INTRODUCTION

The Inspections Division, Office of the Inspector General has completed a review of the Tri-State Violent Crime Task Force (VCTF) of the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) for the District of Maryland. This review determined whether the VCTF is meeting its program objectives as identified in the task force proposal, whether the task force is expending funds for approved purposes, and whether program managers are providing adequate oversight.

FUNDING FOR THE VIOLENT CRIME TASK FORCES

On January 4, 1995, the Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA), notified the United States Attorneys that the Congress had earmarked $15 million in the United States Attorneys' fiscal year 1995 appropriation to support the Attorney General's Violent Crime Task Force initiative. The Director requested that the United States Attorneys submit a detailed plan requesting funding for a VCTF in their districts.

On January 31, 1995, the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland proposed to the Director, EOUSA, a task force to supplement the law enforcement efforts in the rural Tri-State area of Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland, known as the Interstate 81 (I-81) corridor. Under the proposal, the task force would operate in three separate jurisdictions (Western Maryland, the West Virginia Panhandle, and Northwestern Virginia), and would be managed by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agents assigned to the Hagerstown, Maryland, office. The DEA had identified a dramatic increase in drug-related violence in this area. Drug traffickers and drug organizations from the District of Columbia, New York City, South Florida, and Jamaica had increased their activities in the Hagerstown, Maryland, and surrounding areas. Local law enforcement organizations were hampered in their investigations of these drug organizations by their jurisdictional limitations. The United States Attorney for the District of Maryland proposed deputizing 10 state and local law enforcement officers to assist the DEA Special Agents in Hagerstown, Maryland. With federal law enforcement authority, the local law enforcement officers would cross jurisdictional boundaries and assist the DEA Special Agents in investigating violent drug trafficking organizations in the Tri-State area.

The United States Attorney for the District of Maryland requested $120,832 ($76,500 for overtime, $19,732 for support staff, and $24,600 for equipment and supplies). On March 22, 1995, the Director, EOUSA notified the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland that $111,232 was approved for the Tri-State VCTF.

In August 1995 the USAO and DEA began circulating a memorandum of understanding to the federal, state and local law enforcement organizations for signature. The United States Attorneys for the District of Maryland, the Western District of Virginia, and the Northern District of West Virginia, the DEA Special Agent In Charge (SAIC) of the Washington Field Division, the DEA Assistant SAIC of the Baltimore District Office, and each of the agency heads of the state and local law enforcement agencies signed the memorandum of understanding in support of the Tri-State drug and violent crime project.

TRI-STATE VIOLENT CRIME TASK FORCE GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The project goal, as identified in the United States Attorney's proposal, was to form a provisional task force of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers that would target and immobilize drug traffickers and violent drug distribution groups who operate in three separate jurisdictions (Western Maryland, the West Virginia Panhandle, and Northwestern Virginia). The task force would concentrate in the I-81 corridor between Hagerstown, Maryland, and Winchester, Virginia. The task force, in cooperation with the appropriate federal and state prosecutors, was to identify, investigate, and successfully prosecute the primary drug trafficking groups in the Tri-State area and seize their assets. The proposal for the task force established five specific objectives:

• Coordination - to coordinate the activities of all participating agencies in the Tri-State area in order to provide a unified approach that combines the resources of federal, state, and local authorities against the highest level violators in that area;
• Resources - to form a group of trained, deputized drug enforcement officers to conduct drug investigations under the general supervision of DEA agents in the I-81 corridor providing manpower and expertise that would otherwise not be available to small rural police departments;
• Intelligence - to gather, centralize, and disseminate intelligence on drug traffickers in the I-81 Tri-State area and to use that intelligence to its maximum extent to identify and mutually target organizations and members of drug trafficking groups;
• Seized Assets - to identify and seize the assets of drug traffickers and organizations and return a portion of those assets to the participating agencies to enhance their drug law enforcement capabilities in the future; and
• Funding - to develop the task force into a fully funded task force in the future--staffed with full-time officers totally dedicated to drug law enforcement--through a successful, coordinated interagency approach to rural drug law enforcement.

