI systemically review its personnel allocation process and its methods for evaluating how its resources were used to allow it to better assess its investigative needs and to establish realistic personnel projections.

This follow-up audit examines the FBI's progress in managing its allocation of personnel resources and its investigative caseload. Specifically, the objective of this audit was to determine how the FBI has used its agent and intelligence analyst personnel resources between FY 2005 and mid-2009, to identify changes in the FBI's investigation of cases, and to ascertain whether the FBI has improved its resource management processes and oversight capabilities.

* The full version of this report includes information that the FBI considered to be classified or law enforcement sensitive, and therefore could not be publicly released. To create this public version of the report, the OIG redacted the portions of the full report that the FBI considered classified or law enforcement sensitive, and indicated where those redactions were made.

To accomplish these audit objectives, we obtained and analyzed FBI data related to its allocation of FBI field agent and intelligence analyst positions, its actual utilization of FBI field agents and intelligence analysts, and its investigative caseload for FY 2005 through mid-2009. We also reviewed FBI documentation on newly implemented resource management initiatives and tools. In addition, we interviewed FBI officials, including the Assistant Directors of the FBI’s operational divisions and Resource Planning Office, regarding FBI resource allocation and assessment processes, investigative priorities and threats, implementation and use of resource management initiatives and tools, and changes or anomalies in performance metrics.

We also performed audit work at five FBI field offices: Albuquerque, New Mexico; Chicago, Illinois; Jackson, Mississippi; San Francisco, California; and Washington, D.C. We selected these offices based on geographical dispersion, office size, and variances in local threats identified by the FBI. At each site, we interviewed executive field management and examined the implementation of headquarters-driven resource management initiatives. A more detailed description of our audit scope and methodology is contained in Appendix I.

Results in Brief

Of the total number of FBI field agents handling investigative priorities in FY 2009, 26 percent addressed counterterrorism matters, while 51 percent were devoted to criminal matters. This is a significant change from FY 2001 when the FBI used 13 percent of similar resources to address counterterrorism matters, while using 72 percent to address criminal matters.²

In our previous reviews, we determined that the FBI used significantly more field agent resources than it allocated for counterterrorism matters and used significantly fewer agents than allocated for non-terrorism matters. In this review, we found that the FBI generally used field agents in line with its allocation for its highest national priorities in FY 2009, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime, and civil rights.³ However, the FBI continued to use fewer field agents than allocated to

² In addition to counterterrorism and criminal matters, the FBI also devoted agents to address cyber and counterintelligence matters.

³ We were unable to compare the allocation and utilization of FBI field agents on public corruption matters, the FBI’s number four national investigative priority, because the field office allocation of positions for public corruption is not broken out separately from the white collar crime program allocation.
address its lowest national priorities, including criminal enterprises, white
collar crime, and violent crime. Moreover, we identified substantial gaps
between intelligence analyst positions allocated and utilized during our
review period, ranging from 183 in FY 2007 to 427 in FY 2009.

We also determined that, overall, the FBI reduced its number of active
cases between FYs 2005 and 2009 related to violent crime,
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and white collar crime. During that
time period, the FBI increased the number of active cyber crime, public
corruption, civil rights, and criminal enterprise cases.

Each FBI operational division has defined specific program priorities to
more effectively target their work on the FBI’s national priorities. We
determined that, in general, most FBI divisions were using resources as
planned and did not experience significant changes in the number of active
investigations on priority matters from FY 2005 to FY 2009.

The FBI stated that monthly program status reports and field office
strategy performance sessions were the primary mechanisms used by FBI
headquarters to assess the prioritized utilization of resources. However, we
found that the Counterintelligence Division was the only FBI operational
division that specifically tracked the amount of time expended by field
agents on the Division’s most significant investigative priorities. The
Counterterrorism, Cyber, and Criminal Investigative Divisions did not
evaluate performance in priority areas by tracking agent utilization data
according to specific investigative program priorities. Moreover, we found
that monthly status reports used by executive division management and
performance packages prepared for field operations strategy performance
sessions did not include data on agent utilization by priority area.

Nonetheless, we believe that the FBI has improved its ability to
monitor and evaluate its allocation and utilization of resources over the past
5 years. For example, it established the Resource Planning Office to manage
personnel resources and ensure these resources are aligned with the FBI’s
strategic goals. The FBI also developed a management information
system – the Compass system – to improve its ability to generate and use
performance data for managerial decisions. In addition, the FBI initiated
various resource management initiatives to enhance its assessment and
oversight of personnel resources.

However, the FBI had not formalized all of the policies and procedures
related to its resource management initiatives or fully integrated them into
FBI operational practices. This contributed to inconsistent execution of some
initiatives by FBI operational divisions and field offices. Furthermore, the
FBI has not provided to field offices sufficient direction on the goals and benefits of these initiatives. As a result, field offices have an incomplete understanding of how to implement some initiatives.

In our report, we make 10 recommendations to assist the FBI in assessing and overseeing the allocation of its personnel resources. Our full report contains detailed information on the results of our review of the FBI’s personnel resource management. The remaining sections of this Executive Summary summarize these audit findings.

FBI National Priorities’ Personnel Resource and Casework Analyses

The FBI has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., 56 field offices throughout the United States, over 400 sub-offices in smaller U.S. cities, and more than 60 international offices in U.S. embassies and consulate offices worldwide. As of July 31, 2009, the FBI had 32,709 employees: 13,249 special agents and 19,460 support professionals, such as intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, and information technology professionals. The FBI’s FY - '2009 budget was $7.3 billion.

The FBI’s top ten national priorities, which have not changed since the FBI Director established them in FY 2002, are listed in Exhibit 1.

| EXHIBIT 1 |
| FBI NATIONAL PRIORITIES |

1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack.
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes.
4. Combat public corruption at all levels.
5. Protect civil rights.
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises.
7. Combat major white collar crime.
8. Combat significant violent crime.
9. Support federal, state, county, municipal, and international partners.
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission.

Source: www.fbi.gov

The FBI’s National Security Branch and the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch are responsible for programs that address these
priorities. The National Security Branch oversees counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence activities, while the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch manages cyber and criminal investigative activities.\textsuperscript{4}

From FYs 2005 to 2009 the FBI increased its National Security Branch allocated personnel and decreased its Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch allocated personnel, thus reducing the difference between the number of field agents assigned to each branch by more than 1,400 agents.

\textit{Overall FBI Resource Utilization}

As discussed in our prior reviews of FBI resource management between FYs 1996 and 2004, before 9/11 the FBI was utilizing more resources on traditional criminal investigative areas than it was on terrorism, which was its number one priority even before 9/11. After 9/11, the FBI shifted its workload and focused more of its resources on terrorism and fewer resources on its traditional crime priorities, such as drug-related crime, gangs, and white collar crime.

The FBI has used more resources to address counterterrorism matters than on any other investigative area since 9/11.\textsuperscript{5} Between FYs 2001 and 2002, the FBI experienced the most significant changes in personnel resource utilization. Between FYs 2003 and 2009, the FBI, in general, consistently used field agent personnel on its investigative priority areas.

\textit{National Investigative Priorities}

\textbf{Resource Allocation and Utilization:} Exhibit 2 displays our analysis, by investigative priority, of the difference between FBI resources allocated and those actually utilized in that investigative priority, or what the FBI calls a

\textsuperscript{4} The National Security Branch includes the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence Divisions, and Directorate of Intelligence; and the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch includes the Cyber and Criminal Investigative Divisions.

\textsuperscript{5} The FBI tracks actual time worked by its field personnel in its Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system. Field agent personnel record the hours worked on different types of investigative cases, which is converted in TURK to Average On-Board (AOB) data. One AOB equals one agent and refers to either: (1) one agent working solely in a single investigative area, or (2) multiple agents working part-time on the same investigation. Non-supervisory field agents are the employees whose time is captured in these categories. FBI Headquarters personnel and top level field office management do not record time in TURK.
“burn rate.” We found that during FY 2009, the FBI generally used the number of field agents as allocated in four of its eight national investigative priorities: counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime, and civil rights. As of June 2009, the FBI was using only 30 more field agent resources (less than 1 percent) in these priority areas than it had allocated, as shown in the following exhibit. By contrast, in FY 2005 the FBI was using 950 more agents (26 percent) than allocated to these priority programs.

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6 The FBI uses the term "burn rate" to refer to the difference between allocated resources (Funded Staffing Level) and actual resources used (as reflected in its time utilization data base). An "overburn" occurs when more resources are used than allocated. In contrast, the FBI defines "underburn" as using fewer resources used than allocated.
EXHIBIT 2
FBI FIELD AGENT BURN RATES
BY NATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE PRIORITIES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

As we found in our previous reviews, the FBI continued to use fewer field agents than it allocated to address three of the remaining eight national investigative priorities – gangs, white collar crime, and violent crime. However, since 2005 the FBI generally has reduced the gaps between allocated and utilized resources in these areas. For instance, the FBI reduced the underutilization – or underburn – of field agent resources in its gangs program from 706 agents in FY 2005 to 180 as of June 2009.

7 The FBI does not allocate field agent personnel specifically for public corruption matters. Instead, those positions are incorporated into the white collar crime personnel allocation. Therefore, the burn rates for the FBI’s number four priority (public corruption) are not applicable, as depicted in the graph. The burn rates shown for the FBI’s number seven priority encompass the entire white collar crime program, which includes agents utilized on public corruption matters.
Active Cases: We found that between FYs 2005 and 2009 the number of cases related to several investigative priorities, including counterterrorism, counterintelligence, white collar crime, and violent crime decreased. By contrast, the number of cases relating to cyber crime, public corruption, civil rights, and criminal enterprise increased.

While the FBI used fewer resources on violent crime matters than it did in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, criminal enterprise, and white collar crime cases, the FBI investigated far more violent crime cases than any other program area.

Intelligence Analyst Resource Allocation and Utilization

We also reviewed the allocation and utilization levels of intelligence analysts from FYs 2005 to 2009 and found a significant gap between allocated intelligence analyst positions and analysts utilized. As illustrated in Exhibit 3, this gap increased from 199 in FY 2005 to 427 in FY 2009.

**EXHIBIT 3**

**FBI FIELD INTELLIGENCE ANALYST ALLOCATION & UTILIZATION**

**FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2009**

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

According to FBI officials, the TURK data will always show an underburn of intelligence analyst resources because supervisory intelligence
analysts (SIA) are included in the overall intelligence analyst allocation figures, but these individuals do not record their time in the TURK system. In addition, these officials said that the rate of attrition and the time it takes to hire applicants affected the FBI's ability to fill all vacant intelligence analyst positions. FBI officials said the attrition rate for intelligence analysts, which was estimated by the FBI to be between 6 and 12 percent, made it difficult to fill all vacant positions. FBI headquarters and field office management also attributed the high number of vacant analyst positions to not receiving annual appropriations and the resulting personnel allocations until late in the fiscal year and to the time-consuming process for hiring intelligence analysts.

FBI Operational Division Priorities

Exhibit 4 identifies which FBI operational divisions are primarily responsible for targeting its national priorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBI National Investigative Priority</th>
<th>Responsible Operational Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 Counterterrorism</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 Cyber Crime</td>
<td>Cyber Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 Public Corruption</td>
<td>Criminal Investigative Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 Civil Rights</td>
<td>Criminal Investigative Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 Gangs/Criminal Enterprises/Organized Crime</td>
<td>Criminal Investigative Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 White Collar Crime</td>
<td>Criminal Investigative Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 Violent Crime</td>
<td>Criminal Investigative Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI

The FBI’s national priorities provide a strategic framework for prioritizing the allocation of FBI personnel resources. Within these priorities, the FBI’s operational divisions identify a subset of priorities based upon the most significant threats specific to their areas of responsibility. For example,

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According to Directorate of Intelligence officials there were 55, 67, 82, 91, and 129 SIA's onboard during FYs 2005 through 2009, respectively. The FBI's FY 2009 allocation for SIA's was 155.

In its April 2007 audit of Intelligence Analyst Hiring, the OIG found that it took the FBI an average of 217 days from when the FBI closed its announcement for an intelligence analyst job opening until the intelligence analyst candidate entered on duty.
for FY 2009 the Criminal Division identified corporate fraud as its top priority within the financial crimes area, and the Counterterrorism Division's top priority within its international terrorism program was Al Qaeda.

To analyze FBI personnel resource utilization according to the specific programmatic priorities within each operational division, we asked the operational divisions for a list of their programmatic priorities and associated investigative classifications for each fiscal year from 2007 to 2009. During our audit, the Counterintelligence Division was the only operational division to provide us with readily available and previously developed documentation identifying the investigative classifications associated with its program-specific priorities. Based upon our discussions with Counterintelligence Division officials, it was evident that they reviewed the resources expended on counterintelligence priorities. However, upon our request, the FBI's other operational divisions had to create a list of investigative classifications relating to their programmatic priorities. At the audit close-out meeting, FBI officials presented us with monthly program status reports and stated that executive management in the Counterterrorism, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions use these reports to evaluate performance according to investigative priorities. However, the Criminal Investigative Division was the only division, though not until November 2009, that included in its status reports personnel resource utilization data associated with priority programs.

Given the FBI's emphasis of focusing its operations based on highest-priority threats, we believe that the FBI should ensure that all of its operational divisions are identifying the investigative classifications associated with its program-specific national priorities. We believe that it would be beneficial for the FBI to automate these reports through its management information system (Compass), which would allow FBI headquarters to more easily and more effectively monitor the use of field agent resources on these priority matters. Additionally, the FBI should ensure that personnel utilization is included on each division's monthly status report.

Using the investigative classification listings that the operational divisions provided, we examined the percentage of resources utilized and the number of active cases associated with priority matters for all of the FBI's investigative program areas. The following sections summarize these analyses for the international terrorism, public corruption, and white collar crime programs.

International Terrorism

The FBI reduced the total number of field agents utilized for international terrorism matters from approximately 4000 in FY 2005 to
approximately in FY 2009. As reflected in Exhibit 5, throughout this period approximately percent of field agents working international terrorism matters were focused on the top international terrorism priorities during FYs 2005 through 2009. The FBI stated that the primary reason for the 15 percent decrease in agents handling matters and the 16 percent increase in matters was the result of the Counterterrorism Division refining its threat structure to more accurately track and differentiate its operations.

EXHIBIT 5
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PRIORITY MATTERS FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

In terms of international terrorism casework the overall number of active cases has generally declined throughout our review period, as have the active cases associated with . In contrast, when comparing FY 2009 to FY 2005, the number of active cases associated with has increased.
Public Corruption

As displayed in Exhibit 6, the FBI used 107 more agents on public corruption matters in FY 2009 than it did during FY 2005. The largest increase occurred in federal corruption matters, which increased by 5 percent between FYs 2005 and 2009.

EXHIBIT 6
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON PUBLIC CORRUPTION PRIORITY MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Federal Corruption</th>
<th>State &amp; Local Corruption</th>
<th>Law Enforcement Corruption</th>
<th>Non-Priority Matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009 As of June 2009</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Agents 605 687 713 732 712

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

As reflected in Exhibit 7, the FBI experienced a gradual increase in the number of active cases associated with its top three public corruption priorities – federal corruption, state corruption, and law enforcement corruption. Most significantly, the number of active federal corruption cases increased by 50 percent between FYs 2005 and 2009.

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10 For presentation purposes, we combined the fourth through eleventh national public corruption priorities into the category entitled “Other Priority Matters.” Additionally, the Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” This category was created by the OIG and reflects time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
White Collar Crime

As reflected in Exhibit 8, the total number of agents investigating white collar crimes decreased by over 100 agents between FYs 2005 and 2009. However, between FYs 2005 and 2009 agents expended on financial institution fraud matters increased by 7 percent.
As depicted in Exhibit 9, the number of active corporate and securities fraud cases – the top white collar crime priority – increased during our review period. The number of active cases associated with financial institution fraud decreased between FYs 2005 and 2007 and then increased during FYs 2008 and 2009.

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11 For presentation purposes, we combined the fourth through seventh national white collar crime priorities into the category entitled “Other Priority Matters.” Additionally, the Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” This category was created by the OIG and reflects time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
Personnel Resource Planning and Assessments

The FBI has taken several steps to improve its resource management. For example, the FBI created the Resource Planning Office in FY 2006 to attempt to ensure that the allocation of its financial and human resources are aligned with its strategic goals. As discussed below, with the assistance of the Resource Planning Office the FBI has established several initiatives to improve its ability to assess, allocate, and utilize resources in accordance with strategic priorities.

FBI Personnel Planning and Allocation Processes

Before the Resource Planning Office was created, the FBI’s former Resource Management and Allocation Office was responsible for allocating the FBI’s human resources and establishing funded staffing levels for agents and professional staff (including intelligence analysts). In this process, field offices submitted ad-hoc resource requests to the Resource Management and Allocation Office throughout the year. However, Resource Management and Allocation Office personnel did not analyze the program managers’ staffing recommendations to determine whether they were sound.
In FY 2006, the FBI modified its annual resource allocation process by establishing the Corporate Resource Planning Board.\textsuperscript{12} While the ultimate decision on where to allocate resources rests with the FBI Director, the Corporate Resource Planning Board reviews how resource requests correspond with national priorities and votes on resource allocation decisions.

