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Independent Evaluation Pursuant to the Government Information Security Reform Act
Fiscal Year 2002
The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Inmate Telephone System II
Report No. 03-04
November 2002
Office of the Inspector General
Our review disclosed that security controls need improvement to fully protect the ITS II from unauthorized use, loss, or modification. Specifically we found vulnerabilities in the areas of life cycle; authorize processing; system security plan; personnel security; physical and environmental protection; production, input/output controls; contingency planning; hardware and systems software maintenance; data integrity; incident response capability; identification and authentication; logical access controls; and audit trails.
Management Controls |
VULNERABILITIES NOTED |
---|---|
Risk Management | |
Review of Security Controls | |
Life Cycle | X |
Authorize Processing (Certification and Accreditation) |
X |
System Security Plan | X |
As a result of testing management controls, we confirmed that controls were adequate for ITS II's risk management and review of security controls. Vulnerabilities were identified within the following management control areas:
Issue: Inadequate System Development Life Cycle (SDLC)
Condition:
The BOP has not incorporated security requirements into its ITS II SDLC procedures. During the acquisition and development phases of ITS II, the SDLC did not require the BOP to address security issues that may have arisen.
Cause:
The BOP ITS II management failed to fully implement its SDLC methodology.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D, Information Technology Security, states that components shall develop and implement a risk-based security process to provide security throughout the life cycle of all systems supporting their operations and assets.
Risk:
Without security requirements being outlined for the development and acquisition phases of the SDLC, complications in the development process can arise that could cause system vulnerabilities to be present in the final production system.
Recommendation:
Issue: Inadequate Change Control Procedures
Condition:
ITS II does not have adequate change control procedures in place to: (a) document certification testing activities, (b) update system documentation when security controls are added, (c) retest security controls, or (d) recertify the system after changes have been made.
Cause:
BOP management failed to fully implement the SDLC methodology.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D requires that a configuration management process be in place to maintain control of changes to any system.
Risk:
The absence of adequate change control procedures in the SDLC can lead to numerous complications if or when changes are made to ITS II. This can include system failures, system vulnerabilities, and other system flaws. In addition, any changes made for security purposes will not be documented.
Recommendation:
Issue: Operating Controls Not In Place
Condition:
Although ITS II was certified and accredited, we found that BOP management did not improve operating controls outlined in a security test and evaluation (ST&E) report completed by a contractor in June 2002. The report identified 13 areas of weaknesses and correlating recommendations for improving operating controls over ITS II. In addition, areas such as virus controls, password controls, and user level access controls outlined in a December 2000 certification statement as conditions for certification had not been met.
Cause:
BOP management did not update the system resources to fully improve security over the network.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D requires that each component shall evaluate their IT security programs and system protection mechanisms and report deficiencies to the Chief Information Officer annually.
Risk:
Without in-place controls operating as intended, ITS II is vulnerable to security breaches that could lead to a denial of service or a full compromise of the system.
Recommendation:
Issue: Rules of Behavior
Condition:
The BOP developed Rules of Behavior (BOP Directive 1237-12) that BOP approved to provide guidance on how to use BOP systems. BOP staff signed the Rules of Behavior; however, the ITS II contractor personnel have not. Therefore, contractor personnel are not necessarily aware of the BOP's procedures and guidelines for administering and operating ITS II.
Cause:
BOP management did not follow Department procedures requiring contractor's acknowledgement of the Rules of Behavior document.
Criteria:
NIST SP 800-18, A Guide For Developing Private Security Plans For Information Technology, states that a set of Rules of Behavior must be established for each system and should be made available to every user prior to receiving authorization for access to the system. It is recommended that the rules contain a signature page for each user to acknowledge receipt.
Risk:
Contractor personnel not signing the Rules of Behavior document could have several negative effects. For example, users could potentially find themselves in a situation where they are unsure of how to act given the circumstances and could choose an action that goes against the BOP policy. Additionally, the BOP could be unable to hold contractors and vendors accountable for their actions should they affect the BOP or ITS II negatively.
