OIG Inspections Report I-96-11

APPENDIX V Executive Office for United States Attorneys' Response to the Draft Report - Not included in this hypertext version.

Pursuant to Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts, grand jury proceedings are subject to certain rules regarding secrecy. The Department of Justice's (Department/DOJ) rules for securing grand jury material and obtaining clearances for private grand jury court reporter personnel are contained in Department of Justice Order 2600.4, Safeguarding Grand Jury Information, dated August 27, 1980. The Order requires grand jury personnel to receive a security clearance before they are given access to grand jury material. The Order also specifies security and storage requirements for grand jury material.

During our inspection, we assessed whether Federal grand jury information has been properly safeguarded by the United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO). We determined whether grand jury court reporters, with whom United States Attorneys have contracted, have obtained the appropriate security clearances and whether the firms properly have safeguarded grand jury material. We also evaluated how access to and handling of grand jury information has been controlled by the United States Attorneys at their offices.

For our review, we contacted all 94 USAOs to obtain detailed information on grand jury court reporting services. We examined the security clearances for 1,421 contracted court reporter personnel in all 247 firms used by the USAOs. We also performed site visits at six district and one branch office of the United States Attorneys as well as at six court reporting firms.

We found numerous problems related to grand jury court reporting firms. We determined that court reporter personnel clearances were inadequate at 60 percent of the USAOs. These USAOs used court reporter personnel who never had background investigations, had expired clearances, or both. In addition, several USAOs had incomplete or no records regarding court reporter personnel clearances. We concluded that United States Attorneys should provide better oversight for grand jury court reporter personnel security clearances and that DOJ Order 2600.4 needs clarification.

We also determined that the physical security of grand jury material was insufficient at two of the six grand jury court reporting firms visited during the inspection. These two firms allowed court reporters to take grand jury material home. Also, one of the two firms did not have boxes of grand jury material adequately stored as required in the Order. We determined that some United States Attorneys have not ensured that the court reporting firms are meeting security requirements for grand jury material.

We found several inadequacies related to the security of grand jury material at the USAOs. Access to grand jury material was not limited to authorized employees. We found the physical security of the grand jury material at the USAOs to be inadequate at two of the seven sites visited. Records personnel at one USAO had stored 31 boxes containing grand jury material in a hallway accessible to the public, and the boxes were marked with grand jury numbers. At another site, tapes of grand jury hearings were stored in open boxes in a library closet, and the boxes were neither sealed nor secured in a locked file cabinet or office.

Finally, we found no consistency among the USAOs in securing grand jury material relating to closed cases, and we determined that there are no guidelines that address this issue.

The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether Federal grand jury information has been properly safeguarded by the United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO). The objectives of the inspection were to determine whether grand jury court reporters, with whom United States Attorneys have contracted, have obtained the appropriate security clearances and to determine how access to and handling of grand jury information has been controlled by the United States Attorneys at their offices.

Grand jury proceedings serve an important function in criminal prosecution. Grand juries conduct investigations and examine evidence against persons to determine whether it is sufficient to warrant indictment. In this manner, grand jury proceedings set the prosecutorial process in motion. During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the 94 USAOs conducted a total of 43,570 grand jury proceedings.

Federal grand jury proceedings involve United States Attorneys, witnesses, court reporters, and jurors, and these proceedings are subject to certain rules regarding secrecy. USAOs are required to conform to specific security regulations for safeguarding grand jury information. USAOs hire contractors to perform court reporting and transcription services for their offices. Grand jury court reporters stenographically or electronically record all proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting. The court reporters then prepare transcripts from the recording or reporter's notes and provide them to the USAOs. During fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the 94 USAOs spent over $9.9 million on grand jury court reporter related services. Court reporter personnel must receive clearance from the Department of Justice's (Department/DOJ) Security and Emergency Planning Staff (SEPS) prior to handling grand jury material. The background investigation for court reporter personnel security clearances consists of a name and fingerprint check by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