Additionally, the Resource Planning Office instituted a formalized semiannual resource enhancement and realignment process. For each requested resource enhancement or realignment, field offices and headquarters program managers must provide a justification for the change, how the change is expected to reduce a particular threat or risk for the field office, and whether the change will fill any existing resource shortages. The Resource Planning Office compiles and analyzes the results by investigative program area and provides this information to the Corporate Resource Planning Board for review and concurrence. The final results are provided to the Director for final approval.

Field office managers often realign resources on a temporary basis when an emerging threat or a high-profile matter arises and these temporary adjustments do not require official approval. Resource Planning Office officials agreed that, when necessary, field offices can and should move resources without approval on a temporary basis. However, the FBI has not defined “temporary.” One field office manager explained that the field office was using more agent resources than were allocated to its violent crime program for nearly 2 years because of a large, active case. We believe these long-term realignments, which have been classified as “temporary” by FBI field office officials, can hinder the Resource Planning Office’s oversight of the realignment and allocation process. If FBI headquarters officials are unaware of how resources are actually aligned in field offices when new enhancement decisions are made, they may approve resource enhancements to offices that do not have the greatest need.

In February 2009, the FBI began considering the development of a risk-based resource management initiative that would identify risk indicators affecting field offices and allocate agent positions to field offices based upon

\textsuperscript{12} The Corporate Resource Planning Board membership includes the FBI Associate Deputy Director, all Executive Assistant Directors, the Assistant Director of the Resource Planning Office, and executives from FBI headquarters and field offices.
those indicators. During our audit, FBI officials associated with the development of the risk-based resource management initiative stated that the FBI did not have a written plan for executing the project and did not have expected milestones, including a date of completion.

We found confusion among FBI personnel regarding the implementation and expected use of this risk-based resource management approach. In October 2009, a senior FBI official stated that the first iteration of this risk-based approach would be used in the allocation of FY 2010 agent positions for five FBI programs, including foreign counterintelligence, international terrorism, mortgage fraud, cyber computer intrusion, and weapons of mass destruction. Because the FBI appeared ready to begin implementing this initiative, we asked for documentation on the initiative, including any program plans and documents pertaining to the program’s development and implementation. FBI officials stated that the initiative was in its infancy and that a specific implementation plan had not been established. As of March 2010, the FBI had provided no documentation responsive to our request for information related to the risk-based management initiative.

At the March 2010 close-out meeting for this audit, FBI officials stated that the risk-based management initiative was, as of December 2009, developed, released, completed, and integrated into every investigative program’s resource allocation methodology and decision-making processes. At the close-out meeting, the FBI provided risk-based management initiative documentation dating back to March 2009. FBI officials said that they chose not to provide us with information related to the risk-based management initiative at the time we requested it because the program was in its infancy and not ready for external review.

Following our March 2010 close-out meeting, the FBI provided us with a briefing on the risk-based management initiative. During this briefing, we learned that the risk-based methodology includes empirical data related to program-specific risk indicators and provides for the weighting of that information. Moreover, the initiative allows for the inclusion of subjective information from subject matter experts and FBI executive management. Resource Planning Office officials demonstrated the use of the new methodology in allocating personnel enhancements to the FBI’s White Collar Crime Program for addressing mortgage fraud. The FBI used this as an

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13 Risk indicators highlight the potential for an adverse outcome of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with events.

14 According to the FBI the Directorate of Intelligence did not utilize the risk-based management initiative, but plans to incorporate the methodology in FY 2010.
example to illustrate the extensive work that operational divisions devoted to developing the risk indicators and other data needed for implementation of the methodology.

Because we were not provided relevant documentation during our audit, we were unable to examine whether the risk-based management initiative will provide the FBI’s operational divisions with effective, adequate, and appropriate means of evaluating resource needs and making personnel allocation decisions. As with any new program, the FBI must ensure that its risk-based management initiative is appropriately enhancing its resource management efforts according to the specific needs and operations of its investigative programs. We recommend that the FBI establish and disseminate policies and procedures for the execution of the risk-based management initiative, if it will be used for future resource allocations.

Operational Divisions’ Resource Assessment

We evaluated the operational divisions’ resource assessment methodologies in place prior to the release of the risk-based management initiative for FY 2010 field agent resource allocations. We found a wide variance in the methodologies used by operational divisions to determine their personnel resource needs and to allocate resources. The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division was the only operational division that had designed and used a formal, complete, and current resource assessment tool. The Counterintelligence Division’s resource module annually identifies and weighs criteria associated with threats and demographics in field offices’ areas of responsibility to determine the appropriate number of resources to allocate to each field office.\textsuperscript{15} The Counterintelligence Division bases resource allocation and realignment decisions, in part, on the results of this module.

The other operational divisions’ resource assessment methodologies were not as well-developed as the Counterintelligence Division’s methodology. In comparison, some of these methodologies lacked sophistication to assist the FBI in allocating resources to the areas of greatest need. The FBI’s new risk-based management initiative may represent a more advanced methodology for the allocation of resources. We believe that the FBI should continue its efforts to implement a sophisticated approach to personnel resource allocation.

\textsuperscript{15} Weights decipher the importance of various criteria, such as the number of active cases and number of human sources.
The FBI’s Strategy Management System

In FY 2006, the Resource Planning Office supervised the implementation of the FBI’s Strategy Management System to assist in aligning resources and internal activities to FBI priorities. In creating the Strategy Management System, the FBI developed a strategy map that diagrams the cause and effect relationship between strategic objectives, and it also established measurements, targets, and initiatives to track and achieve those objectives.

Based on our review of Strategy Management System documentation and our discussions with FBI officials, we found that the Counterintelligence Division established strategic objectives and performance measures related to personnel resources, as required by the FBI’s enterprise-wide strategy map. The Counterterrorism, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions and the Directorate of Intelligence also incorporated personnel resources into their strategic objectives. However, the performance measures associated with the objectives did not incorporate personnel resources and instead focused solely on financial resources. We recommend that all FBI operational divisions should develop performance measures that help ensure personnel resources are allocated and utilized in accordance with their priorities, as the Counterintelligence Division has done.

FBI Management and Oversight of Personnel Resources

As discussed below, to help it better monitor and manage the use of its personnel resources, the FBI has developed its Compass system, begun routine operational oversight meetings, and implemented a new semi-annual performance reporting and review practice.

Compass Development and Deployment

In 2005, the FBI developed its Compass system, which is a web-based executive management information system that provides FBI senior executives, as well as headquarters and field office management, with up-to-date performance data. Compass displays key information, such as current data on FBI investigative workload, resource utilization, and casework, for each of the FBI’s operational divisions and field offices. We

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16 Compass extracts and analyzes performance data related to resource use, casework, and intelligence information from the following seven FBI source data systems: (1) Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK), (2) Monthly Administrative Report (MAR), (3) Automated Case Support (ACS), (4) Integrated Statistical Reporting Analysis Application (ISRAAA), (5) Financial Management System (FMS), (6) Bureau Personnel Management System (BPMS), and (7) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) management system.
found that FBI headquarters and field office executives used Compass to prepare for periodic headquarters inquiries and meetings with the FBI Director, as well as to compare field offices' burn rates.

One limitation of Compass is that the totals for active cases include non-casework data, such as informant and training files, which could skew some statistics. However, at the audit close-out meeting FBI officials explained that they added a filter feature to Compass in May 2009 that enabled users to break out program classifications and exclude non-casework data from their queries. We observed a demonstration of this new feature, but noted that a Compass user must manually filter out this information, as well as know that non-casework data is included in overall casework statistics. We believe it would benefit Compass users if the system automatically filtered out this data from investigative case information.

The general consensus among FBI officials we interviewed was that Compass is an improvement upon the prior practice of manually extracting data from the FBI's many source data systems. Additionally, Compass provides more information and data than was previously available to FBI management.

**Resource Allocation Planning Tool**: The Resource Allocation Planning Tool is an enhancement to the Compass system that enables field offices to identify program vacancies; review their organizational charts by squads; and evaluate contractors, detailees, task force officers, and state and local assistance in certain investigative areas. If the Resource Allocation Planning Tool is used as intended, it can also help alleviate complaints from field managers regarding Compass' inability to display agents who are detailed to FBI headquarters or external assignments, rather than still associating an essentially vacant position with the field office. However, we determined that many field office managers were not familiar with the information contained in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool or how the information was updated.

We determined that the Resource Planning Office has not disseminated policy or procedures that require field offices to evaluate and update information in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool within an established timeframe to ensure that the information is accurate. We recommend that the FBI enact a policy requiring field offices to keep information in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool current.
Strategy Performance Sessions and Semi-Annual Program Reviews

In FY 2007, the FBI Deputy Director began holding Strategy Performance Sessions among FBI headquarters and field offices related to FBI performance and resource-related decisions. The goal of the Strategy Performance Sessions initiative is to ensure headquarters and field office performance are directly linked to the FBI’s strategic goals and priority threats.

In addition, Semi-Annual Program Reviews were developed by the Inspection Division to examine field office performance in program accomplishments, intelligence production, and utilization of resources. Similar to the Strategy Performance Sessions’ goal, the objective of the Semi-Annual Program Reviews is to strengthen field office implementation of the FBI’s national strategy and increase management oversight of field office performance in achieving strategic goals.

We believe that these Strategy Performance Sessions and Semi-Annual Program Reviews initiatives have increased the interaction between FBI field office personnel and headquarters executive management. However, there appears to be confusion between what headquarters intends these initiatives to accomplish and what field offices perceive as their purpose. For instance, headquarters officials told us they perceived the Semi-Annual Program Review initiative as a way for the FBI to more proactively address resource issues and to strengthen the field offices’ implementation of the national strategic plan. However, field office officials were uncertain of how FBI headquarters used the results of the Semi-Annual Program Reviews because headquarters did not provide feedback during the first round of these reviews. We believe FBI headquarters management needs to ensure that field office management understands the goals and benefits of the Strategy Performance Sessions and Semi-Annual Program Reviews. FBI headquarters officials asserted that in the second version of the Semi-Annual Program Reviews every field office was provided feedback and allowed to challenge their reviews.

Field Office Threats: During Strategy Performance Sessions, each field office must identify its top three threats and justify their selection. We obtained a listing of these top three threats for each office and requested a list of investigative classifications associated with the top three threats for each of the field offices we visited (Albuquerque, Chicago, Jackson,

17 Strategy Performance Sessions are quarterly-management forums between FBI headquarters and field office executives by secure video teleconference.
San Francisco, and Washington). We found that the field offices did not readily know what investigative classifications were associated with their top three threats and had to develop listings in response to our request.

In addition, when we reviewed the list of investigative classifications associated with the field offices’ top threats, we noted that some field offices included classifications that did not appear to pertain to their threats. We also found that although two offices identified similar threats, these offices did not associate the same investigative classifications with those same threats. One office listed 20 investigative classifications associated with its efforts on a top threat, while the other office with the same top threat included only 7 classifications. Therefore, we believe that the data provided to headquarters during a Strategy Performance Session may not be an accurate portrayal of a field office’s performance on combating threats. We recommend that the FBI establish mechanisms to ensure consistency in field offices’ identification of investigative classifications associated with their top threats.

**Initiative Implementation Concerns**

We believe that, to be successful, the FBI’s initiatives related to strategic and resource management require regular reinforcement from the FBI and an understanding among the workforce of the initiatives’ overall objectives.

Historically, the FBI has had significant turnover of headquarters and field office personnel, and this turnover can affect the continuity of initiatives such as the Strategy Management System and the Strategy Performance Sessions. We believe it is important for the FBI to integrate these initiatives into overall operational practices, reinforce guidance on these initiatives throughout the entire agency, and clarify for field managers the expectations for these initiatives.

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18 Our specific analysis on these field offices’ threats is contained in Appendix IV.
FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF
FBI PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK

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INTRODUCTION

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reoriented its top priorities to counterterrorism and counterintelligence. As part of its transformation efforts, the FBI issued a new set of priorities and realigned its investigative resources to increase the number of agents handling terrorism-related matters, while reducing the number of agents handling traditional criminal matters. At the same time, the FBI has evolved from a law enforcement-based, case-driven, focus to a more threat-driven and strategic focus.\(^{19}\)

Between Fiscal Years (FY) 2003 and 2005, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued three reports focused on the FBI’s resource allocations and investigative caseload, as well as the internal and external effects of its reprioritization.\(^{20}\) These reports provided empirical data on FBI special agent time utilization and cases opened and closed by the FBI. Specifically, the OIG determined that the FBI did not open as many investigations and substantially reduced the number of agents devoted to traditional criminal areas, such as drugs, financial crime, and violent crime. The OIG also determined that the FBI was not adequately assessing performance data to allocate resources and to identify changes in its casework.

In two additional reviews, the OIG evaluated the FBI’s efforts in hiring, selecting, training, and retaining intelligence analysts.\(^{21}\) During these reviews the OIG identified significant deficiencies in the FBI’s intelligence

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\(^{19}\) Appendix II includes a timeline illustrating the FBI’s operational evolution since September 2001.


analyst resource management, including the absence of the use of threat assessments in determining the allocation of intelligence analysts.\footnote{22}

The objective of this audit was to determine how the FBI has used its agent and intelligence analyst personnel resources between FYs 2005 and mid-2009, to identify changes in the FBI’s investigation of cases, and to ascertain whether the FBI has improved its resource management processes and oversight capabilities.

The FBI has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., 56 field offices throughout the United States, over 400 sub-offices or resident agencies in smaller U.S. cities, and more than 60 international offices in U.S. embassies and consulate offices worldwide. As of July 31, 2009, the FBI had 32,709 employees: 13,249 special agents and 19,460 support professionals, such as intelligence analysts, language specialists, scientists, and information technology professionals. The FBI’s FY 2009 budget was $7.3 billion.

**FBI Resource and Casework Data**

During our previous reviews, we obtained and analyzed FBI personnel resource allocation and utilization data, as well as casework data, from FYs 1996 through 2004. In this follow-up audit, we analyzed data covering FYs 2005 through June 2009.\footnote{23} The following sections provide a brief overview of the data maintained by the FBI.

**FBI Resource Allocations**

The FBI allocates its personnel resources among field offices by establishing Funded Staffing Levels (FSL). One FSL equates to one funded employee, or one full-time equivalent (FTE). The FBI assigns agent positions to field offices according to investigative programs (or subprograms), such as white collar crime. In contrast, intelligence analyst allocation data is not tracked by specific investigative areas; it is tracked in total by field office.

\footnote{22} The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also conducted several reviews of the FBI’s transformation and reorganization efforts, which identified the FBI’s progress in realigning staff resources, but also noted that as of June 2004 the FBI was still using temporary reassignments to address priorities.

\footnote{23} The FY 2009 resource utilization and allocation data obtained was as of June 2009, while the case data was as of May 2009.
**FBI Resource Utilization**

The FBI develops a resource utilization plan through its FSL assignments, although actual utilization of its resources often deviates from the plan, sometimes because of local conditions and emerging national and local threats.

The FBI tracks actual time worked by its field personnel in its Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system. Field agent personnel record the percentage of their time worked on different types of investigative cases, which is converted in TURK to Average On-Board (AOB) data. One AOB equals one agent and refers to either: (1) one agent working solely in a single investigative area, or (2) multiple agents working part-time on the same investigation. For example, three agents spending one-third of their time investigating a bank robbery is equivalent to one agent working the case full-time, or one AOB. This same rationale applies to field intelligence analysts.

Unlike resource allocations (or FSLs), AOB is tracked by specific investigative classifications, which are assigned to programs or subprograms. Exhibit I-1 illustrates this categorization scheme.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Program</td>
<td>White Collar Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subprogram</td>
<td>Securities/Commodities Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classification</td>
<td>Corporate Fraud</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: FBI

**FBI Casework**

The FBI maintains the universe of data about its cases within its Automated Case Support (ACS) system. Similar to the resource utilization data, ACS data is tracked at the specific investigative classification level and includes data on the dates of case openings and closings.
FBI Structural Reorganization

According to the FBI Director, the initial phase of the FBI’s post-9/11 transformation was its immediate response to the new terrorist threat. Since the initial phase, the FBI has restructured its organization four times. The latest restructuring occurred in FY 2006 and arranged the FBI into five primary branches – each headed by an Executive Assistant Director – and established the position of Associate Deputy Director, who is responsible for management of the FBI’s personnel, budget, administration, and infrastructure. Exhibit I-2 displays the FBI’s current organizational structure, which has been in place since FY 2006.

In this review, we mainly focused on: (1) operational divisions within the National Security Branch and the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch because these are the primary FBI components responsible for investigative and intelligence work; and (2) the Resource Planning Office and Inspection Division because of their oversight of FBI resource management initiatives.


25 Appendix III contains the FBI’s former organizational structure, as of March 2004.
The National Security Branch was established in response to a presidential directive to create a National Security Service that combines the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI. The mission of this branch is to lead and coordinate intelligence efforts that drive actions to protect the United States.

The Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch is responsible for overseeing criminal and cyber investigations, coordination with law enforcement, international operations, and crisis response, as well as ensuring that the criminal programs receive strategic guidance and support.
In recent years, the FBI has shifted personnel resources from the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch’s investigative programs to support National Security Branch programs. As depicted in Exhibit I-3, from FYs 2005 to 2009 the FBI increased its National Security Branch allocated personnel resources and decreased Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch allocated personnel, thus reducing the difference between the number of field agents assigned to each branch by more than 1,400 agents.

