The primary investigative responsibilities of DEA foreign offices are to support DEA domestic operations and develop investigative cases against the most significant drug trafficking organizations affecting the illicit drug market in the United States. To this end, the DEA announced the International Drug Flow Prevention Strategy in April 2005, which supports the primary goals of the DEA’s Strategic Plan. According to the DEA, this approach promotes an intensive use of intelligence and the planning and execution of multi-agency enforcement operations to achieve sustained disruption to the operations of drug trafficking organizations. The DEA recognizes that successful use of this strategy requires strong cooperation between the DEA and other law enforcement agencies, particularly those abroad.

Because major drug trafficking organizations compartmentalize operations with numerous operational cells so that the compromise of one cell will not jeopardize the entire organization, the DEA believes that dismantling a single cell may not significantly impact operations of the major drug trafficking organizations if a new cell soon rises in its place. As a result, the DEA approaches its investigative operations with what it calls an “organizational attack strategy,” which requires DEA field offices to target not just one segment of a criminal enterprise, but the entire organization.

Foreign Investigative Environment

DEA operations overseas differ from those conducted in its domestic offices, since foreign investigations are conducted bilaterally with or through foreign counterpart agencies. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]. Essentially, the DEA is a guest in another country, and many factors affect the DEA’s foreign operations, such as host-country laws, agreements with foreign government agencies, international treaties, and local policies issued to U.S. agencies by the U.S. Ambassador. In some countries the DEA is allowed to directly observe foreign counterpart operations, while in other countries this may not be permitted. For example, DEA foreign agents’ main function in European countries is to maintain liaison relationships with their foreign counterpart agencies.

To accomplish its mission abroad, it is often necessary for the DEA to share information with its foreign counterparts. Moreover, in some countries, the DEA participates in tactical operations with foreign law enforcement agencies. Thus, the DEA must rely on its foreign partners. According to DEA officials, this relationship is sometimes difficult to foster and maintain, particularly in countries that have inherently corrupt law enforcement. Corruption is common in many countries where illicit drug trafficking is a profitable venture. This makes security a major concern, and the inappropriate disclosure of information can compromise the safety of DEA personnel, the security of sensitive intelligence, and the integrity of investigative cases.

Vetted Investigative Units

A major investigative tool employed by DEA foreign offices is the development of investigative units of foreign law enforcement personnel that the DEA has put through a security screening or vetting process. These foreign task forces are commonly referred to as “vetted units.”

Upon entry into a DEA vetted unit, and at periodic intervals, foreign law enforcement applicants have to pass certain security evaluations, such as a background check, a polygraph examination, and a urinalysis test. The vetting process is designed to provide the DEA with a higher level of assurance that the information it shares with its counterparts will not be compromised or disseminated to the wrong party, especially the drug trafficking organizations the DEA is targeting. DEA personnel in foreign offices stated that they needed to maintain safeguards when sharing investigative information, even with vetted units, because of the level of corruption in certain countries.

The use and management of vetted units varies from country to country. The DEA provides financial support for the units’ activities, which are usually managed on a day‑to‑day basis by a senior foreign police officer, with a DEA Special Agent providing general oversight. These vetted units partner with the DEA but are not DEA enterprises. Vetted units perform functions in support of the DEA such as conducting investigative operations, surveillance, and wiretaps; checking on investigative leads; destroying drug production laboratories; and interdicting drug shipments. Many DEA personnel with whom we spoke considered the vetted units critical to accomplishing the DEA’s foreign mission, increasing the safety of its personnel, and helping to reduce the chance of sensitive information being compromised.

