March 17, 2006 The Honorable Glenn A. Fine Inspector General Office of the Inspector General United States Department of Justice Room 4322 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, Northwest Washington, D.C. 20530 Dear Mr. Fine: I would like to thank you for providing the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) the opportunity to respond to your report entitled, "The FBI's Efforts to Prevent and Respond to Maritime Terrorism." I recognize the substantial challenge the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has in producing timely reports on complex issues such as this. This challenge is even more difficult when assessing FBI operations because of the rapid changes it continues to undergo to optimally position itself to address the evolving threats to our Nation. In large part, the FBI agrees with the findings and recommendations of this report. Accordingly, Executive Management from the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) of the FBI and personnel from the appropriate programs within the FBI have reviewed OIG's draft report concerning the FBI's efforts to prevent and respond to maritime terrorism. Ideally, we would like for the report to be updated to provide a current status of maritime security efforts in the FBI, and to that end have set forth several points of information for you to consider. The FBI initiated the Maritime Security Program (MSP) in July 2005. This proactive measure was taken by CTD Executive Management in recognition of the potential threat of maritime terrorism. It is worth noting that this program was established without additional funding by reallocating resources within CTD. Availability of resources has also influenced the FBI's participation in various exercises. Although the FBI would like to participate in additional exercises, the FBI is currently able to support the joint exercises that are coordinated through the National Exercise Program. The FBI is actively working with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and other agencies to resolve potential coordination issues in advance of actual threats and incidents in the maritime domain. Additionally, the following comments are to correct or clarify statements made in the text of the audit report: Page “v”, first paragraph and page 25, first paragraph:  The MSP prepared an Electronic Communication (EC) to the field to request that an FBI Special Agent (SA), as opposed to a Task Force Officer (TFO) be designated as the primary Maritime Liaison Agent (MLA). Although this EC was drafted, it was not approved by CTD management. As a result, in many Field Offices a TFO serves as the primary or only MLA. Page “vi”, first bullet:  This point may need to be modified to include the capabilities of the Laboratory Division’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) in dealing with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) incident. HMRU provides technical and scientific operational response to WMD incidents, including, but not limited to, crime scene management, evidence recovery, emergency decontamination and scientific assessments. The responsibilities of the Hazardous Devices Response Unit (HDRU) includes the response to threats and actual devices before they are detonated or used in an "attack." HDRU does not respond to post-detonation attacks; that is the responsibility of HMRU and/or the Laboratory Division's Explosive Unit. Page “viii”, last paragraph:  The statement, “The FBI has not collected complete data on the number of suspicious activities or terrorist threats involving seaports,” is correct. However, the MSP has begun to collect this information from all available sources. The MSP has created a data base to capture this information which will be used to identify and track possible trends in suspicious activity at ports and port facilities. The MSP is also in the process of creating a standardized reporting mechanism for use by the MLAs when responding to incidents. These reports will be maintained in the MSP case file and the information will also be entered into the data base. Finally, the MSP maintains liaison with other agencies and the private sector, such as the USCG, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL), for the sharing of pertinent threat information. Page 20, bottom of the page:  It should be noted that the MSP will present the 2006 Maritime Liaison Agent Training Conference in Long Beach, California from 04/03‑07/2006. The Port of Long Beach is one of the busiest ports in the United States with a variety of inter‑modal transportation systems. This site was specifically chosen because it offers hands on/familiarization training using various port facilities and vessels. The curriculum for this conference is expected to include presentations on the impact of maritime directives under the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS); informant and liaison development; legal issues; enhancing maritime domain awareness; the FBI’s capabilities and resources to respond to a maritime incident; and guidance to the field on best practices. Page 24, first full paragraph:  The report indicates that as a result of placing responsibility for managing the MLA Program under the MSP, all of the FBI’s transportation related counterterrorism programs are located within the same organizational unit. This is not the case as the National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) initiated