Recommendation:
Issue: Security Plan
Condition:
While the BOP has developed a system security plan for ITS II, BOP did not address critical elements. For example, the BOP has not incorporated all aspects of NIST SP 800-18, into the security plan. In addition, the plan for ITS II was not incorporated into the BOP's overall strategic information resources management (IRM) plan.
Cause:
The current system security plan was developed by the main ITS II contractor, and was based on the contractor's standards, not those of the BOP or the Department.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Section 5 states: "Components shall ensure the certification and accreditation of all systems under their operational control.
Risk:
Without incorporating NIST SP 800-18 standards into the security plan and not incorporating the security plan into the BOP's overall strategic plan could result in aspects of the security plan being incomplete or not in accordance with overall BOP security guidelines. This could lead to a less secure system overall.
Recommendation:
Operational Controls |
Vulnerabilities Noted |
---|---|
Personnel Security | X |
Physical and Environmental Protection | X |
Production, Input/Output Controls | X |
Contingency Planning | X |
Hardware and Systems Software Maintenance | X |
Data Integrity | X |
Documentation | |
Security Awareness, Training, and Education | |
Incident Response Capability | X |
Our testing confirmed that operational controls were adequate within the areas of documentation and security awareness, training, and education for ITS II. However, our testing also identified vulnerabilities within other critical areas of operational controls. The specific details identifying these vulnerabilities are listed below.
Issue: Segregation of Duties
Condition:
Currently, the BOP system administration and system security responsibilities are not adequately separated to ensure least privilege and individual accountability. In addition, different individuals do not always perform distinct systems support functions.
Cause:
According to BOP personnel, due to staff constraints, system maintenance, user maintenance, and security and network administration activities all fall under one person for the BOP and one person for the contractor. In addition, staffing constraints have resulted in one person acting as both a maintenance manager and a researcher and developer.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D, Chapter 2, Section 23 (a) and (c), states: "Department IT systems shall have assignment and segregation of system responsibilities defined and documented…. At a minimum, there shall be a clearly defined role for a security administrator and a system administrator." Additionally, "Controls [compliant with Department access control policies] shall be in place to ensure that the user [and administrators] has access to only the resources required to accomplish their duties and no more."
Risk:
Tasking the same individuals to be responsible for development, system administration, and security administration could potentially allow an individual to commit fraudulent activity and "cover-up" his/her tracks without the BOP detecting the activity. In addition, individuals could potentially implement "backdoors" that would allow access once the individual has left the BOP.
Recommendation:
Issue: Hiring, Transfer, and Termination Documentation
Condition:
Not all BOP ITS II security staff and contractor personnel are aware of the BOP's user account maintenance policy, which provides procedures for how to handle ITS II user accounts when employees are hired, transferred or terminated.
Cause:
According to the BOP security staff, the policy had not been communicated to them or ITS II contractor personnel.
Criteria:
BOP Directive 1237-11, states: "Users shall be trained in protection of computer hardware, software, and information. This includes all persons employed by or working with the Department of Justice receiving direct or indirect compensation or none at all (Public Health Service staff, contractors, volunteers, interns, persons representing or detailed from other Government agencies, etc.). They shall be made thoroughly aware of security and contingency plans for systems they use."
Risk: Without the awareness of the documented procedures for user account maintenance, accounts may be added to the ITS II without authorized approval and accounts of employees that have transferred or been terminated may not be removed in a timely manner.
Recommendation:
Issue: Physical Access
Condition:
The BOP does not have adequate physical security controls in place for ITS II. The ST&E report identified physical security weaknesses relating to 13 areas under NIST SP 800-26, which are being used for this GISRA review. These deficiencies included weaknesses in areas such as physical access to ITS II systems (routers, switches, and wiring closets), documentation of employee access to sensitive areas, reporting of suspicious activities, unauthorized viewing of computer monitors, and fire suppression and prevention.
Cause:
The BOP security management has not taken all appropriate steps to meet the Department and BOP requirements for physical security.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D, states: "Department IT systems shall be physically protected commensurate with the highest classification or sensitivity of the information." In addition, BOP Directive 1237-11 Section 5 also outlines requirements for physical security.
Risk:
Without adequate physical security controls, unauthorized physical access to ITS II can be obtained and damage can be done to the systems. In addition, the systems may not be properly protected from disaster events such as fires and floods.