The VCTF Coordinator in the USAO for the District of Maryland is responsible for the administration of funds and general project coordination. The DEA Special Agents in Hagerstown, Maryland, manage the day-to-day investigative activities of the task force. Investigative case files are maintained in Hagerstown, Maryland, and the task force financial records are maintained in the USAO in Baltimore, Maryland.

To assess program accomplishments and financial activities of the project, we interviewed the USAO's VCTF Coordinator, the USAO's Budget Officer and the DEA Special Agents in Hagerstown, Maryland. We also reviewed investigative logs, case files, quarterly progress and financial reports, and accounting records. Additional information on our scope and methodology is provided in Appendix I.

We developed a questionnaire to obtain the Tri-State VCTF participants' opinions on the task force's achievements (see Appendix II). The 17 questions included in the questionnaire are related to the goals and objectives identified in the approved task force proposal submitted by the USAO. We distributed the questionnaire to the 2 DEA Special Agents managing the program, to the 9 agency heads or agency representatives supporting the task force, and to the 13 state and local law enforcement officers participating in the task force (see Appendix III). Twenty of the 24 law enforcement officers given a copy of the questionnaire responded. The four that did not respond were state and local officers. A summary of the 20 law enforcement officers' responses to the questionnaire is provided in Appendix IV. The DEA Special Agents' responses to the questionnaire are provided in Appendix V. State and local agency officials' and law enforcement officers' questionnaire responses are provided in Appendices VI and VII, respectively.

RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION

The three sections of our report discuss the task force's program objectives and accomplishments, financial controls, and program oversight. We conducted our on-site review of the Tri-State VCTF in March 1997.

REVIEW OF PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The Tri-State VCTF office achieved its goal of forming a provisional task force of federal, state, and local law enforcement officers. According to the law enforcement officers responding to the questionnaire, the Tri-State VCTF targets drug traffickers and violent drug distribution groups that operate in Western Maryland, the West Virginia Panhandle, and Northwestern Virginia. Concentrated in the I-81 corridor between Hagerstown, Maryland, and Winchester, Virginia, the VCTF cooperates with federal and state prosecutors to identify, investigate, and prosecute the drug traffickers in the Tri-State area. The VCTF then seizes the assets of these drug traffickers.

Eighty percent of the responses to our questionnaire indicated that the Tri-State VCTF was meeting its objectives.1 Six percent of the responses showed that the task force was not successful in meeting its objectives in all areas.2 Three agency officials submitted all of the negative and most of the "do not know" responses. Based on their responses to the questionnaire, we believe that they have not been kept informed of task force activities and accomplishments. For example, the Virginia State Police Drug Unit Commander who submitted four of the six "no success" responses commented that neither he nor his Assistant Special Agent in Charge (SAIC) had been contacted concerning activities in the State of Virginia. The Drug Unit Commander and the Frederick County, Virginia, Sheriff also commented that the task force had no success returning seized assets or proceeds to the participating agencies. In addition, the local law enforcement officers' responses to the questions related to seized assets indicated that they have not been kept informed of task force seizures and dispositions.

Because DEA's case log did not indicate which cases were Tri-State VCTF cases, and there was not a separate VCTF-specific case log or any other records to identify the Tri-State VCTF cases separately, our ability to accurately assess program activities of this VCTF was limited. However, the quarterly progress reports and other records showed that the DEA Special Agents opened 18 investigations and made 45 arrests between November 1995 and March 1997. Based on our review of the DEA Hagerstown case file log, it appears that nine investigations involved the DEA Special Agents and local narcotic task force personnel (six investigations with the Washington County Narcotic Task Force, one investigation with a West Virginia Narcotic Task Force, one investigation with a Winchester Task Force, and one investigation with another DEA Task Force), five investigations involved the DEA Special Agents and Maryland State Police, one investigation involved the DEA Special Agents and the West Virginia State Police, one investigation involved the DEA Special Agents and the Winchester, Virginia Police Department, and two investigations were conducted by the DEA Special Agents.

We reviewed 6 of the 18 case files and found that the VCTF investigated drug traffickers operating in the District of Columbia and the states of Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Tri-State VCTF conducted investigations involving a death threat to a federal informant, a murder of a state informant, a gun sale by a convicted felon, and transportation of drug money.

