The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts

Audit Report 05-20
April 2005
Office of the Inspector General

Pursuant to the OIG’s standard audit process, the OIG provided a draft of this audit report to the FBI on March 17, 2005, for its review and comment. The FBI’s April 12, 2005, response is included as Appendix 8 of this final report. The FBI concurred with the 15 recommendations in the audit report and also provided comments regarding 7 general issues in the report. Our analysis of the FBI’s response follows. FBI’s General Comments 1. In its response, the FBI asserted that the report relies on anecdotal evidence to support conclusions, particularly the training and utilization findings. Specifically, the FBI believes that we used the opinion of one guest instructor at the Basic Intelligence Class to conclude that the FBI has not invested sufficient resources in its analyst training program. The instructor was a seasoned intelligence professional and, in our opinion, provided an important perspective. However, we did not rely solely on his perspective. This guest instructor’s critique was one of three sources that pointed to the FBI’s need for more FBI instructors for its introductory analyst class. Based on our interviews of analysts who had taken the introductory training and our review of the new Analytical Cadre Education Strategy-1 (ACES-1) curriculum, we noted the FBI’s reliance on instructors who are either contractors or personnel from other agencies. Moreover, during our audit FBI officials recognized this shortcoming and said they planned to remedy it and our report discusses the FBI’s plans to increase the number of FBI instructors. The FBI’s response also stated that the utilization finding relies on anecdotal evidence to support the observation that analysts complained about being assigned much administrative work. The sentence from the report reads, “Some analysts also complained about being assigned much administrative work.” This statement is fully supported by the results of our survey, which found, on average, analysts reported spending 31 percent of their time performing different types of administrative work. Similarly, our survey supports another sentence that concerned the FBI: “Many analysts told us that most intelligence analysts do very little analysis; instead the work assigned them is what they classify as investigative support.” This comment reflects the response of many analysts. Moreover, our survey found that, on average, analysts spent 49 percent of their time doing work that did not require analytical skills. The FBI notes that a lack of administrative support pervades the intelligence community. While this may be true, our audit examined FBI practices, not the entire intelligence community. 2. The FBI disagreed with our use of the number of disseminated intelligence products as a performance metric for intelligence analysts and said that this metric is only one of 27 it uses to evaluate FBI intelligence operations. We acknowledge other performance metrics are applicable to intelligence analysts, and we revised the report to reflect the FBI’s comment that it uses 27 performance measures. However, we believe that the number of disseminated intelligence products is an important measure of the FBI’s intelligence program and therefore its intelligence analysts, and it was one key performance measure we gathered from our survey of intelligence analysts. Moreover, we believe that both the Mission Statement of the FBI Intelligence Program and the Directorate of Intelligence Performance Metrics Plan support our view that this is an important measure when they state: “The mission of the Intelligence Program is to optimally position the FBI to meet current and emerging national security and criminal threats by . . . Providing useful, appropriate, and timely information and analysis to the national security, homeland security, and law enforcement communities.” In addition, the Directorate of Intelligence Performance Metrics Plan includes the number of intelligence products produced by each analyst as one of its measures of performance. Further, to ensure that our survey included an accurate list of tasks performed by the FBI’s analysts, we discussed the content of the survey with the Office of Intelligence, and we conducted extensive structured interviews and survey pretests with intelligence analysts. The Office of Intelligence did not provide us with comments on the list of tasks covered by our survey of intelligence analysts or suggest that we include other performance measures in our survey. 3. The FBI expressed concern with our use of the term “transfer” to describe intelligence analysts who were hired from within the FBI. We edited the final report to include a footnote defining our use of “transfer” in this context. The FBI also expressed concern about statements in our report in which we found that externally hired analysts had superior qualifications to internally hired analysts. However, the data we received from the FBI and the data from our survey indicated that analysts who entered on duty in the last three years were more likely to possess qualifications desired by the FBI including: military intelligence experience, intelligence community experience, Presidential Management Fellow, experience living outside the United States, and foreign language skills. Analysts who entered on duty prior to 2002 were less likely to have such superior qualifications. In response, the FBI said it had analyzed the educational background of internally hired analysts and found that internally hired analysts were not less educated than the FBI intelligence analyst population as a whole. However, our report does not state that internally hired analysts were less educated than the analyst corps as a whole. In fact, the report notes that analysts hired internally during FYs 2002 - 2004 are better educated than analysts who entered on duty before FY 2002. Finally, the FBI commented that the same hiring standards are applied to all applicants for analyst positions. We did not state otherwise in the report. 4. The FBI expressed concern with our characterization of the comments of the Executive Assistant Director – Intelligence (EAD-I) regarding the analyst attrition rate. The FBI’s response stated that the EAD-I was pleased with the 8 percent attrition rate for FY 2004 because it represents a decline from the previous year and because the attrition rate appears to have stabilized. We edited the final report to state that the EAD-I was pleased with the 8 percent rate because it was a decline from the previous year. However, we note that the FBI did not provide data to support the statement that attrition rate has stabilized at 8 percent. 5. The FBI asserted that our report did not highlight sufficiently that retirement was the reason analysts most frequently cited for not intending to stay with the FBI. However, both the executive summary and the body of our report make it clear that retirement was the reason analysts most frequently cited for not intending to stay with the FBI. 6. The FBI disagreed with the following statement in the report regarding analysts’ attendance of the introductory analyst training: “While all analysts are required to attend the basic course, actual enrollment is voluntary.” The FBI attached a November 2004 Electronic Communication (EC) showing that all FBI intelligence analysts must attend ACES-1 or ACES-1.5. However, the statement cited by the FBI is part of a discussion of the Basic Intelligence Analyst (BIA) class, which has been replaced by ACES. We also note that the EC the FBI provided does not address the fundamental problem the FBI had with accountability for BIA attendance. The EC does not establish any deadline or timeframes by which analysts must attend the ACES classes. 