We reviewed rules and regulations regarding grand jury proceedings, statistical reports, budget data, contracts and blanket purchase agreements, security clearance data, and prior Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) and SEPS reports. Field work included site visits to seven United States Attorneys' offices: the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of Virginia, the Southern District of Alabama, the Western District of Washington, the District of Columbia, the District of Maryland, and the Greenbelt Branch Office of the District of Maryland. At each USAO, we interviewed the Administrative Officer, the First Assistant United States Attorney or Criminal Division Chief, the District Office Security Manager, the Grand Jury Coordinator, and several Criminal Division Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA). In larger offices, we also interviewed the Docket Clerk or Records Manager, the Personnel Security Officer, and several Criminal Division Secretaries. We toured each office and observed the process of securing grand jury information for both current and inactive cases. We conducted over 50 interviews at the USAOs.

In addition, the inspectors performed site visits at 6 court reporting firms and contacted, by telephone and facsimile, the remaining 241 firms used by the USAOs for grand jury work. At each court reporting firm visited, we interviewed the office manager and several grand jury court reporters. We also toured the facilities and observed physical security, storage capabilities, and transcribing and delivery processes. We conducted over 300 telephone interviews of the court reporting firms to obtain the status of court reporter personnel security clearances.

Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts codifies the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy by prohibiting members of the grand jury, government attorneys and their authorized assistants, and other grand jury personnel from disclosing matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise authorized by the Rule. Grand jury secrecy is vital to the investigative function of the grand jury. It serves several distinct interests, such as to encourage witnesses to come forward and testify freely and honestly, to minimize the risks that prospective defendants will flee or use corrupt means to thwart investigations, to safeguard the grand jurors themselves and the proceedings from extraneous pressures and influences, and to protect accused persons who are ultimately exonerated from unfavorable publicity.

The reasons for grand jury secrecy are particularly compelling while an investigation is ongoing. While these reasons may lose some of their force after the grand jury proceedings have been concluded, grand jury secrecy may never be breached, except as provided for by the Rule, no matter what the circumstances.

The reporter who takes and transcribes the evidence is permitted to be present during grand jury sessions, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting. The Rule specifically imposes an obligation of secrecy on the reporter. Furthermore, the Rule explicitly recognizes that other persons such as stenographers, interpreters, and typists also have an obligation of secrecy.

The Rule permits disclosure of grand jury information to attorneys for the government working on criminal matters. The Rule also stipulates that grand jury information may be disclosed to government employees who are assisting attorneys in the investigation and prosecution of criminal violations. Included in the category of government employees are criminal investigators and members of the prosecution support staff such as secretaries, paralegals, and law clerks.

August 27, 1980, establishes the procedures for all Department components for requesting, processing, and adjudicating personnel security clearances of Federal grand jury court reporter personnel and establishes the physical security standards for protecting grand jury information. The Order requires that grand jury court reporter personnel obtain security clearances prior to having access to grand jury information. The Order defines grand jury court reporter personnel as "a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an interpreter or any other person who is employed or contracted to record and transcribe grand jury testimony."

The Order further states that each United States Attorney who uses grand jury court reporter personnel shall establish procedures to ensure that requests for grand jury court reporter personnel clearances are submitted to the Department Security Officer (DSO) for clearance approval, ensure that only grand jury court reporter personnel who have been approved by the DSO have access to grand jury information, and ensure that grand jury information is protected against unauthorized disclosure.

To physically protect grand jury information from unauthorized disclosure, the Order dictates requirements for physical security and storage of grand jury information at the USAOs. The Order charges that Department employees will safeguard all grand jury information that comes into their possession in accordance with these security requirements.

Court reporter services are obtained through contracts or small purchase procedures depending upon the dollar amount of the services required. The Procurement Services Staff (PSS) of the Justice Management Division (JMD) is responsible for the procurement when a contract is used. PSS provides assistance to the USAOs when small purchase procedures are used. In either case, PSS distributes a standard set of security requirements to the USAOs and the court reporting firms. The security requirements include procedures for obtaining clearances for court reporter personnel and securing grand jury information. It is the responsibility of each USAO's Contracting Officer's Technical Representative or the United States Attorney's designee to ensure the court reporting firm complies with the security requirements.