Recommendation:
Issue: Sensitive Media
Condition:
To date, the BOP did not develop documented procedures for handling sensitive media. No formal process has been established to ensure that only authorized individuals can pick up, receive, or deliver input and output information and media. In addition, no documented process has been established to ensure adequate audit trails are used and maintained for inventory management, and labeling of sensitive media.
Cause:
According to BOP, an inadequate number of trained security personnel are on the ITS II security team to handle the associated responsibilities for developing the formal policies and procedure for handling sensitive media and perform the daily tasks required to maintain a secure computing environment.
Criteria:
BOP Directive 1237.11, states: "Be responsible for security of individual and shared office space containing computers, sensitive printouts, and electronic storage devices/media…. Take reasonable precautions to avoid loss of or damage to Government property and information."
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 19, states: "Department IT systems shall: maintain an audit trail of activity sufficient to reconstruct security relevant events."
Risk:
Without these procedures in place, unauthorized individuals could potentially gain access to sensitive BOP data. The lack of adequate audit trails for inventory management could also allow someone with access to the BOP hardware and software to either accidentally or intentionally misplace system components. In addition, contractor staff may not be made aware of the BOP's procedures for handling sensitive media once they have been created.
Recommendation:
Issue: Contingency Plan Implementation
Condition:
The current BOP contingency plan has not been distributed to all ITS II personnel. In addition, the current contingency plan for ITS II is not periodically tested and ITS II staff have not been trained in their roles and responsibilities concerning the contingency plan.
Cause:
The BOP ITS II management have not distributed the contingency plan to appropriate BOP personnel. The BOP management does not know if the plan has been distributed to the vendor's (Dyncorp) personnel.
Criteria:
BOP Directive 1237-11, states: "Users shall be trained in protection of computer hardware, software, and information…. They shall be made thoroughly aware of security and contingency plans for systems they use."
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 1 Section 9, states: "Components shall plan for how they will perform their missions in the event their IT systems are unavailable and how they will recover these IT systems in the event of loss or failure. Components shall:…. Test contingency/business resumption plans annually or as soon as possible after a significant change to the environment that would alter the in-place assessed risk."
Risk:
By not properly distributing the contingency plan, the BOP's security staff may not be fully informed with the plan's details, and contractor staff may not be aware of the appropriate steps to take should a system recovery become necessary. Not testing the plan could allow deficiencies or weaknesses in the plan to go unnoticed for correction until an actual emergency situation. This also leaves the BOP personnel unfamiliar with the steps to take in the event of a disaster and unaware of who is responsible for completing each step as outlined in the plan.
Recommendation:
Issue: Security Configuration
Condition:
The ITS II operating systems were not properly configured to prevent circumvention of the security software and application controls. We observed weak passwords on ITS II (Windows NT administrator level accounts with passwords set to the account name and administrator level accounts without passwords), and numerous vulnerabilities were identified by the contractor in its ST&E report. We also identified numerous vulnerabilities in ITS II diagnostic reviews. In addition, the default settings of security features for ITS II are not as restrictive as possible (Windows NT systems allowed enumeration of users, file permissions were not restrictive, and Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) community strings were weak).
Cause:
These conditions exist due to the lack of a formal configuration standard for the ITS II system.
Criteria:
DOJ 2640.2D CHAPTER 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:.… Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Without properly configured security settings on operating systems, attackers can compromise the ITS II.
Recommendation:
Issue: Integrity and Validation Controls
Condition:
Currently, the integrity and validation controls for the ITS II are not adequate. No Intrusion Detection System (IDS) has been installed on ITS II and no integrity verification programs are being used.
Cause:
The BOP does not have policy on the use of an IDS and integrity verification programs. Additionally, the BOP lacks policy on system penetration testing.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:.… Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
The lack of these controls creates an inability to ensure data integrity and to validate data. This could potentially cause BOP to be vulnerable to unauthorized data modifications. The lack of an IDS also leaves administrators without the benefit of advanced notice of unusual network or system activity. Without the warning an IDS can provide, it is more difficult to respond effectively to suspicious activity.