The DEA uses two types of vetted units: (1) vetted units that are part of the DEA’s Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program, and (2) non-SIU vetted units.⁴² There are distinct differences between these two types of vetted units. First, the SIU Program is an official DEA program for which Congress has designated specific SIU locations. In contrast, non-SIU vetted units are not part of an official DEA program. DEA officials stated that non‑SIU vetted units were created by Country Attaches that capitalized on a “best practice” idea and implemented the vetted unit concept in their offices. Second, each DEA foreign office that is part of the SIU Program receives funds specifically for maintaining its SIUs. Examples of SIU expenditures include payments for operation-related costs (such as travel expenses) and equipment for SIUs to use during investigative activities. In contrast, a DEA foreign office provides financial support to non‑SIU vetted units through its general operational funds. A third difference is that while SIU members participate in a specially designed training course at the DEA Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia, non-SIU vetted units do not receive this training. Finally, the DEA developed an SIU Program Manual detailing guidelines for both DEA headquarters and its foreign offices to follow in administering the SIU program and in managing SIU activities. The DEA has not developed guidance for its non‑SIU vetted units.

Sensitive Investigative Units

In House Report 104-676, which accompanied the FY 1997 omnibus appropriations act, Congress authorized the DEA to initiate a vetted unit program in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.⁴³ The conceptual basis of this program, which later came to be called the SIU Program, is to identify and train security-screened DEA foreign counterpart personnel to work on sensitive bilateral investigations. As of July 2006, the DEA reported that its SIU Program had 26 individual operating units and 968 members in 11 countries, as shown in the following table.

SIU Program Budget

According to the DEA the initial FY 1997 appropriation for the SIU Program in the original four countries was $20 million. In FY 2006, the budget to support the SIU Program was $18.3 million. The DEA FY 2007 budget proposes expanding the SIU Program to four new countries: the Bahamas, Jamaica, Panama, and Venezuela. Additional funding of $11.4 million has been requested for this expansion.

SIU Operations

According to the DEA, its offices in Colombia were the first to use vetted units. The DEA Regional Director in Colombia credited its SIU operation with supporting the vast majority of the DEA’s investigations in that country. We found that the SIUs in Colombia were essential to the DEA’s operations in that country.

We were told of many examples of SIU operations resulting in drug seizures and arrests, including some high-profile drug traffickers. For example, in May 2006, SIUs in Colombia and Brazil, working with several other DEA domestic and foreign offices, completed a 3‑year investigation that resulted in over 100 arrests, including an individual identified on the CPOT list. The operation also resulted in the seizure of about 52 tons of cocaine and nearly $70 million in assets.

A Colombian SIU also participated in an 11‑month operation with other Colombian agencies, the DEA’s Special Operations Division, a money laundering task force in New York, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. Using more than 45 wiretaps of both fixed and cellular telephones in Bogotá, Colombia, investigators found that a specific money laundering organization was capable of laundering millions of dollars for drug traffickers in Colombia. The operation resulted in eight arrests, including the head of the money laundering organization who was extradited to the United States to face prosecution. Also, during the course of this investigation approximately 400 kilograms of cocaine, 5.5 kilograms of heroin, and over $2.3 million was seized.

Another Colombian SIU operation was credited with disrupting the operations of an organization responsible for transporting multi-ton loads of cocaine from the Pacific Coast of Colombia. This operation resulted in 15 arrests and the seizure of 60 million Colombian pesos (approximately $24,000 U.S. dollars), $100,000 in jewelry, high frequency communication equipment, 6 fishing vessels, and several weapons.

In February 2006, a Mexican SIU unit conducted a surveillance operation with assistance from the DEA that resulted in the arrest of a CPOT residing in Mexico. Additionally, the SIU program in Mexico was instrumental in the successful completion of a major methamphetamine investigation that resulted in the seizure of 15 methamphetamine labs and over 130 pounds of methamphetamine with a potential street value of over $1 million.

In Thailand, DEA personnel told us that they are working with Thai officials to ensure that SIU activities are focused on cases that will impact the United States. They said that an example of such an investigation is one that resulted in the indictment of the leader and seven top lieutenants of a worldwide heroin and methamphetamine-trafficking organization. This group was considered one of the largest heroin-producing organizations in the world and was believed to have been responsible for $1 billion in heroin trafficking into the U.S. since 1985. The investigation involved the execution of 26 search warrants that resulted in the seizure of 18,000 methamphetamine tablets, $25.6 million in cash, 86 kilograms of heroin, and various weapons and explosives.