EXHIBIT I-3
FBI SPECIAL AGENT RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

FBI Resource Management Overhaul

To address its overall resource management, the FBI created the Resource Planning Office in 2006. The purpose of this office is to manage FBI financial and human resources to ensure they are aligned with its strategic planning.

Through the Resource Planning Office, the FBI has implemented several initiatives to help ensure resources are utilized efficiently and in accord with FBI strategic objectives and priorities. These initiatives were developed to enhance the transparency of resource decisions and data, encourage dialogue between field offices and headquarters, and improve program and resource performance oversight. The FBI also developed a
management information system that includes data related to FBI performance, including field agent utilization and casework.

**OIG Audit Approach**

This review was performed as a follow-up to our previous work and to examine the FBI’s progress in managing resources and casework to ensure that its investigative responsibilities are carried out according to its strategic goals. Specifically, our objectives were to determine whether the FBI has: (1) used personnel resources and investigated cases in accordance with its top priorities and threats, and (2) developed and executed an infrastructure to better assess and allocate personnel resources to each area of the FBI’s operations based on the investigative needs of the organization.

To accomplish these audit objectives, we reviewed and examined FBI documentation on newly implemented resource management initiatives and tools. We also obtained FBI data related to its allocation of FBI field agent and intelligence analyst positions, its actual utilization of FBI field agents and intelligence analysts, and its investigative caseload for FY 2005 through mid-2009. In addition, we interviewed FBI officials, including the Assistant Directors of the FBI’s operational divisions and Resource Planning Office, regarding FBI resource allocation and assessment processes, investigative priorities and threats, implementation and use of resource management initiatives and tools, and changes or anomalies in performance metrics.

We also visited five FBI field offices to perform additional audit work. We selected these offices based on geographical dispersion, office size, and variances in local threats identified. We visited FBI field offices located in Washington, D.C.; Chicago, Illinois; Jackson, Mississippi; Albuquerque, New Mexico; and San Francisco, California. At each site, we interviewed executive field management and examined the implementation of headquarters-driven resource management initiatives. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology is contained in Appendix I.

The results of our review are detailed in Findings I through III. Finding I provides an overview of FBI resource utilization and casework from FYs 2005 to 2009, which provides an overall picture of the FBI’s investigative work. Finding II presents our analyses of FBI human resource utilization and case data for specific operational divisions’ and field offices’ priorities. Finding III focuses on the FBI’s development of new resource management tools, procedures, and initiatives to allocate resources, as well as operational divisions’ and field offices’ implementation of these newly developed resource management mechanisms.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

I. FBI NATIONAL PRIORITY RESOURCE UTILIZATION AND CASEWORK

In FY 2009, the FBI generally used field agents as allocated on four of its five top national priorities: counterterrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crimes, and civil rights. However, the FBI used significantly fewer field agents than allocated on national priorities six through eight – criminal enterprises, white collar crime, and violent crime. Moreover, the gap between intelligence analyst positions allocated and utilized between FYs 2005 and 2009 was substantial. We also found that the FBI reduced the number of active cases between FYs 2005 and 2009 related to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, white collar crime, and violent crime.

FBI National Priorities

The FBI’s top ten national priorities, which have not changed since the FBI Director established them in FY 2002, are listed in Exhibit 1-1.

EXHIBIT 1-1
FBI NATIONAL PRIORITIES

1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack.
2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage.
3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes.
4. Combat public corruption at all levels.
5. Protect civil rights.
6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises.
7. Combat major white collar crime.
8. Combat significant violent crime.
10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI's mission.

Source: www.fbi.gov

Overall FBI Resource Utilization

In our prior reviews of FBI resource management between FYs 1996 and 2004, we found that before 9/11 the FBI was utilizing more resources on traditional criminal investigative areas than it was on terrorism,
which was its number one priority even before 9/11. After 9/11, the FBI shifted its workload and focused more of its resources on terrorism and fewer resources on its traditional crime priorities, such as drug-related crime, gangs, and white collar crime.

Exhibit 1-2 displays the FBI’s use of field agent resources by investigative priority area from FYs 2001 to 2009. As depicted in this Exhibit, the FBI has used more resources to address counterterrorism matters than on any other investigative area since 9/11.\textsuperscript{26} Between FYs 2001 and 2003, the FBI experienced the most significant changes in resource utilization. However, between FYs 2004 and 2009, the FBI’s use of field agent resources on its investigative priority areas has remained steady.

\textsuperscript{26} The FBI tracks actual time worked by its field personnel in its Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system. Field agent personnel record the percentage of their time worked on different types of investigative cases, which is converted in TURK to Average On-Board (AOB) data. One AOB equals one agent and refers to either: (1) one agent working solely in a single investigative area, or (2) multiple agents working part-time on the same investigation. Non-supervisory field agents are the employees whose time is captured in these categories. FBI Headquarters personnel and top level field office management do not record time in TURK.
National Investigative Priorities – Personnel Resources and Casework

We compared the allocation of field agent personnel to the actual utilization of field agents (known as “burn rates”) for the FBI’s top eight national priorities.27 We also obtained and analyzed the number of FBI open (active) cases related to its top eight national investigative priorities from FY 2005 through May 2009.

National Priority One (Counterterrorism)

Resource Allocation and Utilization – Exhibit 1-3 displays the total number of field agents the FBI allocated to address counterterrorism matters, as well as the number of field agents actually used by the FBI to address counterterrorism matters, between FYs 2005 and 2009. As reflected in this exhibit, the FBI experienced an overburn on the resources devoted to counterterrorism matters during FYs 2005 through 2009. However, this

27 An "overburn" occurs when more resources are utilized than allocated. In contrast, the FBI defines an "underburn" as using fewer resources than allocated.
overburn declined throughout our review period – decreasing from an overburn of 848 agents in FY 2005 to 117 agents in FY 2008. Moreover, as of June 2009, the counterterrorism burn rate was an overburn of only six agents.

According to FBI Counterterrorism Division officials, the FBI made a deliberate effort to more closely align the counterterrorism field agent allocation with the actual number of agents utilized on such matters. Counterterrorism Division officials explained that, as part of this effort, FBI headquarters shifted counterterrorism positions to field offices' Surveillance Operations Groups, which primarily assist on counterterrorism investigations. These officials stated that field offices previously filled these groups with criminal agents who would record their time to the counterterrorism program, thus contributing to the overburn.

EXHIBIT 1-3
COUNTERTERRORISM FIELD AGENT ALLOCATION & UTILIZATION FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

Since the FBI's counterterrorism priority includes both international and domestic terrorism, we examined the burn rates in these two program areas. As depicted in Exhibit 1-4, the FBI significantly reduced the overburn of field agent resources used on international terrorism matters between FYs 2005 and 2008 from 753 agents to 38 agents. As of June 2009 the FBI was using 62 fewer field agents than it allocated to work international terrorism
matters. In contrast, the FBI experienced an overburn of domestic terrorism resources throughout our review period, which remained relatively constant.

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**EXHIBIT 1-4**

**FBI COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM AREA BURN RATES**

**FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2009**

![Bar chart showing burn rates for FY 2005 to FY 2009](chart)

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

**Casework** – The total number of active FBI counterterrorism cases decreased by 1,576 between FY 2005 and May 2009, as depicted in Exhibit 1-5. FBI officials attributed this reduction in cases to a review of active cases that closed out matters found to be inactive.
The FBI experienced a reduction of 1,092 active international terrorism cases from FY 2005 to May 2009, which accounted for most of the decline in the overall number of active counterterrorism cases. Exhibit 1-6 provides our analysis of active international terrorism cases.
The number of active domestic terrorism cases is presented in Exhibit 1-7. Domestic terrorism cases comprised a small percentage of total counterterrorism cases. The FBI experienced a reduction of 484 [484] domestic terrorism cases from FY 2005 to May 2009.
National Priority Two – Counterintelligence

Resource Allocation and Utilization – Exhibit 1-8 displays the total number of field agents the FBI allocated to its counterintelligence program, as well as the number of field agents actually used by the FBI to address counterintelligence matters between FYs 2005 and 2009. In general, the FBI used field agent resources as allocated on counterintelligence matters during our review period. Specifically, we determined that the counterintelligence overburn and underburn rates throughout our review period did not exceed 3 percent.
Casework – The number of open counterintelligence cases decreased by ____% (or 25 percent) between FY 2005 and May 2009, as reflected in Exhibit 1-9. FBI officials explained that because of the evolution of counterintelligence cases, the FBI uses additional manpower and engages in more sophisticated operations. They said that the increase in case complexity has contributed to the decline in the total number of open counterintelligence cases. These officials further noted that the decline in cases was due in part to the removal of human source files from the investigative case data in Compass.
National Priority Three – Cyber

Resource Allocation and Utilization – Exhibit 1-10 displays the total number of field agents the FBI allocated to the cyber program, as well as the number of field agents actually used by the FBI to address cyber matters between FYs 2005 and 2009. The FBI reduced its overburn of field agent resources during FY 2005 to June 2009 from 91 agents to 44 agents. As shown in Exhibit 1-10, the FBI allocated 109 additional agents for cyber matters during our review period, which contributed to the reduction of the overburn in this priority area.
Because the FBI’s cyber priority encompasses two program areas (computer intrusions and cyber crime), we examined the field agent burn rates on these types of matters. As depicted in Exhibit 1-11, the FBI used fewer field agents than allocated to address computer intrusion matters in FYs 2005 and 2006, while using more field agents than allocated to handle such matters between FY 2007 and June 2009. We found that the FBI’s overburn of field agents addressing cyber crime matters generally decreased during our review period – from an overburn of 136 agents in FY 2005 to an overburn of 33 agents in June 2009.
Casework – Exhibit 1-12 shows the change in active cyber cases between FY 2005 and May 2009. We determined that the total number of open cyber-related cases significantly increased by 1,608 cases (or 19 percent) throughout our review period. The Assistant Director of the FBI Cyber Division stated that due to continuing advances in computer technology, which provide more avenues to commit cyber-related crimes, he expected the number of cyber cases to continue to increase.
We found that computer intrusion cases accounted for approximately 25 percent of the total active cyber cases throughout our review period. As shown in Exhibit 1-13, the FBI experienced a gradual increase in the number of active computer intrusion cases from 1,956 in FY 2005 to 2,577 in May 2009.
Active cyber crime cases comprised the majority of total cyber cases, accounting for approximately 75 percent of all cyber cases. Exhibit 1-14 shows that, with the exception of FY 2006, the number of active cyber crime cases has increased throughout our review period – resulting in an overall increase of 987 cases between FY 2005 and May 2009.
### National Priority Four - Public Corruption

**Resource Utilization** - The FBI does not allocate field agent personnel specifically for public corruption matters. Instead, those positions are incorporated into the white collar crime personnel allocation. Therefore, we could not compare the FBI's utilization of resources on public corruption to the amount of resources allocated to this area. However, we were able to determine the number of FBI field agents used on public corruption matters during FY 2005 through June 2009, which is reflected in Exhibit 1-15. As shown in this Exhibit, the FBI increased its utilization of field agents on public corruption matters by 107 field agents (or 18 percent) during our review period.

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28 According to FBI documentation, the public corruption program incorporates the following sub-programs: Antitrust, Environmental Crimes, Other Matters – Public Corruption/Government Fraud, and Public Corruption. Our analysis of public corruption resource utilization and casework includes these sub-programs.
EXHIBIT 1-15
PUBLIC CORRUPTION FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

Public Corruption Casework – Exhibit 1-16 displays the changes in active public corruption cases between FY 2005 and May 2009. The FBI increased the total number of active public corruption cases from 3,104 in FY 2005 to 3,503 in FY 2009, or a 13-percent increase.
National Priority Five – Civil Rights

Resource Allocation and Utilization – As depicted in Exhibit 1-17, between FYs 2005 and 2006, the FBI underburned field agent resources on civil rights case by 17 and 20 agents, respectively. During FYs 2007 through 2009, the FBI experienced overburns that ranged between 4 and 25 field agents.
Casework – Exhibit 1-18 displays the changes in active civil rights cases during our review period. The FBI had an increase in the number of active civil rights cases from 1,378 to 1,661 between FYs 2005 and 2008. According to FBI officials, the increase in the FBI’s use of civil rights task forces generated an increase in the number of civil rights cases being investigated. However, as of May 2009, the FBI’s active civil rights caseload was at 1,404 active cases – a decline of 257 cases from the FY 2008 level.
National Priority Six – Criminal Enterprises

Resource Allocation and Utilization – As shown in Exhibit 1-19, the FBI continued to use fewer field agents than allocated to address criminal enterprise matters during our review period. Specifically, the FBI underburned 706 agents in FY 2005, and overburned of 180 agents as of June 2009.

According to a senior official within the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, the FBI’s gang-related efforts are primarily reflected by the level of activity captured within the Gang/Criminal Enterprise and Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) programs. When examining the allocation and utilization of field agents within these two programs, we determined that the FBI was using approximately the same number of field agents as allocated on gang-related matters. This official stated that the

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29 The FBI’s efforts to combat criminal enterprises encompass three program areas: (1) Gang/Criminal Enterprise Program, (2) Organized Crime Program, and (3) Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Program.
Organized Crime Program is in flux and that the FBI is evaluating the future focus of its organized crime efforts.

**EXHIBIT 1-19**

**CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE FIELD AGENT ALLOCATION & UTILIZATION**

**FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2009**

![Graph showing allocation and utilization of field agent resources from FY 2005 to FY 2009.]

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

**Criminal Enterprise Casework** – Exhibit 1-20 displays the change in active criminal enterprise cases during our review period. The FBI increased the number of active criminal enterprise cases by 923 cases, or 10 percent, between FYs 2005 and 2008. FBI officials attributed this increase to its increased use of task forces to address gang-related matters. However, in FY 2009 the FBI experienced a 379-case reduction, decreasing from 10,430 active cases in FY 2008 to 10,051 in FY 2009.
National Priority Seven – White Collar Crime

Resource Allocation and Utilization – As depicted in Exhibit 1-21, the FBI used fewer field agents than were allocated to address white collar crime during our review period. The FBI experienced underburns ranging from 278 to 128 field agents addressing white collar crime matters from FY 2005 to June 2009. A senior official within the Criminal Investigative Division stated that the underburn was caused by the FBI shifting resources to the Counterterrorism Division and to the Terrorist Financing Center.

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30 Our analysis of the allocation and utilization of white collar crime resources includes public corruption because the FBI includes public corruption resources within its allocation of white collar crime positions.
EXHIBIT 1-21
WHITE COLLAR CRIME FIELD AGENT
ALLOCATION & UTILIZATION
FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH JUNE 2009

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Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

**Casework** – The number of active white collar crime cases decreased throughout our review period.\(^\text{31}\) As depicted in Exhibit 1-22, in FY 2005 the FBI had 15,593 active white collar crime cases, and as of May 2009 that number decreased to 14,129, or a reduction of 1,464 cases (or 9 percent).

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\(^{31}\) We excluded active public corruption, antitrust, other public corruption/government fraud, and environmental crimes cases from our analysis on white collar crime casework because it was incorporated into the section on priority number four - public corruption.
National Priority Eight – Violent Crime

Resource Allocation and Utilization – As shown in Exhibit 1-23, the FBI expended fewer agent resources than allocated on violent crime matters. With the exception of FY 2007, in which field offices used the same number of agents as allocated, the violent crime underburn has remained relatively constant throughout our review period. For instance, the FBI used 14 percent fewer agents than allocated on violent crime matters in FY 2005, and 10 percent fewer agents than allocated in FY 2009. According to senior officials in the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, the violent crime underburn is primarily a result of field offices working higher priority matters, such as counterterrorism.
Casework – Exhibit 1-24 shows that the number of active violent crime cases decreased by 1,873 cases (or 7 percent) from FY 2005 to May 2009.
EXHIBIT 1-24
ACTIVE VIOLENT CRIME CASES
FISCAL YEAR 2005 THROUGH MAY 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

Intelligence Analyst Resource Allocation and Utilization

We also reviewed the allocation and utilization levels of intelligence analysts from FYs 2005 to 2009. Intelligence analysts recorded their time to general intelligence classifications, and the FBI did not track the use of these resources by investigative program area. Therefore, we could not analyze the number of intelligence analyst resources used on FBI national investigative priorities.32

As reflected in Exhibit 1-25, the underburn of intelligence analysts has increased significantly during our review period, from 199 in FY 2005 to 427 in FY 2009.

32 According to FBI officials, intelligence analysts were instructed to record time to investigative program classifications in FY 2009. However, officials expected a delay in this process becoming effective while personnel adjusted to the change and properly recorded their time.
According to FBI officials, TURK data will always show an underburn of intelligence analyst resources because supervisory intelligence analysts (SIA) are included in the overall intelligence analyst allocation figures, but do not record their time in the TURK system. In addition, these officials said that the attrition rate for intelligence analysts, which was estimated by the FBI to be between 6 and 12 percent, made it difficult to fill all vacant positions. FBI headquarters and field office management attributed the high number of vacant analyst positions to not receiving appropriations and personnel allocations until late in the fiscal year and to the time-consuming process for hiring intelligence analysts.