As stated in the Order, the Department requires that favorable personnel security clearances be granted to grand jury court reporter personnel before they have access to grand jury information. The Order further states that clearances to perform grand jury work are effective for five years. At the end of five years, the USAOs must resubmit a request for clearance.

The Order defines grand jury court reporter personnel as a stenographer, an operator of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an interpreter or any other person who is employed or contracted to record and transcribe grand jury testimony. Although not specifically mentioned in the Order, other court reporting firm personnel, including office support staff, office couriers, and translators, have access to grand jury material and should be cleared. EOUSA officials stated that because the Order is unclear some USAOs have interpreted the Order's definition of grand jury reporter personnel to include only those personnel specifically mentioned in the Order and may not have had all court reporting personnel cleared.

Clearances for all personnel, both Department employees and contractors, are processed through SEPS' Personnel Security Group. Court reporter personnel are required to complete Form USA-168, Request for Grand Jury Reporter Personnel Clearance Action, and Form FD-258, Fingerprint Card, for the USAO, who sends the forms to SEPS. SEPS then forwards the information to the FBI for a name and fingerprint check. The FBI does not charge for the name and fingerprint checks. The results are reported to SEPS for final adjudication or further investigation.

The FBI periodically uncovers derogatory information during the name and fingerprint checks of potential court reporter personnel. When such information is found and reported to SEPS, SEPS contacts the USAO to determine whether the United States Attorney wants to pursue the clearance process for the individual. We determined that the most common types of derogatory information were arrest records for robbery, burglary, and handgun violations. Based on our interviews, we found that most USAOs, working in conjunction with the court reporting firms, declined to pursue the clearance for these individuals with derogatory information.

We obtained the names of the 247 court reporting firms used by the 94 USAOs. We contacted each court reporting firm and obtained lists of all employees who have access to grand jury information, totaling 1,421 names. That list was compared with grand jury court reporter personnel clearance data, dated January 29, 1996, obtained from SEPS.

Of the 94 USAOs we reviewed, we found that all USAOs had at least some grand jury court reporter personnel with current security clearances, indicating that the USAOs were aware of the Order's requirements. However, we found that 60 percent of USAOs used some court reporter personnel who were never cleared, had expired clearances, or both. The following table presents the status of USAOs with problems regarding grand jury court reporter personnel clearances:

Status	Number of USAOs	Percent of USAOs
Number of USAOs whose grand jury court reporter personnel did not have current clearances	56	60
Number of USAOs whose grand jury court reporter personnel had current clearances	38^A	40
Total	94	100

Of the 60 percent of USAOs with problems regarding grand jury court reporter personnel clearances, we found the following:

Ninety-two court reporter personnel in 28 USAOs had never been cleared by SEPS. [See Appendix II for a list of the 28 USAOs.] Some had been working on grand jury proceedings for as long as

15 years. Of these 92 uncleared employees, some were the court reporters recording grand jury proceedings. The remaining uncleared employees were court reporter office staff such as typists, transcribers, editors, office couriers, billing clerks, and office managers who had access to grand jury material at some time during the production of grand jury transcripts. EOUSA believes that about 25 percent of these USAOs had not obtained clearances for some support staff such as couriers because the Order did not clearly require it.

One hundred ninety-two court reporter personnel in 40 USAOs had clearances that were more than five years old and had not been updated. [See Appendix III for a list of the 40 USAOs.] Some clearances had been expired for as long as 14 years.

The following table identifies the breakdown of problems with grand jury court reporter personnel clearances:

Grand Jury Court Reporter Personnel

without Current Clearances

Number

USAOs^A

Percent

USAOs

Number of Court Reporter Personnel

Never cleared

Outdated clearances

192

In addition, we found that 11 of the USAOs with problems related to grand jury court reporter personnel clearances also had incomplete or no records pertaining to these clearances. Two USAOs used the same firm for grand jury court reporting services. Each USAO assumed that the other maintained records regarding court reporter personnel clearances. However, neither USAO had complete records or could positively certify that the court reporter personnel used for its grand jury proceedings were cleared.

