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An Investigation of the Belated Production of Documents
in the Oklahoma City Bombing Case

March 19, 2002
Office of the Inspector General

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

  1. Background
  2. OIG Investigation and Report
    1. Staffing and Investigative Process
    2. Organization of this Report

CHAPTER TWO: DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT IN THE FBI

  1. The FBI Field Structure
  2. Documents and Other Physical Items
  3. Document Processing in the Field Offices
  4. The OKBOMB Task Force
    1. Document Processing at the Task Force
    2. Automated Case Support

CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE BELATED PRODUCTION OF DISCOVERABLE ITEMS

  1. Discovery
    1. Federal Discovery Rules
    2. OKBOMB Discovery Agreement
    3. Discovery Process
    4. Task Force Attempts to Obtain Discoverable Material From the Field
  2. Number and Description of Belated Documents
  3. Causes of the Belated Documents: The Field Offices
    1. Field Office Explanations
    2. Did the Field Offices Fail to Send Material to the Task Force?
      1. Originals
      2. Airtels
    3. Reasons Why OKBOMB Materials Were Not Sent to the Task Force
      1. Use of Teletypes Rather than FD-302s and Inserts
      2. Resident Agencies
      3. Leads Generated from Auxiliary Offices
      4. Confidential Informant Files
      5. Non-Pertinent Information
      6. Failure to Respond Properly to OKBOMB Task Force Teletypes in 1995-1997
      7. Other Incidents Involving Discovery Problems
  4. Causes of the Belated Documents: The OKBOMB Task Force
    1. Did the Task Force Receive Documents from the Field that the Task Force Failed to Disclose to the Defense?
      1. Belated Documents Found in the OKBOMB Files
      2. Airtels
      3. Copies Found in the Field Offices
    2. Indicia of Problems with Document Management at the Task Force
    3. Reasons Why Items May Have Arrived at the Task Force But Not Been Disclosed to the Defense
      1. Complex Paperflow System
      2. Temporary Duty Personnel
      3. Computer Systems
        1. FOIMS computer system lacked document management capabilities
        2. ACS
        3. Transition to ACS
        4. Other information management systems and quality control measures
          1. Rapid Start Information Management System
          2. ZyIndex
  5. Did the Government Intentionally Withhold Exculpatory Evidence from the Defense During 1995-1997?
    1. Evidence Showing Lack of Intent to Conceal Exculpatory Information
    2. OIG Investigation of Defense Claims
      1. Defense Exhibit 9
      2. Defense Exhibit 10
      3. Defense Exhibit 11
      4. Defense Exhibit 12
      5. Defense Exhibit 13
      6. Defense Exhibit 14
      7. Defense Exhibits 16 and 17
      8. Defense Exhibit 19
    3. Ricardo Ojeda Documents
  6. OIG Analysis

CHAPTER FOUR: EVENTS OF 2000-2001

  1. Chronology
    1. The Archival Process Begins
    2. January 2001: Field Offices Send Material to Oklahoma City
    3. January 30, 2001, Electronic Communication from Richmond to Field Offices
    4. White, Teater, and Defenbaugh Reactions to News about the Potential Problem
    5. February 2001
      1. Reviewing the Field Office Materials
      2. Reactions to the February Review Process
    6. March 2001
      1. White and Defenbaugh Travel to Oklahoma City
      2. Richmond Sends Another Electronic Communication to the Field
      3. Communications with Oklahoma City SAC and FBI Headquarters
      4. Vernon Tells White about Buffalo Documents
    7. April 2001: The Review Process Continues
    8. May 2001: Notification of Prosecutors, FBI Headquarters, and Department of Justice
      1. Monday, May 7, 2001
      2. Tuesday, May 8, 2001
      3. Wednesday, May 9, 2001
      4. Thursday, May 10, 2001
    9. Court Proceedings
  2. OIG Analysis
    1. Danny Defenbaugh
    2. Mark White
    3. William Teater
    4. Richard Marquise
    5. Peggy Richmond and Linda Vernon

CHAPTER FIVE: FBI HEADQUARTERS' ACTIONS AFTER LEARNING OF THE BELATED DOCUMENTS

  1. Chronology of FBI Headquarters' Actions
    1. Baltimore Sends Material to Oklahoma City, and FBI Headquarters Learns that Field Offices Continue to Possess OKBOMB Materials
    2. May 11, 2001, EC: Headquarters Instructs the Field to Conduct Another Search for OKBOMB Material
    3. May 12, 2001, EC: Headquarters Demands Explanations from the Field
    4. May 16, 2001: Telephone Call by the FBI Deputy Director to All FBI SACs
    5. Additional Telephone Calls from Headquarters
    6. May 18, 2001, EC
    7. FBI Analysis of the "Second Wave" Materials
  2. OIG Analysis

CHAPTER SIX: RESPONSES BY FIELD OFFICES TO 2000-2001 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

  1. Field Office Failures to Respond Properly to Leads
    1. Inaccurate Responses
      1. Baltimore, Maryland Field Office
      2. Columbia, South Carolina Field Office
      3. New York City, New York Field Office
      4. Denver, Colorado Field Office
      5. Newark, New Jersey Field Office
      6. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Field Office
    2. Inaccurate Responses to the May 12, 2001, Electronic Communication
    3. Failure to Respond Adequately to Leads
    4. Untimely Responses
    5. OIG Analysis
  2. Destruction of Documents
    1. Destruction Policies
    2. Destruction of OKBOMB Documents by Field Offices
    3. Columbia Division's Missing Documents

CHAPTER SEVEN: OIG RECOMMENDATIONS

  1. Information Management
    1. Commitment to Automation and Focus on Information Management
    2. Simplification of Record Keeping
    3. A User Friendly and Reliable System
    4. Tracking Information
    5. Retrieving Information
    6. Integrated Databases
  2. Training
  3. Other Recommendations
    1. Leads
    2. Lead Tracking
    3. Temporary Duty Personnel
    4. Administrative File Reviews
    5. IMAs (Rotors)
    6. Post-Case Review
    7. Development of Protocols
    8. Destruction of Documents

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

APPENDIX: Not Available Electronically