Although the DEA was able to provide us with these and other examples of individual SIU accomplishments, the DEA was unable to empirically demonstrate the accomplishments of its SIU program as a whole. For example, the DEA does not collect activity statistics attributable to its SIU Program, such as arrests, the number of surveillance operations, or efforts tied to a CPOT or a PTO investigation. Additionally, the DEA has not evaluated the collective effect of the SIU Program. While we recognize that the investigative activities of the SIUs are often run by the host country, we believe the DEA should identify and collect appropriate empirical data relating to the accomplishments of the SIUs.

SIU Program Management

To manage its SIU Program, the DEA developed an SIU Program Manual to provide guidance and procedures to DEA headquarters and foreign office personnel. Additionally, the DEA completed a self-assessment of its SIU Program in FY 2005. The review resulted in a report that made recommendations to the DEA Chief of Operations for policy changes in the SIU Program Manual. The Chief of Operations approved these recommendations, instituting five supplemental guidelines, which became effective in October 2005.⁴⁴ For instance, the acceptable ratio of DEA SIU advisors to SIU participants was reduced from the previous standard of 1 to 30 to a ratio of 1 to 15. Also, the Chief of Operations instituted a 5‑year term limit for SIU members, requiring Regional Director approval to extend SIU member terms beyond 5 years.

We evaluated the DEA’s management of the program and its practices for ensuring that DEA operations, information, and personnel are protected from compromise. Our examination revealed significant deficiencies related to the DEA’s administration of the SIU program, including: (1) poor recordkeeping practices, (2) [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED], (3) insufficient control over SIU equipment, (4) unsatisfactory practices in supplying salary supplement payments to unit members, (5) excessive span of control ratios for managing units, (6) insufficient evidence of training, and (7) failure to perform exit briefings. At the audit close-our meeting, DEA officials generally agreed with our findings concerning the management of the SIU program.

Poor Recordkeeping

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]. At our request, DEA headquarters queried its foreign offices for the number of members in the SIU program and determined that as of July 2006 there were 968 SIU members. However, these numbers provided by the field offices could not be verified by DEA headquarters.

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

The most important aspect of a vetted unit program is the screening its applicants and members undergo. The SIU Program Manual contains criteria for vetting foreign personnel who are a part of an SIU and states that the vetting of an SIU member should include at a minimum a background check, a urinalysis test, and a polygraph examination. Applicants must pass these three tests before they can become part of an SIU. Additionally, SIU members must submit to and pass periodic urinalysis tests and polygraph examinations throughout their tenure as an SIU participant. According to the manual, if individuals do not pass the re‑vetting process they should be transferred out of the unit. This vetting process provides the DEA reasonable assurance of the integrity and credibility of the foreign counterparts with which it is working. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED].

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]⁴⁶

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

[SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]⁴⁷

Inadequate Equipment Management

In addition to operational funds and training, the DEA provides equipment to SIUs. In some countries, foreign law enforcement agencies do not have the funds necessary to procure equipment needed to investigate drug trafficking organizations. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED].

The SIU Program Manual requires DEA foreign offices to maintain a complete list of all accountable property provided to SIUs. The manual also states that an inventory of all SIU equipment and property must be conducted annually. In addition to this scheduled inventory, one unannounced inventory must be performed each year. We consider these requirements to be appropriate property management practices.

The DEA Mexico office did not maintain an inventory of equipment provided to its SIU teams. DEA personnel indicated that instead, they relied on the State Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) section to keep an inventory of equipment. Using DEA funds, INL handled the purchasing of equipment for the DEA’s SIU teams under the auspices of its Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS).⁴⁸ DEA personnel in Mexico contended that it was then the responsibility of NAS to maintain inventories of SIU equipment. We verified that NAS conducted annual inventories. However, the DEA Mexico City office could not provide evidence that it conducted any unannounced checks of the SIU inventory.