Recommendation:
Issue: Incident Handling
Condition:
In reviewing ITS II, we found the BOP's response, handling, and support procedures for security incidents are not adequate. BOP does not have a formal incident response capability implemented and information concerning incidents does not appear to be disseminated to appropriate personnel or organizations.
Cause:
The BOP does not have a policy addressing incident handling and response, or that addresses how personnel shall be trained to respond.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 1 Section 5, states: "For SBU systems, security incidents that meet the criteria established by the DOJ Computer Emergency Response Team (DOJCERT) shall be reported by the component to DOJCERT within time frames established by DOJCERT. For classified systems, the component shall immediately report to the Department Security Officer (DSO) any incident involving the loss, compromise, or other event affecting the security of a classified system."
Risk:
Incidents that the BOP may encounter run the risk of not being properly handled. The correct or appropriate resolution may not be reached and responsible individuals may not be informed of the incident. Also, by not sharing incident information with other organizations, a common attack or virus outbreak with a known resolution will not be as easily solved for BOP or other affected organizations.
Recommendation:
Technical Controls |
VULNERABILITIES NOTED |
---|---|
Identification and Authentication | X* |
Logical Access Controls | X* |
Audit Trails | X |
X* | Significant vulnerability in which risk was noted as high. A high-risk vulnerability is defined as one where extremely grave circumstances can occur by allowing a remote or local attacker to violate the security protection of a system through user or root account access, gaining complete control of a system and compromising critical information. |
Issue: Password Management
A password is a unique string of characters that must be provided before a logon or access is authorized to a computer system. Passwords are security measures used to restrict logons to user accounts and access to computer systems and resources. The BOP password controls were found to be inadequate.
Condition:
Cause:
These vulnerabilities occurred because BOP management did not enforce compliance with Department password policies and procedures.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D requires the Department's IT systems to implement eight-character password composed of at least three of the following: English uppercase, English lower case, numeric, and special characters. In addition, the Department's IT systems should comply with Department password management policy (DOJ-TS-001).
Risk:
Without strong password management controls, the BOP increases the risk that unauthorized persons could access sensitive ITS II resources, exposing information to unauthorized use, loss, or modification.
Recommendation:
Issue: Access Controls
Condition:
We found logical access controls were inadequate for restricting user activities and network access. On the network, insecure protocols are being used with the router, no formal procedures exist for changing vendor-supplied default security parameters, idle sessions are not disconnected, and no formal policy or procedures exist for firewalls.
Cause:
The BOP management did not develop documented policy and procedures dictating the implementation and use of access control software for the prevention of fraudulent activity.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:.… Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Without access controls in place, BOP management is unable to prevent an individual from committing fraud.
Recommendation:
Issue: User Authentication and Access
Condition:
User authentication and access is not properly controlled on the ITS II network. Specifically:
Cause:
The ITS II management did not have documented procedures for monitoring access scripts with embedded passwords, disabling inactive user accounts, handling lost or compromised passwords, replacing vendor-supplied passwords, service and administrator accounts with weak passwords, and data owners ability to review access authorizations so that only individuals with a need to know can access files.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to: … Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Without periodic review of access permissions, it is possible that individuals without a legitimate need may gain access to sensitive information.
Recommendation:
Issue: Server Configuration
Condition:
Cause:
The BOP management did not develop documented procedures regarding the implementation of the system key utility. In addition, services such as LocalSystem, in "interactive" mode, and "spooler" are running on the server.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:…. Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
NIST Interagency Reports (NISTIR) 5153 Section 3.2.2, states: "Each resource delivered with the system shall have the most restrictive access rights possible to permit the intended use of that resource."
Risk:
These services pose a risk to the system in that many are known to either present system users' information or have known vulnerabilities.
Recommendation:
Issue: Networking Controls
Networking controls access the system from the network. These controls are a front-line defense for the system against intruders.
Condition:
Specifically, we found:
Cause:
The BOP management did not develop documented procedures for networking controls.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:.… Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Without formal networking control procedures, ITS II user logon information is vulnerable in the event of an unauthorized user gaining access to the system.
Recommendation:
Issue: User and Group Management Controls
Management of users and groups is key to controlling access to the system. Proper user and group management can help to enhance overall system security.