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33 According to Directorate of Intelligence officials there were 55, 67, 82, 91, and 129 SIAs onboard during FYs 2005 through 2009, respectively. The FBI’s FY 2009 allocation for SIAs was 155.

34 The FBI noted that the attrition rate includes all personnel who depart from intelligence analyst positions by either separating from the FBI or transferring to a different position within the FBI.

35 In its April 2007 audit of Intelligence Analyst Hiring, the OIG found that it took the FBI an average of 217 days from when the FBI closed its announcement for an intelligence analyst job opening until the intelligence analyst candidate entered on duty.
II. FBI OPERATIONAL DIVISION RESOURCE ANALYSIS

Each FBI operational division has defined specific program priorities to more effectively target investigative efforts to the FBI's national priorities. In general, we found that most FBI divisions targeted their use of resources and the number of investigations to their highest priority matters. However, we found that the Counterintelligence Division was the only FBI investigative operational division that specifically tracked and evaluated the amount of time expended by field agents on its investigative priorities. By contrast, during our review the Counterterrorism, Cyber, and Criminal Investigative Divisions did not have a mechanism to assess the level of resources expended on specific program priorities. We believe that without such a mechanism, the FBI's operational divisions cannot effectively assess how field offices use agents on the most significant investigative program priority matters.

FBI Operational Divisions

The FBI's operational divisions – Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, and Criminal Investigative Divisions – are primarily responsible for overseeing the investigative efforts on the FBI's national priorities. In addition to the overarching national priorities established by the FBI Director, the operational divisions establish more specific national priorities within their respective areas of responsibility. These priorities should be based upon the threats that the divisions identify as the most significant within program areas. For example, corporate fraud is the Criminal Investigative Division's top priority within the financial crimes area, and Al Qaeda is the Counterterrorism Division's top priority within its international terrorism program.

We examined the FBI's personnel resource and casework data associated with division-specific programmatic priorities. We first requested a listing of each division's priorities by program area and the investigative classifications associated with those priorities. The Counterintelligence Division immediately presented documentation showing each of its national priorities with corresponding investigative classifications. Counterintelligence Division officials explained that they examine the utilization of field agents in accordance with the division's top programmatic priorities, and they provided examples of pre-generated charts.
In contrast, the Counterterrorism, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions did not have similar documentation available. Instead, to fulfill our request, they had to compile a list of investigative classifications associated with their program-specific priorities, which took the divisions several weeks to provide. On these lists, we identified inconsistencies and errors in the investigative classifications that were associated with programmatic priority threats. For example, the Criminal Investigative Division provided non-existent and incorrect investigative classifications for numerous priority areas.

During our March 2010 close-out meeting FBI officials provided monthly program status reports, which they did not supply during our audit, for the Counterterrorism, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions. FBI officials stated that these divisions used these reports to track operational efforts on investigative program priorities. These reports include data on pending cases, arrests, the number of wiretaps, and other statistics. However, only the Criminal Investigative Division included personnel utilization data for its investigative priorities, and it did not begin incorporating this data in the status reports until November 2009. Nevertheless, the Criminal Investigative Division reports do not identify and track data according to the most significant investigative classifications associated with each of its program priorities.

We believe that the Counterterrorism, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions should examine personnel resource utilization by investigative priority using specific investigative classifications, similar to the method used by the Counterintelligence Division. We recommend that the FBI operational divisions provide the Resource Planning Office with a reference table listing their program-specific priorities and the associated investigative classifications for use in automating a standard data report in Compass.36

The following sections of this report contain the results of our analyses demonstrating the total number of field agents addressing investigative programs and the percentage of FBI field agents handling FBI operational priorities within these programs. Additionally, we present our analyses of the total number of active cases associated with operational priorities.

36 The FBI’s Compass management information system is discussed in detail in Finding III.
Counterintelligence Division

Senior Counterintelligence Division officials explained that they have two sets of national strategic priorities – issue priorities and country priorities and that the issue priorities are of higher importance. The Counterintelligence Division did not alter its priorities from FYs 2005 to 2009. Exhibit 2-1 lists both sets of priorities (issue and country) in ranked order covering our review period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXHIBIT 2-1</th>
<th>LISTING OF TOP COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIVISION PRIORITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issue Priorities</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation (Counterproliferation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Espionage and Foreign Penetration of the U.S. Government (Counterespionage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Protection of Critical Technology and Assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Response to National Intelligence Collection Requirements</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Counterintelligence Division

We found that the total number of field agents handling counterintelligence matters remained relatively constant throughout our review period. As depicted in Exhibit 2-2, the proportion of field agents handling counterintelligence issue and country priorities also remained consistent throughout our review period. Between FYs 2005 and 2009, the percentage of field agents handling issue priorities ranged from 45 percent to 47 percent, while those addressing country priorities ranged from 50 percent to 52 percent.

---

Counterintelligence Division officials also stated that the amount of time expended on its country priorities does not include all time spent by agents addressing matters pertaining to those countries. Therefore, investigative classifications associated with both a specific country priority and issue priority were listed under the issue priority because the Counterintelligence Division wanted to provide a more complete picture of the time spent addressing the division’s most important priorities.

- 36 -
EXHIBIT 2-2
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION
ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PRIORITY MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 AND 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

Exhibit 2-3 displays our analysis of active counterintelligence cases during FYs 2005 through 2009. In both its issue and country priority areas, the FBI experienced a gradual decline in the number of active cases. As noted in Finding I, FBI Counterintelligence Division officials stated that the increasing complexity of its counterintelligence operations requires more resources to work individual cases, thereby reducing the total number of cases that the FBI is able to work.

38 The Counterintelligence Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” This category was created by the OIG and reflects time recorded to counterintelligence investigative classifications that were not included in the Counterintelligence Division’s priority listing.
Counterterrorism Division

The Counterterrorism Division is comprised of the International Terrorism and Domestic Terrorism Programs. Counterterrorism Division officials provided us with the top priorities of the FBI's International Terrorism Program throughout our review period, which are reflected in Exhibit 2-4. As shown in that exhibit, the priorities did not change between FYs 2005 and 2008 and slightly changed in FY 2009, when the Counterterrorism Division created separate priorities for [redacted] defined areas of concentration and switched the priority order of [redacted].
We obtained a list of investigative classifications associated with these top priorities and examined the number of agents working on these specific activities. As reflected in Exhibit 2-5, approximately 70 percent of field agents working international terrorism matters were focused on the top international terrorism priorities during FYs 2005 through 2009. Additionally, the proportion of agents remained relatively constant within each top priority area during this time period, except for the percentage of time spent on [redacted] matters during FY 2009. The percentage of agents handling [redacted] matters dropped from approximately 50 percent during FYs 2005 through 2008 to 32 percent during FY 2009. In contrast, the percentage of field agents working on [redacted] matters increased from approximately 10 percent in FYs 2005 through 2008 to 24 percent in FY 2009. According to FBI officials, these changes were the result of FBI headquarters refining its threat structure. In addition, FBI headquarters instructed Special Agents to associate operational efforts to [redacted] only when their work was directly related to the investigation of Osama Bin Laden.

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39 For presentation purposes, we combined the FY 2009 priorities related to [redacted] into one category to more easily compare the FBI’s efforts throughout our review period.

40 The FBI reorganized the investigative classification categories to identify countries with a [redacted] presence, which allowed Special Agents to refine their recorded time to specific classifications rather than grouping their time spent on [redacted] matters to the [redacted] classification.
In terms of cases, we computed the total number of active international terrorism cases by priority area, which is illustrated in Exhibit 2-6. The overall number of active cases generally declined throughout our review period, as did the active cases associated with black. In contrast, the number of active cases associated with blue has increased.

41 The "Other" category includes all time expended by field agents on international terrorism matters not specifically associated with black, such as training, hostage rescue team efforts, and other terrorism-related threats.
EXHIBIT 2-6
ACTIVE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

We also examined the number of field agents working on the top priority areas of the FBI’s Domestic Terrorism Program.\footnote{According to the FBI, the Domestic Terrorism Program contains three subprograms: (1) Domestic Terrorism Operations, (2) Weapons of Mass Destruction, and (3) Counterterrorism Preparedness. Among these three subprograms, because the Counterterrorism Division has programmatic responsibility for the Domestic Terrorism Operations subprogram only, the domestic terrorism priorities and corresponding data analyses pertain solely to this subprogram.} The FBI provided a list of the top domestic terrorism priorities for each fiscal year of our review period, as shown in Exhibit 2-7.\footnote{Because the FBI did not rank Domestic Terrorism priorities specifically for FYs 2007 and 2008, in our analysis we applied the ranked order of the FY 2006 priorities to these 2 fiscal years.} According to the Counterterrorism Division, the FBI did not place the priorities in rank order during FYs 2007 and 2008 because headquarters officials allowed field offices to determine their own domestic terrorism threats. In FY 2009, the FBI prioritized national threats, allowing field offices to deviate from these national priorities if an emerging threat in their locale was identified.
Using the investigative classifications associated with each of the FBI’s domestic terrorism priorities, we computed the proportion of field agents expended on each area compared to the total number of field agents addressing investigative matters falling under the Domestic Terrorism Operations subprogram. As illustrated in Exhibit 2-8, we determined that approximately 60 percent were focused on the top priority matters during FYs 2005 through 2009.
EXHIBIT 2-8
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION
ON DOMESTIC TERRORISM PRIORITY MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

FY 2005
FY 2006
FY 2007
FY 2008
FY 2009
As of June 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Agents</th>
<th>343</th>
<th>309</th>
<th>324</th>
<th>326</th>
<th>335</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

As depicted in Exhibit 2-9, we found a general decline in cases associated with terrorism enterprises throughout our review period. When excluding FY 2005, we also identified a general decline in the number of active cases associated with and the remaining domestic terrorism priority areas. In contrast, the number of active cases associated with remained relatively constant between FYs 2005 and 2008, before increasing by over 50 percent in FY 2009.

44 For presentation purposes, we decided to group some of the lower domestic terrorism priorities into a single category entitled “Remaining Domestic Terrorism Priority Areas” that includes and terrorism enterprises. During our analysis, we also found that field agents had not recorded time during FY 2009 to some of the classifications the Counterterrorism Division associated with some of these priority areas.
EXHIBIT 2-9
ACTIVE DOMESTIC TERRORISM CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

Criminal Investigative Division

The FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division is composed of six investigative program areas. We obtained a list of the national priorities and associated investigative classifications for each of the Criminal Investigative Division’s programs and examined the number of field agents expended on each. The following sections, which are organized according to program areas, show the results of our analysis.

Public Corruption – Public corruption is the top investigative priority of the Criminal Investigative Division. Within this program, the Criminal

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These program areas correspond to the FBI’s fourth through eighth national priorities: (1) combat public corruption at all levels, (2) protect civil rights, (3) combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises, (4) combat major white collar crime, and (5) combat significant violent crime.
Investigative Division has established several national priorities, which are reflected in Exhibit 2-10. As shown in that Exhibit, the public corruption priorities remained relatively the same during our review period.

**EXHIBIT 2-10**  
**LISTING OF TOP PUBLIC CORRUPTION PRIORITIES**  
**FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>FY 2005</th>
<th>FYs 2006 - 2008</th>
<th>FY 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Corruption of Federal</td>
<td>Corruption of Federal Public</td>
<td>Corruption of Federal Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Corruption of State &amp;</td>
<td>Corruption of State &amp; Local</td>
<td>Corruption of State &amp; Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Public Officials</td>
<td>Public Officials</td>
<td>Public Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
<td>Law Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Election Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Election Laws</td>
<td>Election Laws</td>
<td>Election Laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Foreign Corrupt</td>
<td>Foreign Corrupt Practices</td>
<td>Foreign Corrupt Practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Practices Act</td>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fraud Against</td>
<td>Fraud Against Government</td>
<td>Fraud Against Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Obstruction of Justice</td>
<td>Obstruction of Justice</td>
<td>Antitrust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perjury</td>
<td>Antitrust</td>
<td>Obstruction of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Environmental Crimes</td>
<td>Environmental Crimes</td>
<td>Perjury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interception of</td>
<td>Interception of Communications</td>
<td>Environmental Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Interception of Communications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division

Using the investigative classifications associated with these priorities provided by the Criminal Investigative Division, we computed the percentage of field agents handling the FBI’s public corruption priorities. This analysis is displayed in Exhibit 2-11. As shown in this exhibit, the FBI’s use of field agents on public corruption priority matters remained relatively constant between FYs 2005 and 2009.
Exhibit 2-12 contains our analysis of active public corruption cases during FYs 2005 through 2009. The FBI experienced a gradual increase in the number of cases associated with its top three priorities in this investigative program area – federal corruption, state corruption, and law enforcement corruption.

46 For presentation purposes, we combined the fourth through eleventh national public corruption priorities into the category entitled "Non-Priority Matters.” Additionally, the Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
Civil Rights – The Criminal Investigative Division’s second highest priority is civil rights, which is also the FBI’s fifth national priority. As shown in Exhibit 2-13, during FYs 2005 through 2009 the FBI had four specific civil rights priorities.

47 “Color of law” involves unlawful violations in which an individual acting under the authority of the government willfully deprives someone of any rights secured or protected by the U.S. Constitution or the laws of the United States. The FACE Act protects against any violent or threatening acts committed against health care providers and persons seeking reproductive health care services.
Of the investigative programs within the Criminal Investigative Division, the Civil Rights Program accounts for the fewest number of field agents utilized. Exhibit 2-13 lists the proportion of total agents used on civil rights matters to those agents used on civil rights priority areas. Our analysis of these priority areas is contained in Exhibit 2-14. The largest percentage of field agents was expended on color of law matters.

EXHIBIT 2-14
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON CIVIL RIGHTS PRIORITY MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hate Crimes</th>
<th>Color of Law</th>
<th>Human Trafficking</th>
<th>FACE Act</th>
<th>Non-Priority Matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008 (As of June 2009)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Agents 136 132 142 152 165

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

As show in Exhibit 2-15, we also examined the FBI’s active civil rights cases within the established priority areas. We determined that the majority of the FBI’s civil rights cases throughout our review period were associated with its second highest priority – color of law. Moreover, the number of active human trafficking cases steadily increased from FYs 2005 to 2009.

---

48 The Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
**EXHIBIT 2-15**
ACTIVE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hate Crimes</th>
<th>Color of Law</th>
<th>Human Trafficking</th>
<th>FACE Act</th>
<th>Non-Priority Matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>299</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>307</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

**Gangs/Criminal Enterprises** — Exhibit 2-16 lists the national priorities within the Criminal Investigative Division’s Gangs/Criminal Enterprises program for FYs 2005 through 2009. The top two priorities (violent gangs and drugs) did not change during our review period. However, in FY 2008, the Criminal Investigative Division moved major theft crimes from a national priority within this program to a national priority of the Criminal Investigative Division’s Violent Crime program.

**EXHIBIT 2-16**
LISTING OF TOP GANG/CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE PRIORITIES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Violent Gangs</td>
<td>1 Violent Gangs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Drugs</td>
<td>2 Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Major Theft Crimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division

We examined the proportion of field agents addressing priority matters within the gang/criminal enterprise program. As depicted in Exhibit 2-17, of the total agents working gang/criminal enterprise matters, we found that the percentage focused on the top priority – violent gangs – increased throughout our review period, while the percentage of field agents used to address the second national priority – drugs – decreased.
### EXHIBIT 2-17
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON GANG/CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE PRIORITY MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Violent Gangs</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Major Theft Crimes</th>
<th>Non-Priority Matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Agents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>1,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>1,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>1,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

Exhibit 2-18 depicts active gang/criminal enterprise cases during FYs 2005 through 2009. In general, the FBI experienced a gradual increase in the number of cases associated with its top priority – violent gangs – throughout our review period. The number of active cases associated with drugs (its second priority area) generally declined between FYs 2005 and 2009.

---

49 The Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
EXHIBIT 2-18
ACTIVE GANG/CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

Organized Crime – In addition to investigating criminal enterprises associated with gang and drug-related activity, the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division investigates organized crime matters. Exhibit 2-19 lists the national priorities within this area of the FBI’s operations. The organized crime national priorities remained the same throughout our review period.

EXHIBIT 2-19
LISTING OF TOP ORGANIZED CRIME PRIORITIES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

1 La Cosa Nostra / Italian Organized Crime / Labor Racketeering
2 Asian/African Criminal Enterprises
3 Eurasian Criminal Enterprises
4 Transnational Criminal Enterprises Program – Other Matters

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division

As depicted in Exhibit 2-20, we computed the percentage of field agents handling FBI organized crime priorities. The number of field agents working on priority organized crime matters remained relatively consistent throughout our review period. For example, the percentage of agents addressing the FBI’s top organized crime priority (La Cosa Nostra/Italian
organizations) ranged between 45 percent and 49 percent during FYs 2005 through 2009.