Coordination

Our review of the quarterly progress reports and case files indicated that, overall, the task force was working cases that required the coordination of several jurisdictions. One case file showed that the Tri-State VCTF participants coordinated their investigation in the arrest of a drug trafficker with a DEA federal task force in Northern Virginia. In this case, the VCTF investigated a drug dealer that migrated from Martinsburg, West Virginia, to Hagerstown, Maryland. The investigation lead to the arrest and indictment of five additional co-conspirators. The primary VCTF members participating in this investigation were the DEA Special Agents in Hagerstown, Maryland; the West Virginia State Police Department; the Martinsburg, West Virginia, Police Department; the Hagerstown, Maryland, Police Department; and the Washington County, Maryland, Sheriff's Office.

Most respondents rated the task force successful in coordinating the activities of all participating agencies, in overcoming the jurisdictional limitations in the Tri-State area, and in coordinating interagency rural drug law enforcement between the USAO and state and local prosecuting organizations. Additionally, most respondents rated the task force somewhat less successful in investigating the highest level drug violators and immobilizing violent drug traffickers or organizations in the Tri-State area. Agency officials submitted six "no success" and five "do not know" responses to the questions related to the task force's coordination activities. Table I shows the overall responses to the five questions related to coordination.

TABLE I. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO COORDINATION

NOTE: The parenthesized numbers above match the questions on the task force questionnaire in Appendix II and in the tables in Appendices IV-VII.

The two DEA Special Agents managing the day-to-day activities of the task force believe that its coordination efforts have been successful. One DEA Special Agent stated that with the initiation of the I-81 corridor Tri-State VCTF, the DEA Hagerstown, Maryland, Office has been transformed from a 2-agent office to a 15-member task force, covering multiple jurisdictions. The other DEA Special Agent believes that "A review of the investigations initiated by the task force will validate the success of this task force in targeting the highest level of drug violators in the Tri-State area."

One DEA Special Agent also estimated that in fiscal year 1997 this task force would arrest no fewer than 50 defendants, nearly tripling the number of arrests made in fiscal year 1996 (17 arrests). The DEA Special Agent noted that most of the defendants pled guilty before going to trial. He said that the defendants that did go to trial were all convicted and, at the time of our review, the task force had a 100 percent conviction rate.

Some task force participants, however, commented negatively on coordination. Agency officials from the Virginia State Police and the Frederick County, Virginia, Sheriff's Office provided all of the "no success" responses to the questions related to coordination. The Virginia State Police official commented that he had been assigned to the Division as the Drug Unit Commander since July 1, 1996, and no representative from the Tri-State VCTF had contacted him, or any of his Assistant SAICs concerning activities in the State of Virginia. The Frederick County, Virginia, Sheriff stated "I have answered this questionnaire from the stand point of the effect this task force has had on our area of Frederick County, Virginia. I fully understand that the VCTF has its hands full mainly in the Hagerstown, Maryland, area and this has resulted in limited to no success at all in the Frederick County, Virginia, area."

Resources

According to our discussions with the DEA Special Agents and a review of VCTF records, the DEA deputized 13 state and local law enforcement officers and provided funds for drug purchases, office space for the task force, and investigative equipment. The DEA also provided training for some task force officers. At the time of our review, the DEA was planning a task force officers school for the summer or fall of 1997. The Tri-State VCTF award provided funds for the payment of overtime to the state and local law enforcement officers and for office, computer and investigative equipment. The state and local law enforcement agencies provided vehicles for their officers and the officers salary and fringe benefits.

Overall, most respondents rated the task force successful in these program areas: providing additional resources including overtime money, office equipment, computer equipment, and investigative expenses to the rural police departments in the Tri-State area; providing expertise on investigating drug related crimes to the rural police departments; and managing the day-to-day activities of the VCTF in the I-81 corridor. Respondents rated the task force somewhat less successful in forming a group of trained, deputized drug enforcement officers. Table II shows the overall responses to the four questions related to resources.

TABLE II. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO RESOURCES

NOTE: The parenthesized numbers above match the questions on the task force questionnaire in Appendix II and in the tables in Appendices IV-VII.