Overall, we determined that employees of the court reporting firms who worked with grand jury information were not cleared for several reasons:

Given the magnitude of the problem at the USAOs, we believe the United States Attorneys should ensure that court reporter personnel clearances are monitored more closely. Failure of the United States Attorneys to provide such oversight could result in various threats to the integrity of the grand jury system, including using court reporter personnel with criminal backgrounds who could disclose grand jury information to persons being investigated.

The Order also requires that translators receive security clearances to work on grand jury proceedings. We found that several USAOs used translators who were not cleared for grand jury proceedings. Translators used were primarily those certified for language ability by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC). These translators were not required by AOUSC to undergo any background check, but they did take the secrecy oath upon entering the grand jury proceeding. The United States Attorneys should ensure that translators receive security clearances for grand jury work, as required by the Order.

The Order states that grand jury material may be transmitted personally by official couriers and messengers. However, the Order does not define "official couriers and messengers" and does not specify security clearance requirements for either. We determined that several court reporting firms used commercial courier services to deliver grand jury transcripts to the USAOs and that their employees have not been cleared by SEPS. We believe uncleared commercial courier service employees who handle grand jury material are a potential security risk, although it may be a risk the Department is prepared to take rather than require additional administrative oversight by the United States Attorneys. SEPS should define the security clearance requirements for commercial courier services. In addition, the United States Attorneys should ensure that all measures are taken to adequately safeguard grand jury material when commercial courier services are used.

According to the Order, it is the responsibility of each United States Attorney who uses grand jury court reporter personnel to ensure that grand jury information is protected from unauthorized disclosure. The Order states that "As a minimum, when not in use, grand jury information shall be locked in a lockbar file cabinet [ A lockbar file cabinet is a steel file cabinet equipped with a steel bar which secures the drawers and is locked with a General Services Administration three position, changeable combination padlock.] secured with a General Services Administration approved combination lock, or their equivalent." These storage requirements apply not only at the USAO, but also at the court reporting firms' offices.

We visited the court reporting firms used by the USAOs where field work was performed. During the interviews and tours of the facilities, we found that one court reporting firm used by two USAOs had numerous problems related to the security of grand jury material:

Boxes of grand jury audio tapes labeled with witness name, case number, date, and attorney name were sitting in the back room of the firm. The boxes were sealed but not stored in a safe or locked room of the office and were accessible to any office staff or visitors.

The court reporting firm could not account for the transfer of grand jury tapes and notes to one of the USAOs for 1991. We found that the firm had records of forwarding grand jury material to the USAO for 1989 and 1990, and grand jury material was retained at the company for the years 1992 through 1995. However, the firm could not produce any documentation for grand jury material for the year 1991. During the time of our review, we found that the administrative staff at the USAO could not locate the grand jury material for 1991 or any related records.

This firm's court reporters record all grand jury proceedings only on audio tape. After the hearing, the court reporters take the audio tapes home instead of securing them at the USAO or the court reporting firm. In addition to the audio tapes of the hearings, there are notes identifying the witness, attorney, case, date, and time which are kept in the court reporter's possession.

At another USAO, we found that some of the court reporters for one of the court reporting firms used by the office transcribed as well as printed grand jury material at home on their own personal computers.

The Order states that in most instances, transcribing and storing grand jury information should occur on the premises of the Department. The Order considers grand jury information given to cleared court reporter personnel still under the control of the United States Attorney, provided that physical security measures at the court reporting firm are in compliance with the Order. Although taking grand jury information home is not specifically addressed in the Order, we believe doing so removes the information from the direct control of the United States Attorney. Furthermore, when court reporter personnel take the material home, the material is then vulnerable to unauthorized access. Because we found that grand jury material was maintained at various locations, the USAO must be particularly sensitive to ensuring that the court reporting firm complies with the appropriate methods for safeguarding grand jury information.

