The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Drug Interdiction Activities

Report Number I-2003-002
January 2003

Introduction

Illegal drugs are present in almost all Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) institutions, as evidenced by inmate drug tests, inmate overdoses, drug finds in the institutions, and criminal and administrative cases lodged against inmates, staff, and visitors. This review by the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) Evaluation and Inspections Division examines how drugs enter BOP institutions and what the BOP is doing and can do better to stem the flow of illegal drugs into its institutions.

The harm of drugs in BOP institutions is clear. Drugs disrupt the BOP from providing a safe and secure environment for inmates and staff. Drug abuse is associated with serious inmate misconduct, and it also interferes with the rehabilitative potential of BOP drug treatment programs. In addition, inmates with drug problems who have not received treatment while in prison are more likely to continue criminal activity after their release from incarceration, thereby affecting public safety.

The BOP's strategy to prevent drugs from entering its institutions employs two major components: (1) stopping the supply of drugs through various interdiction activities; and (2) reducing the demand for drugs through drug abuse treatment for inmates. To stop the supply of drugs, BOP interdiction activities focus on the institutions' points of entry such as visitors, staff, mail, the receiving and discharge area, the warehouse, the rear gate, volunteers, and contractors. To reduce the demand for drugs, the BOP offers drug abuse treatment to inmates through various institution-based programs, including drug abuse education (classroom instruction), non-residential (out-patient) drug abuse treatment in BOP institutions, and residential (in-patient) drug abuse treatment in BOP institutions.

The OIG found that inmate visitors, staff, and the mail are the three primary ways drugs enter BOP institutions. We found that while the BOP employs a variety of interdiction activities to intercept smuggling attempts by visitors and through the mail, it has failed to take adequate measures to prevent drug smuggling by its staff. In fact, interdiction activities common in many state correctional systems, such as searching staff, limiting the personal property staff are permitted to bring into the institution, and conducting random drug tests of staff, are not used by the BOP.

We also found that an insufficient number of BOP inmates receive drug treatment, partly because the BOP underestimates and inadequately tracks inmates' treatment needs. In addition, non-residential treatment - an important component of drug treatment - is not adequately provided at BOP institutions due to insufficient staffing, lack of policy guidance, and lack of incentives for inmates to seek drug treatment.

After describing our principal findings in more detail, we summarize the 15 recommendations we offer to make the BOP's drug interdiction and treatment efforts more effective.

Principal Findings

Indicators of the Drug Problem in BOP Institutions

The BOP recorded more than 2,800 positive tests for drug use by inmates each year from fiscal year (FY) 1997 through FY 2001. The BOP national rate of positive drug tests declined only slightly during this 5-year period, as did the overall rate of positive drug tests for four of the BOP's five institution security levels.

Analyzing trends among BOP institutions of differing security levels is significant because it allows comparison of institutions with similar inmate populations and security features. We found that despite enhanced perimeter security features and internal operational procedures at the higher security level institutions, drugs are still getting in at rates more than 1½ times the BOP national rate. Specific institutions within each security level have much higher rates of inmate drug use. For example, while the BOP national rate for positive inmate drug tests in FY 2001 was 1.94 percent and the overall rate for high security institutions was 3.04 percent, the high security U.S. Penitentiary in Beaumont, Texas, had a positive inmate drug test rate of 7.84 percent.

Misconduct reports issued by BOP staff against inmates also demonstrate that drugs are present in BOP institutions.¹ For FY 1999 through FY 2001, the BOP drug misconduct rates showed that drugs are smuggled into institutions regardless of their security level. Every BOP institution has issued drug misconduct reports to inmates at some time during the 3-year period reviewed. Similar to the drug test results, several institutions within each security level significantly exceeded the overall rate for that security level for drug misconduct charges. Although misconduct rates may partially reflect the BOP's success in uncovering inmates' prohibited behavior, the fact that the total number of drug misconduct charges for all BOP institutions exceeds 3,500 annually indicates that drugs are regularly entering its institutions.