EXHIBIT 2-20
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION
ON ORGANIZED CRIME PRIORITY MATTERS
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

![Bar chart showing FBI field agent utilization on organized crime priority matters from FY 2005 to FY 2009.]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>La Cosa Nostra/Italian</th>
<th>Asian/African</th>
<th>Eurasian</th>
<th>Other Transnational Matters</th>
<th>Non-Priority Matters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

As reflected in Exhibit 2-21, we examined the FBI’s active organized crime cases within the Criminal Investigative Division’s identified priority areas. The number of cases associated with this investigative area’s top two priorities – La Cosa Nostra/Italian criminal organizations and Asian/African criminal organizations – gradually declined throughout our review period. The FBI’s caseload related to Eurasian criminal enterprises remained relatively constant during FYs 2005 through 2009, while the number of active organized crime cases associated with non-priority matters generally increased during this same time period.

50 The Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
EXHIBIT 2-21
ACTIVE ORGANIZED CRIME CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Ongoing Cases</th>
<th>TOTAL 2005</th>
<th>TOTAL 2006</th>
<th>TOTAL 2007</th>
<th>TOTAL 2008</th>
<th>TOTAL 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Cosa Nostra/Italian</td>
<td>1,211</td>
<td>1,184</td>
<td>1,236</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>1,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian/African</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational - Other Matters</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Priority Matters</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

White Collar Crime – As listed in Exhibit 2-22, the Criminal Investigative Division established eight national white collar crime priorities.

EXHIBIT 2-22
LISTING OF TOP WHITE COLLAR CRIME PRIORITIES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Corporate &amp; Securities Fraud</td>
<td>Corporate &amp; Securities Fraud</td>
<td>Corporate &amp; Securities Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Health Care Fraud</td>
<td>Health Care Fraud</td>
<td>Health Care Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Financial Institution Fraud</td>
<td>Financial Institution Fraud</td>
<td>Financial Institution Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
<td>Money Laundering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Insurance Fraud</td>
<td>Insurance Fraud</td>
<td>Insurance Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bankruptcy Fraud</td>
<td>Bankruptcy Fraud</td>
<td>Mass Marketing Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mass Marketing Fraud</td>
<td>Wire &amp; Mail Fraud</td>
<td>Bankruptcy Fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Wire &amp; Mail Fraud</td>
<td>Mass Marketing Fraud</td>
<td>Wire &amp; Mail Fraud</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division

Using the total number of field agents used on white collar crime matters, we computed the percentage of field agents handling the FBI’s white collar crime priorities. As reflected in Exhibit 2-23, 77 percent of field agents working white collar crime matters during FY 2005 were addressing matters associated with the Criminal Investigative Division’s top three national white collar crime priorities. The percentage expended on these three priorities
increased throughout our review period, which accounted for 90 percent of all field agents investigating white collar crime.

Of these three priority areas, the biggest change between FYs 2005 and 2009 occurred in the percentage of time expended on financial institution fraud matters, which increased from 26 percent in FY 2005 to 33 percent in FY 2009.

EXHIBIT 2-23
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME PRIORITY MATTERS FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 200951

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Agents</th>
<th>1,295</th>
<th>1,204</th>
<th>1,110</th>
<th>1,075</th>
<th>1,177</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

As reflected in Exhibit 2-24, we examined the FBI’s active white collar crime cases associated with the identified priority areas. The number of active corporate and securities fraud cases increased throughout our review period. The number of cases associated with health care fraud decreased between FYs 2005 and 2006, increased in FY 2007, and then decreased again during FYs 2008 and 2009. Similarly, the number of active cases associated

51 For presentation purposes, we combined the fourth through seventh national white collar crime priorities into the category entitled “Other Priority Matters.” Additionally, the Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
with financial institution fraud decreased between FYs 2005 and 2007 and then increased during FYs 2008 and 2009. Non-priority white collar crime cases gradually decreased throughout our review period.

**EXHIBIT 2-24**

ACTIVE WHITE COLLAR CRIME CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corporate &amp; Securities Fraud</td>
<td>4,078</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td>3,587</td>
<td>3,581</td>
<td>3,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Care Fraud</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>2,302</td>
<td>2,132</td>
<td>1,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Priority Matters</td>
<td>4,766</td>
<td>4,576</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>4,062</td>
<td>4,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Institution Fraud</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>2,423</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>2,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Priority Matters</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td>1,967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,593</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,614</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,117</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,964</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,129</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

**Violent Crime** – The FBI works with local, state, and federal partners on investigations of violent crime. The Criminal Investigative Division’s national priorities within this area are depicted in Exhibit 2-25.

**EXHIBIT 2-25**

LISTING OF TOP VIOLENT CRIME PRIORITIES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Violent Incident Crimes</td>
<td>Violent Incident Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Crimes Against Children</td>
<td>Crimes Against Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indian Country Crimes</td>
<td>Indian Country Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Violent Fugitives</td>
<td>Violent Fugitives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Transportation Crimes</td>
<td>Major Theft Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Special Jurisdiction Crimes</td>
<td>Transportation Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Special Jurisdiction Crimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Criminal Investigative Division

- 55 -
As displayed in Exhibit 2-26, we computed the percentage of field agents handling the FBI’s violent crime priorities. During FYs 2005 through 2009, the largest percentage of field agents working violent crime matters were addressing the top violent crime priority – violent incident crimes, which includes crimes such as bank robberies, human trafficking, and threatening federal officials. The FBI’s utilization of field agents on priority matters remained relatively consistent throughout our review period.

**EXHIBIT 2-26**  
FBI FIELD AGENT UTILIZATION ON VIOLENT CRIME PRIORITY MATTERS  
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2005</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2006</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2007</td>
<td>787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2008</td>
<td>829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2009</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

Exhibit 2-27 illustrates our analysis of active violent crime cases during FYs 2005 through 2009. The number of active cases associated with violent incident crimes and violent fugitives declined between FYs 2005 and 2008 and rose slightly in FY 2009. The number of active cases associated with

52 For presentation purposes, we combined the fifth through seventh national violent crime priorities into the category entitled “Other Priority Matters.” Additionally, the Criminal Investigative Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Non-Priority Matters.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to criminal investigative classifications that were not included in the Criminal Investigative Division’s priority listing.
crimes against children and Indian country steadily increased throughout our review period.

**EXHIBIT 2-27**

**ACTIVE VIOLENT CRIME CASES**

**FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009**

![Graph showingactive violent crime cases](image)

*Source: OIG analysis of FBI data*

**Cyber Division**

The FBI Cyber Division provided a list of its national priorities for FYs 2005 through 2009, as shown in Exhibit 2-28. According to Cyber Division officials, the Cyber Division reorganized in early 2009, and with the reorganization the Cyber Division revised its national priorities. These revisions included placing a greater emphasis on computer intrusion matters and establishing individual priorities for different types of computer intrusions, as well as the elimination of Internet fraud from the Cyber Division’s top national priorities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>FYs 2005 – JANUARY 2009</th>
<th>JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Identify and disrupt the most significant individuals, groups and foreign powers</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Computer Intrusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conducting computer intrusions, the dissemination of malicious code, or other nefarious</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>computer supported network operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Identify and disrupt online predators or groups that sexually exploit and endanger</td>
<td>Counterintelligence Computer Intrusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>children for personal or financial gain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Identify and disrupt operations targeting</td>
<td>Criminal Computer Intrusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. intellectual property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Identify and disrupt the most significant perpetrators of Internet fraud</td>
<td>Child Exploitation Matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Intellectual Property Rights Matters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FBI Cyber Division

Using the Cyber Division’s categorization of investigative classifications associated with its current priority areas, we computed the proportion of field agents addressing the national cyber-related priorities during FYs 2005 and 2009, as portrayed in Exhibit 2-29.\textsuperscript{53} Between FYs 2005 and 2009 over 70 percent of the time expended by field agents on cyber-related matters was associated with either computer intrusions or child exploitation.

Exhibit 2-29 also reflects that the amount of time spent by field agents on intellectual property rights cases was small throughout our review period. We also determined that while the amount of time expended by field agents on other cyber-related matters (not categorized or non-priority matters) decreased between FYs 2005 and 2009.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{53} For analysis purposes, we used the Cyber Division’s current priorities and combined the individual computer intrusion priorities into a single category entitled “Computer Intrusions.”

\textsuperscript{54} These other cyber-related matters included time expended by field agents handling Internet fraud as well as cyber-related training received by field agents.
Our analysis of active cyber cases related to program priorities is reflected in Exhibit 2-30. The number of active cases associated with computer intrusions and child exploitation increased between FYs 2005 and 2009, and the number of active intellectual property rights cases decreased during this same time period.

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55 The Cyber Division’s grouping of investigative classifications did not include a category entitled “Not Categorized.” We used this category to reflect time recorded to cyber-related investigative classifications that were not included in the Cyber Division’s priority listing.
EXHIBIT 2-30
ACTIVE CYBER CASES
FISCAL YEARS 2005 THROUGH 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer Intrusions</th>
<th>Child Exploitation</th>
<th>Intellectual Property Rights</th>
<th>Not Categorized</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>4,464</td>
<td>4,947</td>
<td>1,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>2,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,505</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>5,663</td>
<td>5,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,537</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>9,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OIG analysis of FBI data

**Recommendations**

We recommend that the FBI:

1. Require operational divisions to provide the Resource Planning Office with the investigative classifications associated with programmatic priorities for the development of an automated report in Compass that provides resource utilization data for these priority areas.

2. Regularly examine personnel resource utilization associated with division-specific priorities for all its investigative programs.
III. FBI PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Through the establishment of the Resource Planning Office, the creation of a new and more advanced management information system, and the development of various strategic and resource management initiatives, the FBI has improved its ability to monitor and evaluate its allocation and utilization of resources. However, we found disparities in the capacities of FBI headquarters operational divisions to assess personnel resource needs and to incorporate personnel resource planning into their strategic plans. Moreover, the absence of documented policies, plans, and procedures hampers the effectiveness of resource management improvements. Inconsistent communication between FBI headquarters and field office management has also left some officials unsure of the purposes and outcomes of the various initiatives.

Establishment of the Resource Planning Office

In 2006, the FBI established the Resource Planning Office to manage human resources to ensure they are aligned with the FBI’s strategic goals. The Resource Planning Office is headed by an Assistant Director who reports to the FBI Associate Deputy Director. The Resource Planning Office is responsible for managing the FBI’s strategic planning process, managing FBI performance data, allocating resources and evaluating resource utilization, overseeing FBI corporate policies, and identifying and resolving FBI organizational inefficiencies.

The following exhibit illustrates the organizational structure of the Resource Planning Office as of FY 2009.
As reflected in Exhibit 3-1, the Resource Planning Office consists of several units. These units are collectively responsible for instituting agency-wide strategic planning, policy coordination, and managing resource assessment and allocation initiatives. Some of these initiatives include the Compass system initiative, FBI semi-annual resource allocation process, Strategy Management System, and Strategy Performance Sessions.\textsuperscript{56}

**Personnel Resource Allocations and Assessments**

During this audit, we reviewed the FBI’s process for allocating resources and examined the FBI’s process for assessing its resource needs.

**FBI Resource Allocations**

Former Resource Allocation Process – In our 2003 audit report, we recommended that the FBI ensure that FSL allocations were made in a timelier manner.\textsuperscript{57} Before the Resource Planning Office was created, the

\textsuperscript{56} The Resource Planning Office is responsible for additional initiatives that are not discussed in detail in this report because they are not related to this audit.

\textsuperscript{57} OIG, *Casework and Human Resource Allocation*. 

- 62 -
FBI's former Resource Management and Allocation Office was responsible for allocating the FBI's human resources and establishing funded staffing levels for agents and professional staff (including intelligence analysts). It had an informal process for determining annual resource allocation decisions. Further, field offices submitted ad hoc resource requests to the Resource Management and Allocation Office throughout the year. FBI headquarters officials stated that program managers found it difficult to assess the field office resource requests in line with the overall program resource needs.

Resource Planning Office management believed that Resource Management and Allocation Office personnel did not analyze the program managers' staffing recommendations to determine if they were sound. Moreover, they stated that headquarters' program manager allocation recommendations were partly influenced by the relationships those managers had with field offices. For example, some FBI headquarters officials said they believed that field offices in New York and Washington received disproportionate resource enhancements in comparison to other field offices because a large percentage of headquarters staff once worked in those offices.

Current Resource Allocation Process – One modification the FBI made to its former annual resource allocation process was the establishment of the Corporate Resource Planning Board in FY 2006. The Corporate Resource Planning Board membership includes the FBI Associate Deputy Director, all Executive Assistant Directors, the Assistant Director of the Resource Planning Office, other executives from headquarters and field offices, and additional FBI personnel with relevant interests or expertise. While the ultimate decision on where to allocate resources rests with the FBI Director, the Corporate Resource Planning Board reviews how resource requests correspond with national priorities and then votes on resource allocation decisions.

The Resource Planning Office also established a formalized semiannual resource enhancement and realignment process for FY 2009 to ensure that documented justification for resource decisions existed. At the beginning of the fiscal year, field offices are required to submit resource enhancement and realignment requests to the Resource Planning Office. The requests include sections for enhancement and realignment of special agents and management positions. Field offices also submit requests for programmatic
support personnel enhancements. For each request, a field office must provide an overall justification for the change in resources and state how the change will reduce field office threats or risks. Headquarters division and program managers review these requests and submit justifications for approvals and denials of requests, and make recommendations. The Resource Planning Office compiles and analyzes the requests and provides the recommendations to the Corporate Resource Planning Board for review and concurrence. The results are provided to the FBI Director for final approval.

The semiannual resource enhancement and realignment process requires field offices to submit a second resource request during the middle of the fiscal year. These requests are examined through the same programmatic, executive review process administered at the beginning of each fiscal year. However, because no new positions are available at that time, field offices are informed that any resource enhancement requests that are granted must come from the realignment of existing positions. These realignments may occur between different program areas within the requesting office or among several field offices.

Exhibit 3-2 displays the FBI’s new semiannual resource enhancement and realignment process.

58 Support personnel are categorized as either general or non-specific support personnel. Field offices cannot request non-specific support personnel through the resource allocation process. General programmatic support personnel positions are identified positions that are tied to a specific investigative program of the FBI’s budget. For instance, the Criminal Investigative Division may receive a certain number of financial analysts to work on white collar crime issues or Counterterrorism Division may receive language specialists for a translation program. In contrast, the non-specific support personnel are not tied to a specific program and are positions that the FBI receives through the budget process based on a ratio of its operational personnel. Therefore, these positions are provided to the FBI to allocate at its discretion.
In general, FBI field office managers told us that they are pleased with the new semiannual resource allocation process because it is streamlined and structured. However, it appears that some field offices do not fully understand the new process. For example, after reviewing several field office resource requests, we found that there was some confusion in completing the document, especially concerning requests for realignment of positions.

Field office managers explained that they often realign resources on a temporary basis when an emerging threat or a high-profile matter arises and that these temporary adjustments did not require official approval. Resource Planning Office officials agreed that, when necessary, field offices can and should move resources without approval on a temporary basis. However, the Resource Planning Office has not defined “temporary.” Therefore, field offices were able to frequently move resources among investigative areas without requesting realignment during the semiannual resource allocation process. One field office manager explained that the field office was using more agent resources than were allocated to its violent crime program for
nearly 2 years because of a large, active case. We believe long-term realignments that have been classified as “temporary” can hinder the Resource Planning Office’s oversight of the realignment and allocation process. We recommend that the Resource Planning Office provide guidelines on what is meant by a “temporary” realignment.

**Future Resource Allocation Process** – In February 2009, the FBI began considering the development of a risk-based resource management initiative that would identify risk indicators affecting field offices and allocate agent positions to field offices based upon those indicators.\(^{59}\) During our audit, FBI officials associated with the development of the risk-based resource management initiative stated that the FBI did not have a written plan for executing the project and did not have expected milestones, including a date of completion.

We found confusion among FBI personnel regarding the implementation and expected use of this risk-based resource management approach. In October 2009, a senior FBI official stated that the first iteration of this risk-based approach would be used in the allocation of FY 2010 agent positions for five FBI programs, including foreign counterintelligence, international terrorism, mortgage fraud, cyber computer intrusion, and weapons of mass destruction. Because the FBI appeared ready to begin implementing this initiative, we asked for documentation on the initiative, including any program plans and documents pertaining to the program’s development and implementation. FBI officials stated that the initiative was in its infancy and that a specific implementation plan had not been established. As of March 2010, the FBI had provided no documentation responsive to our request for information related to the risk-based management initiative.

At the March 2010 close-out meeting for this audit, FBI officials stated that the risk-based management initiative was, as of December 2009, developed, released, completed, and integrated into every investigative program’s resource allocation methodology and decision-making processes.\(^{60}\) At the close-out meeting, the FBI provided risk-based management initiative documentation dating back to March 2009. FBI officials said that they chose not to provide us with information related to the risk-based management

\(^{59}\) Risk indicators highlight the potential for an adverse outcome of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with events.

\(^{60}\) According to the FBI the Directorate of Intelligence did not utilize the risk-based management initiative, but it plans to incorporate the methodology in FY 2010.
initiative at the time we requested it because the program was in its infancy and not ready for external review.

Following our close-out meeting, the FBI provided us with a briefing on the risk-based management initiative. During this briefing we learned that the risk-based methodology includes empirical data related to program-specific risk indicators and provides for the weighting of that information. Moreover, the initiative allows for the inclusion of subjective information from subject matter experts and FBI executive management. Resource Planning Office officials demonstrated the use of the new methodology in allocating personnel enhancements to the FBI’s White Collar Crime Program for addressing mortgage fraud. The FBI used this as an example to illustrate the extensive work that operational divisions devoted to developing the risk indicators and other data needed for implementation of the methodology.