We determined that several of the USAOs visited were not conducting site visits of the court reporting firms to ensure that the firms were adhering to security requirements. One Administrative Officer did not believe it was the USAO's responsibility to ensure that the vendor was complying with the security requirements of the district's contract. The Order requires that the contractor comply with security requirements for safeguarding grand jury information. We believe regular site visits by the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative or the United States Attorney's designee are necessary to verify that grand jury information is adequately safeguarded.

Although we found several instances of violations during our site visits, we also observed some commendable practices:

The District of Columbia provided office space for grand jury transcription in the building where grand jury proceedings are held. This practice resulted in proper storage of and control of access to grand jury material.

Although several court reporting firms in the Southern District of Alabama, the District of Columbia, and the Western District of Washington had numerous court reporters cleared for grand jury work, these firms consistently used only one or two reporters for grand jury proceedings. This practice minimized the risk of access to grand jury material by many individuals.

Security of grand jury material at the court reporting firms is critical because the firms do not work on grand jury material exclusively. Consequently, grand jury material could be inadvertently disclosed to unauthorized personnel. Therefore, we believe each USAO should review the firms' practices for safeguarding grand jury information.

Given the possibility of security violations occurring when private contractors are used for grand jury court reporting, one USAO had an alternative method of obtaining court reporter services. The USAO hired its own court reporter approximately five years ago. The EOUSA approved the position based on the estimated cost savings. Outside court reporting firms are only used for grand jury proceedings when the USAO employee is not available. The USAO cited improved security of grand jury information. Because the court reporter is an employee of the USAO, all transcription of grand jury information is completed and stored at the USAO.

Based on the experience of this USAO, we believe this practice could decrease the likelihood of grand jury security violations. In addition, adoption of this practice may result in cost savings for the USAOs, especially those with high volumes of grand jury proceedings.

We suggest that each USAO consider the option of hiring a full-time grand jury court reporter if cost analyses show these services can be obtained in a more cost effective manner.

The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys:

1. Instruct the United States Attorneys to ensure that all court reporter personnel, including court reporters, office support staff, office couriers, and translators, who have access to grand jury material have proper security clearances and that updates are performed as required by DOJ Order 2600.4.

2. Instruct the United States Attorneys to maintain complete and accurate records for clearances of grand jury court reporter personnel.

3. Instruct the United States Attorneys to conduct site visits annually of all facilities used by contract grand jury court reporters and to ensure that physical and information security requirements are met.

The Inspections Division recommends that the Assistant Attorney General for Administration:

4. Instruct the DSO to update DOJ Order 2600.4 to include a definition of "official couriers and messengers" and to specify the security clearance requirements for couriers who handle grand jury material.

The Rule states that disclosure of grand jury information to government employees is permitted only when necessary to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases. Therefore, access to grand jury material at the USAOs is limited to the United States Attorney; AUSAs; the prosecution support staff, including secretaries, paralegals, and law clerks; and criminal investigators working with prosecutors.

Although the Rule enumerates which government employees may have access to grand jury material, the Order does not. The Order states that Department employees will safeguard all grand jury information under their custody in accordance with the standards established in the Order. We believe that the Order is unclear to the USAOs and that the Order should explicitly state which Department employees may have access to grand jury information.

During our site visits at the USAOs, we found that access to grand jury material was not limited to those employees involved directly with the case:

At several USAOs, grand jury information was stored in case jackets in unlocked cabinets in the hall, accessible to both criminal and civil USAO staff as well as unescorted visitors. We observed unescorted visitors at these USAOs.

USAO support staff delivered grand jury transcripts to AUSAs' interoffice mailboxes in several USAOs. The copies of the transcripts were not safeguarded from access by unauthorized USAO staff or unescorted visitors.

The site visits also revealed the following praiseworthy practices that prevented access to grand jury information by unauthorized USAO personnel and visitors:

At the Southern District of Alabama, only criminal division AUSAs and the Grand Jury Coordinator had access to grand jury transcripts. The Grand Jury Coordinator acted as a librarian for the material, and all grand jury material was stored in a vault until used for trial preparation by the AUSAs.