In addition, inmate overdoses (50 since FY 1997), drug finds in the institutions (1,100 recorded in evidence logs since FY 2000), and criminal cases prosecuted against inmates, staff, and visitors show that drug use and smuggling occur in almost every institution. From FY 1997 through FY 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) opened 791 drug-related cases involving BOP inmates (538 cases), visitors (183 cases), and staff (70 cases). The OIG Investigations Division's drug cases from FY 1997 through FY 2001 reflect 34 staff arrests. In addition, from FY 1997 through FY 2001, the BOP sustained drug-related misconduct allegations against 93 employees.

Stopping Drugs at the Primary Points of Entry

The BOP staff we interviewed identified inmate visitors, staff, and mail as the three primary points of entry for drugs into BOP institutions. We found that while the BOP employs drug interdiction activities to prevent drug smuggling through visitors and mail, it fails to take adequate measures to prevent staff from bringing drugs into the institutions. The BOP does not employ staff interdiction strategies common in state correctional systems such as limiting the personal property staff are permitted to bring into institutions, searching staff, and random drug testing.

        Inmate Visitors

According to BOP officials, inmates' visitors represent the predominant source of drugs entering BOP institutions. At the institutions we visited, wardens, department heads, intelligence staff, and correctional officers attributed visitors' success in smuggling drugs to two primary reasons: (1) the availability of contact visits, and (2) insufficient cameras, monitors, and staff to observe visits.

• Contact Visits are a Main Conduit for Drug Smuggling. All inmates are permitted to receive contact visits, including those in disciplinary and administrative segregation.² During a contact visit, no physical barriers separate inmates and their visitors, unlike the image portrayed on television where inmates are separated from their visitors by glass and speak through telephones. Inmates sit next to or across from their visitors and are allowed limited physical contact, such as handshaking, embracing, or kissing, at the beginning and end of the visit. In a contact visit, visitors can discreetly hand over the drugs to an inmate, exchange the drugs by mouth when kissing, or place the drugs in a food package or beverage purchased from visiting room vending machines and give the food or drink to the inmate.

  As a deterrent to drug smuggling, in 1998 with a $1.8 million grant from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the BOP began a pilot program in 28 institutions using ion spectrometry technology to randomly scan visitors for drugs as they enter the BOP institutions.³ After a 2-year test period, the BOP concluded that the ion spectrometry technology was a significant factor in the decrease of drug use by inmates in medium, low, and administrative institutions, but not in the high security institutions. At the institutions we visited with ion spectrometry, the majority of wardens and correctional officers involved in processing visitors and visiting room monitoring believed this technology is an effective deterrent to drug smuggling. However, the cost of the machine is high ($30,000) and the maintenance contract and supplies are also expensive ($3,000-$8,000 per year). Now that the pilot program has ended, BOP institutions must fund the machines from their existing budgets. Those institutions we visited that did not receive the technology during the pilot program are uncertain whether they can afford to purchase it. The BOP currently does not have plans to centrally purchase more machines for other institutions. Rather, the BOP intends to rotate the machines among its institutions.

• Insufficient Cameras, Monitors, and Staff Available for Adequate Monitoring are Vulnerabilities. In several institutions, we observed and correctional officers told us that there were not enough cameras, monitors, and staff to thoroughly observe inmate visiting sessions. Several of the institutions we visited need to install additional cameras in the visiting rooms because the rooms' architecture, such as large pillars, creates blind spots that obstruct the view of BOP staff. Institutions also do not always have enough camera monitors for correctional officers to view what the cameras are recording. In addition to a lack of cameras and camera monitors, correctional officers at several institutions stated that not enough officers are available to view the camera monitors or roam the visiting rooms on busy visiting days. Institutions with adjacent "overflow" rooms for high-volume days do not always assign an additional officer to observe visiting activities in these overflow rooms.

        Staff

The BOP imposes no restrictions on the personal property BOP staff can bring into the institutions, does not search staff or their property when they enter for duty, and does not conduct random drug testing of staff. The BOP's interdiction activities to prevent drug smuggling by staff consist of background investigations, annual integrity training, and limited drug testing of certain staff. Background investigations are conducted prior to initial employment with the BOP and are updated every five years. In addition, the BOP conducts staff drug tests for pre-employment, post-accident, reasonable suspicion, and post-substance abuse treatment.