Because we were not provided relevant documentation during our audit, we were unable to examine whether the risk-based management initiative will provide the FBI’s operational divisions with effective, adequate, and appropriate means of evaluating resource needs and making personnel allocation decisions. As with any new program, the FBI must ensure that its risk-based management initiative is appropriately enhancing its resource management efforts according to the specific needs and operations of its investigative programs. We recommend that the FBI establish and disseminate policies and procedures for the execution of the risk-based management initiative, if it will be used for future resource allocations.

Operational Division Resource Assessment

Prior to the release of the risk-based resource management approach, we reviewed the resource assessment processes used by FBI operational divisions to determine if these processes were documented, up-to-date, and complete. In general, the processes ranged from highly developed to incomplete and outdated. Our analysis of each operational division is detailed below.

Counterintelligence Division – The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division had developed an advanced methodology that it has used since 2004 to evaluate its resource needs. The methodology identifies and weighs criteria for threats and examines demographics in field office domains, which are
updated to reflect any changes in the domain data. The weighted criteria are used to calculate target staffing levels for counterintelligence personnel in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices. These results and other subjective analyses performed by the Counterintelligence Division are used to make resource enhancement decisions. We believe that the Counterintelligence Division has implemented a useful assessment tool.

Counterterrorism Division – In determining its resource allocations, Counterterrorism Division officials said they placed great emphasis on their executive managers’ operational experience and knowledge. The Counterterrorism Division also employed a more objective resource assessment methodology to evaluate field office resource needs and allocate resources. However, this methodology did not incorporate specific weights for performance criteria to differentiate the importance of various measures, such as the number of active cases and number of human sources. Additionally, the objective methodology was only used to assess resource needs for the Counterterrorism Division’s International Terrorism Program, and not for the Division’s Domestic Terrorism Program. FBI officials stated that they did not use this tool for the Domestic Terrorism Program because the program had not received resource enhancements in recent years.

Criminal Investigative Division – We found the Criminal Investigative Division’s resource assessment methodology to be informal, incomplete, and outdated. The Criminal Investigative Division’s allocation of resources is based upon simplistic or subjective evaluations conducted by each of the Criminal Investigative Division’s programmatic sections. For example, the Financial Crimes Section’s methodology involved looking at the number of active cases in a field office and simply dividing that number by six cases per agent. The Financial Crimes Section used this figure as the number of agents required to work the financial crimes caseload in the field office. Other criminal program sections base resource allocation decisions on resource over and underburns in field offices. However, these methodologies do not

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61 Domain is the territory and issues for which a field office exercises responsibility. A field office’s domain consists of not just its geographic jurisdiction but also the population, community, economy, and infrastructure of the territory. Domain assessments are formalized field office products that incorporate data analysis, subjective perspective and context, and recommendations for courses of action to identify and mitigate threats within a field office’s domain.

incorporate any factors associated with threats or weighted criteria that could better assess resource needs.

**Cyber Division** – The Cyber Division’s Assistant Director was able to articulate, with some specificity, the type of information that they review to assess their resource needs. However, the methodology does not incorporate weights for the criteria that are reviewed, and the factors considered were not contained in a formalized resource assessment methodology. Without a documented methodology, the division risks applying disparate criteria from one year to the next should any turnover occur within the positions involved in resource assessments and allocation decisions.

**Directorate of Intelligence** – The FBI’s Directorate of Intelligence hired a contractor in FY 2006 to develop a methodology for determining the need for intelligence analysts throughout the FBI’s field offices and headquarters operational divisions. However, FBI officials explained that the Directorate of Intelligence used this methodology for FY 2007 intelligence analyst resource allocations, but it could not fully execute the contractor’s personnel allocation model because of intelligence analyst mobility limitations and funding restrictions. Between FYs 2007 and 2008 the Directorate of Intelligence established a field intelligence model to determine the number of intelligence analysts needed for field offices. The Directorate of Intelligence used this methodology to allocate intelligence analysts to field offices in FY 2009.

In contrast to its intelligence analyst resource allocation methodology, we found that the Directorate of Intelligence did not use a specific methodology for the initial allocation of field intelligence agent resources, and it continues to lack a mechanism to assess field agent resource needs.

The FBI’s Strategy Management System

In December 2005, the Counterterrorism Division implemented the Strategy Management System, which was intended to communicate and track FBI strategy and program performance. According to FBI officials, this system assisted the Counterterrorism Division in managing its operations. As a result of the success of this process, in June 2006 the Resource Planning Office was directed to develop an enterprise-wide Strategy Management System for the FBI. In addition, each headquarters division was required to

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63 The Cyber Division reviews the location of threats within key target areas of a field office’s jurisdiction, including U.S. Government agencies, universities, military bases, and financial institutions; historical threat level; previous cases; current workload; and personnel utilization data.
establish a division-specific Strategy Management System and ensure that division level strategies corresponded with the enterprise-wide strategy.

Through the Strategy Management System the FBI developed a "strategy map" that diagrams the cause and effect relationship between strategic objectives and performance, as well as establishes measurements, targets, and initiatives to track and achieve those objectives. The Strategy Management System objectives directly relate to threats that the FBI and each operational division identify as priorities and are categorized in four general areas: customer expectations; internal process; talent, teamwork, and technology; and resources. Exhibit 3-3 shows the FBI’s FY 2009 enterprise-wide strategy map.

In FY 2009, the FBI identified the optimization of human and financial resources as one of its enterprise-wide objectives (as illustrated at the bottom of Exhibit 3-3). Based on our review of Strategy Management System documentation, we determined that the Counterintelligence Division had established strategic objectives and performance measures related to the
allocation and utilization of personnel resources in line with top threats and priorities as required by the FBI’s enterprise-wide strategy map.

We determined that the Counterterrorism, Criminal Investigative, and Cyber Divisions and the Directorate of Intelligence also had incorporated personnel resources into their strategic objectives. However, the performance measures associated with these objectives did not incorporate the allocation and utilization of personnel resources to address top threats and priorities and instead focused solely on financial resources. We recommend that all FBI operational divisions develop performance measures to help ensure personnel resources are allocated and utilized in accordance with their priorities, as the Counterintelligence Division has done.

**FBI Management and Oversight of Personnel Resources**

*Compass Development and Deployment*

In previous OIG reviews, we recommended that the FBI continually examine its utilization and casework data to help ensure that the allocation of FBI resources is in accordance with its strategic plan. In addition, we recommended that the FBI consider developing evaluation models to better manage FBI programs, such as our previous analyses of the underburn and overburn of FBI resources in program areas.\(^{64}\)

In FY 2005, the FBI implemented Compass – an executive management information system – to enhance FBI leadership’s ability to effectively manage personnel resources, while increasing the communication between headquarters and field offices on operational performance. Compass provides FBI leadership with up-to-date data on workload, resource utilization, and casework for each of the FBI’s operational divisions and field offices.\(^{65}\)

The FBI has invested $1.9 million to have a contractor develop and deploy Compass. The Resource Planning Office has responsibility for managing Compass. As of FY 2009, there were around 3,000 Compass users.

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\(^{64}\) OIG, *Casework and Human Resource Allocation; Internal Effects; External Effects.*

\(^{65}\) Compass extracts and analyzes information from the following seven FBI source data systems: (1) Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK), (2) Monthly Administrative Report (MAR), (3) Automated Case Support (ACS), (4) Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application (ISRAA), (5) Financial Management System (FMS), (6) Bureau Personnel Management System (BPMS), and (7) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) management system.
Compass information is available to managers in the field and at headquarters and allows the FBI to track data trends throughout the organization. The FBI Director routinely receives printed reports from Compass that allow him to review and evaluate accomplishments and resources used by FBI headquarters divisions and field offices. For example, once a month the FBI Director receives a Compass report that contains summaries of FBI performance data, such as agent and professional staff resource utilization data, active case data, and intelligence report productivity data.

However, one limitation of Compass is that the totals for active cases include non-casework data such as informant and training files, which can skew some statistics. At the audit close-out meeting FBI officials explained that they added a filter feature to Compass in May 2009 that enabled users to break out program classifications and exclude non-casework data from their queries. We observed a demonstration of this new feature, but noted that a Compass user must manually filter out this information, as well as know that non-casework data is included in overall casework statistics. We believe it would benefit Compass users if the system automatically filtered out this data from investigative case information.

We interviewed FBI headquarters and field office managers about Compass. The general consensus was that Compass is a useful tool and an improvement upon the prior practice of manually extracting data from the FBI’s front-line data systems, such as the Automated Case Support system and Time Utilization Recordkeeping system. Additionally, Compass provides more information and data than was previously available to FBI management. However, many of the FBI officials we interviewed were not using the information in Compass to assess workforce performance, identify programmatic resource gaps, and guide decision making. Instead these FBI headquarters and field office managers only used Compass as a reactive tool to prepare for periodic headquarters inquiries and meetings with the FBI Director, or to compare field offices’ burn rates.

By implementing Compass, the FBI has improved its ability to generate and utilize performance data for informational and managerial decision-making purposes. We believe that enhanced use of Compass by headquarters program managers and field office management can help identify resource gaps, assist in making more informed resource allocation decisions, enhance communication between headquarters and field offices, and improve the day-to-day knowledge of operations.
Resource Allocation Planning Tool – The Resource Planning Office created the Resource Allocation Planning Tool to assist in the FBI’s resource allocation process. The Resource Allocation Planning Tool is an enhancement to the Compass system that enables field offices to identify program vacancies; review their organizational charts by squads; and evaluate contractors, detailees, task force officers, and state and local assistance in certain investigative areas. Headquarters program managers and the Resource Planning Office can review information in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool when they make resource allocation decisions. If the Resource Allocation Planning Tool is used as intended, it could help alleviate complaints from field managers regarding Compass’ inability to display agents who are detailed to FBI headquarters or external assignments, rather than incorporating them into a field office’s agent underburn.

However, during our discussions with field office managers, we determined that some of them were not using the Resource Allocation Planning Tool to evaluate field office resources. These managers stated that they were not familiar with the information contained in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool or how the information was updated. We believe that this lack of familiarity resulted from the Resource Planning Office not disseminating a policy or procedures that require field offices to evaluate and update Resource Allocation Planning Tool information in an established timeframe or to ensure that the information is accurate. If field offices do not update this information in a timely fashion, FBI headquarters and field office managers will not have accurate data on which to base resource decisions. We recommend that the FBI enact policy requiring field offices to keep information in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool current, complete, and accurate.

Semi-Annual Program Reviews

FBI officials informed us that in recent years the Inspection Division re-engineered its triennial field office inspection process, which had entailed a review all aspects of a field office’s operations during a 2-week period. According to an FBI official we interviewed, the problem with this method was that the inspections were a “mile wide and only an inch deep.”

The FBI’s new inspection process contains three areas of review: (1) Semi-Annual Program Reviews, (2) internal inspections, and (3) performance audits. We examined the development of Semi-Annual Program Reviews because they are linked to the management and oversight of personnel resources. In fact, the FBI anticipated using these reviews to proactively address resource issues.
Semi-Annual Program Reviews examine field office performance in program accomplishments, intelligence production, and utilization of resources. There are currently Semi-Annual Program Reviews for 19 different programs, 11 of which are investigative. To conduct the Semi-Annual Program Reviews, the Inspection Division semiannually provides field offices with templates that ask questions related to investigative- and intelligence-program performance. Headquarters program managers then rank the overall field office performance across various inspection criteria, including resource utilization on a scale of one (low) to five (high). The results of Semi-Annual Program Reviews are also used to consider whether the Inspection Division should initiate a full-scope review of a certain program and to assist the Inspection Division in choosing which field offices will undergo an in-depth evaluation. In addition, the FBI intended for these reviews to strengthen field offices’ implementation of the national strategic plan.

We discussed the Semi-Annual Program Reviews with FBI field office and headquarters managers. A common complaint from FBI field office managers was that it took a great deal of time and personnel to complete the Semi-Annual Program Reviews process. In general, field offices reported spending several weeks preparing Semi-Annual Program Reviews and some managers were unaware of how headquarters used the information. In addition, field office officials stated that headquarters did not provide feedback during the first round of these reviews. FBI headquarters officials asserted that in the second version of the Semi-Annual Program Reviews every field office was provided feedback and allowed to challenge their reviews.

FBI headquarters officials believed that the Semi-Annual Program Reviews enhanced the FBI’s performance management. These officials also explained the reviews were still a relatively new concept and acknowledged that the process was “imperfect.” In particular, they stated that the Semi-Annual Program Reviews template needs to be revised and the automated technology used by field offices to complete the templates could be improved.

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Strategy Performance Sessions

In FY 2007, the FBI Deputy Director began holding quarterly Strategy Performance Sessions to improve dialogue between FBI headquarters and field offices and to ensure FBI performance and resource-related decisions are directly linked to the FBI’s overall strategic objectives and highest-priority threats. For each session, packets are provided to the Director, Deputy Director, and other executive managers that contain performance data on a field office’s most significant threats. We found these packets contain detailed statistics and anecdotal information that provide FBI decision makers with a comprehensive view of field office operations. However, personnel utilization data for high priority threat areas in each field office are not included in these packets. Personnel utilization data is an important statistic that helps demonstrate a field office’s level of attention to its most significant investigative threats. We recommend that the FBI begin including such data in its Strategy Performance Sessions field office information packets.

Field office managers we interviewed had differing opinions on the effectiveness of Strategy Performance Sessions. Some stated that Strategy Performance Sessions have improved their field offices’ processes for assessing the threats in their jurisdictions. Other managers said that Strategy Performance Sessions were used by headquarters to critique field office operations and were redundant with other FBI headquarters initiatives, such as Semi-Annual Program Reviews. Many field office managers said that it takes their offices a significant amount of time to prepare for Strategy Performance Sessions.

Headquarters officials stated that Strategy Performance Sessions gave field offices the opportunity to understand executive management expectations for the type of work they should be conducting. Headquarters managers stated that it should not take a significant amount of time for a field office to prepare for Strategy Performance Sessions because field office managers should already understand the threats and crime problems of their locales.

We believe that the development of the Strategy Performance Sessions initiative has improved communication between FBI field offices and headquarters management. We also believe that these sessions are a valuable tool for headquarters management to understand field office priorities and to assist field offices in more precisely identifying specific threats. However, there appears to be confusion between what headquarters intends Strategy Performance Sessions to accomplish and what field offices
perceive as the purpose. We recommend that Headquarters management better communicate the reasons for process and its benefits to field offices.

**Field Office Threats** – During Strategy Performance Sessions, each field office must identify its top three threats, including the justification for those being considered the office’s highest concern. We obtained a listing of these top three threats, dated May 25, 2009, for each office. We also requested a list of investigative classifications associated with the top three threats for each of the field offices we visited (Albuquerque, Chicago, Jackson, San Francisco, and Washington). According to one of the field offices, providing a precise accounting of agent resources expended on each threat was difficult because the descriptions of the threats are not necessarily aligned with investigative classifications. Therefore, the number of field agents expended on threats would only be an estimate.

When reviewing the list of investigative classifications associated with the field offices’ top threats, we noted that some field offices included classifications that did not appear to pertain to their threats. For example, one field office’s top threat was [REDACTED]. However, this field office included investigative classifications related to [REDACTED] in its listing of classifications associated with [REDACTED] threat.

We also found that while two offices have identified similar threats, these offices did not associate the same investigative classifications with those threats. For example, two field offices we reviewed listed the [REDACTED] as one of their top threats. One office listed 20 investigative classifications associated with its efforts on this threat, while the other office included only 7 classifications. Similarly, two field offices listed [REDACTED] as one of their top threats. One office associated 10 classifications with its [REDACTED] threat, while the other listed 3 classifications that related to this threat.

During the Strategy Performance Sessions, FBI headquarters evaluates field office performance on the identified threats. Based upon the inconsistencies in tracking efforts related to field offices’ highest priority threats, the data provided to headquarters during a Strategy Performance Session may not be an accurate portrayal of field office performance related to top threats. We recommend that the FBI establish mechanisms to ensure consistency in how field offices identify investigative classifications associated with their top threats.

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67 Our analysis on these field offices’ threats is contained in Appendix IV.

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Initiative Implementation Concerns

For the FBI’s resource management initiatives to be successful, they require regular reinforcement from FBI management and an understanding of the initiatives’ overall objectives. For example, according to Counterterrorism Division officials, past leadership within the division was highly committed to the Strategy Management System and established an execution plan that was communicated to personnel within the division. This motivated operations-level personnel to understand and execute the Strategy Management System. However, when the Counterterrorism Division underwent a management change, support for the Strategy Management System was not reinforced. Counterterrorism Division officials believe this contributed to new program managers’ difficulty understanding the Strategy Management System process. Current Counterterrorism Division officials stated that management is committed to the division’s Strategy Management System and that it is being correctly executed by staff.