Condition: Specifically, we found:
Cause:
The ITS II management lack procedures for renaming the administrator and guest accounts and assigning strong passwords. In addition, account activity is not being reviewed on a regular basis.
Criteria:
NISTIR 5153 Section 3.2.2, states: "Each resource delivered with the system shall have the most restrictive access rights possible to permit the intended use of that resource."
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to: … Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) 1237.11, Information Security Programs, Section 6, Paragraph b, regarding Movement of Personnel, states: "A new user ID shall be issued at a staff member's new duty station. The ISO at the transferring location shall disable the old user ID within one working day of the employee's departure and delete the ID within 30 days. For a SENTRY ID that cannot be created at the new duty station, use procedures prescribed in c.(3), following. On the UNICOR MCS system, the old user ID shall be permanently disabled, rather than deleted. For all involuntary separations and home duty assignments, the departing employee's access to all computer systems shall be immediately disabled and his/her supervisor or the ISO shall confiscate accessible media. For routine voluntary permanent separations, the employee's access shall be terminated no later than one working day following departure."
Risk:
Without the existence of the /etc/ftpusers file, any user listed in the /etc/passwd file can transfer files across the network. This increases the risk that unauthorized files are transferred across the network. In addition, the 'Administrator' account is known to exist on all Windows NT systems. Consequently, it is among the first accounts that an intruder will attempt to use. The 'Administrator' account on Windows NT has all system rights and therefore should be the most protected account on the system. If the account is not renamed, an attacker would only have to guess the password. Depending on other system settings, this might be easy to achieve in a relatively short period of time without being detected.
Recommendation:
Issue: Account Integrity Management
A system administrator manages user and account rights to ensure that account information conforms to system security policy. A system of user rights and advanced user rights control account integrity. User rights define what a user can do on the system. These rights may include the right to logon directly at a computer (local logon) or the right to logon to a computer over the network (remote logon). Advanced user rights are reserved for users involved in programming efforts.
Typically, administrators can create two types of accounts-user and group accounts. A user account belongs to one person only; rights assigned affect only that account. A group account is a collection of users with common rights. In addition, to maintain account integrity, users must be clearly identified on the system in order to track their use of system resources. Account integrity is also strengthened by renaming Administrator and Guest accounts to make them unidentifiable to unauthorized users and making sure that users can be clearly identified in order to track their use of system resources.
Condition:
Specifically, we found:
Cause:
The BOP management did not develop a documented user rights assignment policy.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:…. Enable the use of resources such as data and programs necessary to fulfill job responsibilities and no more."
Risk:
Without policy and procedures in place for account integrity management, ITS II is exposed to attacks from unauthenticated users.
Recommendation:
Issue: File System Access
Access to the file system can be controlled at the group or user level. Inappropriate settings for file system access can leave sensitive system information vulnerable to unauthorized disclosure or modifications.
Condition:
Specifically, we found:
Cause:
The BOP security management did not develop documented procedures for exporting and sharing users' directories.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:…. Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Without ITS II procedures in place, NFS directories exported to everyone can be mounted by any remote user without authentication. An attacker does not need to actually break into a remote system. Instead, all that is necessary is to mount a file system via NFS.
Recommendation:
Issue: Maintenance Controls
For purposes of the operating system server review, maintenance controls relate to standard user profiles and the use of password protected screen savers and login warning banners.
Condition:
Cause:
The BOP management currently is not following policy regarding password protected screen savers and system warning banners.
Criteria:
FBOP 1237.11, 6.h.2 states: "All personal computers designated as sensitive systems or "STAFF ONLY" shall have software that will, after a specified period of keyboard inactivity, blank the display and require a password for further access. The maximum time of inactivity shall be 10 minutes. All Novell or Windows NT workstations shall use software requiring the network password. This shall be adequate for a staff member to leave a workstation unattended for a short period. The Bureau standard, related requirements, and exceptions are stated in the previous subsection."
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 20, states: "All Department IT systems shall implement a system banner that provides warnings: to employees that accessing the system constitutes consent to system monitoring for law enforcement and other purposes; and to unauthorized users that their use of the system may subject them to criminal prosecution and/or criminal or civil penalties."