Some task force participants commented specifically on task force resources. The Winchester, Virginia, Chief of Police believes that the Tri-State VCTF has provided his agency with valuable assistance on several cases. He said that the DEA Special Agents have worked closely with members of his agency and that they will benefit from a continued relationship with the Special Agents and the VCTF.

The local law enforcement officer from the West Virginia State Police Department responded, "We maintain a full case load with our home task force (Eastern Panhandle Drug and Violent Crimes Task Force) that does not allow us to be more involved with the Tri-State VCTF. The DEA Special Agents are always available whenever assistance is requested, whether pertaining to a VCTF or our task force case. The DEA Special Agents are excellent in networking information, subpoena assistance and being available for investigative and court matters."

Intelligence

During our review of the case files, we found evidence of the task force sharing drug intelligence. For example, on September 13, 1996, the Maryland State Police stopped a tractor trailer truck on I-81 for exceeding the maximum speed limit. The occupants of the truck consented to a search by the state troopers. The state troopers located several thousand dollars on the floor of the truck. Further inspection of the truck by the state troopers and the VCTF at the Hagerstown, Maryland State Police barracks revealed a total of $559,107 hidden in the truck and records detailing what law enforcement officers believed were cocaine transactions. Neither occupant of the truck claimed ownership of the money. Consequently, the DEA seized the money as drug proceeds. The DEA entered the information in the investigative reports prepared by the VCTF into the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Intelligence System (NADDIS).

On January 4, 1997, the Arkansas Highway Patrol (AHP) working a commercial motor vehicle inspection station stopped a tractor trailer for being overweight on the front axle. The occupants of the tractor trailer were the same individuals stopped by the Maryland State troopers in September 1996. A search of the truck cab by the AHP revealed 2,600 pounds of marijuana. The AHP arrested both occupants and seized the tractor trailer and all drug evidence. The AHP learned of the prior investigation of the tractor trailer occupants by querying its law enforcement intelligence system, which is connected to the El Paso Intelligence Center that includes the DEA NADDIS system.

In another case, the DEA provided information gathered by the Tri-State VCTF participants to the North Carolina State Police (NCSP) and the DEA in Raleigh, North Carolina, on a suspected drug supplier living in Hagerstown, Maryland. In the summer of 1996, the DEA agents learned of an individual supplying large quantities of cocaine to dealers in Hagerstown, Maryland, and Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. This individual and three others were stopped by the NCSP in the fall of 1996. The individuals consented to a search of the vehicle and the NCSP found cocaine concealed underneath the vehicle. The four individuals were arrested and the vehicle was seized. The DEA Special Agents in Hagerstown, Maryland, sent copies of their reports and local police reports involving the drug supplier to the DEA office in Raleigh, North Carolina, who was assisting the NCSP. According to the DEA Special Agents in Hagerstown, Maryland, the four individuals were enroute with the cocaine to Hagerstown, Maryland, from Florida.

Overall, most respondents rated the task force successful in intelligence gathering and dissemination, and somewhat less successful in using intelligence and targeting drug organizations. Table III shows the overall responses to the four questions related to intelligence.

TABLE III. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO INTELLIGENCE

NOTE: The parenthesized numbers above match the questions on the task force questionnaire in Appendix II and in the tables in Appendices IV-VII.

The DEA Special Agents responded that there has been an increased flow of information among the participating task force agencies along the I-81 corridor. Because of the close working relationship with their counterparts in the Tri-State area, the DEA Special Agents believe they have access to all intelligence as soon as it becomes known to the state and local officers. The DEA Special Agents told us that they have worked numerous cases that have crossed jurisdictional boundaries, yet the investigations were completed with little or no disruption of investigative activity.

A Maryland State trooper also believes that the task force has been extremely successful, mainly due to the intelligence sharing between the various participating agencies. He said that prior to the task force, it was rare that the different jurisdictions got together to share information; however, it seems to occur now on a daily basis.

Seized Assets

According to records from the DEA Baltimore District Office Asset Forfeiture Unit and the case files, in 7 of the 18 investigations the task force identified and seized the assets of drug traffickers in the Tri-State area. These assets totaled $747,776 ($610,601 in cash, vehicles worth $99,925, jewelry worth $20,850 and landscape equipment worth $16,400). According to federal procedures for transferring forfeited property, the state and local participating agencies receive a portion of these assets to enhance their law enforcement capabilities.