7. The FBI stated that since the OIG conducted the audit, the balance of analysts in the field to analysts at headquarters has shifted. The FBI provided recent data on the distribution of analysts, stating that as of March 2005 the majority were in the field. However, this data did not identify what operational entities were included in the count of analysts at headquarters or in the field. In our report, the analysis of the allocation of analysts includes three categories: field offices, operational divisions at headquarters, and other FBI entities such as the Information Technology Centers and the Critical Incident Response Group. Our analysis found that nine percent of analysts were assigned to these other entities. Because the March 2005 data the FBI supplied does not identify whether the other FBI entities are included in the count of analysts at headquarters or in the count of field analysts, we could not verify that the balance of analysts had shifted to the field offices from headquarters. Status of Recommendations Resolved. In response to this recommendation, the FBI stated that it agrees that its hiring goals should be based on: the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; projected attrition in the analyst corps; and its ability to hire, train, and use analysts. It notes, however, that Congress decides the FBI funded level of intelligence analysts and therefore ultimately determines the number of analysts the FBI can hire. The FBI reports that it is working on a threat-based methodology for determining the number of analysts it requires and is obtaining tools from the Office of Personnel Management to better forecast its needs based on projected attrition and other factors. The recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI’s hiring goals are based on the forecasted need for intelligence analysts; projected analyst attrition; and the FBI’s ability to hire, train and utilize analysts. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI’s statement that it will assign a point of contact to all applicants who have received a conditional offer of employment and the FBI’s statement that its automated hiring system notifies applicants of their application status. This recommendation can be closed when the FBI provides us with documentation showing: 1) that it has established a point of contact for all applicants who have received conditional offers of employment, and 2) that its automated hiring system notifies applicants of their status. Resolved. This recommendation is resolved based on the FBI reporting that it is currently developing a methodology to determine the number of intelligence analysts needed. According to the FBI, this methodology will be based on the FBI Threat Assessment and Field Threat Assessments and other threat and risk data. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI has developed and implemented a threat-based or risk-based methodology for determining the number of intelligence analysts it requires. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation, stating that the Directorate of Intelligence is currently developing a new threat and risk-based Intelligence Analyst Allocation Process. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has implemented a threat-based or risk-based methodology for allocating intelligence analysts across the FBI’s headquarters divisions and field offices. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and stated that it is developing competency models for the Intelligence Career Service. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI has linked its methodology for allocating intelligence analyst positions to its Human Talent Requirements Forecast. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and reports that it has already addressed the recommendation by ensuring that all budget requests identify intelligence analyst positions. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI’s budget documentation includes the current funded staffing level for intelligence analysts as well as any requested additional positions. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and enclosed an EC showing that all analysts must attend either ACES-1 or ACES-1.5. However, the EC does not describe any controls to ensure compliance, such as timeframes or deadlines for completing the ACES training. As a result, this documentation is not sufficient to show that all ACES-1 classes are full or will be in the future. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that ACES-1 classes are full. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and reports that ACES classes in November and December 2004 were a pilot program for a new rigorous evaluation. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI has developed a more rigorous training evaluation system that includes the effectiveness and relevance of each instructional block; asks analysts what other topics need to be covered; obtains the views of analysts after returning to work when they can evaluate the effectiveness of the training in improving their job skills; and obtains evaluations of training effectiveness from analysts’ supervisors. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it is in the process of developing a staffing plan for the Center for Intelligence Training, which includes ACES instruction. According to the FBI, the staff at the Center will be a mixture of contractors, subject matter experts, and full-time FBI instructors. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has developed a methodology to determine the number of staff needed to teach ACES-1 and a plan to staff ACES-1 with FBI personnel, including experienced FBI intelligence analysts. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said that it plans to incorporate testing into the ACES-1 and ACES-1.5 curricula in FY 2006. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI has integrated testing into the ACES-1 curriculum. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and reports that it has begun to provide training to special agents on the roles and capabilities of intelligence analysts. However, based on the information the FBI provided, it does not appear that all special agents receive this training. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation demonstrating that the FBI requires all special agents to attend training on the role and capabilities of intelligence analysts. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and provided documentation showing that it had assessed the work done by analysts in the Operations Specialist work role. The FBI said an assessment for the other work roles — All Source Analysts and Reports Officers — is underway. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation from the FBI showing that it has assessed the work done by intelligence analysts and determined what is analytical in nature and what work is in general support of investigations that can more effectively be performed by other support or administrative personnel. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it had completed a support workforce analysis that documented the FBI’s need for more administrative personnel. This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of the strategic workforce plan for intelligence support personnel, including a gap analysis of current investigative support personnel (by position) and the number (by position) the FBI needs to meet current and forecasted threats. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it has begun retention and succession planning. This recommendation can be closed when we receive a copy of the retention and succession plans and strategies for intelligence analysts, including measurable goals. Resolved. The FBI agrees with this recommendation and said it is beginning to conduct informal exit interviews and plans to implement more rigorous exit interviews. This recommendation can be closed when we receive documentation showing that the FBI conducts exit interviews of intelligence analysts who leave the FBI or transfer to other positions within the FBI.