At the District of Delaware, access to grand jury transcripts was controlled by the Grand Jury Coordinator and Lead Criminal Secretary. Once the case was closed, copies of grand jury information were secured in a grand jury room.

While the Rule addresses access to grand jury material by government employees, the Order does not specify which government employees are authorized to obtain access to grand jury material. We believe the Order should supplement the requirements of the Rule and address access to grand jury material by government employees. Addressing government employee access to grand jury material is critical because unauthorized employees could obtain access to grand jury material for the more than 22,000 grand jury proceedings conducted each year.

The Order specifies that during use, all grand jury information shall be "placed in storage containers or otherwise protected when persons who should not have access are present." In addition, the Order requires that grand jury information should be "Returned to storage containers as soon as practical after use." Storage containers should be, as a minimum, "a lockbar file cabinet secured with a General Services Administration approved combination lock, or their [sic] equivalent."

One district office had 31 boxes of grand jury material stored in a basement hallway. The hallway was accessible to anyone who came into the public building. Thirty boxes were sealed with tape and labeled with the grand jury numbers and court reporters' initials. One box was open and contained envelopes with computer diskettes and court reporters' notes. Several times during our review, we examined the hallway and boxes without being challenged by any USAO staff.

At one USAO, audio tapes of grand jury hearings were stored in a closet in an office located in the USAO library. The boxes were labeled as grand jury material and contained tapes of grand jury testimony taken in 1989 and 1990 by the court reporting firm. These tapes were wrapped in papers that indicated the witness name, case name and number, date of grand jury hearing, and attorney name. The boxes of tapes were neither sealed nor secured in a locked file cabinet or office.

We discussed storage requirements for grand jury material with the Regional Security Specialist at one USAO. He indicated that it is impractical for USAOs to store grand jury material for active cases in a lockbar file cabinet. He also stated that the Order is outdated and does not reflect current security precautions already in place at the USAOs. He believed the combination of access control methods [Access control methods include security officers, visitor logs, visitor badges, visitor escorts, keypad entry systems, locking offices, and locking file cabinets.] at the USAO simulated the environment of the storage container required by the Order. Several AUSAs also believed that similar access control practices in their offices met the minimum security requirements set forth in the Order.

We agree with the USAOs' belief that it is impractical for the USAOs to lock up active grand jury material in a lockbar file cabinet. We believe grand jury material can be protected from unauthorized access through the use of locked file cabinets, locked offices, and visitor access controls. While we found that the USAOs had a combination of access control methods available that could adequately safeguard grand jury material, they were not employing the practices consistently. Therefore, we are concerned that the USAOs are not sufficiently limiting access to grand jury material from unauthorized USAO staff and visitors.

Upon a case's completion, AUSAs prepare their cases for transfer to closed case file status. After a designated period of time as determined by the AUSA, the case is sent to the Federal Records Center. We found that there were no regulations that specifically addressed grand jury material in closed case files or case files being prepared to be sent to the Federal Records Center. There were striking inconsistent practices regarding the storage and disposal of grand jury information for closed cases; sometimes these inconsistent practices occurred within the same USAO.

Grand jury transcripts were removed and shredded before cases were closed and sent to the Federal Records Center.

Grand jury transcripts were placed in sealed envelopes and then into the case jackets. Entire files were sent to the Federal Records Center.

Grand jury transcripts were placed into the case jackets but were not in sealed envelopes. Entire files were sent to the Federal Records Center.

Grand jury material was separated from case jackets and was sent to the Federal Records Center in separate boxes from the case jackets.

Grand jury material was pulled out and put into a grand jury room when files were closed. The grand jury material was then shredded after three years.

Because there are no guidelines that address grand jury material in closed case files, we had no basis on which to determine whether grand jury information in closed cases was adequately safeguarded. We believe EOUSA must provide guidelines that address grand jury material in closed cases because the lack of procedures leaves grand jury material vulnerable to unauthorized access and disclosure.

The Inspections Division recommends that the Assistant Attorney General for Administration:

5. Instruct the DSO to update the Order to specify which government employees are authorized to have access to grand jury material.