During one investigation, the Tri-State VCTF assisted the Maryland State Police in the seizure of $559,107 in cash. According to the February 4, 1997, United States District Court for the District of Maryland default decree of forfeiture between the VCTF and the defendant, the defendant's attorney will receive $9,107. The Maryland State Police will receive $385,000. The Washington County, Maryland, Sheriff's Office and the Hagerstown, Maryland, Police Department will receive a total of $55,000 and the federal government will keep the remaining $110,000.3

In another investigation, the VCTF seized $11,870 in cash, two vehicles worth a total of $43,250 and a wrist watch worth $20,850. The Washington County Sheriff's Office and the Hagerstown Police Department will receive a total of $9,496 or
80 percent of the cash seized and the federal government will keep the remaining $2,379. The Washington County Sheriff's Office and the Hagerstown Police Department will receive 40 percent of the cash proceeds from the sale of the vehicles and wrist watch. The Martinsburg Police Department and the West Virginia State Police will share the other 40 percent. The federal government will keep the remaining
20 percent of the sale.

The respondents rated the task force successful in returning a portion of the seized assets to the participating agencies, and somewhat less successful in identifying and seizing the assets of drug traffickers or organizations. Of all the questionnaire topics, respondents reported knowing the least about seized assets. Table IV shows the overall responses to the three questions related to seized assets.

TABLE IV. RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RELATED TO SEIZED ASSETS

NOTE: The parenthesized numbers above match the questions on the task force questionnaire in Appendix II and in the tables in Appendices IV-VII.

Funding

The DEA Special Agents stated that a fully funded task force in Western Maryland would be of tremendous value. However, they stated that there seemed to be a lack of information about how to make this happen and they did not have definitive instructions or plans to accomplish this objective. At the time of our review, the DEA Special Agents managing the task force investigations could not provide any records showing their efforts to develop the task force into a fully funded task force after the award money is expended. They believe that there are enough EOUSA funds remaining in the overtime budget category to continue the Tri-State VCTF until September 30, 1998.

A local law enforcement officer commented specifically on the idea of a fully funded task force. "The next step we need to take is to co-locate, and move to a fully funded DEA task force. We have seen improvements in case initiation, information sharing and coordination of resources since our venture into the VCTF. However, most of the agents are still spread apart. A co-located fully funded task force would take our positive efforts to the next level."

Conclusion

The USAO and DEA achieved the goal of forming a task force of federal, state and local law enforcement officers, initiating 18 investigations and arresting 45 drug traffickers. Overall, they were successful in meeting four of the five task force objectives. According to a majority of the respondents to the questionnaire, the Tri-State VCTF coordinated the activities of participating agencies and targeted drug traffickers and violent drug distribution groups that operated in Western Maryland, the West Virginia Panhandle, and Northwestern Virginia. The task force formed a group of trained, deputized drug enforcement officers to conduct drug investigations along the I-81 corridor between Hagerstown, Maryland, and Winchester, Virginia. Most respondents also stated that the task force gathered and disseminated intelligence with other law enforcement organizations in the Tri-State area and other law enforcement organizations across the United States. The task force identified and seized assets of drug traffickers in the amount of $748,000, and have returned a portion of these assets to the participating agencies. A significant amount of the success of the task force resulted from the efforts of the DEA Special Agents managing the VCTF's investigative activities.

The majority of the respondents believed that the task force would be fully funded in the near future. However, we found that the Tri-State VCTF members and the USAO for the District of Maryland had not devised a strategy for fully funding the task force after the award money is expended.

While the USAO for the District of Maryland and DEA have regularly reported task force results to the EOUSA, three of the nine agency officials supporting the task force report not being informed of task force activities and accomplishments. These three agency officials submitted all 20 "no success" responses and 25 of 35 "do not know" responses. The agency officials' negative responses to the questionnaire indicate that the task force was concentrating on the Hagerstown, Maryland, area.

Recommendations

The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys requires that the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland:

1. Meet with the state and local officials participating in the VCTF to assess the feasibility of continuing the task force as a fully funded project.