Risk:
By not enabling the Windows NT screen saver with password protection, risk is increased that the server will be exposed to unauthorized access when left unattended. BOP's ability to prosecute criminals may be impacted by the BOP's ability to prove they abused BOP systems with the knowledge these systems were supposed to be used only for official purposes. Also, it is a good practice to proactively inform users that they are subject to audit.
Recommendation:
Issue: NT Registry Settings
A registry is a database used by the Windows NT operating to store configuration information. Most Windows applications write data to the registry, at least during installation.
Condition:
Cause:
The ITS II management did not develop documented standard configuration policy for securing Windows NT registry settings.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:.… Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
By not having the registry keys set to their most secure setting, the system is vulnerable to misuse and overall system security is weakened.
Recommendations:
Issue: Security Patches
Security patches contain update information for the operating system that correct bugs or vulnerabilities in the software.
Condition:
The operating system software is not kept up to date with respect to security patches.
Cause:
The ITS II management has not developed documented procedures for updating computer security patches.
Criteria:
NIST SP 800-13 Section 5.10, Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications Management Network, states: "All new software features and patches shall be tested first on a development system and approved by an appropriate testing organization, prior to installation on an operational system. Tests that modify live data shall not be performed. A risk analysis shall be conducted of proposed software changes to determine their impact on network element (NE) security. Any changes to security features or security defaults shall be documented and made available to the user before the software is distributed."
Risk:
If the version of the operating system and the security patches are not current, there is an increased risk that an unauthorized user may be able to exploit weaknesses.
Recommendation:
Issue: Router Configuration
Condition:
Cause:
The ITS II management has not properly configured the Cisco router.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:…. Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Without properly configuring the Cisco router, attackers can potentially gain access to unauthorized portions of the network.
Recommendation:
Issue: Fail-over Capabilities
Fail-over is hardware or software backup to which the system switches to in the event of a failure.
Condition:
The Cisco's fail-over capabilities are not in place.
Cause:
The BOP ITS II security management did not develop documented configuration standards for securing BOP's Cisco routers. In addition, Cisco's hot standby router protocol (HSRP) fail-over capability has not been implemented on the router.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to:…. Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Cisco internet operating system (IOS) and hardware offers advanced fail-over capabilities in case of hardware or software failure. Mission critical routers (typically core routers) may be good candidates to take advantage of the Cisco fail-over capabilities.
Recommendation:
Issue: Command Line Access
Information on the router configuration can be retrieved or entered via command-line access.
Condition:
Cause:
The BOP management did not develop documented configuration standards for securing BOP's Cisco routers.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2 Section 16, states: "Access controls shall be in place and operational for all Department IT systems to: Protect the system, its data and applications, from unauthorized disclosure, modification, or erasure."
Risk:
Allowing anyone on the network access to the login prompt increases the risk of unauthorized access to the router.
Recommendation:
Issue: Activity Logs
Condition:
System activities are not adequately logged and reviewed on a regular basis on the BOP ITS II system.
Cause:
The ITS II management did not develop procedures for collecting, reviewing and archiving activity logs.
Criteria:
DOJ Order 2640.2D Chapter 2, Section 19, states: "Department IT systems shall:
Risk:
Insufficient logging will result in the lack of an audit trail in the event of unauthorized access or use. Insufficient reviewing of audit logs will result in administrators not being alerted to any unauthorized activity as early as possible. Also, with good logging and monitoring, administrators are often given early warnings for hardware and software errors or problems.
Recommendation:
CONCLUSION
Our review disclosed that security controls need improvement to fully protect the ITS II from unauthorized use, loss, or modification. Specifically, we found security vulnerabilities in the areas of life cycle, authorize processing, system security plan, personnel security, physical and environmental protection, production, input/output controls, contingency planning, hardware and systems software maintenance, data integrity, incident response capability, identification and authentication, logical access controls, and audit trails.
We concluded that these vulnerabilities occurred because BOP management did not fully develop, document, or enforce agency-wide policies in accordance with current Department policies and procedures. Additionally, the Department did not enforce its security policies and procedures to ensure the ITS II was protected from unauthorized use, loss, or modification through its certification and accreditation process.