the Rail Liaison Agent (RLA) Program via EC dated 10/24/2005. The NJTTF requested each Field Office to designate an FBI SA or TFO as a primary and secondary RLA. A separate initiative is currently underway to evaluate the feasibility of creating a program or unit focused on all aspects of the transportation sector. It is important to note this initiative is unfunded and would be created by reallocating existing resources. Page 24, last paragraph:  The report mentions that one of the objectives of the MSP was to create a website on the FBI’s Intranet to facilitate the dissemination of information pertaining to directives, training, intelligence and other matters. This objective has been accomplished. The MSP website address is http://ctd.fbinet.fbi/semu/maritime/. This website contains information on maritime directives including National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)‑41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)‑13, the NSMS and key supporting plans; maritime related statutes; intelligence reports; points of contact; and links to related programs including the Directorate of Intelligence (DI), and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC). Information is continually updated or added to the website. The MLAs are notified of information posted to the website via e‑mail. The website has generated positive feedback from the MLAs and is a readily available source of standardized information for the field. Page 24, last paragraph:  The report also mentions that another objective of the MSP was to review maritime related suspicious activity reports to identify any trends that may be indicative of pre‑operational planning. As noted above, the MSP has already started this process, which is ongoing. This effort is complicated by the lack of standardized reporting and difficulty in retrieving this information, as stated elsewhere in the findings. Page 25, middle of the page:  The report states that the MSP has not reviewed the eight supporting plans under the NSMS to identify the FBI’s responsibilities nor identified all of the FBI’s representatives assigned to the corresponding working groups. That information was supplied to OIG at the inception of the MSP. Since then, the MSP has thoroughly reviewed NSPD‑41/HSPD‑13, the NSMS and all eight of the supporting plans. The FBI’s responsibilities under these directives have been identified and are being addressed. NSPD‑41/HSPD‑13, the NSMS and key supporting plans are posted to the MSP website. Due to limited resources, the MSP must prioritize which of the working groups to attend in support of these efforts. In that regard, representatives from the MSP have regularly attended and participated in the Maritime Security Policy Coordinating Committee (in support of Executive Management); the Maritime Security Working Group; the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Implementation Team; and the Maritime Domain Awareness Implementation Team. In addition, an interagency MOTR Joint Working Group (JWG) has recently been established to address the planning, standardization and exercise requirements that will be deleted from the final version of the MOTR Plan as the Homeland Security Council has indicated. The MSP participates in this JWG as well as the Border and Transportation Security Policy Coordinating Committee. Page 25, fourth paragraph:  The report states neither the MSP’s FY 2006 goals and objectives nor the critical duties of an MLA include the need for the FBI to develop relationships with people who can inform the FBI about maritime operations. It should be noted that at the time the MSP’s goals and objectives were established (via EC dated 08/19/2005), the MSP did not have responsibility for managing the MLA Program. In fact, the first objective identified in that EC was to coordinate with the NJTTF to assume responsibility for the MLA Program. That objective was accomplished on 10/04/2005, when the MSP assumed responsibility for managing the MLA Program. Furthermore, within the goals and objectives (via EC dated 08/19/2005), the MSP established various objectives for the field. One of these objectives was to “ensure effective liaison between the MLA and various law enforcement agencies, port and shipping officials in respect to counterterrorism preparedness.” In the goals and objectives EC, the MSP identified five core competencies which included the establishment of a human intelligence base. Finally, in an EC to all Field Offices dated 07/12/2004, the NJTTF stated, “The goal of the MLA Program is to enhance the maritime environment through increased interaction between MLA members, private industry, state and local port authorities, to include law enforcement and other federal agencies with maritime responsibilities. These enhancements will result from the establishment of close working relationships between the MLAs and concerned entities within the maritime field ¼ ” The EC goes on to provide additional guidance and an extensive list of recommended liaison contacts, including participation in the local Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC). In addition to these specific recommendations, every FBI SA, including those designated as MLAs, are evaluated on specific critical elements. One of the core critical elements for all FBI SAs is the development of an intelligence base, which includes source development. This process encompasses identifying, initiating and developing relationships with individuals or organizations that may provide information or assistance in investigations and assignments. Therefore, CTD believes the need for the FBI to develop relationships with people who can inform the FBI about maritime operations has been thoroughly addressed. As you requested, the MSP has provided responses to pertinent recommendations. Additionally, recommendations not under MSP's purview were provided to the appropriate offices, (i.e., the DI, the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), and CTD's Counterterrorism Analysis Section.) Responses to the recommendations are set forth below. Recommendation #1 OIG Recommendation:    Ensure that MLA guidance is consistent with the actual role of MLAs. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation. The MSP has already made significant progress in this regard. Through the creation of the MSP website, which contains information on maritime directives, including NSPD‑41/HSPD‑13, the NSMS and key supporting plans; maritime related statutes; intelligence reports; points of contact; and links to related programs including the DI and the OGC. Information is continually updated or added to the website. The MLAs are notified of information posted to the website via e‑mail. The website has generated positive feedback from the MLAs and is a readily available source of standardized information for the field. The MSP is in the process of planning the 2006 Maritime Liaison Agent Training Conference in Long Beach, California from 04/03‑07/2006. This site was specifically chosen because the Port of Long Beach is one of the busiest ports in the United States with a variety of inter‑modal transportation systems. The conference will include hands on/familiarization training using various port facilities and vessels. The curriculum for this conference is expected to include presentations on the impact of maritime directives under the NSMS; informant and liaison development; legal issues; enhancing maritime domain awareness; the FBI’s capabilities and resources to respond to a maritime incident; and guidance to the field on best practices. Finally, now that the MSP has responsibility for management of the MLA Program, the MSP will establish specific, quantifiably measurable and attainable goals and objectives that are consistent with the responsibilities assigned to the MLAs, to include recommendations for participation in various local working groups and liaison contacts. Recommendation #2 OIG Recommendation:   Assign MLAs based on an assessment of the threat and risk of a terrorist attack to critical seaports. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation. FBI will ensure that resources are assigned or available necessary to address the risk or threat based on the assessment. Recommendation #3 OIG Recommendation:   Measure the amount of resources devoted to maritime efforts by establishing a maritime case classification under the general Counterterrorism Preparedness classification. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation. The MSP has already taken certain steps which would enhance the FBI’s ability to measure the amount of resources devoted to maritime efforts. FBI is in the process of establishing a classification for maritime matters. In August 2005, the MSP provided recommendations to the Counterintelligence Division for changes to the Investigative Accomplishment Report (FD‑542) to capture activity conducted in support of the MLA Program. Finalization of the modifications to this report are pending. Recommendation #4 OIG Recommendation:   Require field offices to name at least one MLA to each AMSC. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation. FBI will ensure that adequate resources are dedicated to each Area Maritime Security Committee to address priority matters. Recommendation #5 OIG Recommendation:   Require field offices to immediately notify the Maritime Security Program of any MLA appointments or reassignments. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation. The MSP updates the MLA list on a regular basis. The MLA list is maintained by the MSP and is available on the MSP web site. The list identifies, by Field Office, all of the MLAs as well as the JTTF Supervisors who have oversight of the MLA Program. The list provides contact information, identifies if the MLAs are assigned to a Resident Agency (RA) and which ports they cover. The MSP has advised field offices to immediately notify the MSP of any personnel changes affecting the MSP, and this guidance will be reiterated through training such as the 2006 Maritime Liaison Agent Training Conference. Recommendation #6 OIG Recommendation:   Ensure that the Maritime Security Program has measurable objectives. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation and recognizes that significant changes and progress in the MSP require the establishment of more specific, quantifiably measurable and attainable goals and objectives. While FBI recognizes that the goals and objectives established for the MSP (via EC dated 08/19/2005) did not include quantifiable measures, it should be noted that the MSP was a new program and no previous goals and objectives had been established. Furthermore, the MSP did not have responsibility for managing the MLA Program at the time the initial objectives were established. The first objective of the MSP was to coordinate with the NJTTF to assume responsibility for the MLA Program. It is also worth noting that the NSMS and all of the supporting plans were released in the final quarter of 2005, after the date on which these objectives were established. Final directives under the NSMS have not been established, even as of the date of this response. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to quantify the amount of training and/or reference materials required to train MLAs in the field. Despite the lack of specific, quantifiably measurable objectives at the inception of the program, the MSP accomplished several of the stated objectives, including the following: The MSP assumed responsibility for managing the MLA Program on 10/04/2005; Training and reference materials to assist the MLAs have been distributed via e‑mail, posted to the FBI’s Intranet, and will be presented at the 2006 Maritime Liaison Agent Training Conference scheduled to take place 04/03‑07/2006; The MSP established a web site on the FBI’s Intranet where current information including, but not limited to, maritime directives, statutes and intelligence is maintained; The MSP continually identifies, analyzes and disseminates information pertaining to maritime threats, vulnerabilities and safety/security issues; The MSP continually coordinates with other programs within the FBI to enhance situational awareness for the MSP, other programs, FBIHQ and the field; The MSP has already begun to review and track suspicious activity reports to determine if there are any trends which could indicate terrorist activity and has disseminated information to the field in this regard; and The MSP is actively engaged in liaison with other government agencies as well as the private sector. This effort and the fact that the MSP serves as a primary point of contact and a coordination center within the FBI for maritime issues has enhanced the FBI’s liaison with these groups. Recommendation #7 OIG Recommendation:   Ensure that the Maritime Security Program’s objectives include developing human intelligence. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation and asserts that the MSP and the NJTTF have already provided such guidance to the MLAs. As stated above, at the time the MSP’s goals and objectives were established, the MSP did not have responsibility for managing the MLA Program. Even so, the MSP established various objectives for the field. One of these objectives was to “ensure effective liaison between the MLA and various law enforcement agencies, port and shipping officials in respect to counterterrorism preparedness.” In the goals and objectives EC, the MSP identified five core competencies which included the establishment of a human intelligence base. Prior to the existence of the MSP, in an EC to all Field Offices dated 07/12/2004, the NJTTF stated, “The goal of the MLA Program is to enhance the maritime environment through increased interaction between MLA members, private industry, state and local port authorities, to include law enforcement and other federal agencies with maritime responsibilities. These enhancements will result from the establishment of close working relationships between the MLAs and concerned entities within the maritime field ¼ ” The EC goes on to provide additional guidance and an extensive list of recommended liaison contacts, including participation in the local AMSC. In addition to these specific recommendations, every FBI SA, including those designated as MLAs, are evaluated on specific critical elements. One of the core critical elements for all FBI SAs is the development of an intelligence base, which includes source development. This process encompasses identifying, initiating and developing relationships with individuals or organizations that may provide information or assistance in investigations and assignments. Therefore, FBI believes the need for the FBI to develop relationships with people who can inform the FBI about maritime operations has been thoroughly addressed. The MSP also plans to address liaison and the development of a human intelligence base during the 2006 Maritime Liaison Agent Training Conference which is scheduled for 04/03‑07/2006. In addition, the MSP will include specific recommendations to the MLAs in the objectives which will be established for FY 2007. Recommendation #8 OIG Recommendation:   Ensure that the FBI’s MOTR operations plan examines high risk scenarios, determines the required response time, and evaluates how FBI resources would address the scenarios. FBI Response:   The FBI's maritime operational response plan takes into account various high-risk scenarios to include the criminal/terrorist use of biological, chemical or radiological WMD, as well as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs). Other high-risk scenarios include a large number of hostages on a maritime platform and/or the involvement of sophisticated criminal/terrorist adversaries. The TSB's tactical response to maritime threats mirrors the response to any other tactical response. That is, the FBI tactical response is a tiered approach which recognizes that local field offices will respond as necessary (Tier 1), with regional response (Tier 2) added as the evaluation of the situation may dictate. National response, as required (Tier 3), will involve the deployment of the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), as well as other