We found that these limited measures have not been effective. Drugs continue to enter the institutions through staff, as evidenced by the drug cases involving BOP staff investigated every year by the OIG and the FBI. While the number of staff who smuggle drugs into BOP institutions is small, they can do more damage to the safety and security of the institutions than visitors who smuggle drugs. When staff smuggle drugs, the amounts are often larger, they reach more inmates, and more money is involved. Additionally, smuggling may contribute to a reduction in trust among fellow staff and in public trust and confidence in the BOP. We believe that additional drug interdiction efforts targeted at staff are needed to reduce drugs in BOP institutions.

• Property is Unrestricted. The BOP does not restrict the size or content of personal property staff bring into the institutions even though BOP managers acknowledge employees are a primary drug entry point. Such restrictions on personal property are common in state correctional systems. At each BOP institution we visited, we observed staff bringing in duffle bags, briefcases, satchels, and large and small coolers. Institution managers, intelligence officers, and correctional officers expressed serious doubt about the effectiveness of the BOP's efforts to eliminate drugs from its institutions when they have no control over the property staff can bring inside.

• Searches are Rarely Conducted. The BOP conducts searches of staff only if it has reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing by a specific employee, such as suspicion that an employee is introducing or attempting to introduce contraband into an institution. However, BOP intelligence staff told us searches rarely occur because wardens fear charges of harassment and discrimination. Because the BOP does not either routinely or randomly search staff or their personal property, staff can easily hide drugs under their clothes or in the property they bring into the institutions without fear of detection. BOP staff told us that restrictions on the type and amount of personal property employees may bring into an institution, along with procedures for searching property and staff, would help deter drug smuggling. Also, FBI and OIG agents we interviewed who investigate BOP drug cases believed the lack of searches of staff and their property contribute to the staff's ability to smuggle drugs into BOP institutions. Several of the state correctional systems we surveyed routinely search staff and their property.

• Random Staff Drug Testing Has Not Been Implemented. We found that despite winning a federal court case in 1993 that permitted random drug testing of BOP staff, and the existence of a written BOP policy that requires drug testing, the BOP conducts no random drug tests of its staff.⁴ The majority of staff we interviewed at all levels (managers, supervisors, correctional officers, and drug treatment staff) support random drug testing of staff. The union representatives we interviewed also support random staff drug testing. As with other drug interdiction activities directed toward staff, random drug testing is common in both state and local correctional systems. Additionally, the Department of Justice's other components that have a law enforcement mission (such as the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshals Service, and OIG) conduct random drug tests on employees. When we inquired why random drug testing of BOP staff was not instituted, despite the court decision allowing and the BOP policy requiring it, BOP managers were unable to provide a clear reason why the BOP has not done so.

        Inmate Mail

Inmate mail is the third primary entry point for smuggling drugs into BOP institutions. The large volume of inmate mail, limited staff training, and inadequate drug detection technology present significant challenges for BOP staff to effectively detect drugs in inmate mail.

• More Controls are Needed for Incoming Mail. The BOP relies predominantly on manual inspections of mail, but mailroom staff believe these inspections cannot detect all drugs that may be hidden in incoming mail because of the high volume. Institution mailrooms process up to 3,000 pieces of mail daily, with double that amount or more on a Monday (because there is no mail delivery on weekends) and during holiday periods. Because the BOP imposes no restrictions on unsolicited mail (such as catalogues and other publications), which comprises 10 percent of the volume, the added workload further burdens mailroom staff, who must borrow correctional officers from other functions to assist in processing mail in a timely manner. Mailroom staff told us that additional policies are needed to limit the growing volume of unsolicited mail. For example, some state correctional systems, such as Connecticut, Illinois, and Oklahoma, restrict unsolicited advertisements and publications.