2. Establish procedures to inform all VCTF participating agencies of task force activities and accomplishments.

REVIEW OF FINANCIAL CONTROLS

We verified the accuracy and timeliness of quarterly financial reports prepared by the USAO for the District of Maryland. Furthermore, we interviewed the financial personnel in the United States Attorney's office in Baltimore, Maryland, and DEA agents in Hagerstown, Maryland, to assess the administrative and financial controls related to expenditures.

Based on our review of the USAO for the District of Maryland accounting records and selected documents, we did not question any of the costs incurred. We reviewed accounting transactions from all award budget categories. We selected a sample of transactions totaling $27,157 for the award period to determine the allowability and reasonableness of costs incurred for each budget category. Table V shows the award budget categories, award amount, transfers, costs incurred, and the award balance.

TABLE V. BUDGET CATEGORIES, AWARD AMOUNT, TRANSFERS, COSTS INCURRED, AND AWARD BALANCE

On March 24, 1997, the EOUSA approved the United States Attorney's for the District of Maryland request to transfer $19,732 from the support staff to the overtime and computer equipment budget categories. The money is to be used for the purchase of a laptop computer and to pay the state and local police officers overtime expenses during a street-level drug enforcement operation.

We noted an administrative weakness in the financial controls regarding the approval and payment of overtime to state and local police officers. If left unattended, it may result in poor accountability or misuse of funds. The state and local police officers who performed overtime on the task force prepared an overtime cost record that included the employee's name, date overtime worked, individual hours of overtime worked, total hours of overtime worked, hourly overtime wage, and total overtime paid. We could not match the overtime hours to a specific investigation or project. Moreover, the state and local agencies did not include a copy of the police officers' time and attendance sheets with their invoices to the USAO or to the DEA Special Agent certifying that services had been received and approved for payment.

We believe that the internal controls for overtime payments to the state and local jurisdictions should be strengthened. The United States Attorney for the District of Maryland should require the task force members to identify case numbers or project numbers on their overtime cost records and obtain a copy of the task force members' time and attendance sheets. As a result, all overtime expenditures could be identified with task force investigations or administrative and training activities.

Recommendation

The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys requires that the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland:

3. Revise the overtime reporting form to include a space to identify case numbers or other identification for VCTF activities and  require the state and local law enforcement organizations to submit a copy of the police officers' time and attendance sheets with their monthly invoices.

OVERSIGHT OF TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES

In 1995, the EOUSA issued guidance to the USAOs regarding financial controls of the VCTF funds. This guidance identified procedures for accounting of VCTF funds, transfers between funded categories, budget maintenance, property inventory, and use of support staff funding to pay for overtime expenditures. The EOUSA also distributed a document listing the most frequently asked questions and answers concerning VCTF funds and a document explaining Congressional reporting requirements. The EOUSA directed the United States Attorneys to maintain adequate controls and track the accomplishments of their task forces so that EOUSA could provide accurate reports to Congress. Additional guidance identified procedures for preparing quarterly financial and progress reports on their task forces. EOUSA's guidance, however, did not clearly identify the lines of authority for task force program management.

A memorandum of understanding was also developed and circulated for signature by the federal, state, and local law enforcement organizations participating in the task force. However, the scope of the memorandum of understanding was limited to describing the coordinated task force effort and its operational objectives--it did not designate responsibilities for program management or financial oversight.

In our interview with the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, she maintained that it is not clear that her office has the oversight responsibility for VCTF activities. Because DEA managed the day-to-day VCTF activities, she did not assume a strong oversight role. She further asserted that her office did not receive clear written policies and procedures identifying responsibilities for program oversight.

Our findings in this review suggest that the United States Attorneys' responsibilities regarding management and oversight of task force activities are not clear. Our evaluation of the EOUSA's guidance showed that the EOUSA did disseminate information related to program management, although it is limited. To ensure the task force is afforded every opportunity to meet its objectives, a clear and meaningful designation of accountability must also be established through the issuance of additional guidance.

Recommendations

The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys:

4. Issue guidance that establishes a clear and meaningful system of accountability that designates roles and responsibilities for program management and financial oversight by the United States Attorneys' Offices and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys.

5. Define the roles and responsibilities of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Maryland in the Tri-State VCTF program.

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