The Colombia office was in the process of transferring to a barcode inventory system for its SIU equipment. The person responsible for inventorying the SIU equipment acknowledged that the office was behind schedule in its annual SIU equipment inventories, mainly because it was taking significant time to transfer to the new system. Additionally, although SIU Special Agent advisors stated that they conducted unannounced inventories of SIU equipment, most were not retaining physical records of these checks.

The DEA Thailand office was already using an advanced inventory barcode system, which allowed equipment to be electronically scanned and reconciled to an electronic property database. Barcoding also allowed the DEA Special Agents working with the SIUs to conduct physical inventories in a more efficient manner. However, we found that the Thailand SIU inventory database had a few weaknesses. Specifically, the system did not retain a history of the inventories conducted and, when appropriate, the current condition of the equipment.

The DEA provides a significant amount of equipment to the SIUs. Proper inventories for this equipment can prevent waste and loss of taxpayer dollars. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

Unsatisfactory Practices for Salary Supplement Payments

Under the SIU Program, the DEA can give SIU members monetary compensation to supplement the salaries they receive from their home agencies. This compensation can be provided monthly and varies in amount depending on the rank of the individual. For instance, in both Colombia and Bolivia the DEA pays a total of approximately $60,000 a month in SIU salary supplements. The amount of monthly salary supplements range from $70 paid to a constable in Pakistan to $900 for a lieutenant colonel in Bolivia.

According to the SIU Program Manual, the DEA prefers salary supplements be paid via electronic transfer or check payable directly to the SIU member’s bank account. If this is not possible, the Special Agent advisor should observe any cash payments as they are made to each SIU member and ensure each signs a receipt for the funds. The SIU Program Manual specifically states that DEA foreign offices should avoid paying an SIU commander in a lump sum so that he can make subsequent cash payments to the SIU members on his team.

Of the three countries we visited that were a part of the SIU Program, only the DEA offices in Colombia and Thailand provided its SIU members salary supplements. We reviewed the process that these offices used for paying monthly salary supplements. In Thailand, the DEA submitted payment to the SIU members via electronic funds transfer. We observed a deposit book containing the monthly payment amounts and found no abnormalities.

By contrast, in the Colombia office, we found that the DEA provided salary supplements for an entire unit in a lump sum to each of the SIU commanders. We were told by DEA personnel and several SIU commanders that the commanders divided the lump payment provided to pay each SIU member their monthly stipend, and obtained a signature from each SIU member for receipt of payment. However, DEA personnel informed us that they did not always observe the payments made from the commander to SIU members, and SIU commanders were not required to provide evidence that the funds had been received by their members. DEA personnel indicated that in many instances it would be difficult to observe the actual payments because of the remote operating locations of the SIUs.

We understand the difficulty in regularly observing payments from SIU commanders to SIU participants, especially when the SIU is operating in a remote location. However, we believe that, at a minimum, the DEA should obtain the signed receipt of payment forms from the SIU commanders. Additionally, as part of the SIU member profile, we suggest the DEA generate a signature exemplar for each SIU member and use this tool to help validate SIU member signatures. Additionally, when possible, DEA personnel should be present when payments are made to SIU members. DEA management in Colombia asserted that if an SIU member was not paid, or paid the incorrect amount, a DEA SIU advisor would hear about it. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED ]. We believe the SIU Program Manual could provide clearer guidance with procedural controls for paying SIU members’ salary supplements when payment by electronic funds transfer is not possible.

Excessive Span of Control Ratio

At each foreign location with SIUs, the DEA assigns at least one advisor to each SIU. According to the DEA SIU Program Manual, the advisor should be an experienced Special Agent (or Diversion Investigator for an SIU that is focused on diversion activities) who is able to effectively monitor the activity of the SIU. Although a foreign law enforcement employee serves as the SIU commander and is responsible for day-to-day management, the DEA SIU advisor is responsible for overseeing the unit’s activity by maintaining contact with the SIU commander through information sharing, planning operations, and monitoring the status of equipment issued to the unit.

As previously noted, a new SIU guideline issued by the DEA’s Chief of Operations in September 2005 requires that the DEA Special Agent advisor to SIU-member ratio be no more than 1 advisor to 15 SIU members. This was a change from the previous guideline, which required a 1 to 30 ratio.