• Training and Technology are Not Adequate. Drugs may go undetected through all stages of mail inspection because of human error or inadequate technology. Mailroom staff told us that they need improved drug interdiction training to better inspect mail, including training to familiarize themselves with different types and forms of drugs and the methods used by inmates and outsiders to smuggle drugs. Mailroom staff also stated that new technology, such as ion spectrometry technology, is needed to help identify drugs concealed in mail.

Reducing Inmates' Demand for Drugs Through Drug Treatment

Demand reduction for drugs through drug abuse treatment for inmates is the second component of the BOP's drug interdiction strategy. However, this component of the strategy has not been implemented as effectively as it could be. We found that an insufficient number of BOP inmates receive drug treatment, partly because the BOP underestimates and inadequately tracks inmates' treatment needs. In addition, an important component of drug treatment, non-residential treatment, is not adequately provided at BOP institutions due to insufficient staffing, lack of policy guidance, and lack of incentives for inmates to seek drug treatment.

• Inmates' Drug Treatment Needs are Underestimated and Not Tracked. The BOP's Psychology Services Branch, which is responsible for the development, coordination, and monitoring of BOP drug treatment programs, has estimated that 34 percent of all federal inmates need drug treatment. However, this figure is outdated and we believe underrepresents the number of BOP inmates who need drug treatment. According to drug treatment staff at the institutions we visited and research by other organizations, such as the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, this estimate is too low. These staff and organizations reported that the percent of federal inmates with drug problems ranges from 50 to 80 percent. The BOP's 34 percent figure was derived from estimated survey data that was collected in 1994 rather than from actual, real-time diagnoses made at the institutions by psychologists and drug abuse treatment specialists. Therefore, we believe that substantially more BOP inmates need drug treatment than the BOP's official estimate.

  In addition, the BOP does not document all inmates' diagnoses or drug treatment needs in SENTRY, the automated database system that maintains an individual file on each inmate. Without this data, BOP cannot identify and track inmates with drug problems to encourage drug treatment and allocate resources properly.

• Non-Residential Drug Treatment is Not Always Available. The BOP states that non-residential (out-patient) treatment is a major component of its strategy to reduce inmates' demand for drugs. However, at five of the institutions we visited, non-residential treatment was limited or not available at all. Senior staff at these five institutions acknowledged that their drug treatment programs were inadequate. Further, the BOP's internal program reviews have reported ongoing deficiencies in institutions' provision of non-residential treatment. Non-residential drug treatment in BOP institutions should be part of a continuum of treatment for inmates and should be provided after drug abuse education and before residential drug treatment. Non-residential treatment is significant to the inmates' rehabilitation and is the only drug treatment available to BOP inmates in the general population while awaiting BOP residential drug placement. But because inmates are not eligible for BOP residential drug treatment until the last 3 years of their sentences, and because the average sentence is approximately 10 years, many inmates must wait 7 years or more for drug treatment. We believe that non-residential drug treatment should be provided in the interim. The BOP provides drug abuse education classes, but these are not an adequate substitute for drug treatment.

  We found that non-residential treatment is not always available because the BOP has not staffed its institutions with enough drug abuse treatment specialists to provide non-residential treatment and has not adequately emphasized non-residential treatment in its drug treatment policy. Finally, while drug abuse education classes and the residential drug abuse treatment program have incentives for completion and sanctions or consequences for non-completion, non-residential treatment does not have any incentives or sanctions. Because of the lack of incentives and sanctions, inmates do not readily volunteer to participate in non-residential drug treatment. The result is that not enough inmates participate in needed drug treatment programs.

Other Opportunities to Improve Drug Interdiction Activities

We reviewed other points of entry for drugs into BOP institutions - such as the receiving and discharge area, the warehouse, the rear gate, volunteers, and contractors - that BOP staff stated were also vulnerable to drug smuggling. Regarding the receiving and discharge area, the warehouse, and the rear gate, we concluded that better technology could supplement manual inspections for drugs by correctional officers. For volunteers and contractors, we concluded that information about their backgrounds could be more effectively shared among BOP institutions to assist institutions in their selection decisions. We also reviewed the role of institutions' intelligence staff in drug interdiction activities and concluded that rotation of the Special Investigative Supervisor (SIS) lieutenant is too frequent and that timely investigative and drug training for the SIS lieutenants is needed. We also reviewed the BOP's only canine unit at the USP Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, and concluded canine units could be a useful drug interdiction technique for other institutions. Canines trained specifically in drug detection can search for and detect drugs in all areas of the institutions where BOP currently has no drug detecting technology, such as the mailroom, the warehouse, the receiving and discharge area, the rear gate, and inmates' housing, work, and common areas.