FBI SWAT teams and possibly the HDRU and the Laboratory's HMRU, as the scenarios would necessitate. Response times vary as a consequence of venue. Recommendation #9 OIG Recommendation:   Establish a requirement for joint FBI/Coast Guard exercises in field offices assessed as having high‑risk seaports. FBI Response:   CIRG will require the fourteen (14) field offices that have been given enhanced tactical maritime training to make overtures to the USCG to conduct joint exercises on an annual basis. It should be noted that the FBI is not in a position to require USCG participation, however, the FBI will extend the invitation to the USCG as well as to other appropriate entities. Recommendation #10 OIG Recommendation:   Resolve potential role and incident command conflicts in the event of a maritime terrorist incident through joint exercises and, if necessary, a revised and broadened MOU with the Coast Guard. FBI Response:   FBI concurs in stating that this is currently being addressed through the revision of the final interagency MOTR Plan. It may be premature to determine if a revised memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the USCG will be necessary until the final MOTR Plan has been approved and vetted through exercises and/or operations. Again, the FBI is not in a position to require the USCG to enter into a renewed MOU. Recommendation #11 OIG Recommendation:   Prepare after‑action reports after all maritime‑related exercises and use the reports to identify and disseminate lessons learned and best practices. FBI Response:   This is being addressed in a separate joint initiative within the FBI. It is anticipated an After Action Report (AAR) template will be developed that applies to all critical incidents, special events and exercises. CIRG's Crisis Management Unit (CMU) is responsible for program oversight for the production of AARs per the Manual of Investigative and Operational Guidelines (MIOG), Part 2, section 30-1.8 (1) (a), (b) and (c) which specifically sets out the requirements for AARs. Recommendation #12 OIG Recommendation:   Ensure that all field offices submit critical incident reports to the CIRG by January 15 each year; require the FBI’s Maritime Security Program, in consultation with the CIRG, to use the reports to conduct maritime‑specific reviews of the FBI’s crisis management policies and practices — including any requirements for field office crisis management plans — and to disseminate maritime‑related lessons learned and best practices. FBI Response:   CIRG's CMU ensures adherence to the MIOG's Part 2, section 30-1.8 which requires that field offices submit critical incident reports to CIRG by January 15th of each year. CTD's MSP will provide information concerning maritime related lessons learned and best practices. Recommendation #13 OIG Recommendation:   Assess the threat and risk of maritime terrorism compared to other terrorist threats and ensure the National Threat Assessment ranks the various modes of attack and targets. FBI Response:   FBI will ensure that intelligence gaps are identified and action is initiated to resolve any deficiencies. Recommendation #14 OIG Recommendation:   Ensure the amount of FBI resources dedicated to maritime terrorism is based on the extent of the maritime threat in relation to other threats. FBI Response:   FBI agrees with this recommendation. FBI will ensure that adequate resources are allocated to address priority threats. Recommendation #15 OIG Recommendation:   Monitor the progress of operating divisions and field offices in answering intelligence collection requirements pertaining to seaports and maritime terrorism. FBI Response:   The Directorate of Intelligence will provide a response to this recommendation. Recommendation #16 OIG Recommendation:   Focus intelligence reporting to more comprehensively address potential maritime‑related terrorist targets and methods. FBI Response:   The Directorate of Intelligence will provide a response to this recommendation. Recommendation #17 OIG Recommendation:   Name a unit within the Counterterrorism Division to monitor the volume and substance of all FBI maritime‑related intelligence. FBI Response:   FBI Counterterrorism Division will ensure that Maritime related intelligence as well as investigations are monitored and properly managed. Recommendation #18 OIG Recommendation:   Consider establishing a requirement for regular field office intelligence bulletins to summarize the field office’s suspicious incident reporting and, if such a requirement is adopted, establish standardized frequency, content, and distribution requirements. FBI Response:   The Directorate of Intelligence will provide a response to this recommendation. The FBI has prepared the appropriate responses to the recommendations found in your report. The responses have undergone a classification review (Enclosure 1) and Sensitivity Review (Enclosure 2). The responses were coordinated through the FBI's Inspection Division. Please contact Shirlene Savoy of the Inspection Division should you have any questions. Ms. Savoy can be reached at (202) 324-1833. I want to thank you again for your efforts in producing this report, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss in detail the progress the FBI continues to make in this area. Please contact me should you have any questions regarding this matter. Sincerely yours, Willie T. Hulon Assistant Director Counterterrorism Division