Using the figures provided to us in July 2006 by DEA headquarters for the number of DEA SIU advisors and SIU foreign members, we computed the ratio for each country in the SIU Program. As illustrated in the following table, the DEA was in excess of the new control ratio in Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, and Peru.

DEA SIU Program
Span of Control Ratios by Country
According to Data Submitted by DEA Headquarters

Country	SIU Members	DEA Advisors	Ratio
Bolivia	138	7	19.7
Brazil	34	4	8.5
Colombia	203	10	20.3
Dominican Republic	40	3	13.3
Ecuador	59	6	9.8
Guatemala	12	2	6.0
Mexico	184	21	8.8
Pakistan	60	3	20.0
Peru	89	4	22.3
Thailand	124	9	13.8
Uzbekistan	25	2	12.5

Source:

OIG analysis of Drug Enforcement Administration Office of International Programs SIU member and advisor data

Besides the information submitted by DEA headquarters and analyzed in the above table, during our fieldwork we also reviewed SIU rosters submitted by the DEA foreign offices. In a visit to the DEA office in Mexico City in June 2006, we found that the DEA had only 3 Special Agents involved in the SIU Program, and according to the records we obtained from that office there were at least 68 SIU members stationed in Mexico City. Therefore, though the analysis in the previous table shows Mexico in compliance with the 1 to 15 ratio of DEA advisors to SIU members, we believe the ratio for the DEA Mexico City office was at least 1 to 23, far beyond the required ratio.

SIU Basic Training

New SIU members are required to attend the SIU Basic Training course at the DEA’s Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia. The DEA pays for the travel costs of the training participants and the DEA SIU advisors who accompany the trainees. Given the cost of travel and lodging for SIU members to attend this training, members should only participate in it after successfully passing the initial vetting process described previously. According to DEA headquarters personnel, this training has been provided to over 1,600 SIU participants. The course lasts 5 weeks, covering topics such as interviewing, raid planning, first aid, technical training, wire intercept, and computer training.⁴⁹

According to DEA officials, the agency relies on the SIU Basic Training course to raise the investigative ability of SIU members, ensuring they use sound investigative techniques and responsible procedures for handling sensitive information. Our review of the DEA’s SIU Program included comparing our sample SIU members from Mexico, Colombia, and Thailand against SIU Basic Training course rosters maintained at the DEA Training Academy. SIU translators are required to comply with all vetting protocol but are not required to attend the SIU Basic Training. Our sample of SIU members in Thailand included 6 translators; therefore the sample of Thai SIU members was reduced to 24 and the total sample to 100 for this testing element. We were unable to trace 26 members to the course rosters maintained at the Training Academy, as shown below.

DEA SIU Program
Testing of Member Participation in Basic Training

Country	SIU Members Reviewed	Evidence of Basic Training?
		Yes	No
Mexico	32	17	15
Colombia	44	35	9
Thailand	24	22	2
TOTAL	100	74	26

Source:

OIG analysis of Drug Enforcement Administration Training Division, SIU Basic Training course rosters

SIU Member Exit Briefings

The SIU Program Manual states that DEA foreign offices should conduct exit briefings with outgoing SIU personnel and that a record of the exit briefing should be maintained at the DEA foreign office, with a summary of exit briefings forwarded semi-annually to DEA headquarters. We queried DEA management and operational personnel assigned to DEA foreign offices in Mexico, Colombia, and Thailand regarding SIU members’ exit briefings, and found that the DEA generally did not conduct them in these three countries. Such discussions with outgoing SIU personnel could provide the DEA with useful information on any needed improvements for the SIU Program. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

Non-SIU Vetted Units

According to DEA headquarters officials, several DEA managers in foreign offices recognized the utility of vetted units within the SIU Program and capitalized on the concept by creating vetted units outside the SIU Program. DEA headquarters officials noted that these non-SIU vetted units were not part of any official DEA program; they attributed the proliferation of such units to the implementation of good business practices by foreign managers. The DEA surveyed its foreign offices to obtain information related to its non-SIU vetted units. According to the data received, DEA offices in 16 countries operated non-SIU vetted units comprised of 888 foreign personnel. However, the DEA noted at the audit close-out meeting that we were provided incorrect figures on the number of non-SIU vetted unit members.