Recommendations

Our report contains 15 recommendations to help improve the BOP's efforts to prevent drugs from entering its institutions. We recognize that no single interdiction activity or combination of activities may eliminate all drugs from entering BOP institutions, and not every technique may be necessary at every institution. But we believe the BOP should employ a variety of additional and improved interdiction activities. We made these recommendations based on our field work, our review of BOP policies and procedures, and our interviews with BOP staff and their experienced judgment of potential solutions to the drug problem in BOP institutions. We also reviewed information about drug interdiction activities conducted by several state correctional systems. We incorporated into our recommendations those state activities that we believe could be adopted by the BOP to supplement its existing interdiction activities.

Regarding inmate visits, we recommend the BOP consider restricting or eliminating contact visits for specific inmates or institutions based on an assessment of the inmate's history of drug use or drug smuggling in prison and the institution's overall drug problem. We also recommend the BOP consider implementing pat searches of visitors. The BOP also should invest in additional technology such as cameras, monitors, ion spectrometry technology, or other emerging drug detection technology to better screen and monitor visitors. Finally, the BOP should increase its staffing level in visiting rooms to ensure sufficient direct observation and monitoring of each visit.

Regarding BOP staff, we recommend the BOP implement policies to restrict the size and content of property staff bring into institutions. We also recommend that the BOP implement a policy regarding the searching of staff and their property when they enter BOP institutions, as well as implement random drug testing for staff.

Regarding mail, we recommend the BOP implement a policy restricting unsolicited mail. The BOP should provide additional training for staff to help them effectively search mail to detect drugs, and also should test mailroom drug detection technologies.

Regarding inmate drug treatment, we recommend that the BOP maintain in SENTRY complete drug treatment-related data for all inmates and use this data as a basis to better assess the drug treatment needs of inmates and to better allocate resources for drug treatment staff and programs. The BOP should implement additional non-residential treatment programs for inmates in the general population. The BOP should provide a curriculum for non-residential treatment and guidance regarding the minimum number of weeks and sessions. We also recommend the BOP implement incentives for participation in non-residential drug treatment and consequences for non-completion.

We also recommend that the BOP improve drug interdiction activities for the receiving and discharge area, the warehouse, the rear gate, volunteers, contractors, and institution intelligence operations. The BOP also should consider another pilot test of canines as a drug detection technique for its institutions.

We recognize that some of these recommendations may require additional funds, but we believe these efforts are needed to reduce the problem of drugs entering BOP institutions.

1. The BOP has specific administrative rules identifying prohibited inmate behavior. If an inmate violates any of these rules, the BOP issues a misconduct report. The prohibited behaviors are divided into four levels: 100, 200, 300, and 400, with the 100 level being the most serious. Four drug-related misconduct charges are listed as 100-level offenses: Refusing to Provide a Urine Sample; Introduction of Any Narcotics; Use of Any Narcotics; and, Possession of Any Narcotics. Across all security levels for the last five fiscal years, drug misconduct charges have comprised approximately 66 percent of all 100-level misconduct charges.

2. The exception are inmates found guilty of a misconduct related to visiting procedures or otherwise placed on visiting restrictions by the Disciplinary Hearing Officer.

3. Ion spectrometry technology detects the presence of microscopic traces of illegal drugs on persons and their clothing. Currently, approximately 40 BOP institutions have the technology.

4. American Federation of Government Employees, Council 33 v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1993); see also American Federation of Government Employees, Council 33 v. Reno, 1994 WL 22,4570 (N.D.Cal., May 16, 1994) (on remand).