6. Instruct the DSO to update the Order regarding storage requirements of grand jury material to reflect current physical security practices at the USAOs.

The Inspections Division recommends that the Director, Executive Office for United States Attorneys:

7. Instruct the United States Attorneys to limit access to grand jury information to only those persons authorized as provided in the Rule.

8. Provide standardized guidelines to the United States Attorneys regarding storage and disposal practices for grand jury information in closed cases.

On April 1, 1996, the Inspections Division sent copies of the draft report to the Executive Office for United States Attorneys and the Justice Management Division. We subsequently met with EOUSA representatives to discuss several issues in the report. Based on this meeting, we revised the draft report to reflect EOUSA's concerns. Our analyses of the responses from the components follow.

EOUSA was concerned that we held the United States Attorneys accountable for an Order that may not have been clear regarding clearance requirements for court reporter personnel. In some cases, the United States Attorneys interpreted the Order literally and did not include all personnel who handle grand jury material. The OIG interpreted the Order to include all court reporter personnel who handle or have access to grand jury information. Our interpretation was based on Rule 6(e) and conversations with EOUSA representatives in which they concurred with our interpretation. In addition, our interpretation was based on specific language which is part of the contract security information distributed to the USAOs by the Procurement Services Staff of JMD. The language states that staff members and regular employees having access to the work performed are to be cleared.

The EOUSA's comments indicated that the Security Programs Staff found discrepancies between the OIG report findings and the actual USAO practice of having court reporter personnel cleared. EOUSA stated that its Security Programs Staff contacted each USAO to verify the number of persons with clearance problems and stated that its results differed from the OIG's. We believe these results differ because the OIG contacted the court reporting firms to obtain lists of all court reporter personnel who handle grand jury information. We compared this list of personnel to the SEPS contractor database and reviewed the clearance dates of the court reporter personnel. We re-contacted the USAOs to verify the information obtained from the court reporting firms and the database and then re-contacted the court reporting firms to clarify any discrepancies in information. Furthermore, we found that some USAOs contacted by the OIG had incomplete or inaccurate records regarding clearances of court reporter personnel.

The JMD indicated during its exit briefing and in its written response that the Department of Justice Order, 2600.4, Safeguarding Grand Jury Information, was being considered for consolidation with three other orders. While there is the possibility that the DOJ Order governing grand jury material may be eliminated, a proposed replacement order has been in the review process for a year, and there is no definitive date for cancellation of the existing order. In our

opinion, either the proposed order or the current order needs to be clarified to provide guidance on personnel clearance requirements, access to grand jury material by government employees, and physical security practices at the USAOs.

1. Unresolved-Open. EOUSA's response indicated that the USAOs would only be concerned with clearances for those persons who record and transcribe grand jury material. However, we consider the recommendation unresolved because we disagree with requiring clearances of only persons who record and transcribe. We maintain our position that all court reporter personnel who have access to grand jury material be cleared.

2. Resolved-Open. We agree with the proposed corrective action. Please provide us with documentation indicating that EOUSA has instructed the United States Attorneys to maintain complete and accurate records.

3. Resolved-Open. We agree with the proposed corrective action. Please provide us with documentation indicating that EOUSA has instructed the United States Attorneys to conduct annual site visits and ensure that physical and information security requirements are met.

4. Unresolved-Open. JMD's response did not specifically address the recommendation. Please indicate whether policy guidance will be provided.

5. Unresolved-Open. JMD's response did not specifically address the recommendation. Please indicate whether policy guidance will be provided.

6. Unresolved-Open. JMD's response did not specifically address the recommendation. Please indicate whether policy guidance will be provided.

7. Resolved-Open. We agree with the proposed corrective action. Please provide us with documentation indicating that EOUSA has instructed the United States Attorneys to limit access to grand jury information.

8. Resolved-Open. We agree with the proposed corrective action. Please provide us with documentation indicating that EOUSA has provided standardized guidelines regarding storage and disposal practices for grand jury information in closed cases to the United States Attorneys.