Historically, the FBI has had significant turnover in headquarters and field office personnel – from the supervisory level to the executive management level. This turnover can affect the continuity of initiatives such as the Strategy Management System and Semi-Annual Program Reviews. As a result, we believe it is important for the FBI to integrate these initiatives into overall operational practices, reinforce guidance on these initiatives throughout the entire agency, and clarify for field managers the expectations for these initiatives.

Recommendations

We recommend that the FBI:

3. Provide, through the Resource Planning Office, guidelines on what is meant by “temporary” realignments.

4. Require the Counterterrorism Division, Cyber Division, Criminal Investigative Division, and Directorate of Intelligence to utilize a sophisticated resource allocation methodology, such as the risk-based management initiative.

5. Establish and disseminate policies and procedures for the execution of the risk-based management initiative, if this initiative will be used for future resource allocations.
6. Ensure that FBI operational divisions develop performance measures in the Strategy Management System to help ensure personnel resources are allocated and utilized in accordance with division priorities.

7. Ensure that Compass automatically filters out non-casework data from investigative case information.

8. Enact a policy requiring field offices to keep information in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool current, complete, and accurate.

9. Establish mechanisms to ensure consistency in how field offices identify investigative classifications associated with their top threats and include personnel resource utilization data in information packets used during field office Strategy Performance Sessions.

10. Reiterate to field offices the benefits of and expectations for implementing resource management initiatives.
STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS

As required by Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as appropriate, internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives. A deficiency in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to timely prevent or detect: (1) impairments to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in financial or performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation of the FBI's internal controls was not made for the purpose of providing assurance on its internal control structure as a whole. FBI management is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of internal controls.

We did not identify any deficiencies in the FBI's internal controls that are significant within the context of the audit objectives and based upon the audit work performed that we believe adversely affect the FBI's ability to manage personnel resources and investigate cases.

However, we did identify a procedural weakness related to the FBI's oversight of its Compass system, from which we used data to demonstrate FBI personnel resource allocation and utilization, as well as investigative casework. While Compass management reviewed Compass input errors, processing errors, management reports, and audit logs and took corrective action when necessary, the FBI did not maintain evidence of Compass management's review and the corrections or reconciliation of identified errors, reports, and logs. The FBI stated that it had developed the requirements and means for tracking Compass management's review and any required resolution.

Because we are not expressing an opinion on the FBI's internal control structure as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information and use of the FBI. This restriction is not intended to limit the distribution of this report, which is a matter of public record. However, we are limiting the distribution of this report because it contains sensitive information that must be appropriately controlled.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Objectives

The objectives of this audit were to determine whether the FBI has: (1) used personnel resources and investigated cases in accordance with its top priorities and threats, and (2) developed and executed an infrastructure to better assess and allocate personnel resources to each area of the FBI’s operations based on the investigative needs of the organization.

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed FBI documentation, including policies and procedures related to human resource management. Additionally, we analyzed FBI personnel resource allocation, personnel resource utilization, and casework data. We also interviewed officials within several FBI headquarters’ divisions and offices, including the Executive Assistant Director of the Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch; the Assistant Directors of the FBI’s operational divisions; and officials in the FBI’s Resource Planning Office. We conducted fieldwork at five FBI field offices: (1) Albuquerque, New Mexico; (2) Chicago, Illinois; (3) Jackson, Mississippi; (4) San Francisco, California; and (5) Washington, D.C. At each of these locations, we interviewed executive management, including the head of each office. All of our interviews, as well as the documentation obtained during these discussions, provided perspective on the resource-related and casework issues covered by our audit objectives. In total, we interviewed 76 FBI officials.

Between March and October 2009, we requested from FBI officials with direct involvement in the FBI’s risk-based management initiative documentation related to this initiative. FBI officials told us that documentation on the initiative did not yet exist and that they could not provide us with more specific information on the initiative’s development and implementation. However, after our March 2010 audit close-out meeting FBI
officials provided documentation on the risk-based management initiative that was dated as early as March 2009. Additionally, at the audit close-out meeting the FBI stated that the risk-based management initiative had been implemented across all FBI programs to assist FBI executive management in making decisions on FY 2010 personnel allocations. Our report presents an overview of the initiative based on information provided to us following our audit close-out meeting. However, the FBI’s failure to provide information on the risk-based management initiative until after our audit work was completed prevented us from fully examining the initiative.

**Compliance with Laws and Regulations**

According to *Government Auditing Standards*, auditors should identify the laws and regulations that are significant within the context of the audit objectives and assess the risk that violations of those laws and regulations could occur. Through the course of our audit we did not find any laws or regulations concerning the operations of the FBI that were significant within the context of our audit objectives.

**Data Analysis**

To assist in accomplishing our audit objectives, we analyzed data provided by the FBI. Specifically, for FYs 2005 through 2009 we performed analyses of FBI resource allocation, resource utilization, and casework data to identify trends and noted significant changes in the FBI’s operations, including the FBI’s use of personnel resources on top threats and priorities during FYs 2005 to 2009.\(^\text{68}\) In total, this data amounted to 142,305 records.

To examine the FBI’s human resource utilization, we examined data contained in the FBI’s Compass system that originated from the FBI’s Time Utilization Recordkeeping (TURK) system.\(^\text{69}\) The TURK system contains work-hour and Average On-Board (AOB) data for most FBI agents and professional staff involved with investigative matters at the field office level. The FBI transfers this information into its Compass system on a bi-weekly basis. To examine the types and quantity of cases the FBI investigated during our review period, we analyzed data contained in the FBI’s Compass system that originated from the Automated Case Support (ACS) system.\(^\text{70}\) At

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\(^{68}\) We performed our data analyses during June 2009 and, thus, obtained the most up-to-date FY 2009 data available at that time.

\(^{69}\) The FY 2009 resource utilization data obtained was as of June 6, 2009.

\(^{70}\) The FY 2009 casework data obtained was as of May 31, 2009.
the time of our review, the FBI’s Compass system only captured active case information; it did not include information on case openings or case closings. Therefore, our casework analysis was limited to active cases.

Compass Data Reliability

Compass is the FBI’s central source of real-time information on FBI resources, performance, and accomplishments. The utility of Compass information is reliant on the accuracy of the data elements it processes.

During our review, the OIG contracted with an audit firm to determine whether the data elements within Compass are reliable – complete and accurate. The contractor tested Compass application controls, inspected Compass reports, conducted interviews, and reviewed relevant policies and procedures.

The contractor did not find any material deficiencies during its testing of Compass application controls and processes, including data input and output processes.

However, while the contractor noted that Compass management reviewed Compass input errors, processing errors, management reports, and audit logs and took corrective action when necessary; the contractor determined that the FBI did not maintain evidence of Compass management review and the correction or reconciliation of identified errors, reports, and logs. This increases the risk that source data generated from systems feeding data into Compass may be processed without Compass management review and oversight. At the time of the contractor’s testing, the FBI policy did not require the tracking of Compass management’s review of input errors, processing errors, management reports, and audit logs. In September 2009, the Compass Project Team stated that it has initiated a Compass Administrative Control Log and procedures for retaining and reviewing daily evidence of management’s review and input of error logs, processing error logs, audit logs, and a system management dashboard. The FBI stated that it also updated its Compass Operations and Maintenance Manual to reflect this addition to Compass monitoring policies and procedures.

Given the lack of evidence that management reviewed Compass logs and reports, the contractor found that it was unable to sufficiently determine the reliability of Compass data for our review period (primarily FYs 2005 through 2009). However, we believe the results of the other Compass testing, along with the results of our previous reviews of FBI resource and
casework-related data, provide sufficient assurance that the data we present in this report can be used to present and conclude appropriately on FBI resource utilization and caseload. As with most data, the reliability of the FBI’s personnel utilization and casework data is inherently determined by the integrity and care of those initially inputting the data into the originating systems – in this case the FBI’s TURK and ACS systems that feed Compass.

Without significant changes to Compass, following the implementation of the quality control procedures for tracking management review of Compass reports and logs, the FBI should be able to consider sufficiently reliable the Compass data entered into its feeder systems.

Analysis of Personnel Resource Data

We conducted analyses of allocated and actual personnel resource utilization data.

Allocated Resource Levels: We used the FBI’s Funded Staffing Level (FSL) figures established by the Resource Planning Office to analyze agent and intelligence analyst resource allocations. We obtained field office FSLs to the greatest level of detail available for each fiscal year of our review period. The FSLs for FYs 2005 through 2008 represented the final allocations set for each fiscal year, reflecting any mid-year adjustments. Data for FY 2009 FSL included FSL figures as of June 2009 – the most up-to-date figures available at the time of our analysis. We reviewed the FBI’s field agent and intelligence analyst allocations in conjunction with the FBI’s field agent and intelligence analyst utilization, focusing on the differences between the intended and actual use of field resources during FYs 2005 through 2009. The total FSL data amounted to 2,516 records.

Resource Utilization Levels: The FBI’s TURK system generally records the hours worked for both agents and professional staff, including intelligence analysts, in the FBI’s 56 field offices. FBI headquarters personnel do not record their time in TURK. TURK data collection is divided into 13 TURK periods per fiscal year; each TURK period is 4 weeks. Each agent and intelligence analyst records the percentage of time worked each day according to FBI investigative classifications – the percentages are based on a 10-hour day for agents and an 8-hour day for intelligence analysts.  

71 The FBI assigns each of its cases to an investigative classification based upon the nature of the case. If the FBI has a major case, such as 9/11, it creates a category and requires agents to TURK to that case. When it is not a major case, the investigative classification is the greatest level of detail for which the FBI tracks resource utilization. Each classifications is assigned to a program and, if appropriate, a subprogram.
These percentages are recorded and the result is averaged to show time worked in a specific classification equivalent to a full-time employee, which the FBI calls Average On-Board (AOB). The FBI’s Compass system reflects this AOB information.

For example, if 3 agents within a particular field office each spent one-third of their time (33 percent) on Violent Gangs – FBI Investigative Classification 281D – within a given TURK period, the AOB for that field office (on Classification 281D matters for that TURK period) would be equal to 1 agent AOB (100 percent of 1 agent-equivalent). The FBI considers the AOB data to be the best way to assess the actual time worked by FBI employees in specific FBI investigative programs, subprograms, and classifications.

We were provided four separate data files to use in our analysis of FBI resource utilization – two data files pertaining to field agents and two data files pertaining to field intelligence analysts. For both the field agent and intelligence analyst utilization data, we obtained a data file covering FYs 2005 through 2008 and another data file for FY 2009, which was as of June 6, 2009. In total, these data files contained 102,816 records, each containing the following fields:

- Field Office
- FBI Headquarters Division
- Program
- Subprogram
- Classification
- Classification Description
- AOB for the designated program/subprogram/classification for each fiscal year

**Burn Rate Analysis:** The FBI uses the term "burn rate" to refer to the difference between allocated resources (i.e., FSLs) and actual utilized resources (i.e., AOB). In particular, an "overburn" occurs when more resources are utilized than allocated. In contrast, the FBI defines "underburn" as using fewer resources than allocated. We performed an analysis in which we examined the burn rates of field agent resources at the divisional and programmatic levels throughout our review period. We also examined the overall burn rate of field intelligence analysts during FYs 2005 through 2009. We were unable to conduct a more in-depth analysis of field intelligence analysts at the divisional and programmatic levels because at the time of our review, the FBI only allocated intelligence analysts to field offices in a lump sum.
In conducting this burn rate analysis, we identified the number of field agents allocated to each FBI division and program through the use of the pivot table function available in our analytical software. Additionally, we also created pivot tables to determine the number of agents utilized in each FBI division and program. We then computed the actual burn rate and burn rate percentage by comparing the allocation and utilization figures for each division and program. In general, the agent allocation and utilization data contained one-to-one relationships between the divisions and programs. However, to derive the burn rate for the FBI’s White Collar Crime Program, we had to add the field agent FSLs allocated for health care fraud and those allocated for white collar crime.\textsuperscript{72} For intelligence analysts, we simply compared the total intelligence analysts allocated to field offices to the total number of intelligence analysts utilized within field offices during our review period.

Besides assessing the field agent burn rates at the divisional and programmatic levels, we examined the burn rate of field agents according to the FBI Director’s top 10 national priorities for FYs 2005 through 2009. We focused this analysis on the first eight national priorities because the ninth and tenth national priorities are not associated with a specific investigative area. As a result, the FBI’s resource-related data is not captured in a fashion to readily determine the FBI’s level of effort expended on these two priorities.

Similar to our divisional and programmatic burn rate analyses, our burn rate analysis of the FBI’s national priorities generally consisted of a one-to-one relationship between the allocation and utilization data. However, we were unable to compute the burn rate for the FBI’s fourth national priority – Public Corruption – because the FBI does not specifically allocate field agent positions for public corruption matters. Instead, this priority area was encompassed within the burn rate of the FBI’s seventh national priority – White Collar Crime. Again, we had to add the field agent FSLs allocated for health care fraud to those allocated for white collar crime in deriving the burn rate of the FBI’s seventh national priority. Further, in computing the burn rate of the FBI’s sixth national priority (Transnational and National Criminal Organizations/Enterprises), we combined the following programs for both the allocation and utilization data: (1) Gang/Criminal Enterprise Program, (2) Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Program, and (3) Organized Crime Program.

\textbf{Priority/Threat Resource Utilization Analysis:} To assist in accomplishing our objectives, we also attempted to determine how many field agents were

\textsuperscript{72} The FBI separately allocates agent positions for health care fraud since these are reimbursable positions.
used on national priority matters within the FBI's operational divisions. Specifically, we focused on the national priorities of each program in these divisions. For example, the Counterterrorism Division consists of the International Terrorism and Domestic Terrorism Programs, and we assessed the utilization of field agents on the national priorities within these two programs. In performing our analysis, we requested and obtained a list of national priorities by each program for each fiscal year of our review period, including the investigative classifications associated with each priority.

Using the information provided, we queried the agent utilization data files to determine the number of field agents expended on each program's national priorities. After identifying these figures, we computed the number of field agents not utilized on national priorities within each program area. In particular, we subtracted the number of field agents used on each national priority matter from the total number of field agents utilized within that particular program area.

In addition to looking at FBI program priorities, we examined the number of agents used by field offices to address their top threats. During the Strategy Performance Sessions, which began in March 2007, FBI field offices identified their top three threats. We obtained a May 2009 listing of the top threats as identified by field offices during these sessions, which formed the basis of our analysis. Strategy Performance Sessions began in March 2007. We focused our threat analysis on FYs 2007 through 2009 and limited our analysis to the five FBI field offices where we conducted fieldwork.

During fieldwork, some FBI field managers explained that their offices’ threats were slightly different from those reflected in the May 2009 listing we had obtained. Therefore, we incorporated these changes into our analysis – examining both the threats identified as of May 2009 and the threats as of the time of our fieldwork in July 2009. As with our personnel utilization analysis of FBI program priorities, we requested and obtained a list of the office’s top three threats (former and current) during our review period, including the investigative classifications associated with each threat. After querying the agent utilization data files to determine the number of field agents expended on the top threats within the five offices, we calculated the number of field agents not utilized on these offices’ top threats. For example, we subtracted the number of field agents used to address the
APPENDIX I

Chicago Field Office’s top three threats from the total number of field agents utilized within the Chicago Field Office.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Analysis of Casework Data}

The FBI’s ACS system generally records the open, closed, and active FBI cases. The FBI’s Compass system reflects the active FBI cases, but does not contain information on open and closed cases. Therefore, we focused our review on the active cases by investigative program area.

We were provided two separate data files to use in our analysis of FBI casework – one data file covered FYs 2005 through 2008 and another data file covered FY 2009, which was as of May 30, 2009. We reviewed FBI’s active casework focusing on investigative program areas during FYs 2005 through 2009. In total, these data files contained 36,973 records, each containing the following fields:

- Field Office
- FBI Headquarters Division
- Program
- Subprogram
- Classification
- Classification Description
- Active Cases for the designated program/subprogram/classification for each fiscal year

\textit{Priority/Threat Casework Analysis:} To assist in accomplishing our objectives, we also determined how many division-specific priority cases the FBI had active during FYs 2005 through 2009. Similar to our analysis of resource utilization data, we focused on the national priorities of each program in the FBI’s operational divisions. We used the same lists obtained from our priority/threat resource utilization analysis to review active cases.

We queried the active case data files to determine the number of active cases within each program’s national priorities. After identifying these figures, we computed the number of active cases that were not focused on national priorities within each program area. In particular, we subtracted the number of active cases within each national priority area from the total number of active cases within that particular program area.

\textsuperscript{73} We met with FBI officials from operational division programs to discuss our methodology for analyzing priority threat field agent resource data. These FBI officials concurred with our overall approach for analyzing the information related to their respective investigative program areas.

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FBI OPERATIONAL TRANSFORMATION TIMELINE

2001
- December: Initial reorganization of FBI and creation of EADs for:
  - Criminal Investigations
  - Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence
  - Law Enforcement Services
  - Administration

2002
- August: Critical Enterprise Investigations Program Established.
- May 20: Reprogramming of FBI Human Resources

2003
- September: Field Intelligence Groups Established in each Field Office.
- April 3: Announcement of EAD for Office of Intelligence

2004
- March: Revised Organizational Chart of the FBI Approved by the Attorney General. Includes EADs for:
  - Intelligence
  - Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence
  - Law Enforcement Services
  - Administration
  - Criminal Investigations

2005
- February: Directorate of Intelligence Annually Established to replace the Office of Intelligence.