DEA headquarters did not maintain records on its foreign offices’ non‑SIU vetted units. Specifically, DEA headquarters did not have a list of countries with such units, nor did it have an accounting of the number of non-SIU vetted units managed by its foreign offices or the vetting status of the unit members. The DEA stated at our audit close-out meeting that it would begin requiring its foreign offices to maintain a roster of its non-SIU vetted members, including their present vetting statuses.

The DEA does not have guidelines for foreign office management to use in developing and maintaining non-SIU vetted units abroad. As stated earlier, the DEA developed an SIU Program Manual with guidelines for administering its SIUs, but this manual is not applicable to non-SIU vetted units. Given the number of DEA foreign offices using non-SIU vetted units, we believe the DEA should issue guidance to assist foreign office managers in the creation and management of non-SIU vetted units. This instruction is important to help ensure the safety of DEA information and personnel and to protect the integrity of DEA operations.

Conclusion

The DEA has credited its vetted units with performing significant investigations that have resulted in the arrest of individuals on the CPOT list, and the vetted units provide an important tool in the DEA’s international operations. However, we identified various deficiencies related to the administration of the SIU program, including: (1) poor recordkeeping practices, (2) [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED], (3) insufficient control over SIU equipment, (4) unsatisfactory practices in supplying salary supplement payments to unit members, (5) excessive span of control ratios for some managing units, (6) insufficient evidence of training, and (7) failure to perform exit briefings. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]. We recommend that the DEA strengthen its oversight of the SIU Program and promulgate guidance regarding non-SIU vetted units.

Recommendations

We recommend that the Drug Enforcement Administration:

6. Identify performance measurements and implement a methodology to track and evaluate the activities and accomplishments of its SIU Program.

7. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]:

1. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

2. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

3. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

8. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED].

9. Enforce the policy for foreign offices to maintain a record of equipment issued to SIU teams, including a history of inventories conducted and the current condition and location of the equipment. These records should include equipment purchased by the DEA directly and indirectly using DEA funds funneled through another agency such as NAS.

10. Revise SIU guidelines and controls for supplying salary supplement payments to SIU members to account for those circumstances where the SIUs are in remote operating environments and the DEA is unable to utilize electronic payments or observe cash payments to SIU members. This policy should include obtaining signed receipts and conducting periodic comparisons of the signatures on signed receipts to signature exemplars obtained from each SIU member.

11. Ensure that the span of control for managing SIUs in Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, and Peru is appropriate and complies with DEA guidelines.

12. Determine if all SIU members received SIU basic training. If not, ensure all current members receive the Basic Training course.

13. Ensure that foreign offices perform required exit briefings of departing SIU members and submit semi-annual reports to DEA headquarters.

14. Issue guidance to assist foreign office management in creating and operating non-SIU foreign vetted units, including a requirement to [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED].

42. Some Country Offices, such as Colombia, operate both types of vetted units.

43. Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996).

44. The current DEA SIU Manual was dated November 2001. Additional policy changes were incorporated into a memorandum dated September 22, 2005.

45. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

46. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

47. [SENSITIVE INFORMATION REDACTED]

48. NAS receives program guidance, support, and funding from INL and plans and executes counternarcotics policy, strategy, guidance, and operations in foreign countries. Although NAS operates in many countries, it is not included in every U.S. mission abroad.

49. DEA Training Division personnel informed us that advanced, in-country training is sometimes offered to veteran SIU members and the course topics depend upon the specific needs of that location. Greater detail regarding DEA training provided to SIUs is included in Chapter 6, where we discuss the entirety of DEA’s international training endeavors. In this Chapter, our discussion focuses on DEA management’s oversight of the SIU program, including its efforts to train SIU members.