|
The OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the FBI on March 6, 2006, for its review and comment. The FBI provided written responses to the draft report, which are included as Appendix 5 of this final report. The response from the Counterterrorism Division, dated March 17, 2006, addresses 15 of the report’s recommendations. The response from the Directorate of Intelligence, dated March 23, 2006, addresses the remaining 3 recommendations. The FBI agreed with the 18 recommendations in the audit report and provided both general comments and technical comments. We incorporated the technical comments into the report as appropriate.
FBI’s General Comments
In its response, the FBI noted that it had created its Maritime Security Program without additional funding, that resource availability influences its participation in maritime exercises, and that it is working with the Coast Guard to resolve potential coordination issues in advance of any terrorist threat or incident in the maritime domain. In addition, the FBI provided updates on the activities of the Maritime Security Program in the areas of suspicious incident and threat reporting, training, information sharing, and implementation of the National Strategy for Maritime Security.
Status of Recommendations
Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and described three initiatives intended to ensure that the guidance provided to Maritime Liaison Agents is consistent with the actual role of MLAs. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the guidance provided to MLAs is consistent with their actual role. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and reported that it will ensure that resources are assigned, or made available, to address the assessed threat and risk of a terrorist attack. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI has assigned its MLAs based on an assessment of the threat and risk of a terrorist attack to critical seaports. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and described two steps the Maritime Security Program has taken to address the recommendation. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI has established a maritime case classification under the general Counterterrorism Preparedness classification. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and stated that the FBI would ensure that it devotes adequate resources to Area Maritime Security Committees. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI has named at least one MLA to each AMSC. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and stated that the MSP updates the MLA list regularly. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI has required its field offices to immediately notify the MSP of any MLA appointments or reassignments. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and stated that it recognized that significant changes to the MSP require the program to have more specific and quantifiable goals and objectives. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI has established measurable objectives for the MSP. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and stated that it believed that the MSP and the National Joint Terrorism Task Force had provided guidance to MLAs on developing human intelligence. We agree that the electronic communication outlining the MSP’s goals and objectives identifies five core competencies of the FBI, including the ability to establish a human intelligence base, and states that the MSP will be built upon those competencies. However, the MSP’s goals and objectives do not make it clear how this competency will be used. The intent of our recommendation is to ensure that that MSP build a base of informants with knowledge about port operations that cannot be obtained through increased interaction with law enforcement, other federal agencies, port authorities, and the private sector. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the MSP’s objectives include developing human intelligence. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that its maritime operational response plan examines various high-risk scenarios and evaluates how FBI resources would address the scenarios. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows that the FBI’s Maritime Operational Threat Response plan examines high-risk scenarios, determines the required response times, and evaluates how FBI resources would address the scenarios. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that the Critical Incident Response Group will require the 14 field offices with enhanced maritime SWAT teams to annually invite the Coast Guard to participate in joint exercises. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows that the FBI has established a requirement for joint FBI-Coast Guard exercises in field offices assess as having high-risk seaports. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that is actively attempting to resolve potential role and incident command issues that may occur with the Coast Guard in the event of a maritime terrorist incident. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows that the FBI has resolved potential role and incident command conflicts in the event of a maritime terrorist incident through joint exercises and, if necessary, a revised and broadened memorandum of understanding with the Coast Guard. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that a current initiative will develop a template for after-action reports that will apply to all critical incidents, special events and exercises. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows that the FBI prepares after-action reports after all maritime-related exercises and uses the reports to identify and disseminate lessons learned and best practices. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI stating that the Crisis Management Unit will ensure that all field offices comply with annual critical incident reporting requirements and that the MSP will provide the CMU with maritime-related lessons learned and best practices. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows that the FBI: (1) has ensured that all field offices submit critical incident reports to the Critical Incident Response Group by January 15 each year, and (2) requires its MSP, in consultation with CIRG, to use the reports to conduct maritime-specific reviews of the FBI’s crisis management policies and practices and to disseminate maritime-related lessons learned and best practices. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that it will ensure that intelligence gaps are identified and action is taken to resolve any deficiencies. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows that the FBI has assessed the threat and risk of maritime terrorism compared to other terrorist threats and ensures the National Threat Assessment ranks the various modes of attack and targets. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and stated that it would ensure that adequate resources are allocated to address priority threats. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI has ensured the amount of resources dedicated to maritime terrorism is based on the extent of the maritime threat in relation to other threats. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and described two initiatives intended to ensure that its intelligence reporting is responsive to its intelligence requirements. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI monitors the progress of operating divisions and field offices in answering intelligence collection requirements pertaining to seaports and maritime terrorism. Resolved. The FBI agreed with the recommendation and reported that its Intelligence Production Board, made up of senior intelligence managers, would ensure that the FBI’s analytic products adequately address maritime-related terrorist methods. The Directorate of Intelligence noted that the ability to collect intelligence against a specific requirement is based on the availability and capability of sources and terrorist activities. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation that shows the FBI is focusing its intelligence reporting to more comprehensively address potential maritime-related terrorist targets and methods. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI’s reporting that the Counterterrorism Division will ensure that maritime-related intelligence is monitored and properly managed. This recommendation can be closed when receive documentation showing the FBI has named a unit within the Counterterrorism Division to monitor the volume and substance of all FBI maritime-related intelligence. Resolved. The FBI agreed to consider the recommendation and noted that in September 2005 it had issued guidance to its field offices on the content, frequency, and dissemination of intelligence bulletins. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation indicating that the FBI considered establishing a requirement for regular field office intelligence bulletins to summarize the field office’s suspicious incident reporting. If such a requirement is adopted, closure of the recommendation will require documentation showing that the FBI established standardized frequency, content, and distribution requirements.
|