2006
- March: FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009 Released
- September: National Security Branch Established and Headed by one EAD for:
  - Counterterrorism
  - Counterintelligence
  - Directorate of Intelligence

2008-2009
- Implementation of a standardized Field Intelligence Model within each Field Office

Source: FBI Documentation and Previous OIG Reviews
FORMER FBI ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
(AS OF MARCH 2004)

Source: FBI
FIELD OFFICE AGENT UTILIZATION ON TOP THREATS

This appendix provides the utilization rates of Special Agents by identified threats within the five FBI field offices that we visited during this review. The categories titled “other” within the graphs contain the time recorded by agents to all remaining investigative classifications not associated with the office’s top threats.

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Field Office

According to the May 2009 list of top threats generated from the FBI’s Strategy Performance Sessions (SPS), the Albuquerque Field Office’s top three threats were: (1) Cyber National Security, (2) [Redacted], and (3) Indian Country (All Violations). In July 2009 field office management changed the order of importance and replaced one of the office’s top threats. As a result, the office’s top three threats, in order of importance, were: (1) [Redacted], (2) Cyber National Security, and (3) Public Corruption (Pay to Play). We analyzed the agent utilization data and determined the average number of agents used by the Albuquerque Field Office to address its top threats – both its former and current top three threats – for FYs 2007 through 2009, as depicted in the Exhibit AIV-1.
EXHIBIT AIV-1
ALBUQUERQUE FIELD OFFICE
AGENT UTILIZATION ON TOP THREATS
FISCAL YEARS 2007 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

Chicago, Illinois, Field Office

As of July 2009, the Chicago Field Office’s top three threats, in order of importance, were: (1) [classification], (2) [classification], and (3) Public Corruption. Exhibit AIV-2 illustrates the percentage of agent resources used on each of these threats in comparison to the total agents utilized by the office during FYs 2007 through 2009.74

74 The Chicago Field Office explained that unique classifications are not always directly associated with its [classification] and public corruption threats. Therefore, the field office provided a list of general categories associated with these threats in certain instances. However, we only included the specific unique classifications identified by the Chicago Field Office for these threats, which understates to a certain degree the percentages of field agents used to address these two threats.
Jackson, Mississippi, Field Office

According to the May 2009 list of top threats generated from SPS, the Jackson Field Office’s top three threats were: (1) Public Corruption, (2) White Collar Crime – Major Fraud, and (3) [redacted]. However, field office management replaced the office’s third top threat with [redacted] in July 2009. We examined the agent utilization data and determined the average number of agents used by the Jackson Field Office to address its top threats – both its former and current top three threats – for FYs 2007 through 2009, as depicted in the Exhibit AIV-3.
San Francisco, California, Field Office

As of May 2009, the San Francisco Field Office’s top three threats, in order of importance, were: (1) [REDACTED], (2) [REDACTED], and (3) use of San Francisco-based Internet infrastructure for terrorist activities. Similar to what occurred during our visits to the Albuquerque and Jackson field offices, we learned that the San Francisco Field Office had revised its top threats in July 2009. San Francisco field management explained that the office replaced its second highest threat (REDACTED) with gangs. According to additional documentation provided by the San Francisco Field Office, the name of its third highest threat was modified to refer to Cyber Counterintelligence.
Threats. Exhibit AIV-4 illustrates the percentage of agent resources used on each of the office's top three threats in comparison to the total agents utilized by the office during FYs 2007 through 2009.

**EXHIBIT AIV-4**

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE
AGENT UTILIZATION ON TOP THREATS
FISCAL YEARS 2007 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data

Washington, D.C., Field Office

According to the list of top threats generated from SPS, the Washington Field Office's top three threats were: (1) [redacted], (2) [redacted], and (3) [redacted]. We examined the agent utilization data and determined the average number of agents used by the Washington Field Office to address its top threats in FY 2007 through FY 2009, as depicted in Exhibit AIV-5.
EXHIBIT AIV-5
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
AGENT UTILIZATION ON TOP THREATS
FISCAL YEARS 2007 THROUGH 2009

Source: OIG analysis of FBI utilization data
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S RESPONSE

SECRET

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001
April 1, 2010

Mr. Raymond J. Beaudet
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
Suite 5000
1425 New York Avenue, Northwest
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Beaudet:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) appreciates the opportunity to review and respond to your draft audit report entitled, "Follow-Up Audit of FBI Personnel Resource Management and Casework" (hereinafter "Report").

We are pleased that the Report concludes that the FBI has improved its ability to monitor and evaluate its allocation and utilization of resources over the past five years. The FBI's establishment of the Resource Planning Office has helped to manage personnel resources and ensure those resources are aligned with the FBI's strategic goals. As reported, most FBI divisions were using resources as planned and did not experience significant change in the number of active investigations on priority matters over the last five years.

Additionally, the FBI is pleased that this Report reflects the other various FBI resource management initiatives developed over the past five years to enhance the assessment and oversight of personnel resources. The FBI remains committed to further development and deployment of these initiatives to ensure the FBI's national priorities are addressed with sufficient personnel resources.

In conclusion, based upon a review of the Report, the FBI concurs with the ten recommendations directed to the FBI. The FBI appreciates the professionalism exhibited by your staff to complete this Report. Enclosed herein are the FBI's responses to the recommendations. Please feel free to contact me at 202-324-2901 should you have any questions or need further information.

Sincerely yours,

Amy Jo Lyons
Assistant Director
Inspection Division

Enclosure

SECRET
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSES
OIG FOLLOW-UP AUDIT OF THE FBI'S PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK

FBI RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED in the FINAL DRAFT

Report Recommendation #1: “Require operational divisions to provide the Resource Planning Office with the investigative classifications associated with programmatic priorities for the development of an automated report in Compass that provides resource utilization data for these priorities.”

FBI Response: Concur. The Resource Planning Office (RPO) will work with the Operational Divisions to update investigative classifications associated with programmatic priorities to ensure subprogram threats related to the Director’s recently announced “2010 Priorities” are included therein. These updates will be reflected in the RPO’s Compass Priority Report which aligns classifications to the top ten FBI Operational Priorities by reporting TURK, FSL, Overburn/Underburn at the Program and Subprogram levels.

Report Recommendation #2: “Regularly examine personnel resource utilization associated with division-specific priorities for all its investigative programs.”

FBI Response: Concur. Each operational division will ensure TURK is included on Monthly Scorecards to enable regular examination of personnel resource utilization associated with division-specific priorities.

Report Recommendation #3: “Provide, through the Resource Planning Office, guidelines on what is meant by ‘temporary’ realignments.”

FBI Response: Concur. The RPO will work to improve field office understanding of “temporary” realignments in the context of personnel resource requests by including increased guidance in a communication to the field offices soliciting requests for the FY 2010 second “open season.”

Report Recommendation #4: “Require the Counterterrorism Division, Cyber Division, Criminal Investigative Division, and Directorate of Intelligence to utilize a sophisticated resource allocation methodology, such as the risk-based management initiative.”

FBI Response: Concur. Risk Based Management (RBM) and the outputs of this initiative will serve as the FBI’s standard sophisticated resource allocation methodology to be used as one tool when division Executive Management leverages resource allocation decisions. The FBI has
issued initial communications to all field offices and headquarters operational divisions that outline the intended use of RBM in the personnel resource allocation process. See Attachment "A" - Electronic Communication dated 9/16/2009 and e-mail message dated 10/19/2009 to Assistant Directors and Program Managers which provided a link to the collaboration website that explained RBM and its predicted allocation via the Dynamic Resource Allocation Model (DRAM) for the five programs that received personnel enhancements in FY 2010 (Counterterrorism, Mortgage Fraud, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Counterintelligence, Computer Intrusions). Each of these programs utilized the RBM/DRAM as a tool when allocating their FY 2010 resource enhancements, as shown in recently provided documents to the OIG. RPO continues to inform additional program managers as additional programs undergo utilization of this methodology. Based upon the foregoing, the FBI requests this recommendation be closed.

Report Recommendation #5: “Establish and disseminate policies and procedures for the execution of the risk-based management initiative, if this initiative will be used for future resource allocation.”

FBI Response: Concur. As noted above our response to recommendation #4, the RPO has begun dissemination on the RBM initiative. In April 2010, the final output of RBM will be disseminated to all field offices which will explain the initiative, the manner in which the tool was used in the initial personnel resource allocation decisions, and its applicability in making future personnel resource allocation decisions. The RBM has also established a feedback mechanism by which field offices can provide comments on the inclusion of all risk indicators and or suggest additional indicators that could improve the calculation of domain risk. The RPO expects that this information will only serve to improve the field office requests for personnel resources, the program manager’s recommendations to executive management, and finally the Corporate Resource Planning Board and Director’s final decision.

Report Recommendation #6: “Ensure that FBI operational divisions develop performance measures in the Strategic Management System to help ensure personnel resources are allocated and utilized in accordance with division priorities.”

FBI Response: Concur. The RPO will continue to work with operational divisions to ensure that performance measures in the Strategic Management System allocate and utilize personnel resources in accordance with division priorities. The RPO and Finance Division will also continue to facilitate twice-yearly Spend Plan meetings in which each division aligns each program or sub-program to the strategic objective(s) that it supports.

Report Recommendation #7: “Ensure that Compass automatically filters out non-casework data from investigative case information.”
FBI Response: Concur. The FBI currently has in place a Compass report called, “MAR Pending Cases by Program Structure” in the REPORTS section which breaks outs pending cases to Programs, Subprograms, and Classifications. See Attachment “B” - MAR Report. As a result, non-casework classifications (e.g. training) to which cases are logged to can be counted separately from investigative case classifications. Based upon the foregoing, the FBI requests this recommendation be closed.

Report Recommendation #8: “Enact a policy requiring field offices to keep information in the Resource Allocation Planning Tool current, complete, and accurate.”

FBI Response: Concur. The FBI’s official Resource Allocation Policy (RAP), requiring field offices to keep information in the RAP Tool current, complete, and accurate has been approved. See Attachment “C” for Corporate Policy 0288D.

Report Recommendation #9: “Establish mechanisms to ensure consistency in how field offices identify investigative classifications associated with their top threats and include personnel resource utilization data in information packets used during field office Strategy Performance Sessions.”

FBI Response: Concur. As noted in the FBI’s above response to Recommendation #1, RPO will work with the Operational Divisions to update investigative classifications associated with programmatic priorities to ensure subprogram threats related to the Director’s recently announced “2010 Priorities” are included therein. These updates will be reflected in the RPO’s Compass Priority Report which aligns classifications to the top ten FBI Operational Priorities by reporting TURK, FSL, Overburn/Underburn at the Program and Subprogram levels.

Prior to each Strategy Performance Session (SPS), personnel resource allocation (including Special Agent, Embedded Intelligence Analyst, Staff Operations Specialist, Language Analyst, Financial Analyst, and Task Force Officer) for each of the offices priority threats is collected. This information is packaged together for comparison of resource allocation against the various threats reported by the field office. In addition a Compass Report for each field office comparing Special Agent TURK data across operational programs is compiled. The Compass Reports are used to ensure uniformity of data and to serve as a check on the threat resource data that is collected. Due to the varying specific threats in a field offices domain, some variation in the identification of investigative classifications associated with top threats is normal and expected.

The package containing the threat information and resource allocation data and the Compass Report with TURK data is distributed to all operational Assistant Directors (AD), as well as the ADs of RPO, DI, and Inspection Division for review prior to the SPS. During the actual SPS, threat coverage/mitigation strategies are discussed with a strategic effort to ensure personnel resources are appropriately assigned to priority threats.
Report Recommendation #10: “Reiterate to field offices the benefits of and expectations for implementing resource management initiatives.”

FBI Response: Concur. The FBI will continue to communicate and reinforce with all field offices the benefits and expectations of new resource management initiatives. Beginning in December 2009, the FBI’s ADD sent out a monthly “All SACs” newsletter in which resource management initiatives were addressed and guidance was provided. See Attachment "D" for relevant pages from the December 2009, January 2010 and March 2010 newsletters.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT

The OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the FBI. The FBI’s response is incorporated in Appendix V of this final report. In its response, the FBI concurred with each of our 10 recommendations. This following provides the OIG analysis of the response and a summary of actions necessary to close the report.

Recommendation Number:

1. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation for operational divisions to provide the Resource Planning Office with the investigative classifications associated with programmatic priorities for the development of an automated report in Compass that provides resource utilization data for these priorities. The FBI stated that the Resource Planning Office will work with operational divisions to update investigative classifications associated with programmatic priorities to ensure subprogram threats related to the Director’s priorities are reflected in the Compass Priority Report.

To close this recommendation, please provide us with evidence that operational divisions have provided the Resource Planning Office with the investigative classifications associated with their programmatic threats. In addition, please provide us with the Compass Priority Report reflecting these programmatic priorities.

2. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to regularly examine personnel resource utilization associated with division-specific priorities for all of its investigative programs. The FBI stated that each operational division will ensure resource utilization data is included in monthly status reports, which are the FBI’s mechanism to examine personnel resource utilization by division-specific priorities.

To close this recommendation, please provide evidence that the FBI has incorporated personnel resource utilization data in each operational division’s monthly status reports.

3. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to provide, through the Resource Planning Office, guidelines on what is meant by “temporary” realignments. The FBI explained that it plans to improve field office understanding of temporary resource realignments by
disseminating additional guidance in its communication to field offices soliciting FY 2010 personnel resource requests.

To close this recommendation, please provide us with evidence that the additional guidance has been provided to field offices.

4. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation for the Counterterrorism Division, Cyber Division, Criminal Investigative Division, and Directorate of Intelligence to utilize a sophisticated resource allocation methodology. The FBI stated that its Risk Based Management initiative will serve as the FBI’s standard sophisticated resource allocation methodology. In addition, the FBI provided a September 2009 communication to all field offices and headquarters operational divisions that outlined the intended use of the Risk Based Management initiative in the personnel resource allocation process.

To close this recommendation, please provide documentation that all operational divisions are using the Risk Based Management initiative during the resource allocation process.

5. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to establish and disseminate policies and procedures for the execution of the Risk Based Management initiative. According to the FBI, the Resource Planning Office has begun disseminating information on the Risk Based Management initiative and will disseminate to field offices final output information on this initiative in April 2010. However, the FBI did not indicate or provide policies and procedures on how program managers will use the Risk Based Management initiative.

To close this recommendation, please provide documentation on formally established policies and procedures for the Risk Based Management initiative.

6. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to ensure that FBI operational divisions develop performance measures in the Strategic Management System to help ensure personnel resources are allocated and utilized in accordance with division priorities. The FBI stated that the Resource Planning Office will work with operational divisions to ensure that this recommendation is implemented.

To close this recommendation, please provide evidence that operational divisions developed performance measures in the Strategic Management
System related to the allocation and utilization of personnel resources on division priorities.

7. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to ensure that Compass automatically filters out non-casework data from investigative case information. The FBI provided a Compass report that displays pending cases by program structure, which separates pending cases by program, subprograms, and classifications. However, Compass users must know to access this report to separate the non-casework data from the overall data presented in Compass. To ensure the FBI uses the most accurate information, we believe Compass should automatically filter out non-casework data from statistics reflected in Compass.

To close this recommendation, please provide evidence that Compass automatically filters out non-casework data from casework statistics.

8. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to enact a policy requiring field offices to keep information in the Resource Allocation Planning (RAP) tool current, complete, and accurate. The FBI provided a copy of its Resource Allocation Policy and our review of this policy confirmed that it included a requirement for field offices to review the information in the RAP tool to ensure it is current, complete, and accurate. However, we were not provided evidence that this policy had been disseminated to all field offices.

To close this recommendation, please provide evidence that this policy was disseminated to field offices.

9. **Resolved.** The FBI concurred with our recommendation to establish mechanisms to ensure consistency in how field offices identify investigative classifications associated with their top threats and include personnel resource utilization data in information packets used during field office Strategy Performance Sessions. The FBI stated that the Resource Planning Office, Directorate of Intelligence, Inspection Division, and all operational division Assistant Directors are provided a Compass report book containing resource utilization data for field offices participating in the Strategy Performance Sessions. However, we believe that because field offices’ specific threats vary, field offices should be required to communicate to FBI headquarters the particular investigative classifications associated with the top threats identified by that field office. This will ensure that the FBI more accurately and precisely tracks field office performance according to identified threats.
APPENDIX VI

To close this recommendation, please provide evidence that FBI officials from operational divisions are collecting and reviewing investigative classifications associated with the top threats from each field office. In addition, please provide documentation of the field office resource utilization data provided to Assistant Directors during the Strategy Performance Sessions.

10. Resolved. The FBIconcurred with our recommendation to reiterate to field offices the benefits of and expectations for implementing resource management initiatives. The FBI provided examples of monthly “All SACs” newsletter that discussed a few resource management initiatives, including specific guidance to field offices. However, the examples provided did not discuss Strategy Performance Sessions and did not provide detailed guidance on the use of the Strategy Management System or the Semi-Annual Program Reviews.

To close this recommendation, please provide additional newsletters or other guidance disseminated to field offices on all of the resource management initiatives discussed in our report.